The Republic of Somaliland’s quest for international recognition and potential claims against Somalia represent a complex tapestry of historical, legal, and geopolitical factors. As the region navigates ongoing tensions and diplomatic maneuvers, Somaliland’s case for independence and compensation has garnered increasing attention on the global stage.
The roots of the current situation stretch back to the colonial era when Somaliland existed as a British protectorate from 1884 to 1960. In contrast, Somalia was under Italian rule during this period. On June 26, 1960, Somaliland gained independence from Britain, only to join with the former Italian Somalia five days later to form the Somali Republic – and in preparation for what was to be called the Greater Somali Republic uniting all Somali-inhabited territories.
Until 1960, Somaliland and Somalia had no shared history or interaction. The period from 1960 to 1991 was the only time they were forcibly united, without Somaliland’s full consent—the senior partner in that union.
Crucially, a Somaliland legislature or a signature by its leaders ever ratified the Act of Union that Somalia claims formalized this merger, creating a significant legal ambiguity that underlies much of the current debate. The subsequent years saw the rise of Siad Barre’s dictatorship in Somalia, which ruled from 1969 to 1991. Barre’s regime was particularly oppressive towards Somaliland, culminating in a brutal civil war that left deep scars on the region.
Early Signs of Discord: The 1961 Referendum and Coup Attempt
The seeds of Somaliland’s discontent with the union were sown almost immediately after its formation. Two pivotal events in 1961 clearly demonstrated the region’s early misgivings about the merger with Somalia, foreshadowing the decades of conflict and separation to come.
In June 1961, a constitutional referendum was held to ratify the provisional constitution of the Somali Republic. The results of this referendum are telling: while the south overwhelmingly approved the constitution, the northern regions (former British Somaliland) largely rejected it. Since the fate of the then northern regions was to be decided in the referendum, the relatively more populous south should not have been allowed to vote.
This stark regional divide in the referendum results clearly indicated that the people of Somaliland were far from unified in their support for the union. The low turnout and near-even split in votes suggested significant reservations about the merger and the new constitutional arrangement.
Perhaps even more revealing of Somaliland’s dissatisfaction was the attempted co
up that occurred in December 1961, mere months after the referendum. A group of Somaliland military officers, led by Hassan Kayd Walanwal, staged an uprising in Hargeisa, the capital of the former British Somaliland.
The coup plotters aimed to dissolve the union and restore Somaliland’s independence. While the attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, it highlighted the depth of discontent among Somalilanders with the new political arrangement. The swift emergence of this separatist sentiment, less than two years after the union’s formation, is a crucial piece of historical evidence supporting Somaliland’s case for independence.
The coup attempt was quickly suppressed by forces loyal to the central government in Mogadishu, but its occurrence sent a clear message about the fragility of the union and the distinct political aspirations of the Somaliland region.
Both the referendum results and the attempted coup of 1961 serve as critical historical markers in Somaliland’s narrative of independence. They demonstrate that from the very outset of the union, there was significant opposition to the merger among Somalilanders. These events provide historical context for Somaliland’s current claims, showing that the desire for self-determination has deep roots, predating even the atrocities of the Barre regime.
In the context of international law and the principle of self-determination, these early expressions of dissent strengthen Somaliland’s argument that the union was problematic from its inception. They offer concrete evidence that the merger was not universally embraced by the people of Somaliland, lending weight to the argument that the region’s current push for recognition is not merely a recent development, but the culmination of a long-standing desire for independence.
Unconscionable Brutality
The Siad Barre regime’s oppression of Somaliland reached unconscionable levels of brutality, particularly targeting the Isaaq clan. At the height of this campaign, there is evidence of a systematic attempt to eradicate the Isaaq people entirely. This genocidal intent is starkly illustrated by a chilling communiqué from the era.
A letter, written by the commanding military ruler of the northern regions (as Somaliland was then designated) – dubbed the ‘Letter of Death’, addressed to his father-in-law, President Siad Barre, proposed a horrifying strategy. The memo (parts of which are shown below) outlined a plan to arm clans allied with the military regime, pitting them against the Isaaq. In a macabre incentive, these clans were to be promised the lands of the Isaaq as a reward for their participation in what amounted to ethnic cleansing.
This document serves as damning evidence of the regime’s willingness to orchestrate mass atrocities and demographic engineering in its attempt to crush Somaliland’s spirit and any aspirations for self-determination. The planned obliteration of an entire clan group underscores the depths of the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Barre regime. It provides a stark illustration of why many in Somaliland view a return to union with Somalia as both untenable and deeply traumatic. It appears, though, that the remnants of that regime – left unpunished – interpret the gesture as a weakness on the part of Somaliland, and that misdeeds are not laid aside at the moment but forgotten and unrecorded. Groups and movements are rallying around false causes to try for another kill – this time joined openly by countries that approved but did not conspicuously come to the open in the ‘kill but the crows’ ’80s.
Following the collapse of Barre’s government, Somaliland unilaterally declared independence on May 18, 1991. Since then, it has functioned as a de facto independent state, complete with its own government, currency, and democratic institutions.
Principles of Self-Determination
Self-determination is a principle deeply embedded in international law, enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reinforced by various human rights instruments. The legal framework surrounding self-determination provides a crucial foundation for assessing claims of statehood, particularly in the context of the Republic of Somaliland’s aspirations. The Montevideo Convention outlines criteria for statehood, including a defined territory and a permanent population with which Somaliland complies. Moreover, the examination of past United Nations initiatives, like the Council for Namibia, demonstrates that international law can support the legitimacy of aspiring states in their quests for recognition and self-governance. Somaliland’s claim for independence thus aligns with these established principles, underscoring a pathway not only to statehood but also to potential reparations for enduring injustices.
Furthermore, Somaliland boasts internationally recognized boundaries with all its neighbouring countries—Somalia, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. In contrast, Somalia lacks such clearly defined borders. Its only internationally recognized boundary is with Somaliland and Kenya. Somalia shares only a dotted, provincial line with Ethiopia—the longest of the three borders.
Additional Arguments for Somaliland
Somaliland’s case for independence rests on several key legal pillars. First and foremost is the unratified nature of the 1960 union, which provides a strong argument that the merger was never legally binding in the first place. This is bolstered by the principle of self-determination under international law, particularly given Somaliland’s distinct colonial history and its current de facto independence.
The region’s effective self-governance since 1991 further strengthens its case, demonstrating its capacity to function as an independent state. Historical precedents, such as the dissolution of other voluntary unions like Senegambia and Egypt-Syria, offer additional support for Somaliland’s position.
Moreover, the human rights violations committed by the Barre regime against Somaliland’s population could be grounds for arguing that the union was invalidated by these actions, providing both a moral and legal basis for separation. More than 200 000 people either died or were maimed or were never accounted for dead or alive and more than 300 000 more fled the aerial bombardments and indiscriminate massacres of the army. At least two of its major cities were left in shambles.
2005 AU Mission Findings
A significant milestone in Somaliland’s quest for recognition came in 2005 when the African Union (AU) sent a fact-finding mission to the region. The mission’s report acknowledged several key points that lend credence to Somaliland’s case.
The AU mission recognized that Somaliland’s situation was unique and did not fit the typical narrative of secession. They noted the region’s relative stability and functioning governance structures, starkly contrasting the ongoing instability in much of Somalia. The mission also acknowledged Somaliland’s distinct colonial history and the circumstances surrounding the 1960 union.
While stopping short of explicitly endorsing independence, the mission suggested that the AU should “find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case,” indicating a recognition of Somaliland’s unique status and the need for a tailored approach to resolving the dispute.
Shared Resources and Economic Claims
Beyond the question of independence, Somaliland has potential grounds for significant economic claims against Somalia. These include compensation for shared natural resources, particularly oil and gas reserves in disputed border regions, as well as maritime resources such as fishing rights and potential offshore deposits.
Somaliland could also seek compensation for historically shared infrastructure developed during the union period, a share of international aid and debt relief provided to Somalia as a whole, and damages for economic opportunities lost due to lack of international recognition.
Recent Developments and Threats
The situation has been further complicated by recent developments. In January 2024, Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Ethiopia, granting Ethiopia access to the Red Sea in exchange for potential recognition. This move has escalated tensions with Somalia.
In response, Somalia’s Foreign Minister, Ma’allin Fiqi, has reportedly made threats regarding regional destabilization and support for insurgents against Ethiopia. These statements could potentially strengthen Somaliland’s case, serving as evidence of Somalia’s hostility and unwillingness to peacefully resolve the dispute. The same Fiqi also openly admitted to how Somalia bankrolled and militarily supported the Las Anod insurgency – which has since then become a no-man’s land and a haven for extremists and Shabab training camps. He said Somalia wished to derail an international momentum leading to a possible formal recognition of the Republic of Somaliland sooner than they expected which obviously scared the frail Mogadishu administration.
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International Aid and Unintended Consequences
A critical yet often overlooked aspect of the Somaliland-Somalia dispute is the role of international aid and peacekeeping efforts. While intended to promote stability and development in the region, these initiatives have had the unintended consequence of potentially exacerbating tensions. The substantial financial and military support provided to the Federal Government of Somalia, ostensibly to combat extremism and build state capacity, may, in fact, be enabling Somalia’s ability to maintain its hostility towards Somaliland’s independence aspirations.
There are concerns that some of these resources are being diverted to support regional destabilization efforts and to extremists such as the al-Shabaab whose operations Somalia is suspected of condoning, especially those that served its purposes. More alarmingly, there have been allegations of indirect cooperation between elements within the Somali government and Al-Shabaab, the militant group that continues to pose a significant threat to regional security. This complex dynamic suggests that international aid, rather than solely promoting peace and stability, may inadvertently be fueling Somalia’s capacity to resist Somaliland’s independence claims and potentially support proxy conflicts in the region.
This situation underscores the need for a more nuanced approach to international engagement in the Horn of Africa, one that takes into account the intricate political dynamics and avoids inadvertently strengthening actors that may be working against regional stability and the peaceful resolution of the Somaliland-Somalia dispute.
International Conscience Must Resurface
Given the escalating tensions and threats to regional stability, the international community must reassess its approach to Somalia and Somaliland. The global powers that have invested heavily in Somalia’s peace process must now consider more stringent measures to ensure that their efforts and financial commitments are not inadvertently fueling conflict. Moreover, it is high time for the international community to address its long-neglected support for Somaliland’s sovereignty and the rights of its people.
A recalibration of international policy could include the reimposition of targeted arms embargoes to limit the potential for military escalation. Additionally, the implementation of smart sanctions focused on individuals within the Somalia government who have been identified as obstacles to peace or who have made inflammatory statements threatening regional stability should be considered.
Furthermore, international aid and support should be conditioned on concrete steps towards peaceful dialogue and conflict resolution, particularly regarding the status of Somaliland. This approach should be coupled with increased scrutiny of how international funds are being utilized, ensuring they are not diverted towards destabilizing activities.
Crucially, the international community must revisit its stance on Somaliland’s sovereignty. It is worth noting that upon its independence in 1960, Somaliland was recognized by over 35 countries. This historical fact, combined with Somaliland’s sustained stability and democratic governance, calls for a renewed examination of its case for recognition. The international community has an obligation to honor the aspirations and rights of the Somaliland people, who have maintained a de facto independent state for over three decades.
These measures would send a clear message that the international community’s tolerance has limits and that actions jeopardizing hard-won peace will have consequences. By taking a firmer stance and addressing the long-overlooked issue of Somaliland’s status, the global community can realign its substantial investments in the region with the original goals of promoting peace, stability, and economic development for all people in the Horn of Africa.
This approach would demonstrate a commitment to addressing the root causes of conflict, ensuring that international support truly benefits the entire region, and recognizing the legitimate aspirations of the Somaliland people. It’s time for the international community to correct its historical oversight and engage meaningfully with Somaliland’s quest for recognition, thereby contributing to a more just and stable regional order.
Legal Avenues and Potential Outcomes
Several legal avenues exist for Somaliland to pursue its claims. These include bringing a case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), although this would likely require Somalia’s consent or UN involvement. Alternatively, an international arbitration tribunal could be established to address specific claims and compensation.
Mediation by international bodies such as the AU or UN is another possibility, as are direct negotiations between Somaliland and Somalia, potentially with international support.
Potential Compensation and Damages
If successful in its legal claims, Somaliland could potentially seek a range of outcomes. These include formal recognition of its independence and sovereign status, confirmation of its internationally demarcated borders, and economic compensation for shared resources and lost opportunities.
Somaliland might also pursue reparations for human rights violations committed during the Barre regime, for the loss it incurred by not equally sharing power and resources, for foreign reserves, and for the blocked development for the past 64 years, as well as international support in gaining wider recognition and assistance.
Finally, Somaliland’s case for independence and compensation from Somalia is built on a strong foundation of historical and legal arguments. The unratified union, distinct colonial history, effective self-governance since 1991, and human rights violations during the Barre regime all contribute to its position. Recent developments, including Somalia’s reported threats, may further bolster Somaliland’s claims.
Decisive Action
The time has come for Somaliland to mount a more aggressive diplomatic and legal offensive to break the 34-year stalemate that has held its people in limbo. The weight of historical evidence, legal arguments, and moral justification all stand firmly on Somaliland’s side. The region’s stability, democratic governance, and resilience in the face of international neglect only serve to underscore the legitimacy of its cause. However, patience and quiet diplomacy have yielded limited results.
Somaliland must now leverage every available international forum, from the United Nations to regional bodies and international courts, to forcefully present its case for recognition. It should actively seek out allies willing to champion its cause on the global stage and consider innovative legal strategies to challenge its current status. The people of Somaliland have endured decades of economic hardship and missed opportunities due to their lack of international recognition. They can ill afford to wait any longer for the world to take notice.
Somaliland can work to end the cycle of underdevelopment and economic stagnation that has resulted from its unrecognized status by, for instance, adopting a more assertive stance. It’s time to break free from the constraints of diplomatic inertia and pursue a bold, multi-faceted campaign for recognition. This approach should include not only traditional diplomatic channels but also increased engagement with international media, civil society organizations, and academic institutions to build a groundswell of global support.
For Somaliland, the path forward remains complex, given the political sensitivities involved and the lack of clear international mechanisms for resolving issues of this kind. As the situation continues to evolve, it will require careful navigation of legal, diplomatic, and geopolitical considerations to reach a resolution that addresses the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the people of Somaliland.
The stakes are too high and the injustice too great for Somaliland to continue accepting the status quo. It must seize this moment to demand its rightful place on the world stage, secure its independence, and unlock the full potential of its people. Only through such decisive action can Somaliland hope to overcome the obstacles of the past and forge a path towards a prosperous, recognized future.
