The current salient international debate for Somaliland’s recognition regarding the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between Somaliland and neighboring Ethiopia primarily touches on several significant areas of international law, including the right to self-determination, recognition of states, and the legal implications of granting foreign military bases.
Somaliland’s offer to grant Ethiopia a commercial and naval base access to the Red Sea in exchange for recognition, fits into a wider trend of breakaway regions leveraging strategic resources or locations to gain international recognition or support is neither something new nor cause for panic and jelousy. Somaliland’s strong case is based on its right to self-determination and recognition because of its unique historical background, relevant legal principles, and current political circumstances.
First, the right to self-determination is enshrined in international instruments like the UN Charter (Article 1, paragraph 2) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 1). Although international law favors territorial integrity of states, it nevertheless appreciates exceptions for colonial contexts or severe oppression and ethnic-cleansing of peoples by their repressive dictatorial governments including significant human rights violations or denial of internal self-determination. For example, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia (2008) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in an advisory opinion in 2010 that Kosovo’s declaration did not violate international law (Remedial Secession). Today, Kosovo is recognized by many countries with the exception of only Serbia and Russia. Similarly, after decades of brutal civil war in Sudan, the south, now South Sudan, seceded from Sudan following a referendum.
Recognition of breakaway states is merely a political act, not strictly governed by international law. For breakaway regions, recognition by powerful states can make a significant difference and in some cases, entities seek recognition by offering strategic advantages, such as military bases. For instance, in 1983, Northern Cyprus declared independence from Cyprus and today is only recognized by Turkiya. In exchange for recognition and support, Northern Cyprus allows Turkiya to run military bases there.
Likewise, Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke away from Georgia after the war with Russia (2008) and were given formal recognition by Russia in exchange to establish a military base there which bolstered their claims to independence. Transnistria, a region in Moldova also declared independence in 1990 for a similar deal and is recognized by Russia, though it remains unrecognized by most countries.
Historically, when regions declare self-independence, they often enter into military agreements with powerful nations. This is a strategic move on their part to gain legitimacy and defence capabilities, even without international recognition. A case in point, the United States has a military base in Kosovo (Camp Bondsteel), which serves both strategic and protective functions. The U.S. also provides arms sales and conducts military training with Taiwan, ensuring its self defense capabilities. This U.S. -Taiwan Defence Cooperation agreement doesn’t amount to a military base, but it is well understood that the huge U.S. military forces in the region play a critical role in Taiwan’s security to safeguard its de facto international recognition.
Taiwan has both economic and diplomatic de facto recognition and engages with many countries economically and diplomatically through mutually signed and binding strategic partnerships and arms sales agreements despite the lack of official state recognition.
Similarly, Somaliland’s case to use its geographic advantage to obtain formal recognition is therefore a “no brainer” concept, so to speak! For starters, Somaliland has already leased parts of the strategic port of Berbera to the United Arab Emirates which is using it as a military and commercial hub to project power in the Horn of Africa. Adding Ethiopia to the list of strategic partners would further increase Somaliland’s importance in the Red Sea region which is one of the most important trade routes in the world where several other actors including Saudi Arabia, China, the U.S., Egypt, Iran and Turkiya are vying for influence.
Of note is the fact that Djibouti currently hosts a horde of military bases within its territories.
Foremost amongst them are the main ones such as the French with 1000 soldiers at Tadjoura, US with 4000 soldiers at Camp Lemonnier, China at Golf Camp with 3000 servicemen, Japan with strength of 1000 at Port Djibouti and Italy with 500 soldiers at Camp Doria.
In essence, there are a total of 16 military bases presence in the country with the likes of Spain, Saudi and UAE amongst the rest 11 to a lesser extent. They both fall under the categories of foreign operated military bases and transit and logistical ones.
For that matter, base in Somaliland would give landlocked Ethiopia greater autonomy over its maritime security and trade routes, reducing its dependence on Djibouti and could also shift Ethiopia’s position in its broader rivalry with Eritrea thus enhancing its role in the regional security architecture. Somaliland and Ethiopia could help its allies and contribute to the security in the region in countering terrorism and piracy to protect global shipping lanes. Somaliland’s current situation clearly highlights how so-called “breakaway” regions are increasingly using strategic resources as bargaining chips in the quest for recognition, similar to other unrecognized or partially recognized entities globally.
Additionally, Somaliland has a very strong case for recognition based on its historical status as a sovereign state (June 26-July 1st 1960), its de facto recognition for the past 33 years, and its fulfillment of the criteria for statehood under international law. Its stability, democratic governance, and strategic importance make it an ideal candidate for recognition by countries like Ethiopia, UAE, Britain, and the United States and others to follow in due course.
Somaliland’s compelling case for recognition is additionally based on its historical independence and initial recognition. Somaliland was a British Protectorate until it gained independence on June 26, 19960, and was recognized as an independent state. It became a member of the United Nations, and within four days, it voluntarily united with the former Italian administered Trust Territory of Somalia to form the Somali Republic. This union, however, was never ratified or institutionalized through a proper legal framework, and the partnership quickly became unequal, problematic and dysfunctional. Somaliland declared independence after the collapse of the Somali State in 1991. Since then, it has functioned as a de facto state, with stable government, democratic elections, a functioning judiciary, and a separate military. Somaliland, therefore, has the right to revert back to its original independent status and restore its sovereignty (1960), and this justifies its relentless quest for international recognition.
By the same token, it meets the legal basis for self-determination in international law in the context of colonialism and peoples seeking independence from brutal oppressive failing states like Somalia, which is a classic textbook case. The UN Charter (Article 1, paragraph 2), gives Somaliland the right to legally restore its independence, however, its efforts to gain international recognition have been frustrated and blocked by the African Union’s commitment to maintaining colonial borders and Somalia’s claims of sovereignty. The African Union’s position on respecting so-called colonial borders, while well-intentioned, cannot be applied to this exceptional case where two independent states (Somaliland and Somalia) entered into a union that was never legally ratified and which subsequently became dysfunctional and collapsed.
Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) further guarantees the right to self-determination, especially when people are oppressed or denied a meaningful role in governance. In the case of Somaliland, it was worse following the brutal civil war (19888-1991) in which over 50,000 Somalilanders were killed, more than a million forced to flee and the region’s major cities bombarded and leveled to the ground. In 2001, the people of Somaliland overwhelmingly expressed their desire for independence in a referendum under Article 1 of CCPR, where over 97% of voters supported independence refusing to be part of a failed, sort of a political marriage of convenience union with Somalia. Moreover, the concept of Remedial Secession under international law argues that a region can secede when the central government fails to function or when a union as with Somalia became dysfunctional culminating in 1991.
In addition, a key element in gaining international recognition under international law is proving that an entity meets the criteria for statehood as outlined in the Montevideo Convention (1933) which defines statehood based on a) a permanent population which is about 4 million in Somaliland; b) a defined territory which is clearly defined for Somaliland with internationally recognized borders, largely coinciding with those of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, c) a functioning government which Somaliland has and finally, the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Somaliland has been actively engaged in diplomatic and economic relations with international organizations as well as with several countries, even though it is not formally recognized. It is no secret that it has officially signed many agreements with other countries including Ethiopia, UAE, Taiwan and EU.
Given all of the above factors, Somaliland meets all the criteria for statehood, but lacks formal recognition merely due to political considerations rather than legal shortcomings. However, recent developments and international perspectives seem to be inching towards final formal recognition for Somaliland, which has already gained informal recognition. The UAE’s military base and port agreements in Berbera have given Somaliland a higher geopolitical profile in the Horn of Africa region and it has also signed the MOU with Ethiopia for a sea access and potential naval base in exchange for formal recognition.
In short, recent reports of the U.S. Engagement suggests that the United States is increasingly engaging with Somaliland, recognizing its stability in sharp contrast to continued instability despite the military support it has been getting from thousands of African troops for the past 17 years. And while the U.S. has not formally recognized Somaliland, growing security and economic ties could pave the way for future diplomatic support. For instance, in 2001, members of the U.S. Congress introduced resolutions calling for an immediate U.S. engagement with Somaliland.
Similarly, there has been growing momentum within the UK political establishment to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent state, driven mainly by multiple factors, including UK’s historical responsibility, Somaliland’s track record and its importance in regional security. There are ongoing Parliamentary Debates calling for the UK government to formally recognize Somaliland. They argue that Somaliland meets all the criteria for statehood and that Britain, as a former colonial power, has special responsibility to lead the way emphasizing its stability compared to Somalia.
The UK media has also begun covering the debates around Somaliland’s recognition more actively with several prominent outlets like The Guardian and the The Telegraph publishing several editorials, opinion pieces and analysis arguing for Somaliland’s recognition and advocating for a shift in UK policy towards formal recognition of Somaliland, framing it as a moral and strategic necessity given the fact that Somaliland as an independent state voluntarily entered into union with Somalia. As a former colonial power, Britain has a historical connection to Somaliland that makes its potential recognition particularly significant.
Although there still remain some challenges, it is only a matter of time before powerful countries like the UK, U.S., and UAE. get onboard. For now, they don’t want to be seen meddling in the internal affairs of African countries, and are naturally waiting on the sidelines for formal recognition to first come from an African country, namely Ethiopia.
It remains to be seen whether or not the current dynamic geopolitical chess game competition for influence and hegemony on the volatile but strategic Horn of Africa’s Red Sea region will play a significant role in expediting Somaliland’s long-overdue de jure recognition in light of the compelling arguments I had articulated in this article.
By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin
Former Political Science Major in International Relations and International law,
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tn. U.S.A., and
Former Editor and Freelance Journalist
Now a professor at Gollis University based in Hargeisa, Somaliland.
