Sunday, March 30, 2025
Facebook Instagram Twitter
Home Blog Page 936

Book Review: Somaliland: An African Struggle for Nationhood and International Recognition

By
-
0

HARGEISA, 15 November 2009 (Somalilandpress) – Somaliland: An African Struggle for Nationhood and International Recognition, by Iqbal D Jhazbhay, Institute for Global Dialogue & South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2009, 243 pp., $25.00 ISBN 978-1-920216-20-7

This book review takes the form of an extended commentary highlighting some of the important issues, by the way of discussing the author’s theory, narrative and analysis.

According to the author, ‘the central hypothesis underlying this study is the importance of Somaliland’s example as a case study in the efficacy of the internally-driven, “bottom-up” approach to post-conflict nation-building and regional stability and the implications this approach holds for prioritizing domestic reconciliation between indigenous culture and traditions, and modernity in achieving relative stability and international recognition in the nation-building project’ (p. 19). Given my familiarity with Somali studies literature, as well as my participant observation of Somali affairs, I find this study to be highly original, relevant, valid and timely. The originality is partly because both the Somaliland domestic and international experiences are unique. As the author states, this is a mid-level theory intended to qualitatively illuminate a case study that could be used in future as a building bloc towards a grand theory.

The author provides as an analytical tool what he terms a ‘quadrilateral framework’: reconciliation-reconstruction-religion-recognition. This allows him to compile a huge pile of data, dates and events and to present them in a structured and organised manner. All this leads to an original sub-theory of the dialectic between international relations and internal factors.

There are several articles on narrow aspects of the Somaliland experience and a few general reports by the War-torn Society’s Project and the International Crisis Group whose works are cited here. From my perspective, this is the first scholarly and substantial manuscript on Somaliland covering both domestic and international topics. Its survey of existing literature — books, articles, reports, newspapers, web-sites — is simply breath-taking. His nine field trips over a period of several years, have allowed him to check and recheck most of the data collected from various sources. He conducted interviews with an impressive list of personalities, including heads of state, ministers, diplomats, Somali studies experts, and other academics such as heads of research institutes. I happen to know many of them and they are relevant and knowledgeable.

[ad#Google Adsense (336×280)]

Professor Jhazbhay is correct in pointing out that the elders are the engine that drives all reconciliation efforts in Somaliland; their absence in Somalia is partly responsible for the chaos in the south. This marriage of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ is what allowed the north to survive two civil wars and now enjoy 18 ten years of peace. At the centre of the elders movement is the Council of Elders (the Guurti). Somali culture is rich in traditional institutions evidenced in its systems of land management, agricultural and grazing systems, conflict mediation, legal adjudication, and many related functions. What facilitated the modern role of traditional elders? This study mentions the role of British colonialism. The British wanted colonialism ‘on the cheap’, therefore they practiced ‘indirect rule’, allowing traditional elders to manage grassroots politics. Jhazbhay sees this as a secondary rationale; after all, the British colonised India and Nigeria (where the term ‘indirect rule’ itself was coined); yet India emerged with a liberal democracy while Nigeria experienced decades of military rule. The thesis points to the existential compromise between the liberating Somali National Movement (SNM) and the elders as the primary rationale.

The SNM is also unique in being the only liberation movement that has voluntarily dissolved itself and allowed the elders to give power to a veteran politician, Mohamed Egal. The five-month-long gathering in Borama in 1993 was a Guurti project that laid the basis for a constitution. This study notes: ‘In the case of Somaliland, clan leadership ascendancy was facilitated by the modernizing nationalism of the SNM which, ideologically, sought to bridge the cultural gap between tradition and modernity and which, from the standpoint of self-reliant pragmatic survival, depended on the clan elders as pillars of support in mobilizing the social base of insurgency and post-conflict governance’ (p. 55). Somaliland has gone on to adopt a constitution by referendum, and to hold local government elections followed by presidential and parliamentary elections.

With regards to reconstruction in Somaliland, the author suggests that the engine for it is a free (nearly) unregulated market economy. The expansion of the free market has been facilitated by the provision of security which is also a product of reconciliation. Women with piles of various currencies transact business in open markets. There is a need for limited and appropriate regulation and light but suitable taxation. The author is right to observe that, in both Somaliland and Somalia, there is a climate of opinion in favour of decentralisation and power sharing institutions. The focus on the diaspora is critical. ‘Roughly half of Somaliland’s 3.5 million nationals have been estimated to live outside its borders’ (p. 96). This diaspora provides remittances that sustain the country. For example, the export of livestock to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States is critical to the Somaliland economy. However, it is also its Achilles heel: from time to time Saudi Arabia bans such exports. On one such occasion, the ban lasted 14 months and the number of animals exported from Somaliland fell sharply from 2.9 million in 1997 to just over 1 million in 1998.

The chapter on religion (Islam) is crucial given recent events. Analysing the chapter, I come up with the following options before the Islamists: (a) The civil society strategy — for example: ‘The Waxda movement has adapted a long-term strategy of developing a Muslim society by influencing by example via schools, charitable work, trade, etc., much in the same way of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt’ (p. 116). (b) The Jihadist option — those who want to impose, top-down, an Islamic state by all means, including violence and militarism. In Somalia this movement, led by Hassan Dahir Aweys, captured Mogadishu and several parts of the south in June 2006 but were evicted by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian troops in December 2006. This study covered these events in the form of 2006 reflections. I do not see a future for jihadists in Somaliland as explained and analysed in the thesis. (c) The Islamic courts movement — a large faction saw this as a civil society option and was willing to compromise with the TFG. However, a minority of jihadists hijacked the whole Sharia courts movement which led to the confrontation with Ethiopia. (d) The constitutional, democratic option like Turkey — this alternative is compatible with Somaliland’s democratic political culture. Women are playing an increasingly prominent role in Somaliland civil society (in Somalia too).

These initiatives have won general respect. During the post-Siyad era, women have assumed key roles in the economy, including taking jobs in retailing, money-changing, and local distribution of imported goods. They have played critical roles in peacemaking. They continue to prosper in teaching and medical professions. This study shows, however, that women are highly under-represented in political life including among the three main political parties. As far as women’s roles are concerned, there is the need to tilt the tradition-modernity dialectic a little more towards modernity. Their contribution in education has made this sector the most self-reliant.

The chapter on recognition provides a great deal of new information, with brilliant analysis. I come out with the conclusion that, while aiming for full recognition, Somaliland may have to opt for an interim special status. Nations sympathetic to Somaliland include Ethiopia, South Africa, Rwanda, Kenya (with some question mark) and the United Kingdom. Rwanda, in a recent AU session, tabled a resolution to discuss Somaliland. Arab States — Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan — are generally against the recognition of Somaliland. This is mostly due to Egypt’s anti-Ethiopian politics over the Nile. Ethiopia is in a delicate position: it has used its military power to impose the TFG in Mogadishu. Will it allow the TFG to impose itself over Hargeisa? If it does so, it will reopen the Pandora’s box of Somali irredentism which will eventually consume Ethiopia’s Somali Region 5 (the Ogaden). If it recognises Somaliland too soon, it will alienate the TFG ‘puppet’ regime.

In any case, the fate of Somaliland and Somalia is in Ethiopian hands. This is contained in the analysis provided. What is preventing a dialogue between the north and south is a clash of political cultures. Deriving inspiration from its traditional reconciliation practices, Somaliland has evolved a secular democratic political culture. Somalia, for almost 15 years, was suffocated by brutal warlord culture. For a brief period it experienced a radical Islamist, jihadi political culture, and is now confronted by authoritarianism and neo-Siyadism.

This book facilitates the development of a new sub-field of International Relations dealing with the ‘internationalization of domestic transformation’ (p. 17). Somaliland’s stability and democratisation needs recognition, and recognition will strengthen and sustain Somaliland’s stability and democratisation.

I summarise with one of the most insightful observations: the struggle for recog nition helps to discipline Somaliland’s internal politics and society. He provides concrete examples of this domestic-international linkage and disciplining of Somaliland politics and society. For example, Somalilanders turned out in record numbers to vote in the constitution referendum because they are acutely aware of the international struggle for recognition. The domestic disciplining involves the elders, the business sector and leaders of civil society. The acceptance of the extremely narrow results (80 votes difference) in the presidential elections is due to these domestic actors plus awareness of the struggle for recognition. The same thing explains the very cordial and civil relations between the opposition parties (with a majority in parliament) and the ruling party. Since the hypothesis is confirmed, we may go on to predict that the disciplining of Somaliland is bound to increase as a result of the drastic events in Mogadishu and the coming to power of the hostile Abdulahi Yusuf.

The Somaliland experience is summed up by the observation: ‘Whether one embraces, rejects, or is ambivalent about Somaliland’s bid for recognition, Somaliland’s progress in democratization, stability, and economic recovery constitutes one of the few pieces of genuinely good news in the troubled Horn of Africa’ (p. 153).

As a contribution to a new sub-field in International Relations and a penetrating original analysis of a unique socio-political experiment, I hereby commend this book with great enthusiasm.

Click Here to Download the Review in PDF Format

Hussein M Adam
Holy Cross College, Worcester, MA; Founding President, Somali Studies International Association
Email: hadam@holycross.edu
© 2009, Hussein M Adam

Ethiopia rebels 'capture towns'

By
-
0

JIGJIGA, 15 November 2009 (Somalilandpress) — Ethnic-Somali rebels in the south-east of Ethiopia say they have launched an offensive against government forces and captured several towns.

The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) said it began attacking on several fronts on Tuesday.

The separatists said a “significant number” of Ethiopian troops had been killed and their equipment captured.
[ad#Google Adsense (250×250)]
The reports could not be verified and Ethiopia has in the past dismissed rebel accounts of military gains.

“The operation involved thousands of ONLF troops and resulted in two days of heavy fighting,” an ONLF statement said.

The group added that its forces had been “warmly welcomed” in the towns it claimed to have captured – Obolka, Hamaro, Higlaaley, Yucub, Galadiid, Boodhaano and Gunogabo.

The ONLF, formed in 1984, is fighting for the independence of ethnic Somalis in the oil-rich Ogaden region.

It says the Somali-speaking population has been marginalised by Addis Ababa.

Fighting has escalated over the past two years following an ONLF attack on a Chinese-run oil exploration field.

More than 70 people died in the attack, including Ethiopian guards and Chinese workers.

Addis Ababa calls the rebels “terrorists” and has cut off all access to the region.

However, watchdogs have accused the Ethiopian government of human rights violations.

Source: BBC

Somaliland shelters war-displaced

By
-
0

BURAO – 14 November 2009 (Somalilandpress) — Thousands of people displaced by fighting in Somalia are ending up in the relatively peaceful neighbouring territory, Somaliland.

Once part of Somalia, it is now a self-declared republic in the troubled Horn of Africa region, and has been seeking international recognition of its independence since 1991.

Al Jazeera’s Mohammed Adow, in Burao, the main city of Togdheer province, says the complicated nature of local politics is blocking relief efforts.

Somaliland is a former British protectorate in north western Somalia.

In 1960, it gained its independence and united with what was then Italian Somaliland to form the Somalia republic.

In 1991, it declared independence after Mohamed Siad Barre, the Somali military leader, was overthrown.

Political unrest

Tension over the Somaliland presidential election, which was due to have been held on September 27, has given rise to fears that the self-declared territory could become a failed state like its neighbour Somalia.

The polls have been postponed indefinitely due to serious differences between the political parties since 2008.

[ad#Google Adsense (336×280)]
The complicated nature of local politics is blocking relief efforts in Burao
This uncertainty has led to increased concern about Somaliland in the international community, and a flare-up of political animosity within the territory.

Recent violence, particularly in the capital Hargeysa, has shown that the crisis in Somaliland has changed from being political to one of security and stability.

Despite the unrest in September, Somaliland has a relatively stable democracy.

It has a population of 3.5 million people, according to government estimates, and is a relatively stable democracy even though it has not been internationally recognised.

This is partly because it has developed a unique hybrid system of government.

The row over elections – largely seen as a test for this fledgling nation – threatens to divide it.

Source: Al Jazeera and agencies

Suicide Attack Against Meeting Organised by Finns Thwarted in Somaliland

By
-
0

HARGEISA, 13 November 2009 (Somalilandpress) – Security officials in Somaliland narrowly thwarted a terror attack that had been planned against a peace conference in the town of Hargeisa last Sunday. The gathering of clan leaders had been organised by Finn Church Aid, the foreign aid arm of the Finnish Lutheran Church.

Ten kilos of powder-based explosives were found in the possession of two uninvited guests. The aim was apparently to conduct a suicide attack against the meeting of the chiefs of the Hawie clan.

Such an attack would have put the lives of seven Finnish citizens at risk.

The events began to unfold on Friday, when about 30 clan leaders flew from the Somali capital Mogadishu to the Hargeisa meeting. Also on board the commercial flight were two young men. At the destination they boarded a bus taking the participants in the meeting to their hotel.

[ad#Google Adsense (336×280)]

The hotel’s security personnel made note of the nervous behaviour of the two. Organisers of the meeting also noted that there were two people there who had not been invited.

“Their room was searched, and explosives suitable for use in a suicide attack were found in their possession”, said Antti Pentikäinen, executive director of Finn Church Aid, who spoke by telephone from Washington.

Pentikäinen himself was to have attended the meeting on Sunday, its opening day, but the trip was cancelled after the terror plot was unveiled.

The suspects were arrested, and they have been interrogated by local officials. The identity of the suspected would-be bombers has not been disclosed, nor is there any information on what rebel group they might belong to. News of the incident apparently has not been reported in Somaliland itself.

On the basis of previous suicide attacks, the main suspect is the al-Shabab movement, which controls the south of Somalia. Al-Shabab introduced the practice of suicide attacks to Somalia a few years ago, and the movement is believed to have links with the al-Qaeda network.

After the plot was unveiled, the organisers considered cancelling the meeting. However, it began on schedule on Sunday.
“Security arrangements are at the maximum. The meeting will proceed only if security can be guaranteed”, Pentikäinen says.

The planned attack will not stop meetings aimed at peace from being organised in the future, Pentikäinen says. However, he adds that the situation will make it necessary to re-evaluate how the security of participants and organisers can be guaranteed.

“In Somalia, we are trusted as organisers of meetings of this type. Under no circumstances do we plan to pull out. When we have collected all information about this event, we will ponder how the risks could be minimised in the future.”

He sees the case as a worrying example of how security for aid organisations has deteriorated in recent years, especially in fragile states such as Somalia.

Finn Church Aid has organised gatherings of clan chiefs and religious leaders in Somalia for a year and a half already. The meetings are low-profile events set up for airing the views of local leaders on how the peace process in Somalia should proceed.

Pentikäinen emphasises that Finn Church Aid dies not bring its own agenda to the peace process. Instead, it seeks to support local communities, and to communicate their views to the international community.

Source: HELSINGIN SANOMAT

Somalis’ Money Is Lifeline for Homeland.

By
-
0

HARGEISA, 12 November 2009 (Somalilandpress) PARIS — As Somalis struggle to survive the chaos that has overtaken their country, a network of companies that distribute money from the nation’s large diaspora has quietly expanded, providing a crucial safety net.

As in other poor countries, the main purpose of these companies is to ensure that money from those working abroad reaches family members left behind.

But in war-torn Somalia, where the government has little control of the country and is itself struggling to survive, the companies are now also helping international organizations shift money into and within Somalia, according to the World Bank, academics and aid workers.

And in Somaliland, a breakaway region where the government is more stable than in other parts of the country, the Somali diaspora has contributed money for education, health and other social programs.

The remittance system has become the lifeline for the Somali people and the lifeblood of the economy during the last two decades of civil strife,” said Samuel Munzele Maimbo, a World Bank specialist based in Mozambique, who added that many Somalis survived only because of the money from abroad. For others, the money has been crucial to establishing or propping up businesses.

A study sponsored by the British Department for International Development from May 2008 found that 80 percent of the start-up capital for small and medium-size enterprises in Somalia benefit from money sent by the diaspora.

Dilip Ratha, a World Bank economist, said that Somalia, like Haiti, was among the countries that are the most dependent on money from abroad.

The remittance system — and its importance in Somalia — has grown as decades of political upheaval have driven many Somalis abroad and, in recent years, as Islamists have wrested control over much of the country from a weak transitional government. The government, which has international support, is trapped in a small section of the capital under the protection of African Union peacekeepers.

A recent study by the United Nations Development Program estimated the size of the Somali diaspora at more than one million and the amount of annual remittances to Somalia at up to $1 billion, equivalent to about 18 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product.

The system began to take off during the dictatorial rule of President Mohammed Siad Barre, who ran the country from 1969 to 1991. As the banking system weakened, according to Mohamed Waldo, a consultant who has worked with Somali remittance companies, traders stepped in with a solution: act as middlemen in the resale of consumer goods shipped home by the increasing number of Somalis working abroad, especially in the Persian Gulf region. The traders kept a small cut of the proceeds and turned the rest over to the laborers’ relatives in Somalia. The shipments got around currency restrictions.

Eventually, when the government collapsed, Somali workers abroad began to send money instead.

Mr. Waldo said that these days, there were more than 20 active Somali remittance companies, five of them large. One of the leading companies is Dahabshiil, founded in the early 1970s by Mohamed Said Duale from his general store in Burao in northwest Somalia.

In 1988, fighting between government forces and rebels with the Somali National Movement swept Burao. Mr. Duale subsequently left the country and continued his work from abroad.

In 1991, when the Barre government was overthrown, Mr. Duale returned to Somalia. He opened offices in major towns and later in remote villages that the Western money-transfer giants would struggle to serve.

“Through word of mouth we built this business,” said his son, Abdirashid Duale, now chief executive of the company.

Today, Dahabshiil says it has more than 1,000 branches and agents in 40 countries.

The United Nations Development Program uses Dahabshiil to transfer money for local programs, said Álvaro Rodríguez, the agency’s director for Somalia. Such companies provide “the only safe and efficient option to transfer funds to projects benefiting the most vulnerable people of Somalia,” he said. “Their service is fast and efficient.”

Abdirashid Duale, who gives his age as “35, but with 25 years of experience,” declined to provide profit or revenue figures, saying that would only help his competitors. The company charges commissions that vary from 1 percent to 5 percent depending on the size of the transaction; he said most Somalis he worked with abroad sent home $200 to $300 a month.

Nikos Passas, a professor at Northeastern University in Boston who researches terrorism and white-collar crime, said Dahabshiil was helped by the closing of a larger rival, Al Barakaat, at the behest of the United States authorities in the wake of the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.

In the end, F.B.I. agents found no evidence linking Al Barakaat to terrorist financing. But for Dahabshiil, gaining market share from Al Barakaat was “like shooting fish in a barrel,” Professor Passas said.

Dahabshiil’s image has been helped by its charitable works. It says it invests 5 percent of annual profit in such ventures; Abdirashid Duale said this represented around $1 million a year.

In Mogadishu — a city of pockmarked Italian architecture and rubble — Dahabshiil operates from Bakara Market, despite continued clashes in the area between the weak government and Islamist insurgents.

Its office, in an unassuming two-story building, is protected by security guards.

Looking ahead, Abdirashid Duale plans more expansion.

“One day the fighting will stop,” he said, “and we will still be here.”

Mohammed Ibrahim contributed reporting from Mogadishu.

Source: NY Times, Nov 11, 2009

Somali Rebels Issue Aid Rules

By
-
0

HARGEISA, 12 November 2009 (Somalilandpress) – Don’t promote democracy, fire all women, don’t take Sundays off and remove all logos from your vehicles: these are only some of the 11 new rules Somalia’s Shabaab rebels want to slap on aid groups.

According to a document obtained by AFP on Friday and issued two days earlier by the authorities for the south-central Bay and Bakool region – the country’s main humanitarian hub – aid groups should comply with tough new guidelines.

[ad#Google Adsense (300×250)]

“We are notifying all aid agencies operating in Bay and Bakool region that we will ensure their security 100%… and that the Islamic state of Bay and Bakool will issue permits once the following conditions are met,” it says.

Fees

The list of requirements, which was distributed to local aid group representatives on Thursday, includes a registration fee of $20 000 payable twice a year.

Several humanitarian organizations confirmed receiving the document, which bears the Shabaab’s logo, but no official from the al-Qaeda-inspired insurgent group was immediately willing to comment on the record.

High-ranking Shabaab and security officials however confirmed the document’s authenticity, but also said that some of the insurgent group’s leaders thought the conditions too harsh and were pushing for the document to be re-examined.

Bay and Bakool are the main hub for the international aid efforts in the Horn of Africa country, where the Western-backed central government is unable to assert its authority a few blocks beyond the presidency in Mogadishu.

Weeded out

The United Nations has its largest humanitarian compound there, in the town of Wajid, and most aid organizations have already been weeded out from other regions under Islamist control.

The document imposes draconian conditions concerning women employees, who should all be replaced with men within three months.

Aid organizations “should distance (themselves) from anything that will affect proper Islamic culture… like promoting adultery and establishing women’s groups.”

World Women’s Day is singled out along with Christmas and World Aids Day as proscribed celebrations, while “preaching democracy” is also listed as a value “interfering with Islam” that should be banned.

The Shabaab also reiterated a ban on alcohol and movies and also insisted that all humanitarian organizations’’ logos should be removed from vehicles and all flags be taken down.


Source: AFP

Eritrea’s Repayment Of Its Fraternal Debt To The Somali People

By
-
0

HARGEISA, 12 November 2009 (Somalilandpress) – I have just read Sophia Tesfamariam’s diatribe of character assassination and vilification against Professor Peter Pham on American Chronicle entitled “ETHIOPIA-Meles Zenawi’s latest ´Intellectual for Hire´ Exposes Himself” and dated 23 October 2009.

Ms Tesfamariam’s rant does not merit discussion here and Professor Pham’s credentials, objectivity and work are well known to those with an interest in the Horn of Africa, hence he needs no defense against this type of intemperate, personal attack. However, the piece did make me reflect upon the history of Somali-Eritrean relations and the current status of this relationship.

Historically, the Somali people have had warm, neighborly relations with the people of Eritrea residing as they do in the same locale. During the 1960s this relationship became one of close political allies as both peoples were victims of the collusion between the European colonialists and the Haile Selassie regime in Ethiopia to deny them their national aspirations for self determination.

Indeed, when the Somali Republic was formed in July 1960 by the union of the ex-British Somaliland Protectorate and the Italian-administered UN Trust Territory of Somalia to the south, support for the aspirations of the Eritrean people for self-determination and statehood became an integral cornerstone of the new Republic’s foreign policy.

To this end, the Eritrean liberation movements were supported politically and materially, and political offices for them were established in Mogadishu before any other African country. In fact, such was Somalia’s backing of the Eritrean quest for statehood that Eritrean refugees were routinely issued Somali passports to enable them to travel internationally, and many Eritrean refugees were awarded government scholarships alongside Somali students.

Thus, the Somali people were the first supporters of Eritrean independence and the Somali Republic was the first country to provide the Eritrean liberation movement with financial, material and moral support, in its cause for freedom. In one of those ironies that defy a deterministic and mechanical view of history, the Republic of Somalia began to collapse in 1991 just as Eritrea began to achieve its nationhood.

Since the achievement of independence in 1993, Eritrea has shown its appreciation for Somalia’s long and unstinting support of their struggle for self determination, by providing refuge and support for those members of Siyad Barre’s dictatorial regime that chose (or were compelled) to request same, e.g. Ahmed Suleiman Abdullah (“Dhafleh”).

It is indeed ironic, and rather bizarre, that the architects of Somalia’s collapse and erstwhile oppressors of the Somali people are now the beneficiaries of the support and largess these people extended to the Eritrean liberation movements.

While it might be understandable for the Afewerki regime to provide a safe haven for the members of the Siyad Barre dictatorship that assisted them in their liberation struggle, what is beyond the pale is their support for the murderers of Al-Shabaab and for the megalomaniacal dreams of Hassan Dahir Aweys.

Of course, it is self evident that Afewerki’s decision to support these terrorists was made as part of his strategy to confront Ethiopia at every possible turn pursuant to the unresolved conflict over Badme. Clearly, he is pursuing the time-honored tenet of realpolitik which holds that ´my enemy’s enemy is my friend´, and he saw an opportunity to bloody Ethiopia’s nose when it invaded Somalia in 2007.

[ad#Google Adsense (336×280)]

However, it is also true that ´if you lay down with dogs, you will get fleas´, and the maniacs that Afewerki has chosen to lie with are not only reviled in Somalia and Somaliland, but throughout the region and further afield. Further, Ethiopia’s ill advised invasion of Somalia has failed ignominiously and Ethiopia withdrew its troops over a year ago, yet Afewerki continues to arm and bankroll the jihadists, even as they behead, dismember, oppress and blow up their own brethren in a doomed, nihilistic quest to reverse the course of human progress and development.

Perhaps Afewerki should ponder that these ´friends´ of his perceive him as an infidel and that he would suffer death should he ever find himself in their version of the Caliphate. What is undeniable, however, is that the families, relatives and countrymen and women of the many thousands of victims of his ´friends´ in Somaliland, Somalia and Puntland will neither forget nor forgive the Afewerki regime for arming and succoring these murderers.

In modern parlance, it is considered smart humor to quip “no good deed goes unpunished”, but nothing could be a more apropos summation of the long and sustained support the Somali people extended to their Eritrean brothers and sisters and the evil with which the Afewerki regime has repaid them.

In fairness to them, it must be said that this regime is an equal opportunity evil-dispenser; after all it has managed to find a reason to fight a war against every single one of its neighbors. Thus, perhaps the people of Somalia should not feel too bad about the fraternity extended to them by the Afewerki regime; they share this gift of evil with the Sudanese, the Ethiopians, the Djiboutians and the Yemenis, not to mention, of course, the Eritreans themselves.

Since independence the Afewerki regime has done nothing to promote economic development and social progress for its citizens, but has instead chosen to squander the meager resources of this poor country in endless conflict and war.

After emerging from the agony of the longest armed struggle for freedom and independence on the entire continent of Africa, the Eritrean people had every right to look forward to developing their country and leaving a better future for their children.

Instead, they are the beneficiaries of the Afewerki regime’s policy of permanent war. Where Trotsky promoted the concept of ´permanent revolution´ as the embodiment of true Marxism-Leninism, Afewerki and his cohorts have implemented an actual policy of permanent war.

We can only hope that divine providence deliver the Eritrean people from this stunted cabal that can only trade in the currency of war, death and destruction instead of peace, fraternity and construction. As for the rest of the region, they must isolate and shun this regime of rogues.

By: Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Egal

Source: Somaliland Times

Somaliland stability 'at risk'

By
-
0

HARGEISA, 12 November 2009 (Somalilandpress) — Somaliland has been hailed as a beacon of stability in the troubled Horn of Africa region since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991.

But Al Jazeera’s Mohamed Adow, reports that some experts now believe the self-declared republic is at crisis point, as an election row deepens.

The current tension in Somaliland centres on the presidential election, which was due to have been held on September 27.

The polls have been postponed indefinitely due to serious differences between the political parties since 2008.

This uncertainty has led to increased concern about Somaliland in the international community, and a flare-up of political animosity within the territory.
[ad#Google Adsense (336×280)]
Recent violence, particularly in the capital Hargeysa, has shown that the crisis in Somaliland has changed from being political to one of security and stability.

Fears over the crisis have even led one senior political figure to warn that it could become another failed state, like neighbouring Somalia.

Somaliland is a former British protectorate in north western Somalia.

In 1960, it gained its independence and united with what was then Italian Somaliland to form the Somalia republic.

Limited democracy

In 1991, it declared independence after Mohamed Siad Barre, the Somali military leader, was overthrown.

Somaliland has a population of 3.5 million people, according to government estimates, and is a relatively stable democracy even though it has not been internationally recognised.

This is partly because it has developed a unique hybrid system of government.

The row over elections – largely seen as a test for this fledgling nation – threatens to divide it.

Afyare Elmi, a Somali political analyst, told Al Jazeera: “The concerns are real. The opposition fears the government is not interested in holding this election and there is a lot at stake. Unless these elections take place, they might have some problems.

“However, if history tells us anything, the Somaliland leadership has shown that at least they could address with traditional leadership the issues when they arise.”

The hope now rests with a recently appointed electoral commission, entrusted with the task of organising elections, a step seen as vital to Somaliland’s quest for international recognition.

 

Source: Al Jazeera and agencies

Premier Somaliland Boarding School Begins Inaugural Year

By
-
0

HARGEISA, 11 November 2009 (Somalilandpress) — This week marked the beginning of the Abaarso Tech 2009 – 2010 school year. AT is pleased to announce that all 51 students who received an invitation, committed to Abaarso Tech’s four year secondary program and many more students expressed their desire to join the school.

Of the 51 students accepted, 30 boarding students were chosen as a result of scoring in the top 1% of the country on the Somaliland 8^th Grade Exit Exam and then further passing an exam administered by SOS and AT. This diverse group draws from all over Somaliland, including the distant Eastern regions, with 20% of students coming from Sanaag and Sool.

[ad#Google Adsense (336×280)]

Abaarso Tech’s 21 day students were selected from a pool of students who fell just below the top 1% on the Somaliland 8^th Grade Exit Exam, were recommended by their principals, or attended our September program. This group then took a separate AT exam which tested math, logic, science and writing. With an acceptance rate well under half of those students applying, the AT faculty is extremely pleased with the day students selected and thus far those children are proving every bit as good as those who are boarding.

Initially, Abaarso Tech did not anticipate having the capacity to house female students in its first year. However, the school recently received a grant commitment from Horseed Inc. (a non-profit organization committed to supporting education in Somalia) to put towards the construction of a temporary girls dormitory. As such, AT was able to accept 8 girls in its inaugural boarding school class and 15 overall. In the future, when proper dormitories are constructed for both boys and girls, this structure will become the Abaarso Tech biology/chemistry Lab.

Apprentice teachers during August English training
Apprentice teachers during August English training

Abaarso Tech is a world class secondary boarding school designed to take the best students from across Somaliland, provide them with four years of practical curriculum and intensive English classes. At the end of their time with Abaarso Tech, students should be well equipped to seek opportunities in Somaliland and abroad that they would not have had access to otherwise. Abaarso Tech is also running professional training for teachers and starting development projects in the village of Abaarso.

Source: AllAfrica

Saudi livestock move boosts Somaliland economy

By
-
0

BERBERA, 10 November 2009 (Somalilandpress) — Days after Saudi Arabia lifted a nine-year ban on livestock imports from Somalia, the market in Hargeisa, Somaliland, has seen a 10-fold increase in sales, according to local traders.

“One thousand five hundred sheep used to be sold in the market before the recent announcement… compared to more than 16,000 animals in the market daily in the last few days,” Jama Farah Du’alle, a middleman (`dilal’) in the market, told IRIN on 7 November.

Livestock keepers in the self-declared republic of Somaliland, whose mainstay is pastoralism, said they were beginning to see a change in their fortunes.

“In the last nine years I used to earn 5,000-10,000 Somaliland shillings a day [US $1.6 – 3.2] but by Allah’s mercy in the past few days I have been earning 60,000-70,000 a day, which has really improved my life,” Du’alle said.

Somaliland’s livestock minister, Idiris Ibrahim Abdi, announced the Saudi move on 5 November. Imposed in late 2000, the ban followed an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) in the Horn of Africa region.

RVF is an acute viral infectious disease of humans, cattle and sheep, which usually occurs during the rainy season. Clinically it is characterized by fever, loss of body coordination and sudden death.

Saudi Arabia, which used to be the biggest buyer of Somali livestock, said it had lifted the ban to coincide with the `haj’ pilgrimage later in November.

Better days for Berbera

The decision allows livestock keepers to ship animals to Saudi Arabia through Somaliland’s traditional livestock port of Berbera. In the past, the port also served livestock trucked from the neighbouring Ethiopian regions of Somali and Oromiya.

Berbera had been losing its importance as a business centre since 2000. Thousands of people there moved to other towns such as Hargeisa and Burao.
[ad#Google Adsense (336×280)]
“[Most] of the young men who used to work in the livestock export business as animal herders on vessels heading to Saudi Arabia, have moved to Arab countries or other urban centres within Somaliland,” a local resident said.

The Saudi decision, according to local pastoralists, has renewed hope that Somali livestock can fetch a good price. “We have suffered in the last few years because of the ban; our animals had no value in the market.

“For example one lamb was valued at only about US$20, which is much less than the cost of foodstuff,” said Rashid Haybe Illeeye, from the Lebi-Sagaale region along the Somaliland-Ethiopia border.

“Today I came with four lambs as usual – to buy food – and three of them were bought at $40-50,” Illeeye said.

A local journalist based in Burao told IRIN that the lifting of the ban was a boon to all. “The market has not seen such activity for nine years,” he explained. “The whole of Burao – from tea ladies, truckers and nomads, to porters – is doing a booming business.”

Source: IRIN

1...935936937...980Page 936 of 980
Facebook Instagram Twitter
© Somaliland Current 2020, All Rights Reserved | Designed by SomSite