WHO CAN BRING THE CHANGE WE ARE LOOKING FOR?
Often i ask myself this question and never succeed answering it, for some people it might be so easy for them to answer this question because they already made up their mind about it, and whether that was for a personal interest or because they see in this or that party the change Somaliland needs, and let there be no doubt that no matter who wins in this election change is inevitable.
It’s true that we come from different parts of the country and represent different clans and that we support different presidential candidates. But we speak in one voice and say that the best way to make Somaliland stronger is to work together to address the urgent crisis facing our nation. This process requires honesty, give-and-take and genuine nationalism. Only In that spirit, we might address the common threats, and overcome them, and we must also be vigilant in upholding the beliefs and the values of our founders so it will live on in our time.
I must admit that it’s so easy to judge people when you are sitting on the other corner of the table, and also it’s so difficult to know the truthfulness and honesty of a politician, and maybe all politician shares that same element of being a deceivers. A wise politician once said, “in politics, everybody is a liar.’ And there is no doubt that the politicians are the same all over. They promise to build bridges even when there are no rivers.
I don’t like mocking or bickering, but we shouldn’t’t be shy to expose anyone and everything as long as we are not insulting the character or marking them as traitorous without having evidence and jurisdiction needed to pass such accusations, and as a democratic nation we should ask and request answers, and we do have the right to express and hear ideas about our candidates even if other people find those ideas to be outrageous.
Over the decades Somaliland People proved their tenacity, maturity, pragmatism, sensibility, wisdom, equality, freedom, civility and democratic and concessionary governance. These are the characteristics and attributes of Somaliland people, which are enshrined in their history. These are assets that the Almighty God gave it to them.
Somalia maltreated the Somalilanders from the beginning of the one-sided unification and treated them as second-class citizens in their own country. They were labeled as Somali ‘Qaldaan’, the wrong Somali. It was like the prison camp reminiscent of Apartheid South Africa, or the Belgian Congo at its most oppressive. It seemed inevitable that this level of cruelty could not but inflame a reactive liberation struggle.
The SNM personals, who establish the organization and fight the enemies of humanity, was true indisputable nationalist figures, who loved their country and people above any other thing, they sacrifice the most precious thing they have, and a lot of those heroes are dead today, but no one should take it for granted, Somaliland don’t owe anyone anything, those who struggle for it or die to liberate it, did their duty for their country, because they were a true citizens. It’s bad when someone comes, and asking for a payback for their loyalty it is a nasty and regretful thing to do. I know that we do a lot of embellishing so we don’t provoke this and that person, or that group or this tribe, and all of that not because we can’t, but because we don’t want problems for our country. but I believe that any fact that needs to be disclosed should be put out now or as quickly as possible.
SNM as any resistance party in the world had two functions first the political wing, and the other is the military wing. Now some of us might know a lot of things when it comes to the history of SNM, but when we talk about how heretic, and patriotic SNM was we are talking about those innocent civilians of Somaliland who were brutalized, and survived from the systematic barbarian holocaust war waged on them.
In 1980s, Somalia hired Rhodesian mercenaries to bombard Somaliland’s three major towns – Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera. Those who survived the bombings or the deliberate starvation were often rounded up, tied together using barbed wires and gunned down from a point-blank range. If that method was not cruel enough, they would often tie them together in barbed wires, bulldozed and were left to rot in the streets. Those who were lucky to survived and fled to neighboring Ethiopia was to experience starvation disease and the Ethiopian way of hospitality but nevertheless they were the lucky once. The pain is searing, everywhere you go there is a tragedy stores of people who lost their life’s, and you can still since the screaming voices of the innocent people when you visit the mass graves — the hurt, the humiliation, the degradation and the sheer brutality of the act of physically separating a mother from her children is a deep assault on our senses and on our most elemental sense of humanity. It is all bad and it is all pain and above all it is desperately sad when you feel great about what you have achieved to forget yesterday’s catastrophes and mass murders, and to accept the illusions that your struggle has ended.
In 1993 Borama Congress the Constitutional Committee recommended and was approved by the Congress that the key leadership positions in Somaliland would not be allocated on clan basis but would be contested by every Somalilander no matter the number of his/her clan.
The most important thing is to learn what one has to hold back when it comes to the issues of nation-building; what chuckhole were there; what mistakes one made; what more one needs to do in order to emulate the role of leadership. It’s by co-operation and engaging all parties that you can build a nation, and also through efficient administration that put the public interest above all, but not any leader is leader; the real leader is the one who gets his people from where they are to where they have not been.
Leaders must invoke vision and ideas that contribute to the unified sense of mission and thereby to the harmony of the whole. The art of creative leadership is the art of institution building, the reworking of human and technological materials to fashion an organism that embodies new and enduring values. Those leaders who do not are ultimately judged failures, even though they may be popular at the moment, therefore we can learn that nations are built by exploring new opportunities and elaborating ideas that will lead to prosperity, and that each exploration is only a means to the next.
Our politicians are product of a time and generation, it’s difficult for them to change their methods of practicing politics unless they find it not effective, and in order to make them realize that we should think wisely and have the adequate insight to decide intelligently who will meet our needs and represent us the best way to reach our goals for a better future, and we should make a reasonable effort to get the facts and reflect through it, few of us will have the greatness to bend history itself, but each of us can work to change a small portion of events, and in the total of those acts will be written the history of this generation. When we start electing our representatives on basis of what he could achieve for our country, and not by what tribe or benefit he represent for me, we can in our own ways, in our own lives, make a difference. let all of us co-operate and make change become possible, and reflect that in our way of dealing whit each other, and admit that there will be always a problem to confront and solve, otherwise there will be always this notion that we didn’t do enough for our homeland, and that we missed the opportunity to repair the roof when the sun was shining. It’s time to turn the page of these old policies of the past. ________________________ Views expressed in the opinion articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the editorial
HARGEISA, 8 April 2010 (Somalilandpress) – Leaders of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have left Yemen for Somalia, according to Somali officials quoted by Reuters and Yemeni media reports. Somali officials said at least 12 AQAP leaders arrived in Somalia from Yemen in the last two weeks.
“We don’t have evidence that this is happening, but it’s not beyond the pale,” says Kamran Bokhari, regional director ME and South Asia for the global intelligence company STRATFOR. He notes that it’s in the interest of the Somali government to say that the AQAP leaders have come to Somalia, as it could translate into more help from the U.S. in the fight against militant groups in the country. It’s also in the interest of the Yemeni government, since it would mean its recent efforts against jihadist groups were successful.
But Bokhari believes the reports could be credible, especially given the nature of the group.
“AQAP is now behaving not like a regional jihadi force, but like an international jihadi force, like al Qaeda prime,” he says.
Bokhari points out that they are planning attacks beyond the region, including the training of the Umar al Faruq Abd al Mutalib, the Nigerian behind the failed suicide bombing of the Northwest Airways plane last December. Moving to Somalia would therefore not be solely for safety reasons but also to expand their operations.
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AQAP had relocated once before from Saudi Arabia to Yemen for strategic reasons. Yemen has stepped up its efforts against al Qaeda in the country after the December 25th failed attack in the U.S.
According to the recent reports, the AQAP members left through the port of Al Mukala and ordered their cells in Yemen to suspend all operations and communications between them until the end of June.
The reports come a few days after the Somali Islamist group Hizbul Islam invited al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to Somalia.
They also come amid reports that the U.S. has approved putting the radical American Yemeni cleric Anwar al Awlaki on a hit list. Al Awlaki resides in Yemen. He is believed to have had ties with both Abdulmutallab, the failed Northwestern Airline suicide bomber, and Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, the Army psychiatrist who is accused of killing 13 people at Fort Hood last November.
Bokhari says Yemen’s geographical position puts it at the crossroads of four jihadists camps, namely Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Afghanistan/Pakistan. “There’s a lot of traffic in this area which is a problem for the President (Ali Abdullah Saleh). His country is open to infiltration from all these four different camps.”
HARGEISA, 6 April 2010 (Somalilandpress) – Piracy off the coast of Somalia is getting worse, partly due to the legal limbo that has led some countries to release captured suspects, Russia’s UN envoy said.
Over the past year and a half, the UN Security Council has passed several resolutions on piracy in the Horn of Africa and has authorized countries to use military force to pursue pirates in cooperation with Somalia’s transitional government.
“So far the results have not been entirely satisfactory,” Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin told reporters after a closed-door council meeting on Somalia, Iraq and other issues.
“The problem continues to be there and, in some respects, is growing,” he said. “We feel that one of the weak links in the entire setup … is the legal process.”
He said a stable legal mechanism was needed “to be sure there is no impunity once pirates are caught off the coast of Somalia.”
Churkin said Russia had drafted a Security Council resolution that would call on UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to outline options for ending the international legal ambiguities that have enabled pirates to escape prosecution.
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Council delegations would continue discussing the draft at the expert level before putting it to a vote, he said. It was not clear when the resolution would be ready to vote on.
The hijacking of ships near the coast of Somalia, where an Islamist insurgency and lawlessness has created a pirate safe haven, has cost the shipping industry millions of dollars but it is difficult to prosecute those planning an attack.
Earlier yesterday, a South Korean navy destroyer caught up with a super tanker hijacked by pirates that is cruising towards the Somali coast with a cargo of crude oil worth as much as $170 million, an official said yesterday.
Russia, Japan, the European Union and others have sent naval forces to the region to combat the scourge of piracy.
But the European Union Naval Force’s operation commander, Rear Admiral Peter Hudson, told Reuters recently that some suspected pirates detained by EU NAVFOR have had to be released due to questions about who could try them.
Churkin said Moscow was “concerned” about reports of European authorities releasing suspected pirates.
Kenya has been holding a number of suspected pirates. But Churkin said media reports that Kenya would put an end to trials for them were unsettling.
“This is one of the reasons we think this resolution would be timely and appropriate,” he said.
One option, he added, would be to establish a special tribunal to try suspected pirates captured off Somalia.
Other Security Council diplomats have said privately that such special tribunals are complicated, expensive and might not be worth the trouble. It would be better, they said, to work with countries like Kenya to help them continue to prosecute pirates in national courts.
City midfielder Abdisalam Ibrahim is re-writing the history books for East African footballers across the globe.
MANCHESTER (Somalilandpress) — The 18-year-old made his full debut at Scunthorpe in the FA Cup in January then came off the bench against Liverpool in February to become the first Somali-born footballer to play at the highest level in England.
Though he represents his adopted country Norway at international level, it is still a great source of pride for Ibrahim that he has put not only Somalia, but East Africa on the world football map.
“I’ve heard that I’m not only the first Somali-born footballer to play in the Premier League, but also the first East African, too,” said Abdi.
“I feel very proud to have achieved this at such a young age – it is the result of a lot of hard work and it just makes me want to do even better.
It’s the sort of thing I dreamed of as a kid, so for it to have become a reality is incredible
But Abdi accepts that representing his birth country is highly unlikely – he is already an established youth international for Norway, where he lived almost 10 years before joining City.
He added: “I’ve played at most levels for Norway from Under-15s up to the Under-19s, and if I am ever called up by the senior national side, I would be happy to take the opportunity.
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“I would love to give something back to a country that welcomed my family and gave us the chance to build a new life.”
Abdi is hoping for more chances to impress in the remainder of the season, but claims whatever happens in the closing weeks, it’s been an amazing first year with the senior squad.
He said: “I’ve had a terrific season – I only arrived six months ago and I’ve progressed to the first team. Everything has happened so quickly, but I’m loving every minute.”
Hargeisa, 6 April 2010 (Somalilandpress) – At the beginning of 21st century, the initiative of youth organization came on board in the Republic of Somaliland. The move has enhanced the competency and talents of the youth in the country. It has built a bridge for youth to ascend to the skyscrapers of international job market like the UN organizations as well as other private offices.
Consequently, a youth organization has become the only available option where they can develop and practice their leadership roles, which ultimately will lead to the participation of decision making at national levels.
However, the youth of today has no role in decision making, since they do not have any acting member in the current parliament, whose term is at the edge. Youth continue to remain inactive in minds of adults. They still believe youth cannot contribute anything in the decision making of the country. The saying that “Youth are the leaders of tomorrow” has consistently been used by adults as an excuse to perpetuate age gaps or simply to set climate for ignoring their role in national development.
This is not an issue confined only to Somaliland; in fact, the definition of “youth” is universally referred to as the age between 16 to 34. If this is taken literally, then it is unfortunate the population that is excluded from the decision making bodies in almost every country. While youths in other countries of the world have made combined efforts to the involvement of decision making, our youth have remained behind.
In addition, a decade ago youth involvement in leadership and decision making in Somaliland was beyond discussion. Their careers would not be visible since the country had recovered from severe wreckage; people aged 60 and over were called on duties and are still in offices, because of the absence of pension policy for retirement. Not only their future alternative, but there is no plan in place to enrich the current youth to actively participate and benefit from the inherited future.
Similarly, youth are also affected by myriad social, and economic issues, as well as health related problems, which has devastated their efforts, cohesion and ambitions.
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The youth have often quoted the constitution of the country as the primary obstacle to their participation in decision making. The constitution of Somaliland, allows only persons over 34 years of age to take part in parliamentary election, but lack of clarity of their roles, the absence of their interest, and their disarray can also be taken as the preliminary factors of youth challenges.
The ultimate solution is not only in the identification of the challenges, but also an all inclusive attempt. Equally, youth in Somaliland have not expressed their interest to participate in the decision making with the zeal deserved.
“We have made a number of attempts to advocate for youth on how to participate in the decision making in the country; we even had a meeting with the two houses (the representative and elders), and forwarded the youth issue and discussed our concern, but we have not yet gotten any response”, said Mohamed Mohamoud (Barwani), the Executive Director of SONYO (Somaliland Nationwide Youth Organization).
It is generally believed that youth can contribute nothing to the parliament, if they were given opportunity to play a role in decision making. Abdirahman Abib (Rabile), one of Somaliland youth has a different view on this; “youth are more dynamic than others; they have a new blood free from tribalism and nepotism; compatible with new technology and based on nationalism” he said.
“Having youth as Members of Parliament can allow them to bring on the board all issues effecting youth, come up a fresh initiative based on development, and take part in the race as they are energetic” he added.
Remarkably, youth organizations are institutions where youth build their leadership capacities, support the youth, and make their own career to the involvement in decision making. SONYO Umbrella is considered the only center for youth building that has played pivotal role in youth capacity in leadership building.
Thus, the continuation of youth organizations will increase their involvement in the decision making of the country. Finally, with all due respect, it is important for senior citizens to acknowledge that the tomorrow referred to in the saying is actually today – the future is now.
HARGEISA, 6 April 2010 (Somalilandpress) – This is a reply to Dr Mohamed Abbas’s 1st April 2010 article ‘Mr Goth’s Article Represents an Old Disease’ meant to rebut Mr Bashir Goth’s 23rd March 2010 ‘Somaliland: America’s Underestimated Friend’ both of which were posted on Hiiraan.com. In his rebuttal Dr Abbas tries to cover issues including the case of a woman extradited by Somaliland authorities to Ethiopia Somaliland-Ethiopian relations; Somaliland’s statehood; President Dahir Riyale’s alleged humiliation by Ethiopian Airline staff at Hargeisa airport and globalisation processes. Although most of these themes did not feature in Mr Goth’s article, Dr Abbas invokes them to undo the picture portrayed by Mr Goth advising us to disregard Goth’s article. In the following I am going to consider the substance of his rebuttal to see if we can take his advice.
On Busharo Wacdi
Dr Abbas discusses the case of a woman Somaliland authorities had extradited to Ethiopia. Notwithstanding that this case has no connection with Mr Goth’s article, Dr Abbas, without giving us relevant background information, wants us to accept his verdict of the story: an innocent woman going about her business extradited to Ethiopian authorities. The only description he gives us is that Busharo is a 50-year-old grandmother accused of having links with ONLF. Apart from his sexist and ageist view in his description of Busharo, Dr Abbas referring to aspects of the Somali culture wants to tell us that women do not commit a crime.
Although I disagree with Dr Abba’s sexist and ageist description of Busharo, and although Busharo does not feature in Mr Goth’s writing, I still want to comment on this. Because this part of his rebuttal contains valuable insight into his views on an important issue: Ethiopia’s fifth Kilil. Wondering why Busharo left Jigjiga for Hargeisa in the first place, Dr Abbas invokes Prophet Muhammad’s (Pbuh) advice to ‘his companions to emigrate to’ Ethiopia. To him Jigjiga, dating back to the start of the Islamic Hijra, has always been an Ethiopian town. Here Dr Abbas signs off Jigjiga as being an Ethiopian territory. I believe that such historical misrepresentation would annoy many Somalo-Ethiopians, because it goes against the historical evidence dating back to Imam Ahmed Guray in the fifteenth century that Ethiopia was an occupying force. Further, Dr Abba’s misreading of history has implications for the legitimacy of the ONLF and others to wage a war against Ethiopian government and their aspirations of independence or autonomy. In addition to his conceding the fifth Kilil to Ethiopia, Dr Abbas’s ascription of the resistance in that region solely to members hailing from the Somali Ogaden sub-clan is, I think, an ‘insult’ to the wider Somalo-Ethiopians aspiring for more advanced autonomy, self-determination or even an independent state.
He goes on to accuse the Somaliland government for its ties with Ethiopia. If anyone holding ties with Ethiopia is by definition guilty of siding with the enemy how would Dr Abbas describe those in Ethiopia’s fifth Kilil who are not taking up arms against the Ethiopian government?
Dr Abbas is right that people fleeing persecution should be protected under international treaties. But he is perfectly happy that Busharo was after all sent back to her Ethiopian home country – a place recommended by our Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh). Is she not blessed then? In my view instead of invoking Busharo’s case which has no relevance to Mr Goth’s article, Dr Abbas would have been better advised to raise his concerns, if he is concerned, about Somali nationals being fished out of their boats sometimes in their own maritime waters and tried in Egypt, Yemen, Seychelles, Kenya, Spain, France and even as far as in the US. Some of these people could have been engaged in a piracy activity, but under what international law are they being tried in foreign soils? I think Dr Abbas would be better advised to worry about why these Somali nationals ended up in foreign juridical system than worrying about an Ethiopian national who, in his own admission, was sent back to her home country.
On Somaliland-Ethiopian Relations
Dr Abbas tells us that Somaliland is not a sovereign state. According to him Somaliland is a ‘satellite state’ of the Ethiopian government. Although he does not use the term ‘satellite’ that is, however, what he trying to get at. To substantiate his point, Dr Abbas tells us of an incident whereby the president of Somaliland H.E. Dahir Riyale Kahin was subjected to a humiliating search at Hargeisa airport by Ethiopian airline security staff whilst President Kahin was boarding an Ethiopian airline. This incidence, if true, is an unfortunate fiasco. I suspect though that no one in their right mind would take that on face value. Because of the effectiveness of the opposition parties in Somaliland such a fiasco would not have gone unnoticed.
It appears to me that the issue is not necessarily a routine search of someone boarding a plane. If Dr Abbas means that Somaliland is not a sovereign country, simply because of the presence of Ethiopian airline security at Hargeisa airport, I suspect, he has just bared his grasp of international jurisdictions. Even in the heyday of the presence of Ethiopian army in Somalia, Somalia was in international legal terms never considered as an occupied country. The mere presence of an Ethiopian army did not render Somalia an occupied country. Likewise, the presence of Ethiopian airline staff at Hargeisa airport searching passengers boarding Ethiopian airlines has no bearing on the sovereignty of Somaliland. I am sure their presence is legislated for within commercial pact between the two nations. However, I agree with Dr Abbas that heads of states should be exempted from routine searches.
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On Dr Abbas’s view on Somaliland
Dr Abbas is right to say that world is becoming further globalised, but he forgets that another process of localization is at the same time taking place. Globalisation is truly meaningless if not based on rigorous local initiatives. But like many other concepts he has been using in his writing, Dr Abbas seems to have no grasp of what the concept of that he refers to in his use of the concept of ‘globalisation’. However, it appears he invokes the term to mean that more and more nation-states are giving up their sovereignty and joining up to form a bigger nation-state. Dr Abbas is simply mistaken in his thinking as no country in the world is giving up their sovereignty for globalisation sake. Further, you cannot just turn up at a local Singapore municipality and request a voter registration form arguing the world is globalised.
The funny thing in his rebuttal of Mr Goth’s article is that whilst Dr Abbas seems to be familiar with some political current terms, at the same time he appears frozen in his thinking. The situation in Somalia is changing so fast. Yes, historically Somalia had no piracy problems nor was there religious extremism. But that is no longer the case: piracy is peeking in Somalia, whilst extreme violence waged under the banner of Islam is an everyday reality in the country. In this respect, Dr Abbas fails to place Mr Goth’s reply to the Kenyan lawyer and his recent article in their historical perspectives. Dr Abbas also confuses commenting on Somali issues by a Somalilander is tantamount to their being pro or anti a particular political position.
He accused Mr Goth of secessionism. ‘Secession’, Dr Abbas tells us, ‘is an old disease’. Dr Abbas’s use of the phrase ‘old disease’ in his title raises serious questions. Not only is the phrase irrelevant to the topic he discuses, but his use of it has implications for the Somalo-Ethiopians dreaming to one day have their own state: by implication he warns them ‘session is an old disease’. This is understandable after he has signed off the fifth Kilil to Ethiopia. However, if he means by the phrase that people of Somaliland had in the past harboured hatred towards their brethrens in Somalia, Dr Abbas would need to educate us the history of that animosity. Indeed if this is his line of thought, I believe it is a very dangerous accusation to regard people of an entire nation to have always been harbouring animosity.
I think it would have made sense if Dr Abbas complained that Somaliland government has not contributed to finding solutions to the Somalia problem. But I can say that in my observation, the general feeling among people in Somaliland is that the misery that befell on their brethrens in Somalia ended sooner rather than later. It is a good sign to see that things are taking shape in Somalia. Indeed Somalilanders forwarded support to Somalis fleeing war in Somalia as they stood by their brethrens in Djibouti when the Eritrean forces invaded their country over border dispute in the summer of 2008.
Clearly, Dr Abbas seems stuck in time. In real terms former Republic of Somalia as a legitimate entity ceased to exist 20 years ago. Not only that he does not wake up to that reality, but after signing off Somali inhabited fifth Kilil to Ethiopia, Dr Abbas wants to revive dangerous irredentist movements in Somalia – to get all Somali ethnic inhabited regions in the Horn of Africa under one Great Somalia. If something is a dream, as Dr Abbas says of Mr Goth’s view regarding Somaliland, Great Somalia was a big dream that turned into a nightmare to every Somali across the Horn.
Now Ethiopia’s fifth Kilil enjoys now some form of federal provisions would Dr Abbas advise them to join their brethrens in Somalia and leave the Ethiopian federal system they are part of? In a similar vein, now Kenyans are voting for a new constitution would he tell them ‘come on guys you have now the opportunity’. Likewise, it would be naïve to ask Somaliland drop its sovereignty to join up an already fragile and complicated Somalia problem.
It appears to me that Dr. Abbas political literacy has let him down. It is not good enough to find some seemingly contradictory remarks in some one’s political writings. Dr Abbas fails to understand the complexity and richness in Mr Goth’s opinion articles. Dr Abbas took the example of Goth responding to a Kenyan lawyer proposing Somalia be divided between Ethiopia and Kenya. Anyone of Somali blood, Somalilander, Somalian or Djiboutian would oppose to such nonsensical proposition.
But that does not make one either in favour of Somaliland or Uninion of Somalia. Indeed if Dr Abbas cares about the Republic of Somalia he is so concerned about, did he respond to the Kenyan maverick, instead of taking on a brethren who just expressed his opinion. To be sure, rejecting to Somalia being divided between Kenya and Ethiopia does not equate to Somalia and Somaliland being re-united one more time. There is nothing contradictory in believing the cause of Somaliland and rejecting the idea of the territory of former Somali Republic being divided between Kenya and Ethiopia.
On Dr Abba’s rebuttal approach
Dr Abbas, because he disagrees fiercely with Mr Goth, has unreservedly descended into very undiplomatic language. With few exceptions, throughout his writing Dr Abbas refers to Mr Goth as ‘the man’. I think that Dr Abbas is unfamiliar with the rules of the game of engaging in a political debate. Even if you disagree with the Sheikh, you still address him as by his proper title. Instead of taking that charitable approach, Dr Abbas continued to make unsubstantiated psychoanalytical inferences. Quoting Mr Goth, Dr Abbas writes:
“When you read his recent article, you will understand how deep the man hates Somalia except his hometown. His biased comparison is only a small part of what he believes about the rest of Somalia. … Mr. Goth’s rhetoric and fallacious words reveal that the man wishes to see Somalia remains where it is today”.
Dr Abbas immediately continues with the following remarks:
“Previously, Mr. Goth has written many fascinating articles that attracted many readers. He should use his pen to unite his people instead of using it to propagate secessionism”.
Commenting on Goths article, Dr. Abbas continues to say that:
“He based his abusive criticism against Somalia on certain problems that are obvious and already known to everyone such as piracy, religious extremism, lawlessness, a weak government and so forth. The man has denied mentioning that similar problems can also be found in the two regions that he gloried blindly”.
By his own admission Dr Abbas agrees that there is a government in Somaliland, albeit weak. Somaliland is not par excellence the most democratic or strongest government in the region of Horn of Africa. But where Dr Abbas shows his misunderstanding of Mr Goth’s article, or for that matter what is happening in the region, is his claim that ‘piracy, religious extremism and lawlessness’ exist in Somaliland. The absurdity of this statement is, I think, quite clear. Although Dr Abbas does not tell us why he thinks that these three problems exist in Somaliland he seems to be happy that he has convinced us that Somaliland is a lawless, piracy-ridden country struggling with religious extremism. I just wonder who would buy into those misrepresentations.
Dr Abbas agrees that Mr Goth’s commentary on Somalia is something ‘everyone’ knows. However, Dr Abbas takes issues with Mr Goth portraying such a picture of Somalia and likens his expression of free speech to warlodrism. Here Dr. Abbas seems to give being a ‘warlord’ a new meaning: those who write about truth are warlords. If Mr Goth’s representation of what is happening is Somalia is tantamount to warlordism simply because Mr Goth made some factual comparison between Somaliland and Somalia, I just wonder why Dr Abbas is hesitant to call the BBC, the VOA and other media airing the killings and maiming in Somalia warlord media. Wouldn’t that be absurd? Dr Abbas may have tried to shoot down the messenger, but what the messenger has said is still true and has been heard.
Written by:
Mohamed Obsiye
mobsiye78@hotmail.com
____________________________________________________________________________________________ Views expressed in the opinion articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the editorial
Somalilandpress has received the following statement from the Union of Somaliland Students in Yemen:
Graduated Students:
A graduation ceremony was organised in the University of Science & Technology’s main campus (Sana’a) hall on Friday 2nd of April by the Union of Somaliland Students in Yemen and was attended by Somaliland officials, students, foreign lecturers and other distinguished guests.
The ceremony was named in honour of Daallo mountains, in the Sanag region of Somaliland. Indeed very beautiful and inspiring place and in this occasion it was chosen to symbolize the students reaching new heights and peak in education and also to reflect on the student’s various fields of expertise and for their determination for the betterment of their country.
In total, ten students, half of whom were young inspiring girls graduated in the faculties of Engineering, Agriculture, Media (Mass Communication), Pharmacology, Laboratories, Accounting & Business Administration and Computer Science.
Most of these students have been studying in the last four years in some of Yemen’s finest universities and colleges including University of Science & Technology, Sana’a University, Queen Arwa university and the International College (a college affiliated to the university of Science & Technology). The graduates include a young girl who received her Masters in business administration.
Last year, similar number of students have graduated from Engineering, Information & Communication Technologies and Business – all of them have successfully returned to Somaliland.
Similarly, many of this year’s graduates have the intention of returning back home and hopefully work there, while others want to further their education. Most these students pay their own tuition and accommodation, so they can stay and proceed their studies if time and circumstances allow them, or they have another option of joining other universities elsewhere. An important thing worth noting is that most of the Somaliland Students in Yemen study different fields, which gives them greater chances than those studying similar faculties.
The total number of Somaliland students currently in Yemen are quite large, and they are spread in the different regions of the country. Although the student’s union registered a total of 200 students, who filled the Unions admission requirements; however there are a large number of them studying in Islamic Institutions such as Ma’bar and Dammaj (centers for Islamic teachings). Many also come from abroad and stay here at least during the summer, while others come from Europe and America who want to further their Islamic teachings from such Islamic institutions.
Student’s Living conditions:
Most of the students live in rent apartments or houses, few of them get the opportunity to live in a dormitories. Part of these dormitories are paid so students interesting such option pay the residence expense. Some of the universities have affordable apartments on their premises but they can be hard to obtain one.
The living conditions are not so bad but challenging, however students manage their livelihoods one way or another. Students are aware of each other and support one another as much as they can.
Yemeni Scholarships:
Yemen gives Somaliland students 15 scholarships each year. Ten students in undergraduate vacancies and another five are given positions in technical and further education colleges. Some of these students are selected from the Somaliland community in Yemen, but the main number always comes back home.
However, it is worth to mention that many of these positions are vacant and are not filled up by our students. This is because students often arrive late in Yemen when admissions have been completed or they are turned down because the Yemeni Ministry of Education does not recognize Somaliland’s GCSE certificate. If they are not refused, their applications are often delayed and many start their educations a year later. Another problem facing these students is related to the visa arrangements process, admissions and transportation.
Many students come late to Yemen because often the visa process takes forever and It is not yet clear, how the new Yemeni office in Hargeisa will solve or address some of these issues. Whatever the case, we believe a solution could lay within the context of the following points:
Students should know Arabic prior to their arrivals, so that they do not waste the scholarship opportunity
All students should take into consideration possible delays including political, economic and accomodations and should apply early. Normally, the Yemeni school year runs from September to the following June with a long summer holiday in the months of July and August. It is important for students to be in Yemen by this time and not after two or three months.
To simplify visa requirements and processes for the students. The ministries concerned should raise this issue with Yemeni officials.
The government needs to convince the Yemeni government that our certificate meets international standards.
The Somaliland Office in Yemen should help students get visa on time, arrive early and begin studies within a short period of time.
Some students never get the field of study they like despite their high marks, so this issues should be also discussed with Yemeni officials.
Student’s Organization:
The Union of Somaliland Students in Yemen is an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organization working voluntarily for the betterment and development of Somaliland students in Yemen. The organization was founded by a group of students and was officially established in 2006 by H.E President Rayale, during his official visit to the Republic of Yemen.
The organization acts as a network for Somaliland students in Yemen, giving them awareness programs, guidance and consultations in course selections and helping students choose the right field and career. The organization also gives information to students interested in knowing or joining Yemeni universities. Once students arrive in Yemen, the organization welcomes and takes them from the airport to temporary hostiles prepared for them, helping them settle and adapt with the new environment.
University admissions and sometimes visa preparations are some of the tasks that the organization performs for the students. Although the organization works voluntarily and without financial support and donation from any where, yet it is one of the most effective, component and well-managed student organizations outside Somaliland.
The organization organizes ceremonies, festivals and sometimes debates. All students in Yemen act as one cell, and the organization has the intention to widen it’s activities into broader fields and projects for the coming years.
Besides that, the organization works under some constraints and challenges. To mention some, finance is a major obstacle plus the fact that the hosting country does not deal directly with Somaliland as an independent state.
Somaliland’s lack of international recognition, sometimes delays or at least has it’s impact one way or another on the organization’s work. We are still received as part of what was the Somali Republic more than 18 years ago and we know, we are not alone, as many of you have experienced similar situations in different countries. But, our goal is clear; no politics, 100 per cent dedication in education and self-support.
Somaliland Office in Yemen:
The memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Yemen late 1990s, paved the way to the establishment of Somaliland office in the Yemeni capital, Sana’a. The office was officially inaugurated in 1998 as the current deputy chairman Mr Gudal informed us, but it was lacking vision and resources at the beginning. It’s top priority is to strengthen economical ties between Somaliland and Yemen, and the Office gives little attention to students in Yemen.
However, students work closely with the office having in mind that half of loaf is better than none. Some complaints about this office are on the ground such as: giving little or no attention to students, it is also incompetent, lacks direction and vision, does not engagement with students, etc.
As far as the students are concerned they have proposed a number solutions to the ongoing certificate problems and students late arrivals which they discussed with both the trade office and Ministry of Education but they all turned deaf ears.
The organization questions, why such opportunities are spoiled and wasted while many students back are eager to get higher educations and join a university. For the last three years, many opportunities were lost – take for example, last year, only four out of the ten possible students arrived in Yemen, six just gave up because they did not receive the help and information they required.
The organization on it’s side has addressed these issues and similar ones to the appropriate departments, but it seems that up to now it is a major problem ahead of every Somaliland student planning to study in Yemen.
In Conclusion:
The above mentioned information is just small portion of the reality that lies on the ground. Somaliland students in Yemen have in mind that there is no lift to success but one has to take the stairs. life doesn’t always take the straight path but it has it’s ups and downs, and the very thing we learned here in Yemen is patience.
Somaliland students from Yemen never fill their cup of patience. In short, Yemen is a challenging environment for students but these challenges can be solved easily if the student shows commitment, dedication, hard work and patience.
Finally, we wish to thank somalilandpress.com for their services and I want to say to them that the sky is your limit, you have shown great success in such a short period of time. Thank you and keep up the good work.
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Ahmed Mohamoud Elmi – Shawky
The Chairman of Somaliland Students in Yemen
susyemen@hotmail.com
Nairobi, 5 April 2010 (Somalilandpress) – IGAD Wide Training of Trainers Meeting on IGAD Conventions, which is mutual legal Assistance and Extradition, was held in Nairobi, Kenya from 23-25 March 2010.
The training was initiated by ICPAT in collaboration with Center for Global Counter Terrorism Co-operation (CGCTC) with financial support of Danish Government.
It was noted that the IGAD region was targeted by Organized Crimes. The prevalence of porous borders and traditional cross border ties exacerbate illegal activities across borders. It was pointed out that the Somali Pirates are increasingly becoming innovative with new funding techniques.
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It was also noted that IGAD member states have not fully incorporated and ratified all the UN resolution yet.
Presentations were made on the IGAD wide Extradition and MLA conventions by ICPAT, UNCTED, CGCTC, Amicus Consult and Experts from Kenya Law Society.
Fragile and failed states have been with us since we’ve had a state-based international order. But the interest of policymakers in such states took on a new life after 9/11. The events of that day, and subsequent terrorist attacks, made devastatingly clear just how dangerous failed states such as Afghanistan could be, not only to their own people, but to communities around the world.
Afghanistan and the neighboring tribal areas of Pakistan continue to demonstrate the threat posed by ungoverned areas to their citizens, their neighbors and the broader international community. Somalia has been a failed state since the nineties, and has recaptured the international community’s attention in recent years – not because of the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in the country, but because it has become a base and haven for pirates preying on international shipping. And an unsuccessful bomber who probably received training in Yemen has been the catalyst for a surge of international interest in that fragile state.
So what is a fragile state? There’s now a substantial body of literature on such states. And every academic or agency appears to have their own descriptor – so apart from fragile statues, you also have states that are “weak,” “failing,” “failed,” “collapsed,” “at risk,” “precarious”, “vulnerable” or “recovering”. Some of these are alternate descriptions to “fragile” and some are encompassed within it. Even the term “fragile state” has come under criticism in recent years. Some scholars now consider the term both pejorative and analytically imprecise. They claim that fragility is not an either/or concept but rather exists along a continuum, and that it is highly context-specific and comes in a variety of economic, political, and social forms. But regardless of the specific conceptual formulation, these descriptors and analyses all point to some type of significant state failure or dysfunction.
The World Bank provides a good working definition, observing such states “share a common fragility, in two particular respects: State policies and institutions are weak in these countries: making them vulnerable in their capacity to deliver services to their citizens, to control corruption, or to provide for sufficient voice and accountability. They face risks of conflict and political instability.”
Predicting conflict in fragile states
One consistent theme is the strong correlation between state fragility and conflict. Not all states experiencing conflict are fragile (India is a good example, with a number of internal conflicts, and the conflict in Kashmir), but most of them are; and not all fragile states are experiencing conflict, but almost all of them of them are or recently have. The World Bank identifies 37 fragile situations in 2010 – and all bar a small handful are post conflict or conflict affected.
It shouldn’t be surprising that there is such a strong correlation. Many of the indicators for conflict are indicators for state weakness. Low and declining growth are widely recognised indicators for conflict – and low income and weak growth typically translate into lack of state capacity. A lack of state capacity usually results in an inability to mediate between competing interests. Low income also lowers the cost of rebellion, making it more attractive to would-be rebels.
And the converse is also true. Conflict invariably has a negative impact on economic growth. Resources directed to conflict are diverted from development. Conflict destroys the infrastructure needed for economic activity. And without security, development efforts are unlikely to take hold and have the desired effects.
While the link between fragility and conflict is by now widely accepted there is certainly no similar consensus about how this link plays out in practice. Much academic work is now devoted to mapping the various causal flows between fragility and conflict. And it’s the kind of academic work that has direct relevance to policymakers, particularly when it comes to prevention and its necessary accompaniment, prediction.
Policymakers focus on the linkages in their efforts to obtain early warning of fragile states that may slip into conflict, and in an effort to ensure timely and cost-effective responses.
There is no shortage of early warning in this age of proliferating NGOs, instant and widespread internet and satellite communications, and an awareness of the threat posed by failing states. In fact, there may be too much of it – the challenge for policymakers can be to determine which of the barrage of warning they receive is credible, and requires action, and which can be ignored. The related challenge is to tie early warning to effective early action – early action here means policy response by governments and international and regional organisations. Analytical and advocacy NGOs have the luxury, and the frustration, of being able to warn, but not being able to respond.
So what kind of early warning do policymakers have access to?
Very broadly, there are two types of early warning – qualitative and quantitative warning.
The early warning produced by my organization, the International Crisis Group, is a good example of qualitative early warning. The task of our analysts is to find out what is happening and why. They identify the underlying political, social and economic factors creating the conditions for conflict as well as the more immediate causes of tension. Our role is to warn, as early and effectively as possible, those who are able to influence a situation where the risk of new or renewed conflict has reached a dangerous threshold.
Crisis Group’s particular value-added in this respect is that all our reporting and analysis is field-based. At last count we had people on the ground from 50 different nationalities, speaking between them 49 different languages. They are steeped in local language and culture, getting dust on their boots, engaged in endless interaction with locals and internationals on the scene, and operating from 9 regional offices and 17 other locations in the field.
Crisis Group also produces the monthly CrisisWatch bulletin which summarises developments during the previous month in some 70 situations of current or potential conflict, assessing for each whether the overall situation has significantly deteriorated, improved, or on balance remained more or less unchanged. This is one of the few examples of very short term early warning in the public domain.
The challenge that this kind of qualitative early warning poses for policymakers is that its credibility and hence usability relies to a significant extent on the reputation of the external provider of such analysis. It is difficult, though not impossible, for governments to make big resource allocation decisions (ie whether to intervene to seek to prevent a looming conflict) on the basis of independent, non government, analysis. Of course, governments have their own analysts, but these often they won’t have the expertise, or the institutional freedom, of their non-governmental peers. There are ways to incorporate independent qualitative analysis into governments’ own analysis and planning, but the constraints will usually act to inhibit governments from using such external analysis as the predominant basis for their early response decision making.
This is where quantitative early warning comes into the picture. The advantage (in theory) behind quantitative analysis is that it relies on verifiable data, and hence provides an independent and transparent basis for making resource allocation decisions.
That’s the theory. The reality is more complex. Quantitative warning, relying as it does on statistical analysis, requires a model of conflict with quantifiable factors that can be measured, compared and analysed. But this conflict modelling is still more of an art than a science, despite rapid advances in the field over the last decade or so. The other challenge with quantitative warning is the timeframe of its predictive ability. It is much better adapted to highlight worrying trends than to identify with great specificity a likely tipping point into violence.
Quantitative theories used to be broadly, if simplistically divided into two camps – that of greed versus grievance – with the greed camp holding that economic factors were largely responsible for conflict, and the grievance camp blaming on inequality and political, ethnic and religious grievances.
The debate has been refined in recent years – concurrent with big improvements in the data – and now is more usefully characterized as one between feasibility and regime type, with the proponents of the feasibility thesis focusing on the conditions that determine the economic viability of rebellion, whereas the regime type proponents conclude that it is political institutions and not economic conditions that are the most powerful predictor of instability.
The doyen on the feasibility side of the debate is Oxford academic Paul Collier. His models have been developed and refined over the years, but the essence of his analysis is that the defining feature of civil war is the emergence and durability of a private rebel army, and under most conditions such organizations are likely to be neither financially nor militarily feasible. Civil war will only occur if a rebel organisation can build and sustain a private army. He and his co-authors go on to argue that “where insurrection is feasible it will occur, with the actual agenda of the rebel movement being indeterminate.” Their research shows that three factors in particular are important in demonstrating feasibility of conflict – namely low per capita income, slow economic growth, and large exports of natural resources. Further variables have been recently added to the model, namely whether a country is under the implicit French security umbrella and the proportion of its population who are males in the age range 15-29, and a weaker variable that mountainous countries are more conflict prone (see “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War”, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner, May 2008).
Low per capita income points to the incapacity of the state to maintain effective control over its territory. Both low income and slow growth can be interpreted as lowering the recruitment cost of rebel troops, and natural resources can provide rebel organizations with finance.
The attractiveness of this theory of conflict is that most of these factors can be quantified. And many civil conflicts over the past couple of decades can be readily explained by it – for example, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo, Sudan, Aceh, Niger Delta, and Cote d’Ivoire – but does not provide a robust explanation for all civil conflicts or for the lack of conflict in some states.
Collier has more recently looked at the links between democracy, development and conflict. He has argued that income level is the key factor in preventing violence during transitions to democracy. He believes that while the international community often favours promoting democracy as a solution to overcoming violent conflict, democracy also constrains the technical possibilities of government repression, and that this makes rebellion easier. Although the net effect of democracy is therefore ambiguous, he suggests that the higher is income the more likely is it to be favourable. He finds that whereas in rich countries democracy makes countries safer, below an income threshold democracy increases proneness to political violence.[i]
The regime type advocates take a different approach. The most sophisticated and sustained research on factors influencing motivation has been done by the Political Instability Task Force (formerly known as the State Failure Task Force), a panel of scholars that has worked since 1994 to collect and analyze data on political regimes and conflict around the world. Its work has focused particularly on regime type and quality.[ii]
The Task Force’s research postulates that regime type is overwhelmingly the dominant factor behind revolutions, ethnic wars, and adverse regime changes. However, the effect of regime type is not a simple function of the degree of democracy or autocracy. The starting point is that strong autocracies are rarely prone to conflict. Strong democracies are also not prone to conflict. It is certain kinds of partial autocracies and partial democracies that are much more vulnerable than other regime types, with the vulnerability depending on the patterns of executive recruitment and political participation under those regimes. A particularly strong contributor to instability is that of factionalism within the political process.
The taskforce model has four independent variables: regime type, infant mortality (as a proxy for poverty), a “bad neighborhood” indicator flagging cases with four or more bordering states embroiled in armed civil or ethnic conflict, and the presence or absence of state-led discrimination. They claim for this model an 80% success rate in identifying likely instability within a period of two years.
Interesting recent research has also looked at the linkage between climate and conflict. Studies by scholars such as Edward Miguel at Berkeley attempt to establish clear causal links between climate factors and conflict. While most studies claim that poverty (which can be intensified or induced by climate change) has suffered from questions of reverse causality – namely, whether conflict leads to poverty or vice versa – Miguel finds that drops in rainfall in Africa, clearly an exogenous factor not affected by conflict, produce drops in income, increasing the likelihood of conflict the following year by nearly half. He recommends pre-empting violence by targeting foreign aid to shore up incomes in regions where livelihood is affected by rainfall, thereby removing a short term trigger of violence.[iii]
The latest work in this field has moved beyond precipitation to looking at warming and finds strong historical linkages between civil war and temperature in Africa, with warmer years leading to significant increases in the likelihood of war. One recent research paper suggested a roughly 54% increase in armed conflict incidence by 2030 if current climate model projections are correct.[iv]
So that is a very quick run though of the current models for predicting conflict and instability. As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of this type of quantitative analysis depends on the robustness of the models, and the quality of the data – and these are both continuing to evolve.
For policymakers seeking to establishes processes in which early response is less ad hoc and more systematic, perhaps the best course of action is to use quantitative analysis to identify a small group of fragile states at risk of violent conflict within a two year timeframe, and then incorporate external qualitative analysis to refine that list and determine the most appropriate intervention.
Policy approaches to fragile states
Another difference between quantitative and qualitative analysis is that while the former may tell policymakers when to intervene, it doesn’t give them much guidance on how. Good qualitative analysis is much better geared to inform policymakers’ interventions in particular fragile states.
So how should policymakers engage with such states? Given the variations between states, their problems, the tools available to interveners, the political will to intervene and all the other permutations, I won’t attempt to set out a menu of policy options here. However there are a number of guidelines that could usefully inform interventions in all fragile states.
1. Understand the problem.
This is perhaps a statement of the obvious – but it is salutary to understand how often the obvious is ignored when the international community intervenes. Far too often lessons painfully learned in earlier interventions are forgotten or ignored.
There is no checklist of appropriate policies for fragile states. What may have worked in Iraq for instance – such as international support for tribally based militias – is unlikely to work in Afghanistan. In fact in the latter country, the last five years have seen failed incarnations of the same policy on militias – first in the form of arbakai (tribal militias), then the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, then the Afghan Public Protection Force, and now the Coalition appears determined to repeat the failures of those initiatives with its latest effort, the Local Defense Initiative. So perhaps an exhortation to understand the problem is not quite as obvious as it seems.
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Policies have to be evidence-based. They have to build on a field-based understanding of the history, culture, political dynamics and region. This is where the work of organizations like Crisis Group is so important. We produced field-based policy reports. Our analysts are stationed in or near the countries they cover. They are steeped in an understanding of the country, its culture, politics, and the interests of the key players. They can and do travel around countries much more freely than embassy staff can. They usually have better access too. All of which is reflected in our analysis.
2. Recognise that prevention is better than cure, and that prevention does work.
There was an excellent report published in 2005 – the Human Security Report – which documented the trends in conflicts since the Second World War. (The 2009 issue of this report is forthcoming.)
Its headline statistic is an encouraging one, and perhaps counterintuitive – namely that there has been a 40% reduction in the number of state-based armed conflicts since the early 1990s. And, while there has been a small uptick in the number of state-based conflicts since 2003, when non-state conflicts are included (i.e. conflicts in which all both parties are non-state actors, such as rebel groups) there has been a continuing decline in the overall number of conflicts since 2003. There has also been a longer term trend decline in battle deaths (ie military personal and civilians killed in fighting.) There were only some 12,000 reported battle deaths in 2005 – less than any year since 1946.
Why has there been a decline in conflict, and what lessons can we learn from these trends? The Human Security Report posits a number of causes, such as end of the Cold War leading to a reduction in proxy conflicts, and the growth in the number of democracies. But it attributes much of the reduction to a surge in international conflict prevention and resolution activities in the 1990s, led by a reinvigorated United Nations. Between 1987 and 2008, the number of Special Representatives of the Secretary- General increased six-fold. UN peacekeeping missions – which play a key role in preventing renewed conflict – increased from four in 1990 to 15 currently.[v] The international financial institutions and donor governments and civil society have played a significant role with their efforts to address the root causes of conflict. The key message is that conflict prevention efforts, for all their failings and inadequacies, can make a real difference.
There are some examples of where these advances – seen, for example, in the rise in resources devoted to peacekeeping and conflict prevention work among national governments, stronger regional peace and security response mechanisms, the evolution of vibrant civil society engagement in conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives, and advances at the level of international law – have paid dividends. In some cases, coordinated international engagement has been instrumental in shifting states affected by devastating civil wars onto the fragile road to transition. Countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Nepal continue to face considerable challenges, in economic development, institution building and professionalization of their public services in the wake of devastating civil wars. The painful and long-term task of reconciling societies damaged by war will remain relevant for some years. But these states also managed to execute a transition to post-war recovery that would have seemed inconceivable in the early 2000s.
Concerted efforts by regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have also played a decisive role in preventing violent outbreak in fragile states and in bringing states back to the fold. We saw some encouraging evidence of the impact of coordinated regional and international engagement in Guinea over the past few months. Effective regional and international actions in response to 2009’s military takeover have been instrumental in encouraging the country’s shift back to civilian rule from January this year.
Of course, there is no room for complacency. Climate change, the fallout from the global economic crisis (including falling commodity prices and reduced remittances from diasporas), the aftermath of recent fuel and food price shocks, and a likely fall in the aid and development budgets of rich countries are all likely to increase the likelihood of conflict in fragile states in the coming years.
Given this outlook, policymakers need to develop smarter and more cost effective interventions. And that being the case, we need to recognise that prevention is not only more effective than intervention after the bullets have started flying – but (and this should be music to policymakers’ ears) it is also much cheaper.
A 2004 study estimated that on average one euro spent on conflict prevention generates over 4 euros in savings to the international community.[vi] As with all such studies, there are a number of heroic assumptions involved – but not so heroic to render the key finding redundant, namely that the cost of properly targeted prevention is a lot less than the cost of conflict.
To give some concrete figures, though again, very much context specific: the former UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has estimated that the small preventive military deployment in Macedonia, stopping the slide to war there, cost the British taxpayer £14 million (24 m euros), while fighting the war in Kosovo, by contrast, cost Britain £200 million (350 m euros), and in Bosnia over £1.5 billion (2.6 billion euros). And those are just the military costs, not the costs of reconstruction.
3. Understand the regional context
Fragile state policies are generally geared towards individual states, and too often ignore the regional context. But as the experience of Africa and the Balkans and South Asia have amply demonstrated — conflict and state-failure usually have very strong regional dynamics.
Neighboring states can contribute to conflict in a number of ways. The most obvious is by being a party to the conflict. They can be active participants, for instance by being at war with the state in question, but more usually they are indirect participants, preferring to support proxy militias or fund rebel groups. Rwanda and Uganda were both in the Congo. Neighboring states can also provide a safe haven for rebels or spoilers, as Pakistan is doing with the Taliban, and Chad and Sudan are doing for each other’s rebels. They can funnel arms and supplies to governments or rebels (as some 11 countries are alleged to have been doing in Somalia, many of them being neighboring countries); or they can be more subtle in their destabilisation – as one could perhaps characterise Ethiopia’s role in Somalia, as it pulled its troops after its intervention, leaving a security vacuum and likely ensuring Somalia remains a failed state for many years yet.
As noted above, the Political Instability Task Force has identified “bad neighborhood” as a statistically significant risk factor for conflict, with bad neighborhood here being defined as four or more bordering states embroiled in armed civil or ethnic conflict.
So when it comes to strengthening or rebuilding fragile states, failing to address these regional dynamics will probably consign even the best-designed and most well-intentioned peacekeeping mission or development assistance package to failure as soon as the troops leave or the donor community’s generosity runs dry.
4. Commit the necessary political, financial and security resources
The key political resource is a commitment to stay the course. It takes many years to rebuild a state, and premature disengagement can very quickly destroy all the progress and the billions invested in rebuilding. Just look at Timor Leste, where premature disengagement allowed that country to fall back into conflict, with the result that in 2006 it was almost back to where it started after its violent rebirth in 1999.
Doubt among Afghans about the international community’s commitment to stay feeds insecurity there, and feeds patronage-based politics, and a willingness to do deals with the insurgent leadership – driven in part by their fear that the internationals will abandon them, as they have done in the past.
The sad fact is that the international community isn’t good at staying the course. Too often we adopt a formulaic approach – particularly to those states requiring large scale international intervention. The standard response is a four or five year commitment, in the form of largish peacekeeping missions to back up internationally mediated peace agreements or Security Council resolutions, some DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants) and SSR (security system reform) followed by a rush of indigestible aid dollars, a flurry of institution building, and premature elections – followed too often and too soon by a withdrawal of peacekeeping troops and a drying up of aid money just when it is most needed and the absorptive capacity is able to beginning coping with it.
A rush to early elections can be particularly problematic. Holding elections – although good for political show business (and, in post-conflict peacebuilding contexts, much loved as an exit benchmark for governments anxious to meet their commitments and go home) – quite often has nothing much to do with democracy. Crisis Group was one of the first organisations to really make this point loudly and clearly, opposing as we did a rush to an early election in Bosnia in 1996 because we feared this would consolidate ethnic divisions which hadn’t had the chance to be counterbalanced by the development national secular political forces, or at least strong civil society institutions. The recent presidential election in Afghanistan, held when there evidently wasn’t the domestic institutional capacity to manage a credible and legitimate process, is another example.
We know that the period of transition to democracy is in many ways one of the most dangerous and fragile of all. This doesn’t mean that we should retreat from democratisation, but that we should rethink our priorities in the way we pursue it. The most important of all things to prioritise is the rule of law – often a very difficult challenge, but essential if democratic institutions are to take root and flourish.
When it comes to financial resources – the temptation is to do it on the cheap. This is the ultimate false economy. Conflict imposes horrendous financial costs, not to mention the devastating human toll. And failure to get it right after conflict significantly increases the risk of a return to conflict.
It has been estimated (in 2004) that civil war in a low-income country costs that country and its neighbors on average 42 billion euros in direct and indirect costs. That is for a single conflict.[vii] To put that figure in perspective, the worldwide aid budget in 2004 was 60 billion euros.
So we should properly fund effective prevention, and thereby reduce the costs spent on peacebuilding post-conflict reconstruction. And when we do have to fund peacebuilding, we shouldn’t do it on the cheap – as the likelihood is that this will increase the risk of the country falling back into conflict, thereby requiring yet further expenditure on peacekeeping and stabilisation forces and the follow-up peacebuilding.
Finally there are the security resources. A secure environment is a necessary but not sufficient condition to strengthening a fragile state. It’s sobering to realise that rebel groups and militias responsible for terrorizing a country or large parts of it are often very weak and brittle. They often survive and prosper because there are no capable forces to oppose them. When confronted with effective forces, they will often collapse – as happened with the rebels in Sierra Leone (confronted first by the mercenaries of Executive Outcomes, and subsequently routed by a few hundred British special forces); militias in Bunia, DRC (confronted by EU/French forces in Operation Artemis); or rebelling soldiers recently in Timor Leste (confronted by Australian troops and police).
More importantly, security guarantees can be critical in deterring future spoilers. The ability to rapidly deploy an effective military force can be sufficient to ensure that the need to deploy will not arise. The commitment can be an over-the-horizon one – as the UK provided to Sierra Leone – but it needs to be real and credible.
But sometimes a small security commitment will not be sufficient, and large scale sustained commitments are required. Even then, an effective and timely commitment may repay the investment many fold in terms of the avoidance of future costs. Such commitments are expensive and politically difficult – particularly where there is a likelihood of casualties – but as always the cost of failing has to be weighed against the cost of the commitment. Back in March 2002, when there were some 4,500 NATO peacekeepers stationed in Kabul, Crisis Group called for the peacekeeping force to be expanded to 25,000-30,000 and deployed around the country – a call subject to much criticism and ridicule from some Coalition governments, and NATO itself, as being greatly in excess of what was needed or feasible. Some eight years later, NATO is on track to have 150,000 troops deployed by September 2010.
Conclusion
Fragile states need lots of security and lots of development if they are to become viable and effective states in future. And it’s important to remember that in a globalised world, it’s not just capital and trade that travel the world – terrorism and extremism can also be exported, or nurtured in fragile states, and ill-gotten funds laundered by them.
But while that provides an incentive for international engagement, it’s important that it not become the sole justification for engagement. Fragile states inflict untold misery on their citizens and on neighboring countries.
When it comes to addressing state fragility we increasingly understand what works and what doesn’t – even if we are a long way from having all the answers yet. We certainly know enough to know that we aren’t doing enough to assist such states. Earlier and better targetted assistance to fragile states would dramatically improve the quality of life for hundreds of millions of people, which makes it a tremendously worthy goal in its own right.
Speech by Nick Grono, Deputy President of the International Crisis Group, to Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense, Brussels, 27 March 201
SHEIKH, (Somalilandpress) — The son of Kuwait’s Emir, Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah has arrived in Somaliland on Sunday on behalf of his father to conduct and oversee a number of projects.
His arrival follows after the Kuwaiti emir has built a modern luxury
villa worth more than $3 million dollars in the town of Sheikh, in Sahil region, as a family vacation home. In a move to familiarize himself with the town and locals, the prince, Ahmad Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah, toured the main hospital in the town and a number of historical sites before visiting his private villa. While on tour, the prince was accompanied by the provincial governor of Sahil and some of the local residents.
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While talking to locals, the prince asked, if they needed any thing from the Kuwaiti royal family, on which the locals told the prince that the region desperately needed a university, so that graduates from Sheikh’s famous boarding school could receive their complete higher education in the region. The Prince promised he would convey the message to his father.
Abandoned: The Sheikh hospital
Somalilandpress has also learned that the hospital of the town will be upgraded and renovated in the next six months by the Kuwaiti royal family at a cost of about $1.5 million USD. The hospital will come directly under the Red Crescent of Kuwait and will be renamed after the Emir’s own wife.
The hospital was constructed by the Soviet Union in the 70s and was one of the leading hospital in what was then the Somali Republic. The hospital was slowly abandoned during the civil war, no one has since offered to renovate nor provide the funds. It seems now, the day of destiny has finally arrived from Emir of Kuwait.
Emir's palace under construction - (Gargare/7th January 2009)
