Faisal Ali Waraabe, Chairmen of UCID Party, and Khaalid Hassan H.Mahamud, UCID Representative to Socialist International and EU, attend the meeting of the Council of the Socialist International in Cascais, Portugal.
UCID Party became a member of the Socialist International following the historic SI Congress held in South Africa September 2012. The Socialist International are holding their first meeting of its Council in Cascais, Portugal, on 4-5 February, hosted by the Portugese Socialist Party.
Under the heading “The World Economy: Our Vision for Growth, Jobs and Sustainable Development”, the Council’s agenda will address the following aspects “The Eurozone Crisis: From here, which way forward?”; “Emerging and Developing Economies in an ‘Out of Crisis’ Strategy”; and “Multilateral Institutions and other International Actors in the Search for Fair and Sustainable Answers”.
Chairmen of UCID Party, Faisal Ali Waraabe met with Luis Ayala, Secretary General of the Socialist International and with George Papandreou, President of the Socialist International and Prime-Minister of Greece, Alfred Gusenbaur, former Prime Minister of Austria. The UCID representatives met with the African block and member parties of the Socialist International.
The meeting takes place in Cascais(Portugal) from Monday 4 February till Tuesday 6 February.
All dictators on the African continent have sought immortality by leaving a legacy that will outlive them and endure for the ages. But all have inherited the wind.
Kwame Nkrumah led the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from colonialism in 1957. Nkrumaism sought to transform Ghana into a modern socialist state through state-driven industrialization. He built the Akosombo Dam on the Volta River, at the time considered the “largest single investment in the economic development plans of Ghana”. He promoted the cult of personality and was hailed as the “Messiah”, “Father of Ghana and Pan Africanism” and “Father of African nationalism”. He crushed the unions and the opposition, jailed the judges, created a one-man, one-party state and tried to make himself “President for life”. He got the military boot in 1966. He left a bitter legacy of one-man, one-party rule which to this day serves as a model of dictatorship for all of Africa. Nkrumah died in exile and inherited the wind.
Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to create his own brand of Arab socialism and nationalism and propagated it as a secular Pan-Arab ideology. Using an extensive intelligence apparatus and an elaborate propaganda machine, he promoted a cult of personality projecting himself as the “Man of the People.” He built the Aswan High Dam with Soviet aid. He ruled Egypt in a one-man, one-party dictatorship and crushed all dissent, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Today the Muslim Brotherhood is in power and Nasserism is in the dustbin of history. Nasser left a legacy of military dictatorship in Egypt and inherited the wind.
Mobutu Sese Seko proclaimed himself “Father of the Nation” of Zaire (The Democratic Republic of the Congo), and became dictator for life. He declared, “In our African tradition there are never two chiefs….That is why we Congolese, in the desire to conform to the traditions of our continent, have resolved to group all the energies of the citizens of our country under the banner of a single national party.” Mobutuism consisted of the delusional thoughts of Mobutu and his program of “Zairianization”. He promoted a cult of personality describing himself as the “the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest leaving fire in his wake”. Mobutu built the Inga Dams over the Congo River hoping to create the largest hydroelectric facility in the world. He left a legacy of kleptocracy and inherited the wind.
Moamar Gadhafi proclaimed the “Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” and ushered the era of the state of the masses (Jamahiriya). He sought to elevate Libyan society by reducing it to a massive collection of “people’s committees”. He brutally suppressed dissent and squandered the national resources of that country. He launched the Great Man-Made River, the world’s largest irrigation project and proclaimed it the “Eighth Wonder of the World.” After four decades in power, the “Brother Leader” and author of the Green Book literally suffered the death of a sewer rat. He left a legacy of division and destruction in Libya and inherited the wind.
Idi Amin Dada, the “Butcher of Uganda” and the most notorious of all African dictators, imposed a reign of terror on the Ugandan people and sadistically displayed his tyrannical power to the international press. He pompously described himself as “His Excellency President for Life, Field Marshal Al Hadji Doctor Idi Amin, VC, DSO, MC, Lord of All the Beasts of the Earth and Fishes of the Sea, and Conqueror of the British Empire in Africa in General and Uganda in Particular.” He built no dams by damned the Ugandan people for 8 years until he was forced into exile. He left a legacy of death, destruction and ethnic division in Uganda and inherited the wind.
The “Great Leader”?
The late Meles Zenawi, like all African dictators, sought to make himself larger than life. He was not only Ethiopia’s savior but Africa’s as well. He sought to project himself as a “visionary leader”, “inspirational spokesman for Africa” and supreme practitioner of “revolutionary democracy.” Following his death sometime in late Summer 2012, the propaganda to deify, mythologize, exalt, immortalize and idolize him became a theatre of the absurd. Hailemariam Desalegn, Meles’ handpicked titular prime minster, in his speech to the party faithful in parliament virtually made Meles a lesser god offering blessings of “Eternal Glory to Our Great Leader.” Even the original “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung of North Korea achieved no more glory than being “The Sun of the Nation”. Desalegn promised to consummate his own divinely delegated mission with missionary zeal: “My responsibility now… is to successfully carry out the aims and ambitions of a great and notable leader… Following in the footsteps of our great leader, we will strive to maintain and develop the influential voice in regional, continental and international forums” and “successfully implement the aims and vision of our great leader. He was not just a brilliant generator of ideas: he was, par excellence, the embodiment of selflessness and self-sacrifice…”
Was Desalegn talking about Meles or the Man of Galilee?
The Vision and Legacy of the “Visionary Great Leader”
Like all African dictators before him, Meles had illusions, delusions and obsessions. He did not have a grand vision; he had illusions of grandeur. Like Mobutu before him, Meles had the illusion of building Africa’s largest dam, the so-called Grand Renaissance Dam, on the Blue Nile at a cost preliminarily estimated (unadjusted for cost overruns) at nearly USD$5 billion. Experts believe such a dam if built will “flood 1,680 square kilometers of forest in northwest Ethiopia, near the Sudan border, and create a reservoir that is nearly twice as large as Lake Tana, Ethiopia’s largest natural lake…. The current cost estimate [for the dam] equals the country’s entire annual budget…” Moreover, the dam “could cut the Nile flow into Egypt by 25% during the reservoir filling period” and substantially reduce the reservoir capacity of the Aswan High Dam. According to a document obtained by Wikileaks from the private intelligence group Stratfor, “Sudan’s president Omer Al-Bashir had agreed to build an Egyptian airbase in his country’s western region of Darfur to be used for assaults on The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) should diplomatic efforts fail to resolve the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over Nile water-sharing.” A legacy of regional war and strife?
Meles did not have a growth and transformation plan; he had delusional plans of economic growth and transformation. As I have demonstrated in “The Voodoo Economics of Meles Zenawi”, Meles “has been making hyperbolic claims of economic growth in Ethiopia based on fabricated and massaged GDP (gross domestic product) numbers, implying that the country is in a state of runaway economic development and the people’s standard of living is fast outstripping those living in the middle income countries.” When the U.S. State Department reported an average inflation rate (FY 2008-2009) of 36 percent, Meles predicted a decline in inflation to 3.9 percent in 2009/10. His Growth and Transformation Plan (or what I called “Zenawinomics”) which I reviewed in my June 2011 commentary “The Fakeonomics of Meles Zenawi”, “is a make-a-wish list of stuff. It purports to be based on a ‘long-term vision’ of making Ethiopia ‘a country where democratic rule, good-governance and social justice reigns.’ It aims to ‘build an economy which has a modern and productive agricultural sector with enhanced technology and an industrial sector’ and ‘increase per capita income of citizens so that it reaches at the level of those in middle-income countries.’ It boasts of ‘pillar strategies’ to ‘sustain faster and equitable economic growth’, ‘maintain agriculture as a major source of economic growth,’ ‘create favorable conditions for the industry to play key role in the economy,’ ‘expand infrastructure and social development,’ ‘build capacity and deepen good governance’ and ‘promote women and youth empowerment and equitable benefit.’ Stripped of its collection of hollow economic slogans, clichés, buzzwords and catchphrases, Meles’ growth and growth and transformation plan is plain sham-o-nomics. A legacy of inflation, economic mismanagement, crushing foreign debt and environmental destruction?
Meles had no national vision; he only had a vision of ethnic division. His warped idea of “ethnic federalism” is merely a kinder and gentler reincarnation of Apartheid in Ethiopia. For nearly two decades, Meles toiled ceaselessly to shred the very fabric of Ethiopian society, and sculpt a landscape balkanized into tribal, ethnic, linguistic and regional enclaves. He crafted a constitution based entirely on ethnicity and tribal affiliation as the basis for political organization. He wrote in Article 46 (2) of the constitution: “States shall be structured on the basis of settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people.” In other words, “states”, (and the people who live in them) shall be corralled like cattle in tribal homelands in much the same way as the 10 Bantustans (black homelands) of Apartheid South Africa. These tribal homelands are officially called “kilils” (enclaves or distinct enclosed and effectively isolated geographic areas within a seemingly integrated national territory). Like the Bantustans, the Killilistans ultimately aim to create homogeneous and autonomous ethnic states in Ethiopia, effectively scrubbing out any meaningful notion of Ethiopian national citizenship. Meles’ completely fictitious theory of “ethnic (tribal) federalism)”, unknown in the annals of political science or political theory, has been used to justify and glorify these Kililistans and impose an atrocious policy of divide and rule against 90 million people. A legacy of ethnic balkanization, political polarization, brutalization, and sectarian strife?
Under Meles, Ethiopia became the poster country for international alms and charity and crushing international debt. During his two decades plus tenure, Ethiopia has been among the largest recipients of “economic aid”, “development aid”, “military aid”, “technical aid”, “emergency aid”, “relief aid”, “humanitarian aid” and aid against AIDS in the world. As I argued in my commentary “Ethiopia in BondAid?”, Meles has successfully subverted international aid and loans, particularly U.S. aid, to strengthen his tyrannical rule. A legacy of international aid addiction and beggary?
Despite the country’s exceptionally heavy recent investment in its telecoms infrastructure, it has the second lowest telephone penetration rate in Africa. It once led the regional field in the laying of fiber-optic cable, yet suffers from severe bandwidth and reliability problems. Amid its low service delivery, an apparent lack of accountability, and multiple court cases, some aspects of the sector are perceived by both domestic and international observers to bedeeply affected by corruption.
In the Construction Sector, “Ethiopia exhibits most of the classic warning signs of corruption risk, including instances of poor-quality construction, inflated unit output costs, and delays in implementation.” Corruption in the Justice Sector “takes one of two forms: (a) political interference with the independent actions of courts or other sector agencies, or (b) payment or solicitation of bribes or other considerations to alter a decision or action.” Corruption in the Land Sector is inherent in the law. “The level of corruption is influenced strongly by the way policy and legislation are formulated and enforced. For example, the capture of state assets by the elite can occur through the formulation of policy that favors the elite.” In other words, the laws are written to rig the bidding process to give Meles’ cronies, buddies and supporters a significant advantage so that they can pick up state assets at fire sale prices. A legacy of endemic corruption?
Meles’ “revolutionary democracy” as an ideology or policy guide never quite transcended the sloganeering and phrase-mongering stage, but he indulged in its rhetoric whenever he was overcome by revolutionary fervor. In a seminal analysis of “revolutionary democracy” and arguably the “first paper to seriously examine the political programme and political philosophy of EPRDF based on a review of its major policy”, Jean-Nicolas Bach of the Institute of Political Studies (Bordeaux, France) in 2011 described “Abyotawi democracy (revolutionary democracy) [as] neither revolutionary nor democratic.” Bach argued that revolutionary democracy is a ‘‘bricolage’’ (hodgepodge) of “Leninism, Marxism, Maoism, and also liberalism” concocted by a “small group of party ideologists around Meles, and a few agencies.” As an ideology, “revolutionary democracy” “provides justification for fusing political and economic power in the party-state run by EPRDF.” A critical “review of party pamphlets and official party/state discourses reveals the degree to which revolutionary democracy has become an ambiguous doctrine vis-a`-vis ‘liberalism’” and “remains a powerful fighting tool to exclude internal and external ‘enemies’.” One commentator recently likened revolutionary democracy to communism and fascism. Revolutionary democracy is responsible for delivering a 99.6 percent parliamentary victory to Meles’ party in 2010. A legacy of rigged and stolen elections and bad governance?
Melesismo: Meles’ Greatest Legacy
Meles’ singular legacy is Melesismo, a political legacy I foretold in my December 2009 commentary entitled “The Raw Machismo of Power”. Meles perfected Melesismo– the political art of “My way, the highway, no way… or jail!” Melesismo reaffirms the ignoble principle that might makes right.
Meles’ worshippers proclaim they are marching in his footsteps with the same reverence of those who claim to walk in the footsteps of the Man of Galilee. They ostentatiously display raw machismo invoking the divine power Meles. How little things have changed? From a legacy of the divine right of kings to a legacy of the divine rule of a lesser god!
Meles’ worshippers seek to mythologize, canonize and idolize him. But they cannot reincarnate Meles as the “Messiah”. Even the great Nelson Mandela is undeserving of “eternal glory”. He said so himself, “I am not a saint, unless you think of a saint as a sinner who keeps on trying.” Neither saints nor demons deserve “eternal glory”. Meles will eventually be consigned to the dustbin of history as nothing more than another petty African tyrant.
Meles’ greatest legacy would have been what he said his legacy would be. In 2007, Meles said his “hope is that [his] legacy” would be not only “sustained and accelerated development that would pull Ethiopia out of the massive deep poverty” but also “radical improvements in terms of good governance and democracy.” Without radical democratic improvements by Meles’ worshippers, Meles will be remembered in history as a reactionary petty African tyrant.
Is it possible for Meleismo to hold the center after Meles? Will Melesismo survive Meles?
My friend Eskinder Nega, the personification of press freedom in Ethiopia today, who was jailed by Meles, was likely right in foretelling the inevitable implosion of the “EPDRF”. Eskinder wrote, “Scratch beyond the surface and the EPRDF is really not the monolithic dinosaur as it is most commonly stereotyped. [It has become] a coalition of four distinct phenomenon: the increasing confusion of the dominant TPLF [Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front], the acute cynicism of the ANDM [Amhara National Democratic Movement], the desperate nihilism of the OPDO [Oromo People’s Democratic Organization] and the inevitable irrelevance of the incongruent SEPM [South Ethiopian People’s Movement] (a grab bag of some 40 ethnic groups from the southern part of the country).”
Meles was a man with a mission who confused mission with vision. He has completed his mission. History will record his legacy to be human rights violation, press suppression, ethnic division, endemic corruption, obsessive secrecy and a political culture whose lifeblood is impunity, lack of accountability and transparency. Shakespeare wrote, “The evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones…” Scripture teaches that “He that troubleth his own house shall inherit the wind: and the fool shall be servant to the wise of heart.” Meles and his worshippers have profoundly troubled the Ethiopian house and they shall inherit the wind!
Professor Alemayehu G. Mariam teaches political science at California State University, San Bernardino and is a practicing defense lawyer.
Previous commentaries by the author are available at:
In anticipation of your meeting with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamudnext week, we would like to bring to your attention recent actions taken by the Somali government, as well as the increasing number of unsolved journalist murders in the country.
Mr. Prime Minister, U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague recently launched a global initiative to secure new international action against the use of rape and sexual violence in conflict. However, the Somali government is in the process of prosecuting freelance journalist Abdiaziz Abdinuur for interviewing an internally displaced woman on January 8 who claimed she was raped by Somali soldiers while living in a camp last year. Although Abdiaziz never published the interview, he was charged on Monday under Article 269 of the Somali penal code for offending the honor of a state institution and for filing a false report,news reports said. The alleged victim, along with three other individuals, faces charges that could lead to up to nine years in prison, the reports said.
Abdiaziz was detained illegally in a police station for two weeks before he was charged. Throughout his detention, top Somali officials, including the president, the police chief, and the interior minister, issued statements that prematurely judged his guilt and undermined the credibility of the judicial process. Journalists are not above the law, but neither are officials or security forces.
Mr. Prime Minister, the U.K. has taken a leading role in supporting Somalia’s recovery, a commitment illustrated by the government’s pledge to increase aid levels by 74 percent by 2014, according to news reports. Ultimately, Somalia’s success will depend on leadership that, as President Hassan has stated, is accountable and ends a culture of impunity.
On January 17, President Hassan said the country needed to overcome a “culture of impunity.” But despite his public pledges to create a task force to investigate journalist murders, none such team has been created. The day after President Hassan’s speech, on January 18, unidentified assailants in Mogadishu shot dead journalist Abdihared Osman, the fifth journalist from the Shabelle Media Network killed in 13 months. CPJ documented 12 journalist murders in Somalia in 2012, making the country the most dangerous in Africa for journalists.
CPJ research shows that not a single journalist murder has been prosecuted in Somalia over the past decade. CPJ ranked Somalia second worst on its 2012 Impunity Index, which spotlights countries where journalists are murdered regularly and the killers go free.
We ask that you urge President Hassan to follow through on his commitment to create a task force to investigate journalist murders. Such steps would hasten the progress toward tackling corruption and abuse and will sustain the development of a transparent and accountable system that would foster security and stability in the country.
In your meeting, we urge you to engage President Hassan on his administration’s responsibility to respect freedom of the press and to bring the killers of journalists to justice. Journalists should be allowed to report freely on issues of public interest and should never face reprisal for their reporting. We trust that you will help us in bringing this matter to his attention.
Sincerely,
simon_sig
Joel Simon
Executive Director
CC List:
The Rt. Hon. William Hague, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
The Rt. Hon. Justine Greening, Secretary of State for International Development
The Rt. Hon. Hugh Bayley, Labour MP, Africa All-Party Parliamentary Group, Chair
The Rt. Hon. Baroness D’Souza, Africa All-Party Parliamentary Group, Vice Chair
The Rt. Hon. Mark Pritchard, Africa All-Party Parliamentary Group, Vice-Chair
The Rt. Hon. Richard Ottaway, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Chair
The Rt. Hon. Sir Menzies Campbell, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Member
Abdikarim Hussein Guled, Minister of Interior, Federal Republic of Somalia
Abdullahi Elmoge Hersi, Minister of Information, Federal Republic of Somalia
Georges-Marc Andre, European Union Representative of Somalia
Matt Baugh, U.K. Ambassador to the republic of Somalia
Augustine Mahiga, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Somalia
###
CPJ is a New York-based, independent, nonprofit organization
For the first time ever Russia and OIC representatives will discuss problems of the international economic security within a round table of the V International summit: Economic cooperation between Russia and OIC countries – KAZANSUMMIT 2013 on May 15-17, 2013 in Kazan.
The attention to the international economic security passes in the tideway of activization of a role of Russia in the questions that are being discussed and solved by OIС. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, called on Russia at a meeting with the ambassador of Russia Oleg Ozerov in Saudi Arabia on January 30, 2013.
It is necessary to mention KAZANSUMMIT 2013 as a platform where the international economic security will take up with the OIC delegates and the Russian representatives of the State Duma, Economic Development Ministry and Federal Security Service. KAZANSUMMIT is aimed to the development of multi-faceted partnership of Russia and OIC countries – prospects re discussed here not only in the sphere of trade and economic relations, but also in the sphere of investments and scientific and technical cooperation.
It is proved by the extensive and multidimensional KAZANSUMMIT 2013 program in which you can see Strategic and Investment forums, Conference of OIC countries’ parliament’s representatives, a meeting of administrations of Malaysian and Russian universities and so on.
KAZANSUMMIT Press Office
Become acquainted with KAZANSUMMIT at web-site www.kazansummit.com
The new Somalia president is miserably behaving like Mr. Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, Saddam Hussein’s information minister. He reminds me of Mr. al-Sahaff pitifully saying: “There are no American infidels in Baghdad. Never!” Mr. al-Sahaff made this statement while the USA armored vehicles and tanks were rolling few blocks from where Mr. al-Sahaff was standing and embarrassingly that event was being watched all over the world on live TVs. To be honest, I even think Mr. Hassan is at times more preposterous than Mr. al-Sahhaf, when he cyclically and outrageously calls Somaliland “a Somalia region”. Everyone on earth truly knows that Somaliland had nothing to do with Somalia before July 1st, 1960 and again for the last 21 years plus.
Last night, in a life televised program in London Mr. Hassan alluded that there were undeclared surreptitious talks and contacts taking place between his government and that of Somaliland. He also added that he will steadfastly stick with his unionist agenda and would like to bring Somaliland to the Union of Somalia federation without the use of military force or diplomatic pressure.
In this statement Mr. Hassan was tactfully and covertly saying the Somaliland government is conspiring against the will of its people by holding mysterious on-going talks with Mogadishu. Consequently, the Somaliland government is hiding the essentials of those secret meetings from its people. Mr. Hassan’s statement is preordained to create a feeling of suspicion and a rift between Somaliland government and its people. Fortunately enough, the international community and the Somaliland people know very well that the Somaliland leadership will never accept anything less than the full sovereignty for their country even if that will lead to a second round of a violent military confrontation with Somalia.
In other words, Mr. Hassan of Somalia is attempting to create chaotic disarray in the Republic of Somaliland, analogous to what is going on in his own country- the anarchic Somalia. In the same way, Mr. Hassan is dutifully following the lines of threats used before him by Mr. al-Sahaff against the USA, when he says that he will not use military force or diplomatic pressure on Somaliland. What a military or diplomatic pressure could this helpless Mr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud exert over Somaliland? I would confidently say none whatsoever, because this was used from the olden days of Siad Barre to this present day and without a flicker of success.
I think Mr. Hassan is too naïve to think the people of Somaliland will respond and will give him the reaction he intends to get from Somalilanders through his malicious statements. Mr. Hassan doesn’t understand the relationships between the people and the government of the Republic of Somaliland. The Somaliland government was elected in a landslide through one man one vote and on an agenda of working hard for the attainment of the full sovereignty of Somaliland. The bond between the government and the Somaliland citizenry is unbreakable and is based on transparency and accountability. Therefore, Somaliland citizens have full confidence in their government and Mr. Hassan’s theory of creating a chaotic Somaliland will never take off the ground. This is not the only time Mr. Hassan has made such an outrageous statement, but he repeated such malevolent statements more than at least four times in a raw within the last two weeks.
One other time he made an equally comparable regretful comment in regard to Somaliland was in a town hall meeting with Somalians (his compatriots from former Italian colony of Somalia) in Minnesota, USA. In that meeting Mr. Hassan has made even more insolent statement towards the people of Somaliland, when he declared that the recent USA recognition of Somalia in his words: “will benefit all Somalia including Somaliland and the financial assistance given to Somalia will be distributed evenly to Somalia, this will in turn bring about the unity of Somalia.” What a discreditable and affront statement to the Republic of Somaliland and its people from a hopeless man, who is suppliantly going around the world and asking for the monthly salaries for his government and his tribally selected parliament?
Take it from me, Mr. Hassan, you do not understand Somalilanders and contrasting to you and to the natives of your country, Somalilanders do not price their principles and sovereignty with material gains. This is not me saying it, but history is here to witness this indisputable fact. Hence, you must immediately and publicly apologize to the people of the Republic of Somaliland and must be on the guard not to repeat making such reprehensible statements in the coming future.
Let me be specific and give a hint of fact to Mr. Hassan and tell him that Somaliland independence was not granted by Somalia through a charitable and compassionate process, but Somalilanders fought for their sovereignty and lost everything they held dear including the precious lives of their loved ones. This time around Somalilanders are prepared to sacrifice even more to keep their well-deserved independence.
The former Somali prime minister, Omar Arteh Qalib, had a habit of saying “ Somalis will sort out their differences under a tree”, in reference to the traditional shir ( meeting ) to which disputes are referred for adjudication by elders of two clans. When he made the now-famous “under the tree” speech Somalia had not fully slipped into anarchy. What is striking about Omar Arteh Qalib’s prescription for conflict resolution is that he viewed the war to have been not between government loyalists and armed opposition groups but among clans. He instructed remnants of Somalia army to surrender to armed opposition groups— in the north to the Somali National Movement; in the south to United Somali Congress, Somali Salvation Democratic Front and Somali Patriotic Movement.
Omar Arteh was a member of The Reconciliation Committee ( Guddiga Suluxa) appointed by the military dictatorship before it has been overthrown by the opposition, and foresaw the impending power struggle between United Somali Congress’s Rome and Ethiopia wings as well as possible armed opposition response to United Somali Congress’s unilateral decision to form a government in Mogadishu without consultation with other armed opposition groups. His ‘meeting under the tree’ metaphor was situationally relevant but practically irrelevant: political elites of clans were at loggerheads with each other over how to share state power but under a tree two clans thrashed out their differences in the absence of penal of code or , when penal code was adopted after independence, without recourse to it.
Twenty two years after state collapse Somalia has a government facing challenges left behind by successive transitional administrations. “ Who is preoccupied with what happened yesterday— ‘ camels looted from us, houses destroyed, our murdered clansmen’— will miss the future. Most of the time people don’t agree on the history of a civil war. The man you view as a thug or robber is seen by someone else as a hero. There is no disagreement on good life and dignity of the human being” said president Hassan in a speech for the Somali Diaspora in Brussels.
President Abdirahman Farole of Puntland Regional Administration reacted to president Hassan’s speech by alluding to the 1991 massacres after United Somali Congress captured Mogadishu, forcing the late dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre to flee to his home of, Buurdhuubo. “The Somali people have suffered since the days of military dictatorship. The 1991 massacres that targeted particular [Somali] clans in Mogadishu and other areas of southern Somalia must be addressed, and those who committed the massacres and looted the people’s properties must request forgiveness. I had two houses in Mogadishu. I had to sell the two houses.” President Farole said.
In Somalia human rights debate has become a playground for politicians. The Somali civil war was not among clans. It was among militias commanded by the political elite. Had the war been among clans, man-made famine and large-scale looting would not have been taken place. The civil war began in Somalia in May 1988 when Somali National Movement forces captured Burao and Hargeisa, prompting the military dictatorship to respond harshly to the opposition’s unforeseen attacks. There is no a Somali leader defending the thesis that Somali government’s response to the civil war in the north was in line with its obligation to hold the nation together. Equally, there is no a Somali leader challenging the thesis that United Somali Congress leaders failed to rein in their supporters who massacred innocent people and looted properties and other possessions.
Apology from putative clans of looters and murderers will not be forthcoming because the logic of asking a clan to apologise for actions of looters and murderers at the service of politicians is the same logic that led to widespread massacres and looting after state collapse. The way president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia and president Abdirahman Farole of Puntland Regional Administration have framed the human rights debate in Somalia undermines the possibility of seeing transitional justice in place in Somalia. The Resolution number 2067 (2012) adopted by the Security Council at its 6837th meeting on 18 September 2012 noted “the importance oftransitional justice processes in building lasting peace and reconciliation.” The debate on human rights violations in Somalia should not be politicised.
MOGADISHU (Reuters) – Somalia’s prime minister on Sunday said the authorities will do more to protect rape victims after foreign donors and human rights groups criticised the arrests of a woman allegedly gang-raped by soldiers and a journalist who interviewed her.
The trial of an unidentified 27-year-old woman, her husband, and the freelance journalist has sparked international concerns over sexual violence and press freedom in the country.
The trio face prison terms of several years on charges including insulting a government body, making false accusations, and seeking to profit from the allegations.
Human rights groups say the trial is politically motivated, designed to cover up rampant sexual abuse of women by Somali security forces, while the U.N. and the United States have voiced concerns about the treatment of rape victims.
Recently-appointed Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon Saaid promised to reform Somali armed forces and the judiciary once the trial has concluded, acknowledging “deep-seated problems” with both institutions.
“We recognize the concerns of our international partners and we are only too aware of the enormous challenges our nation faces,” Saaid said in a statement.
For two decades the Horn of Africa state has been plagued by civil war, anarchy and Islamist insurgencies. However, September’s peaceful elections, the first since military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown by warlords in 1991, have been heralded as the dawn of a new era for Somalia.
The U.N.’s Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura, on Saturday called for the Somali government to deal with the country’s rape problems, saying the U.N. had evidence around 1,700 women were raped between January and November last year in camps for internally displaced people around Mogadishu.
Saaid, a former businessman who is married to an influential Somali peace activist, said the government has launched public campaigns designed to bring down instances of rape. However, he concedes more can be done.
“I have since urged the government in the strongest terms to be much more responsive on this question, to take proactive measures, prosecute any such crimes and provide all appropriate care to the victims,” he said.
Journalism organizations and human rights groups say arresting a journalist and putting him on trial for interviewing a rape victim is an attack on media freedoms and free speech.
Somalia is one of the world’s most dangerous places for journalists, with killings of reporters reaching an all-time high in 2012 when 18 media workers were killed, according to the National Union of Somali Journalists.
But Saaid stressed the government’s support for press freedom, saying “journalists perform a critical role and we want them to be able to work without fear or favor”.
Saaid said the government will soon form a new and independent task force on human rights which will investigate attacks against women and violence against journalists.
The people and the nation of Somaliland joins the security National Armed Forces in celebrating their anniversary, this time round with the Somaliland. Not Somalia. Somaliland has been an independent region of Somalia proper for more than 20 years. Yet, most Westerners do not associate the former British protectorate with 20 years of independence and stability but rather with the instability and chaos of Mogadishu (which is not part of Somaliland if you did not know).
As I crossed the Somaliland border by land, I was quickly reminded of the Kurdistan part of Iraq. In similar fashion, Kurdistan is not far from Baghdad but bears little resemblance to the chaos of the Iraqi capital city. Further, Somaliland similarly bears little resemblance to Mogadishu. Rather it looks like Dubai 20 years ago. The construction and economic activity seemed out of place in Dubai 20 years ago, but now it is the norm and the epicenter of the booming Middle Eastern financial sector.
Somaliland: Emerging Economy in the Face of Contradiction
Due to the lack of official recognition internationally, Somaliland still suffers from the international trade embargo imposed on Somalia. Still, Somalians have made a name for themselves as Africa’s most skilled traders. As keen businessmen working within constrained parameters, Somalians are a driving force in Africa’s informal market.
Sitting down with the Somaliland Central Bank Governor Abdi Dirir, you learn quickly how informal the Somaliland economy is. “The GDP of the Somaliland economy is possibly $1.5 billion,” said Mr. Dirir. In response to my speculation that the Somaliland economy could range from $3 to $4 billion, the governor easily replied “it is possible.” The movement of money throughout the Somaliland economy is a misnomer for modern day economic growth. If you are looking for commercial banks and “visa accepted here” signs, you will be highly disappointed.
According to the Governor, the Somalian Schilling maintains a stable exchange rate except for the minor fluctuations that occur when the diaspora visit this territory usually at the same time for a holiday week. During this time, a huge influx of Somalians brings U.S. dollars into the economy, creating a minor boost in the dollar supply. To say informality characterizes this economy would simply be an understatement.From Traders to Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurship is the second best characterization of the Somaliland economy. If you ask a local Somalian to introduce you to some local entrepreneurs, he will ask if you are staying for a couple weeks. A short visit will not do the country justice.
Somaliland is a country of more than 20 newspapers, more than 15 universities, and several telecom operators. For a republic that has around 4 million inhabitants, these types of numbers are both impressive and concerning. In the world of media, newspapers come and go as the best ones rise to the top and the defunct ones disappear. As one local Somalian described the situation, one day a guy is a newspaper entrepreneur and the next day he is pitching you on a new agribusiness idea.
In the world of education, starting a new university may seem as easy as a hobby in Somaliland. Yet, in reality, it is an area of opportunity where the local population is starving for increased education. At the same time, it is another manifestation of a growth opportunity for government regulation. As the government begins to implement a quality standard around education, the number of universities should shrink and the quality of graduates should improve. Despite all the challenges in sectors, such as news media and education, optimism must be taken from the current situation.
“Free enterprise is Somalia,” according to the Minister of Planning Dr. Sa’ad Ali Shire, “because the prior circumstances of the country required the private sector to do a lot of work.” The private sector effort in creating modern day Somaliland can never be fully appreciated. “It is the private sector building this country,” added the minister. Calling Somaliland the emerging Silicon Valley for its creativity may be an overstatement today but give it time.
Booming Telecom
The Somaliland telecommunication industry is a beacon of the championed free enterprise system in Somaliland. Six telecom operators populate the bandwidth of Somaliland. Some telecom experts speculate that mobile penetration could be as high as 35 to 40 percent as of January 2013. The amount of companies and the accompanying penetration rates are a stark contrast to the estimated 3 to 5 percent penetration rates at the turn of the century.
Telesom is the biggest player in the market with more than 85 percent of the mobile subscriber market and the only firm with significant market power. SomTel is the second largest operator with a rapidly growing number of internet users. The presence of multiple operators, despite the imbalance in market share, has made Somaliland one of the cheapest mobile phone environments in the world.
And that’s just one example. Next week we’ll look at the challenges facing the booming telecom industry, and dive into mobile banking, and the import/export business in Somaliland, which is centered around Port Berbera.
By Kurt Davis/Business & Finance Commentary
(Kurt Davis Jr. is a Senior Associate with Schulze Global Investments in its Ethiopia office. He is a private equity professional and early business/start-up consultant with experience in Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, Asia, Europe and United States. He is an avid traveler who has been to 60+ countries throughout the world in search of new investment opportunities, new people, and a better understanding of the world).
The people and the nation of Somaliland joins the security National Armed Forces in celebrating their anniversary, this time round with the special surprise gift, one that was awaited for quite a long time.
The hierarchy system of forces ranking is however, as clearly vivid, something that was indispensable and had to come, whatever time it took.
Apart from being the basic right of the serving personnel, it is also an administrative leadership structure that not only marks categorical status while instilling discipline amongst the ranks, but is also an incentive catalyst of (and for) enhancing performance within the service by individual servicemen to earn (or for) befitting merits.
Now that the system of hierarchy is here with us, we wish the commanders well in their strenuous tasks of disbursing the ranks within their forces.
Congratulations Your Excellency for realizing the dream for the nation.
Congratulations too, the armed forces, for at last earning your rights.
Promoting investment presents its own set of challenges, but a flexible approach adapted to Somaliland’s circumstances and culture has a good chance of success
A tradesman arriving at the Port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden will have to pass through a gate marked by a bright sign saying ‘Enter’ and emblazoned with the flag of Somaliland. The entrance is an apt symbol of the fledgling state’s desire, with an acutely Somalilander twist, to attract foreign and diaspora businessmen and their capital into the economy.
As the international community increasingly turns its gaze to the Horn of Africa, this desire is beginning to gain some traction, and development agencies are increasingly eager to capitalise on investment flows for the sake of pro-poor growth. But will Somaliland’s way of doing business turn out to be sufficiently compatible with what investors and the development community seek?
A frontier economy
To many the idea of economic activity and investment in such a place may seem anathema. Somaliland is arguably the least recognised, self-declared independent state in the world and is known more for its tempestuous neighbour to the South (of which it officially forms a part) than for any of its own qualities.
However, as is so often the case in the Somali arena, the reality differs somewhat from perception. Given the region in which it lies, its recent history of violent conflict and the complete lack of recognition that followed its declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland can boast an active and successful business community embodying the entrepreneurial spirit for which Somalis are known. It enjoys a lucrative trade in livestock with the Gulf, exporting live camels, sheep and goats from all over East Africa by the million every year. With its advantageous location on the Gulf of Aden, it acts as a gateway to Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa for the exchange of all sorts of goods and services, from logistics to bottled drinks, electronic goods to food aid. In the field of telecommunications it hosts an array of widespread, reliable and cheap mobile phone networks that enhance economic opportunity. Furthermore, via global financial firms such as Dahabshiil it absorbs an impressive $800 million annually in diaspora remittances which feed the consumer economy and boost domestic investment.
The economic opportunities are also not to be sneered at. As a frontier economy with slack capacity for investment, Somaliland presents a high risk, high return profile for those investors willing to try their luck. Recent exploration points to the imminent discovery (risks notwithstanding) of sizeable reserves of oil and gas, and sectors such as fisheries, consumer products and food processing are all relatively untapped. These will be aided by improving infrastructure links by land to Ethiopia and by air from Hargeysa airport (currently being rebuilt with money from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development).
A small but growing number of investors, mainly from the diaspora but also numbering amongst them those from further afield, are making their first, tentative moves. Early in 2012 a Djibouti-based firm (Somaliland Beverages Industry, part of the Osman Guelle Farah Group) invested $17 million in a Coca-Cola franchise and bottling plant – the largest single investment in Somaliland since 1991. UK-based investment fund Invicta Capital and Jacka Resources, an Australian firm, are currently preparing an investment in oil exploration and development. Two further investment funds, based in the UK and Kenya respectively, are considering their options, and Chinese ICT giant Huawei is actively involved in the expanding mobile market.
Investment promotion, Somaliland style
The government is keen to capitalise on these inflows and to attract more, for purposes of fostering economic growth and poverty reduction as well as of encouraging private capital to foot some of the bill of the ambitious National Development Plan. This is doubly appropriate.
Not only can investment create jobs and development but also, with the dispersed nature and limitations of state authority in Somaliland, non-state actors (whether private actors or communities) have traditionally taken responsibility for providing services such as healthcare, education, power and roads – areas that in the Western model are habitually consigned to the state. In this context the private sector has a unique and influential role to play.
In keeping with the government’s commitment, a host of investment promotion measures exist, from the foreign investment law which was passed in 2004 and creates incentives and mechanisms to bring in and protect investors to the ongoing reform of tax policy and the new investment climate unit within the Ministry of Commerce. Efforts are afoot to establish the foundation for commercial banks to operate via the central bank act passed in April 2012 and the forthcoming commercial banking bill. The National Development Plan also contains a raft of instruments to support the private sector, such as the drafting of a private sector development strategy that will include amongst other things a public-private partnership platform and further plans for business environment reform.
However, investing in Somaliland predictably presents, as the complement to high returns, its own set of risks, challenges and complications. Many of the problems that a tentative investor would face will be familiar from other frontier and fragile economies. Most business happens on an informal basis, the legal and regulatory framework is unpredictable and inadequately implemented and enforced, and information asymmetries abound. In addition,
infrastructure and skills levels are low and, perhaps not surprisingly, accessing insurance is by and large prohibitively expensive.
True to form though, Somaliland presents its own set of characteristics. Firstly, the fact of its non-recognition considerably enhances the perception of risk and raises concerns about the long-term viability of contracts and investments. These are abetted by the uncertainty surrounding Somaliland’s relationship with Mogadishu, which continues to assert – in theory if not in practice – its sovereignty over the whole of Somalia, and Puntland, with which Somaliland is currently embroiled in a territorial dispute. Equally importantly, the lack of recognition prevents Somaliland from participating in international institutions, laws and norms, and thereby a host of associated services and benefits.
Secondly, the nation’s social and political structures have imposed their own distinct brand of doing business: embedded in these structures are the means to undertake transactions, build trust and mitigate business risk between the parties and allegiances involved. Through such means business takes place both within and across Somaliland’s clans and tends to span political and commercial interests. To ensure the safe transfer of goods, trade routes are by tradition jointly run by members of the clans through whose sphere of influence the route runs. Likewise, through traditional shareholding and equity structures (exhibited for example by Telesom and a number of large livestock players), different interest groups, whether based on clan, political affiliation or business interest, are brought into the fold as a means of both raising capital and providing insurance. Commercial disputes are more often resolved by reaching consensus within a private council than within a court of law.
Such distinct ways of going about one’s affairs may serve as a drawback or an advantage for investors depending on the circumstances and the inclination of the business in question. But, for a first-time investor unfamiliar with prevalent norms and practices, they will at the very least prove perplexing in their opacity, and may well be too much of a deterrent to proceed.
Thirdly, the bulk of economic activity is concentrated in a small number of sectors and dominated by a handful of large and well-connected players. The Indhadeero Group, for example, is not only the largest animal trader in Somaliland but also has businesses in light manufacturing, food retail and hospitality, whilst the group behind Daallo Airlines, an international airline based in Hargeysa, also owns firms in livestock and logistics. Such monopolistic tendencies hamper competition and new market entrants and weaken market governance.
Development agencies gearing up
There is of course a broader context to this story. Somaliland is a model of relative peace and stability in a region largely devoid of both, and this has not gone unnoticed in Western capitals. Create a stable political and economic environment, provide the infrastructure and regulation and make the market available, and – so the theory goes – investment will come. The jobs, consumer freedom and improved services that this investment will bring will provide a popular mandate for political stability, which will in turn attract further investment.
As a result, concomitant with increased international attention on achieving peace in the Horn of Africa, the world’s development agencies are gearing up their involvement in Somaliland. Roughly 60% of the UK’s development budget for Somalia is to be spent in Somaliland, and private sector development is a key focus within that envelope. DfID, the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, world leaders at the London Conference on Somalia in February 2012, International Labour Organisation, USAid, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and others are all poised, if not already active on the ground. The usual array of pro-poor activities is on display, from grants and training for small and start-up businesses to value chain and market development to investment climate reform. In addition to such mainstream activities, the British government is also supporting the Somaliland Development Corporation, a specialised public-private partnership between the Somaliland government and prominent British and Somalilander citizens, which is designed to provide a safe platform for international and diaspora investors to engage with Somaliland and overcome inherent risks.
In seeking to promote pro-poor investment, what should development agencies, in tandem with investors and the government, do in continuation of – and in response to – this trend of amplified commercial, political and international interest in Somaliland? The answer is a range of options drawn from the international development manual, all of which are applicable. On the supply side, they could continue ongoing efforts to reduce risk and improve Somaliland’s image abroad as an investment destination. They could subsidize inward-flowing funds and provide security for investors, thereby increasing the supply of capital and lowering its cost. On the demand side, they might work with Somaliland’s firms and value chains to increase the number and size of investment opportunities. Consideration of cross-cutting issues such as the quality of energy and transport infrastructure may also be necessary.
On a governance level efforts could be made to improve and, perhaps more importantly, enforce existing laws and regulations and to enhance the overarching (and sector-specific) investment climate. This could happen alongside moves to promote transparency and competition and establish a concrete basis for engaging with the government. On a political level, there may well be a need for a solid, long-term commitment from the government, backed up by development agencies, that Somaliland is open for business, together with efforts to allay investor worries about regional instability and national non-recognition.
However, as Somaliland presents its own set of challenges, so it must have its own set of solutions. Somalilanders everywhere have shown themselves to be adept at mixing their own tried and tested ways with Western norms, practices and appearances, dexterously bridging the interface between the two spheres of influence whilst maintaining one foot in each. As evidence, one need look no further than Dahabshiil in the commercial arena and at the set-up of the parliament in the political one. If the welcoming sign in Berbera is to have as many visitors as possible pass beneath it, investors and development agencies ought to follow suit.
Content on this page is produced and controlled by Adam Smith International.
