Somaliland’s election campaign has entered its 7th day the Hilaac (Lightning) political organization held its rallies on the first day across the country but mainly focuses in the towns of Borama and Berbera.
The supporters expressed their happiness as the Hilaac political organization presented its plans for the future and the reasons behind its establishment.
In several arenas and public meeting places supporters were seen converging in large numbers as the chanted their political slogans with shouts of may we win’ ranting at the air as the listened to speakers after speakers selling their policies to voters.
Of note was the party leader Ahmed Ismael Samatar who addressed a large gathering of hundreds of supporters in Borama, urging them to vote as a block.
He revealed that he has for long been sore and exasperated that his community was subjected to tyranny of the numbers hence urged them to vote as a block such that they may be reckoned with by voting in the such that it may be an official political party.
He said that ‘the time of begging and soliciting for alms is over’ and that the people ought to stand up to be seen by being triumphant.
He said that despite the fact that the nation has made major strides for the past three decades, the hurdles of the political cross-roads that the country is presently at can be overcome by having Awdal being at the fore-front.
He said, “Political groupings mean that you have a base from which you can take off from such that you may concretely be in the country’s politics, and make sound decisions on the economy, education, health, and the power structure within the country.”
He said it was to this connection that he formed the organization in anticipation of making the region politically formidable.
He pointed out that the elections should be able to turn a new page for the Awdal residents hence they ought to turn out in large numbers and control their own fate.
The campaigns saw numerous similar meetings held in various districts and urban centers.
The elections scheduled to be held on 13th November 2024 are for both the presidential and political party organizations.
The Constitution requires that the top three political organizations become the official political parties in the nation for a period of three years.
The currently existing three official political parties viz, KULMIYE, WADDANI and UCID are being challenged by seven other political organizations, with Hilaac trying its hand in it.
Both elections are to be held simultaneously on the same day.
From left, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi. AFP
Hamza Hendawi
Tuesday October 15, 2024
Egyptian military advisers, trainers and counter-terrorism commandos support Somali forces in fight against Al Shabab militants
Egypt is building up its military mission in Somalia before the December 31 deadline for Ethiopian troops to withdraw from the Horn of Africa nation, with Cairo also training and supporting Somali security forces in the fight against Al Qaeda-linked militants, sources told The National on Tuesday.
Egypt and Somalia, members of the Cairo-based Arab League, signed a milestone military co-operation agreement in August. Egypt has since sent weapons, military advisers, trainers and counter-terrorism commandos to Mogadishu.
Thousands of Egyptian personnel were expected to be involved in the military mission by the end of the year, the sources said. Ethiopia is believed to have about 22,000 troops in Somalia, they added.
The Ethiopians are in the country under the terms of a bilateral agreement and as part of an African Union peacekeeping force to help Somalia fight against Al Shabab.
Both Egypt and Somalia are at sharp odds with Ethiopia. Cairo has complained that a Nile dam built by Addis Ababa will reduce Egypt’s vital share of the river’s water. Somalia said its sovereignty was breached by a deal announced this year between landlocked Ethiopia and the breakaway region of Somaliland that is to give Addis Ababa a port on the Red Sea.
Egypt announced it intended to replace the Ethiopian peacekeepers at the end of the year, a move Somalia has publicly supported.
Some Somali forces supported by Egyptian advisers, the sources said, have already been sent along the Ethiopian contingent’s supply routes to prevent, if necessary, any attempt by Addis Ababa to send more soldiers into the country before the withdrawal deadline.
The sources said Ethiopia increased its military presence by an estimated 7,000 men to 22,000 in the days after Egypt began to send weapons and military personnel to Somalia.
Ethiopia has been defending its January deal with Somaliland, arguing that access to the Red Sea allows it to protect shipping and ensure the stability of the Horn of Africa region. It has also indirectly criticised Egypt’s military role in Somalia.
Ethiopian President Taye Atske Selassie, who was foreign minister at the time, said he was concerned that arms from “external forces would further exacerbate the fragile security [in Somalia] and would end up in the hands of terrorists”, the Ethiopia News Agency reported. He was referring to Al Shabab.
In response, Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi said: “Ethiopia’s motivation behind these defamatory statements is its attempt to conceal the illegal smuggling of weapons across the Somali borders, which are falling into the hands of civilians and terrorists.” He did not elaborate.
Ethiopia has repeatedly sought to assure Egypt, and fellow downstream country Sudan, that the nearly complete Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will not harm their interests. The project was crucial to the country’s development, Addis Ababa has explained.
More than a decade of negotiations between the three nations have failed to produce a deal, with Egypt and Sudan pushing for Ethiopia to enter a legally binding agreement on the operation of the dam and filling of its reservoir. Ethiopia said a set of recommendations should suffice.
Last week, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi touched on the issue at an online water conference. “The River Nile, specifically, is an issue that’s associated with the life and survival of Egyptians,” he said. “It’s the chief source of life in our nation. Egypt is the gift of the glorious river.”
Mr El Sisi has in the past decade sought to persuade countries in the Nile basin and Horn of Africa to put pressure on Addis Ababa to be flexible over the dam dispute. It’s toward that goal that Egypt has struck a series of military co-operation agreements with some of those nations and offered expertise and professional assistance to others.
Cairo’s actions in Somalia and growing ties with Eritrea emphasise Egypt’s increasing resolve to put pressure on Ethiopia to enter an agreement on the dam. Both Somalia and Eritrea overlook the southern reaches of the Red Sea and neighbour Ethiopia to the south and north respectively.
Last week, Mr El Sisi and the leaders of Somalia and Eritrea met in Asmara for an intensely publicised summit. Mr El Sisi told reporters in the Eritrean capital that his country “will provide all forms of support to the brotherly nation of Somalia so that it can restore its safety and security”.
“We discussed practical suggestions to offer this help,” he added. “Egypt will spare no effort nor withhold advice that serves the objectives of our peoples and the aspirations of our nations in the Horn of Africa.”
Egypt’s growing ties with Eritrea is a reflection of the fraught relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa.
A 2018 peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia eased tensions temporarily and paved the way for Eritrea to support Addis Ababa in its war against the separatist Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). But Eritrea is unhappy with the peace accord Ethiopia signed in 2022 with the TPLF, which Asmara views as a threat to its national security.
The National Electoral Commission (NEC) of Breakaway region of Somaliland has officially announced the campaign timeline for the upcoming Presidential and Political Party elections. As per the announcement, the campaign will take place from October 19 to November 10, 2024, allowing political groups and parties to share their agendas with the public.
Muse Haji Yusuf, the NEC Chairman, stated that the campaign period will last for 23 days, distributing time among seven political organizations and three established political parties.
This well-organized schedule ensures all participating factions have a fair chance to engage voters before the elections.
Scheduled for November 13, 2024, these elections represent a pivotal moment in Somaliland’s democratic evolution.
This will be the fourth presidential election since the region adopted a democratic electoral framework in 2002, empowering the populace to select their President and Vice President.
Three prominent political parties will vie for the presidency: Kulmiye, represented by the current President Muse Bihi Abdi; Waddani, the opposition party led by Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi Cirro; and UCID, with Eng. Faisal Ali Warabe as its candidate.
In addition to the presidential election, this cycle will also shape Somaliland’s political future by electing various political organizations and parties.
This marks the third occurrence of such elections in the region, where both presidential and party elections will appear on the same ballot.
The dual elections have generated excitement, but there have also been delays due to legal disputes about their timing.
Ultimately, a consensus was reached to conduct both elections simultaneously.
The upcoming elections on November 13 are essential for Somaliland’s democratic trajectory, marking a crucial step towards fortifying political institutions through fair and transparent electoral competition.
Additionally, the Somaliland Electoral Commission has inaugurated the Ethics, Conflict Resolution, and Election Monitoring Committees, a critical milestone in preparing for the anticipated elections.
During the swearing-in ceremony, Musa Hassan Yusuf, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission, reassured participants that the elections would proceed as planned and remain on schedule.
AsSomaliland gears up for its presidential and party elections on November 13, the political environment is fraught with tension, high stakes, and significant expectations. The upcoming election pits the long-standing ruling party, Kulmiye, against the rising opposition force, Waddani. While the political contest has captured the imagination of voters across Somaliland, the outcome remains highly unpredictable, hinging on how each party navigates its strengths and overcomes its weaknesses in the critical weeks leading up to election day.
Kulmiye, the ruling party, carries the weight of incumbency, which in many cases offers both advantages and substantial burdens. The party has been in power for several years and has managed to maintain a significant grip on the political landscape, largely because of its control over state resources. In Somaliland, as in many nascent democracies, the ability to leverage government resources during elections can make a considerable difference. This gives Kulmiye a distinct edge in terms of organizing, mobilizing voters, and controlling the narrative through state media channels.
Historically, Kulmiye has positioned itself as the custodian of Somaliland’s independence and sovereignty. The party has deep ties to the struggle for liberation from the brutal military dictatorship of General Mohamed Siyad Barre, a narrative that resonates with a significant portion of the electorate, particularly older voters who lived through that tumultuous period. The party’s association with figures like former president Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud “Silanyo,” who was a key figure in Somaliland’s struggle for independence, still lends it a certain prestige and legitimacy.
However, Kulmiye’s incumbency also exposes it to intense scrutiny and criticism, particularly over its performance in governance. During its time in power, the party has been accused of failing to deliver on critical issues such as economic development, security, and border protection. Somaliland has faced numerous challenges under Kulmiye’s leadership, from spiraling inflation (with the Somaliland Shilling to the US Dollar standing today to an unprecedented, staggering SlShs 1080 to the US Dollar), increasing insecurity, particularly in the eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag, where militias and extremists have taken advantage of the government’s weak control. The cost of living has surged, and public dissatisfaction has grown over the inability of the government to bring inflation and foreign exchange rates under control. In a country where economic stability is closely linked to political legitimacy, Kulmiye’s inability to address these issues effectively may cost it dearly at the ballot box.
Further complicating matters for Kulmiye is its association with nepotism and clan-based politics. Somaliland’s political system, though democratic in theory, remains heavily influenced by clan allegiances, which often dictate voter behavior. While Kulmiye initially enjoyed broad support across various clans, its governance has increasingly been seen as favoring certain clans over others. This perception has alienated parts of its base, particularly among younger voters who are less tied to the old clan-based political structures. The party’s handling of government appointments and employment opportunities has been criticized for being skewed toward certain clans, leaving many feeling excluded from the benefits of state resources.
Moreover, internal divisions within Kulmiye have begun to surface. President Muse Bihi Abdi, who took over the reins of the party and the presidency in 2017, has faced resistance from within his own ranks. Some of his closest allies appear more focused on consolidating personal power than on supporting his leadership or advancing the party’s agenda. This internal discord has weakened Kulmiye’s ability to present a united front heading into the election. The perception that the president is surrounded by individuals who are undermining his leadership rather than bolstering it has created an atmosphere of mistrust within the party’s core.
President Bihi of Kulmiye and candidate Abdirahman M Abdullahi of Waddani
Despite these challenges, Kulmiye still has several opportunities to turn the tide in its favor. One of its key strategies will likely involve mending fences with influential traditional leaders and business elites who have felt alienated by the current administration. These figures wield considerable power in Somaliland’s society and could play a decisive role in swaying votes. Kulmiye’s success may also hinge on its ability to achieve a significant diplomatic breakthrough, such as securing international recognition for Somaliland, a long-held aspiration for the unrecognized state. Though unlikely within the remaining days before the election, even partial diplomatic gains, particularly with countries like Ethiopia, could energize its voter base and enhance its standing as the party capable of achieving Somaliland’s long-term goals.
On the other side of the political spectrum is Waddani, the opposition party that has grown in strength and appeal over the past few years. Founded in 2011, Waddani represents a relatively new force in Somaliland politics. Unlike Kulmiye, it has never held power, which gives it the advantage of being untainted by the failures of governance. This outsider status has resonated with voters who are frustrated with the current state of the nation. Waddani’s core appeal lies in its promise of change and its positioning as the alternative to Kulmiye’s dominance.
Waddani has capitalized on Kulmiye’s governance failures, particularly in areas like economic management and security. The opposition party has been vocal in criticizing the government’s inability to control inflation, bring down the high cost of living, and protect Somaliland’s territorial integrity. Waddani has also focused on presenting itself as a party of inclusivity, drawing support from a diverse range of clans and communities. In recent months, the party has gained momentum, especially among younger voters and urban populations, who are increasingly disillusioned with the ruling party.
Waddani Coalition With KAAH
Waddani’s position has been considerably bolstered by its strategic coalition with the KAAH party – expected to elevate to a national party status in the upcoming elections, a move that has reshaped the political dynamics of the race. The alliance has allowed Waddani to extend its reach beyond its traditional strongholds, tapping into regions, clans, and communities that were previously less accessible to the party. By joining forces with KAAH, Waddani now enjoys a more extensive nationwide support base, giving it representation in both urban centers and rural areas where KAAH has deep-rooted influence. This coalition signifies a unification of political forces, making Waddani not just a viable contender, but a dominant force in the election landscape.
The partnership with KAAH brings together voters from diverse political and ethnic backgrounds, including constituencies that were previously loyal to other factions. It strengthens Waddani’s claims to being a party of inclusivity and reform, helping it dispel perceptions that it is aligned with only one dominant clan. In a country where political success often hinges on securing broad, multi-clan support, this coalition significantly boosts Waddani’s chances of securing a clear majority.
Moreover, the alliance has enhanced Waddani’s ability to mobilize voters at the grassroots level. With KAAH’s established networks in previously untapped regions, Waddani now has the infrastructure to reach a wider audience. This new partnership positions Waddani as not just a challenger but as a genuine nationwide movement, drawing support from across Somaliland’s diverse political and social spectrum. It reflects the party’s growing momentum, signaling that it is capable of breaking through the traditional barriers that have historically defined Somaliland’s elections.
This coalition marks a critical shift in the political balance and reinforces Waddani’s image as a party of change. It brings into sharp focus the reality that Waddani, backed by a now broader and more unified electoral base, is not only competing with Kulmiye on equal footing but is increasingly seen as the most inclusive and wide-reaching political force in Somaliland today.
Shortfalls
However, Waddani is not without its own set of challenges. While the party has succeeded in broadening its appeal, it remains closely associated with a dominant clan, which limits its ability to present itself as a truly national party. This association with a single clan could be a significant obstacle, particularly in rural areas where clan loyalty remains a strong determinant of voting behavior. The party’s leadership has also struggled to control some of its more divisive elements, particularly in the rhetoric of some of its supporters, who have alienated key segments of the population, including the military. This has raised concerns about Waddani’s ability to govern effectively and maintain the unity and stability that Somaliland has worked hard to achieve over the past three decades.
Furthermore, Waddani’s decision to bring in former Kulmiye members as part of its reformist platform has raised eyebrows. While this move was intended to signal that the party is capable of attracting experienced leaders, it has also led to accusations that Waddani is simply recycling old political elites rather than offering a genuinely new direction. This has created skepticism among some voters who question whether Waddani truly represents a break from the past or if it is simply repackaging old ideas under a different banner.
Despite these concerns, Waddani has a significant opportunity to capitalize on the growing dissatisfaction with Kulmiye’s governance. The party’s best chance lies in presenting a clear, credible program for governance that addresses the economic and security challenges facing Somaliland. If Waddani can articulate a vision for the future that builds on Somaliland’s past achievements while offering tangible solutions to the country’s current problems, it stands a strong chance of securing victory.
The final outcome of the election will likely depend on how well each party can navigate the complex dynamics of Somaliland’s political landscape in the coming weeks. For Kulmiye, the path to victory lies in its ability to repair internal divisions, regain the trust of key power brokers, and deliver on key promises, such as addressing inflation and insecurity. The party’s historical legacy and control of state resources give it a solid foundation, but without addressing the governance failures of the past few years, it risks losing the support of an increasingly frustrated electorate.
For Waddani, the challenge is to maintain its momentum while broadening its appeal beyond its core base. The party must demonstrate that it is capable of governing effectively and that its promises of change are more than just rhetoric. Waddani’s ability to present a credible, inclusive vision for Somaliland’s future will be critical in determining whether it can convert its growing support into electoral victory.
Worth Considering
As Somaliland approaches election day, one thing is clear: the country is at a crossroads. Voters face a critical choice between continuity and change, and the outcome of this election will shape the future of Somaliland for years to come. Whether Kulmiye retains power or Waddani emerges as the victor, the challenges facing the next government will be immense, and the path forward will require strong leadership, inclusive governance, and a clear vision for the future.
The presence of international election observers could play a crucial role in ensuring the credibility of the election process. Their assessment of the fairness and transparency of the elections could impact both domestic and international perceptions of the results. A positive evaluation from respected international observers might lend legitimacy to the winning party, while concerns raised could cast doubt on the outcome and potentially lead to post-election tensions.
Having said so, there are several additional factors to consider that if any of the two frontrunners adeptly exploit can change the outcome of the elections.
Diaspora Influence
Somaliland has a significant diaspora population often plays an important role in politics through remittances and political activism. Their influence could sway voter opinions, especially through social media and financial support. The diaspora’s engagement in political discussions and their ability to influence family members back home might impact voting patterns in difficult to predict but potentially significant ways.
Women’s Participation
The role of women in Somaliland’s politics has been growing, albeit slowly. Their participation as voters and candidates could be a deciding factor in some regions and potentially shift traditional voting patterns. If either party can effectively mobilize female voters or present compelling female candidates, it might gain an advantage, particularly in areas where women’s issues are paramount.
Youth Bulge
Somaliland has a very young population, with a significant portion of voters being first-time participants in the electoral process. Their priorities and concerns may differ from those of older generations, potentially leading to unexpected voting patterns. Issues such as job creation, education, and technological advancement might resonate more strongly with this demographic, potentially favoring the party that best addresses these concerns.
Economic Factors
The global economic situation, including rising inflation and food prices, could have a significant impact on voter sentiment. The party that can convincingly address these immediate economic concerns may gain an edge. Voters might prioritize short-term economic relief over long-term political promises, potentially influencing their choice at the ballot box.
Regional Tensions
The ongoing disputes in the Sool and Sanaag regions, as well as relations with neighboring Somalia and other regional powers, could influence voters’ perceptions of which party is best equipped to handle these sensitive issues. The party that presents a clear and convincing strategy for managing these tensions while maintaining Somaliland’s sovereignty claims might appeal to security-conscious voters.
Who Is Likely To Win?
Based on the facts presented and the additional considerations, I would predict a very close election with a slight edge for the opposition party, Waddani. This prediction is based on several factors:
Anti-incumbency sentiment appears strong, with widespread dissatisfaction regarding Kulmiye’s handling of economic issues and security. This could lead to a significant anti-incumbency vote benefiting Waddani.
The growing youth population is likely to favor change over continuity, potentially benefiting Waddani. If the opposition can effectively mobilize this demographic, it could tip the scales in their favor.
Waddani’s stronger appeal in urban areas could be crucial, as urban voters tend to be more politically active and influential. This urban base might provide the opposition with a solid foundation of support.
In a situation where there’s significant discontent with the status quo, Waddani’s promise of change and new leadership could be more appealing to voters looking for a fresh approach to governance.
The analysis suggests that Waddani has been gaining momentum in recent months, which could carry through to election day, potentially culminating in an election victory.
However, this prediction comes with several important caveats:
Kulmiye’s control over state resources and media could still sway the election in their favor, particularly if they can effectively leverage these advantages in the final stretch of the campaign.
The clan dynamics, which are difficult to predict accurately, could play a decisive role. Last-minute shifts in clan alliances or voting patterns could significantly impact the outcome.
Unforeseen events such as last-minute diplomatic breakthroughs or security incidents could shift voter sentiment rapidly.
Given these factors, while I predict a Waddani victory, it’s likely to be by a narrow margin. The election could easily go either way, and the losing party’s acceptance of the results will be crucial for maintaining Somaliland’s stability and democratic credentials.
Regardless of the outcome, the close nature of the race suggests that the winning party will need to work hard to unite the country and address the concerns raised during the campaign to ensure effective governance post-election. The new government will face significant challenges in addressing economic issues, security concerns, and diplomatic relations, requiring a inclusive and pragmatic approach to governance.
The Chairman of the Somaliland Electoral Commission (NEC) Mr. Musa Hassan Yusuf has unequivocally stated that the upcoming presidential and political party elections would be held as scheduled and as slated on the 13th of November 2024.
He categorically dispelled the rumours in the media that claims the elections has been either delayed or postponed and at the same time cautioned those who are perpetrating the lies through the social media to cease and desist from it forthwith.
He made the statement during an event over the week as the NEC administered oath to the electoral ethics committee.
The two leading official parties, the ruling party KULMIYE and WADDANI and also the KAAH political organization were sternly cautioned from kicking off their political campaigns earlier than scheduled and instructed them to wait for the official time stipulated.
The Chairman of the Ethics Committee, Mohamed Hassan Mohamud, who spoke after the oath of office, warned the said Official National Parties and Political organization.
He reminded the sworn officials of the gravity of the essence of oath taking and to underestimate it nor take it lightly hence urged them to be diligent on the tasks ahead for them.
In conclusion, the NEC sent a message to the organizations, parties and the people of Somaliland urging them to avoid anything that would undermine or harm national security or Islamic tenets.
Of note were strict instructions of not infringing upon regulations and rules of the Somaliland National Elections Act.
In a significant stride towards enhancing healthcare services in Somaliland, Taiwan has officially pledged nearly 22 million USD in grant funding for the design, construction, and equipping of the Taiwan Medical Center at Hargeisa Group Hospital. This monumental project will not only boost Somaliland’s healthcare infrastructure but also deepen the growing cooperation between the two nations.
The Taiwan Medical Center, once completed in three years, will be a two-story facility housing 97 beds, bringing the hospital’s total capacity to nearly 600 beds. The Center will feature cutting-edge medical equipment and essential services that promise to improve the health and well-being of the people of Somaliland. This milestone is a testament to Taiwan’s ongoing efforts to share its expertise and support global healthcare development, as Ambassador Allen Chenhwa LOU of the Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland noted.
Healthcare is a key pillar of Taiwan’s international outreach. According to the 2023 Health Care Index from Numbeo, Taiwan’s healthcare system has been ranked as the world’s best for five consecutive years, a testament to its excellence. By extending this expertise to Somaliland, Taiwan is fostering mutual growth and understanding, based on the principles of equality and friendship.
The vision for the Taiwan Medical Center in Somaliland began under the leadership of Taiwan’s current President, William Lai Ching-te, and was supported by prominent Taiwanese officials including former Foreign Minister Dr. Joseph Wu. Ambassador Lou, echoing President Lai’s words, emphasized that “With every step forward that Taiwan takes, the world takes a step forward with us.” This project is one such step that symbolizes the deepening ties between Taiwan and Somaliland.
Beyond healthcare, Taiwan’s collaboration with Somaliland spans various sectors, including education, agriculture, ICT, security, and humanitarian aid. However, healthcare has emerged as a flagship of this relationship, with notable accomplishments such as the digitalization of hospital services in Hargeisa, Boroma, Brauo, and Berbera, and the donation of ambulances to improve medical mobility.
Through training programs both in Somaliland and Taiwan, scholarships, and the establishment of the Taiwan Medical Mission, Taiwan continues to invest in the human resources development of Somaliland’s healthcare professionals. This project underscores Taiwan’s broader vision of creating sustainable and people-centered cooperation models.
Ambassador Lou emphasized that while Taiwan has made this generous contribution as a symbol of friendship, the success of the Taiwan Medical Center relies on Somaliland’s partnership. As an African proverb wisely notes, “If you want to walk fast, walk alone. But if you want to walk far, walk together.” Taiwan’s healthcare initiatives are designed to transcend borders, and with Somaliland as a partner, the two nations are poised to achieve great things together in the realm of public health.
The Taiwan Medical Center in Somaliland is more than just a healthcare facility—it is a symbol of the enduring friendship and collaborative spirit between Taiwan and Somaliland. As Taiwan leads the way in healthcare, technology, and innovation, this partnership promises a brighter, healthier future for all.
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) remains deep-rooted in certain cultures, particularly in Somali regions, despite global human rights efforts to eradicate it. One of the most persistent arguments used to justify FGM is the claim that it is a religious obligation. However, this justification is rooted more in cultural misconceptions than in religious doctrine. Another complex factor is the belief that men, including fathers, should not interfere in what is considered a “woman’s affair,” such as decisions about FGM for their daughters. These dynamics present significant challenges to efforts aimed at protecting girls from this harmful practice.
The belief that FGM is a religious requirement, particularly within Islamic communities, is widespread but incorrect. Many argue that FGM, particularly the Sunna cut is mandated by Islam. The term “Sunna” refers to the practices of the Prophet Muhammad, leading to the misconception that this form of FGM is a religious obligation. However, Islamic scholars are divided on the issue. While some hold onto traditional practices, the majority, including authoritative voices in the Islamic world, have clarified that FGM has no basis in Islam.
Islamic scripture does not mandate FGM. In fact, key Islamic texts, including the Quran and Hadith do not mention FGM as a requirement for women or girls[1]. The Prophet Muhammad’s teachings emphasize the importance of mercy, dignity, and respect for the human body, none of which align with the practice of FGM. Yet, in many Somali communities, FGM has been passed down through generations as a cultural tradition, which over time has been conflated with religious duty.
This misconception stems from a lack of clear religious guidance in rural and undereducated areas, where religious and cultural practices blend into one another. FGM is seen as a rite of passage into womanhood, falsely believed to promote cleanliness and morality, ideals mistakenly linked to religious purity. Leaders in these communities, who often hold significant influence over families, perpetuate these beliefs, sometimes endorsing FGM as a way to preserve a girl’s modesty and ensure her marriageability. The argument that FGM is religiously required remains powerful, even though the practice is more deeply rooted in pre-Islamic tribal customs than in Islamic theology[2].
I wrote this article as both a personal reflection and a call to action, stemming from the profound experience of watching my daughters, Dheeman and Aragsan, fall victim to a practice I have spent my entire career opposing. As a lawyer and human rights defender, I have fought against harmful traditions like FGM, believing that I could shield my own family from these violations. However, this experience has shown me that even in the most personal of battles, cultural norms can overpower individual conviction, leading to devastating consequences. By sharing this story, I aim to highlight the pervasive nature of these traditions and to underscore the importance of continuous advocacy—not just in public spaces but within our own homes and communities.
Moreover, I wrote this article to expose the dangerous misconceptions that allow FGM to persist under the guise of religious obligation. The widespread belief that the Sunna cut is a religious mandate has created a powerful barrier to change, even among those who otherwise reject harmful practices.
As a lawyer, human rights defender, and advocate for the rights of women and girls in the Somali territories and the Horn of Africa, I never imagined that my own daughters, Dheeman and Aragsan, would one day experience the very violations I have spent many years fighting against. My advocacy has always been grounded in the belief that every girl should be free from the oppressive practices that undermine her dignity and bodily integrity. Yet, to my profound shock and sorrow, this violation happened within my own home.
For years, my colleagues and fellow advocates often commented on how “lucky” my daughters were, given that their father was a committed women’s human rights activist. They believed my profession and passion for justice would safeguard my family from the harmful practices that are so deeply entrenched in our culture. In many ways, this assumption was justified: I ensured that Dheeman and Aragsan had access to education and were raised with the same opportunities as boys. This was not difficult for me to enforce, as my own father was also a staunch believer in equal education for both his male and female children. This mindset was, in fact, a family tradition—one that I took great pride in continuing.
However, there was one area where I failed to protect my daughters, and that failure weighs heavily on my heart. Despite my dedication to human rights and my staunch opposition to female genital mutilation (FGM), I was unable to prevent my daughters from undergoing this harmful practice. FGM, in all its forms, is a violation of human rights, and I was certain that my personal and professional stance against it would be enough to protect Dheeman and Aragsan from this atrocity. However, the power of culture and tradition proved to be stronger than my convictions.
The conflict escalated when my wife and my mother began discussing subjecting our daughters to what is referred to as “Sunna. I was adamantly opposed. I made it clear that I did not want my daughters to undergo any form of cutting. I believed that, as a father, husband, and son, I could carry enough weight to convince my family that we could defy this dangerous tradition. Unfortunately, my mother—firmly rooted in cultural norms and deeply entrenched in the customs of our ancestors—did not agree. She questioned how I, as a man, could dare to intervene in what she saw as a “woman’s affair.” In her eyes, this was not my decision to make—it was a long-standing family tradition that she was determined to uphold.
In an attempt to mediate, I suggested that we let the girls grow up until they were 18 years old, allowing them the autonomy to decide for themselves whether they wanted to undergo the procedure. I also reminded my wife and mother that FGM was not a religious obligation, as many falsely believe. Yet, my wife found herself torn. On one hand, she was opposed to FGM, but on the other, she found it difficult to oppose my mother, especially given the persistent belief that the Sunna cut was linked to religious practice.
Despite my objections and my attempts to offer alternatives, I found myself at a disadvantage. Cultural expectations, coupled with the deep respect I held for my mother, prevented me from pushing my argument further. I did not want to disrespect her. I tried to convince my mother that times were changing, and that our daughters deserved the opportunity to grow up free from the harmful traditions that had scarred so many girls before them. But in the end, tradition triumphed over reason.
The most devastating part of this experience is that the cutting took place while I was out of the country. When I returned home, I was met with the shocking and heartbreaking news that my mother had taken matters into her own hands. The Sunna cut had been performed on my daughters without my knowledge, without my consent, and against everything I stood for. The realization that this violation had occurred in my own home, despite all my efforts to prevent it, was a profound shock.
The aftermath has been nothing short of heartbreaking. Dheeman and Aragsan now carry the physical and emotional scars of a practice that I have spent my entire career trying to eliminate. As their father, I feel an overwhelming sense of guilt. I ask myself repeatedly: Could I have done more? Could I have been more forceful in my opposition, and more persuasive in my arguments? Did my absence during this crucial time create the space for my family to make a decision that I would never have agreed to?
I hold deep respect for my mother, and I know that her intentions were not malicious. Like many in our culture, she believed that FGM was a necessary rite of passage, a tradition that prepares girls for womanhood. But as a human rights advocate, I know that FGM is a harmful practice that causes needless pain and suffering and violates the fundamental rights of girls and women. My daughters’ experience has opened my eyes to just how deeply ingrained these cultural norms are. Even within my own family, where I thought my advocacy would hold sway, tradition proved too strong to overcome.
What this experience has taught me is that the battle against FGM is not only fought in public arenas—through advocacy, policy changes, and legal reform—but also within our own homes and families. Cultural traditions run deep, and change is often met with resistance. But this is where we must begin. If we are to eradicate FGM, we must challenge the beliefs and practices within our own communities, even when that means standing up to the people we love most.
In Somali culture, decision-making around practices like FGM is often viewed as a matter for women, excluding men, even fathers, from the conversation. This deeply ingrained belief that men should not interfere in “women’s affairs” presents a major obstacle to eradicating FGM. In many cases, this cultural taboo reinforces the idea that issues related to girls’ bodies and rites of passage, including FGM, are strictly within the domain of female family members, especially mothers and grandmothers.
This creates a paradox where fathers, who are protectors and providers for their children, are sidelined when it comes to decisions about their daughters’ bodies. Even when men are educated on the dangers of FGM and oppose it, their voices are often drowned out by the collective pressure of tradition, which places the decision squarely in the hands of female relatives. In the case of Dheeman and Aragsan, despite my clear opposition as their father, my mother upheld the practice, believing it was her cultural responsibility to ensure that her granddaughters underwent the Sunna cut.
This belief is particularly dangerous because it silences those men who might otherwise advocate for their daughters’ well-being. Even when men, like the me, take a stand against FGM, they are often seen as overstepping their boundaries, questioning the wisdom and authority of the women in their family. In Somali society, respect for one’s elders is paramount, and going against the decisions of a mother or grandmother can be perceived as a serious offense, further complicating the efforts of men who want to protect their daughters from FGM.
This intersection of cultural, religious, and gendered expectations creates a deep-rooted system that is resistant to change. Women, particularly older generations, become gatekeepers of harmful practices like FGM, while men are discouraged from intervening. Even in families where there is clear opposition to the practice, like me, the combination of cultural pressure, religious misconceptions, and the taboo of male interference makes it difficult to protect girls from undergoing FGM.
To challenge these justifications, both cultural norms and religious misconceptions need to be addressed simultaneously. Religious leaders who speak out against FGM and clarify that it is not an Islamic requirement play a crucial role in debunking myths surrounding the practice. Additionally, challenging the cultural belief that FGM is solely a “woman’s affair” can help fathers and other male family members play a more active role in protecting their daughters. This shift requires community-wide education and dialogue that encourages men and women to jointly oppose harmful practices that violate the rights and dignity of girls.
FGM is a harmful practice with no basis in Islam, yet it continues to be justified under the guise of religious and cultural traditions. The exclusion of men from decision-making on their daughters’ bodies further complicates efforts to eradicate FGM, as it reinforces the power of women who uphold this practice. To protect girls like Dheeman and Aragsan, a collective approach that includes both men and women, as well as religious leaders and human rights advocates, is essential in challenging these beliefs and practices. This experience has reminded me just how personal this struggle is, and how much work still lies ahead.
Islamic Perspective on FGM
Islamic scholars across the Muslim world have consistently argued that FGM has no basis in Islamic doctrine. Neither the Quran nor the Hadith—the sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad—prescribe any form of genital cutting for women. In fact, Islam emphasizes the protection of bodily integrity, dignity, and health, all of which FGM directly violates.
Key Islamic scholars, such as those in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Muslim-majority countries, have clarified that FGM is a cultural tradition, not a religious obligation. For instance, in Saudi Arabia, a country known for its adherence to Islamic teachings, FGM is not practiced or sanctioned by religious authorities[3]. The absence of FGM in Saudi Arabia provides a compelling case that Islam does not mandate the practice.
Prominent scholars from Egypt’s Al-Azhar University, one of the most prestigious Islamic institutions, have also issued fatwas against FGM[4]. In 2007, Egypt criminalized FGM, a significant step in dismantling the cultural association of FGM with Islam. These examples show how countries with a deep commitment to Islamic values have publicly rejected FGM, providing clear religious guidance to their populations.
In Somali communities, the belief that FGM is part of Islamic practice, particularly the Sunna cut is widespread. The term “Sunna” itself refers to the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, which reinforces the misconception that this form of FGM is a religious requirement. However, as shown in countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, FGM is not aligned with Islamic teachings.
The persistence of FGM in Somali communities stems from a blend of cultural and religious confusion. In rural areas with limited access to religious education, local leaders often propagate FGM as a moral and religious obligation, confusing pre-Islamic cultural practices with Islamic beliefs. This is where Somalis could benefit from the approach taken by other Muslim-majority countries that have separated religious practices from harmful cultural traditions.
Somalis can learn from the religious clarity provided by scholars in countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Public education campaigns led by religious authorities in these countries have helped to dispel the myth that FGM is an Islamic obligation. Involving religious scholars in discussions about FGM, Somali communities can begin to differentiate between religious practice and harmful cultural traditions.
Religious leaders could take similar steps by issuing clear and unequivocal statements denouncing FGM, emphasizing that it is not supported by Islamic teachings. Community engagement through mosques and religious gatherings could serve as powerful platforms to educate families and dismantle the belief that FGM is necessary for religious or moral reasons.
Beyond religious clarification, Somalis must also challenge the cultural perception that decisions about FGM are solely within the domain of women, excluding fathers and male family members from the conversation. The example of countries like Egypt shows that national legislation, backed by religious support, can play a critical role in changing societal attitudes. Fathers and male family members need to be empowered to protect their daughters from this harmful practice.
FGM is a human rights issue, not a religious mandate. Somalia’s path to eradicating FGM lies in aligning with the Islamic values of bodily integrity and dignity, as demonstrated by countries like Saudi Arabia, while challenging the cultural norms that perpetuate this harmful practice
Yousef Timacade is a lawyer, legal analyst, and commentator with over a decade of experience in program management, research, and human rights advocacy. He holds master’s degrees in both law and executive management, which have equipped him with a unique blend of legal expertise and leadership acumen. Throughout his career, he has worked with numerous national and international non-governmental organizations, driving impactful initiatives in the areas of human rights, policy development, and social justice. Currently, Yousef serves as the Country Coordinator for Somalia and Somaliland at SIHA Network, where he leads efforts to advance women’s rights and advocate for marginalized communities.
Egypt’s intervention in Somalia is posing unprecedented threat to regional stability in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopian Public Diplomacy Institute (EPDI) in Sweden President Yassin Ahmed warned.
The president told ENA that Egypt was unable to contribute to peace keeping peace in its neighboring countries like Sudan and Libya; and could not even protect its borders from threats.
Egypt’s inexperience, rather history of failed peacekeeping missions, render its efforts in Somalia futile, he recalled.
Yasin cited the absence of Egypt from the African continent for more than three or four decades and its utter failure to keep peace in its neighboring countries.
The main reason behind Egypt’s intervention in Somalia is its claim with regard to Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) and a vain attempt to create pressure on Ethiopia, he added.
With regard to peace keeping, Ethiopia has on the other hand demonstrated its long-standing commitment and experience in regional and global peacekeeping, according to Yasin.
He said Ethiopia’s role is widely recognized and respected by the international community, including the United Nations and the African Union.
“Ethiopia, as a pivotal country and as an emerging country and a rising regional power, enjoys international and regional respect for its role in maintaining peace and regional and international security.”
Instead of pursuing divisive policies, the president called on Egypt to cooperate with Ethiopia in promoting regional security.
“It would be more appropriate for Egypt to cooperate with Ethiopia in preserving regional security,” he noted.
Moreover, Yassin expressed concern about Egypt’s supply of weapons to Somalia, arguing that it could exacerbate existing security challenges and undermine ongoing efforts to stabilize Somalia.
“Sending weapons to Somalia, which is witnessing internal security challenges, can contribute to undermining security within Somalia; because if these weapons are acquired by some terrorist groups they could pose serious challenge to the region.”
Yasin recalled that Ethiopia has been working in partnership with consecutive Somali governments and the international community to maintain peace and security in Somalia.
Furthermore, he underscored the importance of regional security cooperation among the countries of the Horn of Africa in order to deter external involvement and maintain stability in the region.
“It is necessary to think and create regional security cooperation for the countries of the Horn of Africa and/or East Africa. These countries have common security challenges. So, regional security cooperation is the solution to any external interventions.”
He noted that the countries in the region can better resist external interference and promote stability by strengthening economic ties and addressing common security challenges.
For the president, Ethiopia is also crucial for maintaining the security of the Red Sea as it is the largest country in the region and possesses the necessary capabilities to contribute to its protection.
“Peace, security and stability come through strengthening common economic interests. The economy is what creates peace, and creates economic cooperation. All of these countries, especially those on the Red Sea, cannot dispense with Ethiopia’s role in preserving and protecting regional security, even protecting the Red Sea.”
He observed that Ethiopia’s potential sea access through the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland could significantly enhance regional security in the region and the Red Sea.
“The MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland comes within the framework of creating a new reality. Research indicates that if Ethiopia obtains a sea outlet through the MoU, after it is developed into an agreement between the parties, then Ethiopia will have the natural role of protecting the security of the Red Sea.”
As a coastal state, Ethiopia would be able to play a pivotal role in protecting the region’s security and promoting economic interests, Yasin underlined, adding that this aligns with the international law which grants landlocked countries access to the sea,
To ensure lasting peace and security, the president noted that military and security cooperation should be fostered through strengthened economic ties.
Somaliland is a de facto sovereign state that is not recognized by the international community. Somaliland President Muse Bihi has established a foreign policy strategy based on the development of Hargeisa’s relations with Taipei, meeting Taiwan’s willingness to become strong allies in a “complicated environment.”
Bihi’s stance became crystal clear in 2020, when he rejected an offer from then-Chinese ambassador to Somalia Qin Jian (覃儉) to establish a Chinese liaison office in Somaliland on the condition it halted its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. He stressed the need to strengthen bilateral ties with Taipei instead of becoming part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which aimed to develop infrastructure in return for a country’s unfavorable stance regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and efforts to have a primary role in the international arena.
This position was followed-up by the establishment of the “Republic of Somaliland Representative Office in Taiwan,” the largest diplomatic mission of Hargeisa in East Asia. Its name speaks volumes of the two nations’ intention to use “official” and “formal” terms avoided by countries that are worried about possible retaliation from China.
“Both sides are motivated by a spirit of mutual assistance that will never expose any harm whatsoever to the interests of other countries, but rather contributes to international peace and regional economic activities,” Bihi has said.
Since then, the relationship between Hargeisa and Taipei has improved and the two are discussin several areas of common interest. It signals the parties’ willingness to engage in economic, commercial, diplomatic and political matters.
One important sector of common interest is fisheries and coastal zones. Somaliland Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Development Rabi Mohamed in February visited Taiwan to strengthen links on marine and ocean issues. In particular, they are to explore the potential for support, knowledge sharing and collaborative initiatives aimed at maximizing the socioeconomic benefits of marine resources while maintaining long-term viability.
Another strategic area is energy, given Taiwan’s desire to become increasingly independent from China and Somaliland’s compromise in terms of oil exploitation. The first meeting, which took place last year, laid the foundations for cooperation in exploration, exploitation, training and technical expertise, as Somaliland identifies Taiwan as “a partner to cooperate with in oil development.” Somaliland Minister of Energy and Minerals Abdi Abdillahi Farar this year also visited Taiwan to boost cooperation and discuss potential Taiwanese investments in the field.
Taiwan is increasingly contributing to Somaliland’s efforts in protecting and fostering a “safe and democratic environment.” For example, Taiwan donated about US$2 million to Somaliland in support of its presidential and political party elections next month. There is also a line of continuity, considering the financial support Taiwan provided in the previous parliamentary and civic elections in 2021.
The relationship between the two nations continues to show a high level of mutual trust and readiness for further development to secure a future that safeguards the countries’ established democratic institutional structure and strengthens its foundations.
Taiwan’s role could be extremely beneficial to achieving this purpose, given its efforts toward reaching high standards of democracy and rule of law. Somaliland, which is ranked as the only “partly free” state in the Horn of Africa on Freedom House’s “political rights and civil liberty rankings,” wants to follow in the footsteps of its Asian ally. That proves how Taiwan can help in economic and political issues.
Michele Maresca is an analyst at the online international law journal Il Caffe Geopolitico.
Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki (R) has been holding talks with his Egyptian counterpart Abdul Fattah al-Sisi (C) and Somalia’s Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (L) in Asmara. Eritrean Information Ministry
Thursday October 10, 2024
By Teklemariam Bekit
The leaders of Egypt, Somalia and Eritrea – countries which all have strained relations with Ethiopia – have been meeting in the Eritrean capital, Asmara.
An Eritrean statement wrapping up the summit made reference to “respect for the sovereignty… and territorial integrity of the countries in the region”.
This could be taken as a pointed reference to landlocked Ethiopia’s ambitions for access to a sea port, but the country was not specifically mentioned.
A recent diplomatic disagreement has pushed Somalia into closer ties with Egypt and Eritrea, both of which have long-standing disputes with Ethiopia.
There have been fears that the growing tension could spill over into some sort of conflict.
“This is an axis against [Ethiopian capital] Addis Ababa,” Hassan Khannenje, director of the Horn International Institute for Strategic Studies, told the BBC’s Focus on Africa programme.
“I think it’s an attempt to bring the hate together in trying to increase pressure against Addis Ababa.”
A photograph released by Eritrea in the wake of the meeting shows President Isaias Afwerki clasping hands with his counterparts from Egypt, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, and Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
Why Ethiopia is so alarmed by an Egypt-Somalia alliance
A statement said the three men had “agreed to… enhance the Somali state institutions to confront various internal and external challenges and to enable the Somali National Federal Army to confront terrorism in all is forms”.
This was Sisi’s first visit to Asmara, while the Somali president had already been three times this year.
Ethiopia has for years been a staunch backer of the government in Mogadishu in its fight against al-Qaeda-linked militant group al-Shabab.
But Somalia is furious that Ethiopia signed a preliminary deal at the beginning of this year with the self-declared republic of Somaliland to lease a section of its coastline. Somalia sees Somaliland as part of its territory.
Meanwhile, Addis Ababa and Cairo have been at loggerheads for more than a decade over Ethiopia’s construction of a vast hydroelectric dam on the River Nile. Egypt sees this as a possible threat to the volume of water flowing down the river, which it relies on.
Last month, an Egyptian ship delivered a significant consignment of military equipment to Somalia. This came after two Egyptian military planes landed in the Somalia capital with arms and ammunition in August.
In 2018, it was hoped that the fractions relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which followed the bloody border war two decades earlier, were over.
It was then that Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a “declaration of peace and friendship” with Eritrea.
The agreement won him the Nobel Peace Prize the following year.
But ties between the Horn of Africa neighbours again deteriorated following the end of the two-year civil war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, which borders Eritrea.
Asmara had been an ally of the Ethiopian government in that conflict but has been lukewarm about the accord that ended the fighting in November 2022.
Relations were further aggravated by Abiy’s pronouncement last year that his country wanted to secure access to a port on the Red Sea.
