Somali campaigners and Oxfam call for Barclays to reverse the decision to close accounts allowing Somalis in the UK to send money home. Photograph: Andrew Aitchison/Oxfam
Bank agrees to keep money-transfer firm’s account open until after verdict, as UK unveils moves to aid Somali remittances
October 16, 2013
A high court judge is expected to hand down a decision next week on an injunction sought by Dahabshiil, the biggest remittance company in the Horn of Africa, against Barclays’s decision to close its account.
Barclays has agreed to continue to keep Dahabshiil’s account open until after the verdict. The hearing, which took place at the high court before Mr Justice Henderson, ended on Wednesday.
“We are pleased to reassure customers (both individuals and NGOs) who rely on our services in the UK and across Africa that Dahabshiil remains open for business,” the company said in a statement. “The court hearing has now concluded, and the judge’s decision will follow later. Barclays has agreed to continue to keep our accounts open until judgment is received.”
Barclays, the last major bank providing remittance services, announced in May that it planned to shut down the accounts to about 250 money-service businesses, initially giving a 10 July deadline, citing concern over falling foul of money-laundering regulations.
But after an outcry from Somali remitters, academics and some MPs, who said the bank’s concerns were exaggerated, the deadline was pushed back. Dahabshiil, the only money-transfer organisation whose account is still open, sought an injunction to stop Barclays from shutting it down. It claimed that Barclays is abusing a dominant position by proposing to end an existing relationship without objective justification and by treating Dahabshiil differently from other customers.
Barclays had said it was closing the accounts of around 250 money-service businesses because it is obliged to follow rules and regulations set by governments.
“We understand and appreciate the important role these businesses play in helping people to transfer money around the world, in some cases to places where there is great need of financial support,” a spokesman said. “However, Barclays has an obligation to operate within the rules and regulations set by governments and regulators in the countries in which we do business. Failure to do so would result in Barclays being prosecuted by regulators around the world and potentially fined many hundreds or potentially billions of pounds.”
Somalis living in the UK send more than £100m a year for food, healthcare and education to relatives back home. Somalia is particularly depended on money-service businesses such as Dahabshiil as it lacks a formal banking system after decades of war.
“Barclays’s closure of the accounts will mean my 80-year-old mother-in-law won’t receive the money she relies on for food, rent and healthcare,” said Farhan Hassan, whose change.org petition calling on the bank not to cut the lifeline was endorsed by double Olympic gold medallist Mo Farah, and has more than 100,000 signatures.
“My relatives in Somalia know about Barclays’s decision in the UK and they don’t understand why the banks and government can’t work together on the issue. It is unwise and unethical that a gap is going to be left before a solution is put in place.”
Somalia, which is struggling to get back on its feet after decades of war, stands to be the country most affected by Barclays’s decision.
Annual remittances from the UK amount to more than £15bn worldwide, with up to 65% flowing to developing countries. The UK has one of the largest money-transfer markets in Europe as well as the largest number of money-transfer operators.
After a meeting last month, chaired by senior officials from the Treasury and the Department for International Development (DfID), the government announced several steps to deal with the fallout from Barclays’s move. The measures included a planned “safe corridor” for transferring money between the UK and Somalia.
The pilot scheme will be developed to establish and test audit mechanisms to track payments at the sending, clearing and receiving stages of the remittance process. DfID will work with the World Bank to support the development of an audit mechanism and train money-transfer operators in Somalia over the next 12 months.
The government will also form an action group to draft guidance on anti-money laundering, while the National Crime Agency will provide more detailed and specific risk assessments and alerts about the sector to banks and money-transfer companies, to help differentiate the risks involved in dealing with different money transmitters.
Development experts welcomed the government action, but expressed concern about what would happen in the short term. “The Treasury plans are interesting,” said Laura Hammond, head of development studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, “but it will take months for them to be put in place and there is no plan for what to do to safeguard the corridor in the short run, until the proposed steps are put in place and banks agree to work with the money-service businesses.”
Despite that Somalia enjoys territorial integrity and political independence, it has no representative government locally and internationally, no central government to look into the affairs of the State. Turmoil, chaos, disorder and anarchy prevail at its highest with insurgents, terrorists, warlords and piracy as a new scourge since 1991 when functional government ceased to exist in Somalia. Multiple sub State (Somaliland and Puntland) groups control various sections and layers of the territory or segments of the population.
UNSC resolutions give mandates to States to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law (UNSC Resolution 1816) but they never cater for those as to who should prosecute the pirates? In the same line the UNCLOS, 1982 does not contain any definition of when an individual can be categorized as a pirate. UNSC Resolution 1851 declares that States must cooperate with the STFG to ‘undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea” but STFG is neither a State nor a functional government elected by its people for its people and has certainly no authority to rule Somalia and it has never been mandated by the Somali people to speak or to represent them. How can States cooperate with the STFG that has no power, unlike a State with a proper government per se, to, inter alia, negotiate and ratify treaties, covenants and resolutions? It is trite law that any State cannot enter into international agreements without a representative government. And this is what is happening in a divided Somalia. Under Article 39 of the UN Charter the UNSC (Chapter VII) may use force in any State provided it satisfies a sole criterion: that the State is a threat to peace and security to the international community and there is no need to have the consent of that State. However, ironically UNSC passed Resolution 1851 which stipulates that foreign troops may enter Somalia to repress and arrest pirates provided that the STFG has consented. Here, some authors suggested that UNSC resolutions are superfluous (Treves, 2009).
UN passed a certain number of resolutions (Resolution 1816, 1836, 1844, 1846, 1851 and Resolution 1897) to confirm the sovereignty of Somali. However, it is undisputed that Somalia is a ‘failed State’ (supra) which lacks government, as explained (supra), and is not in a position to negotiate actually with other States in any way. After the extradition of pirates from the Victim State or Seizure State back to Somali according to transfer of suspected persons (EU-Kenya Transfer Agreement and the EU-Seychelles Transfer Agreement for example) who will look after them since all institutions have collapsed and there is no functional police or judiciary?
Under UNSC Resolution 1851 States who still wish to cooperate with the STFG may enter Somalia to arrest pirates. UNSC Resolution 1846 (10) provides that States and organizations which are cooperating with the STFG may enter into the ‘territorial waters’ of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea with all necessary means to repress such acts. Apart from the undisputed fact that this amounts to a violation of a State’s sovereignty (supra) who will prosecute suspected pirates once they have been captured in Somali or outside Somalia? To this question, first all institutions have collapsed and there are no courts and administrative buildings at all. Second, which States would like to enter in the troubled waters of Somali to chase pirates, civil-war insurgents, terrorists, warlords capable of engaging themselves into non-international armed conflicts. It is important to point out here that both the ReCAAP (Article 2 (5)), which is an international legal binding instrument, and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (Article 15(j)) deny any right of foreign vessels to enter another State’s territorial waters in order to counter piracy. And in no way is Somalia an exception to the general rule. Major Problems in Somalia Unsolved
The UN fails to handle the main problems facing Somalians: poor socio-economic development; Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU); maritime poaching, free and fair election to settle back a government to deal with its socio-economic problems. Western countries, the US principally, are not willing to give support and financial aid to a country like Somalia where there is no economic benefit and material gain unlike in Iraq or Israel. One of the main offences of piracy is primarily armed robbery at sea; and where there may eventually be attacks, murder and wounds and blows; but this concept of armed robbery at sea does not even appear in the UNCLOS, 1982. Western countries have not yet participated (except the US-led Combined Task Force 151 which is deployed in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden) actively or with an intent to commit to a cause in Africa where there is no material, economic of financial gain like in Irak or strategic benefit like the Chagos Archipelagos for example. Nevertheless, NATO, the US-led Combined Task Force 151 and The European Union Naval Force Operation Atlanta have been deployed within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy to protect maritime trade (piracy alone in the Indian and Pacific Oceans result in the loss of $ 13-15 billion annually due to maritime piracy on vessels, tankers, ransom payment which ranges from $3 to $ 5 million, and loss of materials and logistics) after an Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor has been established. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is also playing a vital role in communication and information to eradicate piracy (329 piracy cases were reported worldwide, 23 ships were attacked by Somali pirates in 2005 with 440 hostages taken, in 2007 111 piracy cases were reported in Somalia and 217 in 2009. Pirate attacks may provoke oil leakage and oil/petrol/hazardous and dangerous products spill-over in our seas and beaches with disastrous impacts on our tourism sector and consequently income of this emerging sector in Mauritius. Maritime trade occupies approximately 80% of international trade and it is time to reflect on it now before it is too late. Finally, as far as the UNCLOS, 1982 is concerned is it obsolete? Probably yes!
References
Geib R. (2009), Armed violence in fragile States: low intensity conflicts, spill-over conflicts and sporadic law enforcement operations by third parties, 91: 873 International Review of the Red Cross 127 and 132
Geib R. and Petrig A. (2010), Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, Volume I, Oxford University Press.
Gordon R. E. (1995), Some legal problems with trusteeships, 28 Cornell International Law Journal 301 at 332
Gunputh R.P. (2013): Dilemma of Somali Pirates and SIDS in the Indian Ocean -The Mauritian Case Study-Global Maritime Annual Conference 2013, Gujarat National Law University, Gujarat, India
Gunputh R.P. (2013), Prosecution of Non-State Actors under Municipal Law according to International Maritime Law. Some Legal Implications in a Failed State- The Somali Piracy Case Study-
Gunputh R.P.(2013): Pirates of Aden v. Governments of Eden: Myth or reality? Organised by the University of Lancashire (UClan), UK, September 2013, Garden Flower, Port-Louis, Book of Abstracts
Gunputh R.P (2013), International Law in a ‘Failed State’ -The Indian Ocean Somali Piracy Case Study-
Iyi J-M (2011), Somali Piracy, UNSC Resolutions 1816-1851: dilemma of state failure and the burden of legitimacy, p. 47-78, African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law, Juta
Nairobi, October 16, 2013–Unidentified assailants threw two grenades at the Galkayo offices of Radio Daljir in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland on Tuesday night, according to news reports and local journalists. The Committee to Protect Journalists condemns the attack on Radio Daljir, which has been targeted in the past, and calls on authorities to identify the perpetrators and ensure they are brought to justice.
“While maintaining security in Galkayo is challenging, authorities must do their utmost to end repeated attacks on the station,” said CPJ East Africa Consultant Tom Rhodes. “They will make progress only if they thoroughly investigate and prosecute this and all previous attacks.”
Tuesday’s attack, which occurred at around 8 p.m., damaged the office wall and a vehicle, news reports said. No one was injured despite journalists and other staff members being inside the offices. The assailants fled in a vehicle with no license plates, news reports said.
Authorities are investigating the attack, but have not arrested anyone yet, local journalists said.So far, no motive has been identified.The station is able to continue broadcasting.
Some local journalists said they suspected the attacks could be linked to the station’s past programming, which included broadcasts that encouraged citizens not to join insurgent militia groups such as Al-Shabaab. Radio Daljir staff are planning to improve security around their station’s compound by installing security cameras, among other measures, local journalists said.
The station has been targeted in the past. In August 2011, assailants threw a grenade at the Radio Daljir offices in Galkayo, which injured a security guard and damaged the front of the station, according to CPJ research. An unexploded bomb was found outside the station’s gate in May 2011, according to local journalists.
Two unidentified gunmen killed Radio Daljir journalist Farhan Jeemis Abdulle in May 2012 as he walked home from work at the station, according to news reports. Local journalists said at the time that they suspected Al-Shabaab insurgents had killed Abdulle in connection with his coverage of a program that encouraged young people to lay down their guns. The perpetrators have not yet been found.
MOGADISHU, Somalia, Oct. 16 (UPI) — Somalia’s Western-backed government is talking to major international oil companies like Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell and BP about resuming exploration programs abandoned when the East African state collapsed into anarchy in 1991.
On the face of it, that could be an extraordinarily hard sell since Somalia remains highly volatile despite recent military setbacks for the Islamist insurgents of al-Shabaab who are linked to al-Qaida.
What makes it tougher is that Somalia’s neighbors, Kenya in particular, have their eyes on potentially large oil and gas reserves in disputed waters in the Indian Ocean.
Al-Shabaab still controls large areas of the Somali countryside and any oil company that ventures into the country risks getting caught up in sharp political rivalries between the fragile central government in Mogadishu and semiautonomous regions like Puntland and the self-declared state of Somaliland in the north. Both have deals with Western oil juniors.
A high-profile Sept. 21 attack by al-Shabaab on an upscale shopping mall in downtown Nairobi, capital of neighboring Kenya, in which at least 67 people were killed points to al-Shabaab widening its terror campaign across East Africa.
On top of this, the Kenyans, who provided troops for an African Union military force that drove al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and other Somali cities in 2011-12, are trying to set up a buffer zone in a Somali border region known as Jubaland, the better to stake a claim on the disputed waters in the Indian Ocean.
“The world’s leading oil companies are increasingly accepting that their quest for new reserves will take them into challenging new territory,” analyst Katrina Manson observed.
“In regions such as the Arctic, the problems are technical. Around the Horn of Africa, companies must calculate whether political and security risks will put too heavy a burden on their production costs,” she wrote in The Financial Times.
“This is hazardous territory in which to operate. A chunk of Somalia is still under the control of al-Shabaab. Its waters are the hunting ground of pirates, who since 2005 have earned close to $400 million by ransoming 149 vessels.”
Despite all this, Abdullah Haidar of Somalia’s Ministry of Natural Resources reported recently that discussions in London with the major oil companies, including Conoco Phillips, Chevron Corp. and Eni of Italy, “are going well.”
These companies, along with BP and Shell, acquired onshore and offshore exploration blocks in the 1980s during the military dictatorship of Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre.
But when Somali warlords deposed him in 1991, exploration ceased as the country was torn apart by clan warfare. They declared force majeure.
Now several, such as Shell and Eni, want their blocks restored and to enter into production-sharing agreements with the 8-month-old, donor-dependent government of President Hassan Sheik Mohamed that wants to use oil to rebuild the impoverished country’s ravaged economy.
The companies are largely tight-lipped about their dealings with Mogadishu, but ENI said its chief executive met with Mohamed in September. Shell said talks are currently “of a preliminary and exploratory nature.”
But there is clearly interest because these and other majors have made big strikes across East Africa, particularly with oil around Uganda’s Lake Albert and gas off Mozambique and Tanzania.
The only Western company to sign up with Mogadishu so far is the British company Soma Oil & Gas, established in 2012 and headed by Lord Michel Howard, a former Conservative Party leader who’s held several cabinet posts.
It signed an agreement Aug. 6 and will conduct seismic surveys in designated areas on land and offshore, and update historic seismic data for the government, in return for nominating exploration and drilling rights for up to 12 blocks.
Somalia’s U.N. Monitoring Group warned in a report to the Security Council in July oil exploration across the shattered state risks “exacerbating clan divisions and therefore threatens peace and security. … Oil companies should cease and desist negotiations with Somali authorities.”
Some oil has been found in Somaliland and Puntland, which have largely escaped the violence. But the dozen or so oil companies drilling there have to be protected by militias or private forces.
“It is alarming that regional security forces and armed groups may clash to protect and further Western-backed oil companies’ interests,” the U.N. warned.
One of Somalia’s most notorious pirate leaders, known as “Big Mouth”, is under arrest facing charges of kidnapping and piracy after being tricked into travelling to Belgium, the prosecution said Monday.
Federal prosecutor Johan Delmulle said Mohamed Abdi Hassan, known as “Afweyne” or “Big Mouth”, was being held in Bruges after being detained at Brussels airport on Saturday on disembarking from a flight from Nairobi.
He was arrested along with his accomplice, Mohamed Aden Tiiceey, former governor of Himan and Heeb state in central Somalia, the prosecutor said, reading a statement to the press in French and Dutch.
Both Afweyne and Tiiceey were facing charges of kidnapping and piracy in the case of the 2009 capture of a Belgian ship, the Pompei, which was seized and held by pirates off the Somali coast for more than 70 days.
Belgian investigators had been working for years to bring the men behind such crimes to book and lured the notorious pirate to Brussels in a scheme that took months, the prosecutor said.
Because Afweyne lived in Somalia and rarely travelled, Belgian police “elaborated an infiltration operation aimed at arresting Afweyne outside of Somalia,” he said.
“The plan was to approach Afweyne through the intermediary of his accomplice named Tiiceey,” his statement added.
“Via Tiiceey, Afweyne was asked to collaborate as an advisor and expert on a film project on maritime piracy. The film was supposed to reflect his life as a pirate.”
But when Afweyne and Tiiceey landed on Saturday morning to sign the movie contract, “they were expected and taken into custody,” the prosecutor said.
Afweyne announced in Mogadishu in January that he was quitting piracy after a highly profitable eight-year career. He said he was working to persuade other pirates to do the same.
Described last year by the UN as “one of the most notorious and influential leaders” in Somalia’s pirate hub, he notably was involved in the 2008 capture of the Saudi-owned Sirius Star oil supertanker, released for a ransom of several million dollars.
He also reportedly took part in the 2008 capture of the MV Faina, a Ukrainian transport ship carrying 33 refurbished Soviet-era battle tanks, which was released after a 134-day hijack for a reported three million dollars.
In a quick reaction, a spokesman for EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton welcomed the arrests as a new breakthrough in the fight to stop piracy off the Somali coast.
“We welcome the arrest of Mohamed Abdi Hassan, alias Afweyne, one of the main suspected sponsors of Somali piracy, by Belgian authorities,” said spokesman Sebastien Brabant.
“While fully respecting the principle of presumption of innocence, we consider that this arrest marks a significant step in the fight against piracy.
“It demonstrates that law enforcement authorities can now track not only the pirates themselves, but also the leaders of these criminal networks, who benefit most from pirate attacks.”
The European Union heads the EUNAVFOR Atalanta sea operation against piracy which has helped stem attacks. There have been no successful captures of ships since May 2012 and Somali authorities too have made progress on land.
The White House is mixing it up. Usually after commando raids against terrorist targets, the leaks flow like a fine triumphalist wine. We hear just enough detail of high-level secret meetings to emphasise that everything that worked was actually the president’s idea. We may get a photo or two indicating that while considering the raids everyone was looking extremely serious.
But that’s not what happened in the wake of the raids last week. Rather, the response to the US commando operations in Libya and Somalia reminded me a bit of the movie The Right Stuff, when after a post-splashdown screw-up that resulted in the sinking of his Mercury spacecraft, Gus Grissom is denied the pomp and parades that his colleagues had enjoyed.
The raids did not go according to plan. According to reports, the raid in Somalia on Al Shabab encountered heavier resistance than anticipated and presented a much higher risk of civilian casualties than expected.
Post-raid reports indicate that faulty intelligence may have been to blame. The raid in Libya that led the US to grab accused embassy-bombing operative Nazih Abdul Hamed Al Ruqai, better known as Abu Anas Al Libi, produced political blowback ranging from a post-raid statement from the Libyan government that the mission was carried out without its knowledge to the loud criticism of influential Islamic groups in the country that the US had violated Libyan sovereignty to subsequent assertions by Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan that “Libyan citizens should be judged in Libya, and Libya does not surrender its sons”.
Exceptionalism is contrary to the spirit of the US Constitution and the ideas that led to the founding of the country. If there is one lesson of human civilisation, it is that equality under the law needs to apply to nations as well as people or else chaos and injustice ensue.
The raids were more damaging not because the outcome of one was unsuccessful, but because the outcome of the other was. If countries feel they can swoop in and snatch up bad guys anywhere, whenever, and however it suited them, the world would quickly fall into a state of permanent war.
It is ironic that President Barack Obama has become the avatar of exceptionalism. As a campaigner and even as a president, he has sometimes seemed resistant to the idea — even when he seemed to embrace it during his first trip abroad after becoming president when he said, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.” It was a dodge designed to drain the idea of its odiousness. That is typically done (by academics as well by politicians like the president) by focusing on the noble values that set us apart.
The defences of this idea founder on the hard truths of what the US justifies with our argument that we are freer or that we promote more equality or whatever other qualities we might list (in a self-congratulatory way) on our national Facebook profile. But then we develop drone programmes that we launch against friends and enemies alike with or without their permission. Or we launch commando raids to grab bad guys. Or we assemble a global surveillance apparatus that knows no limits, violating the sovereignty and privacy of even close allies as if they had no rights at all.
It is one thing to be proud of those qualities that have enabled America to create opportunity and ensure freedom for so many. It is quite another to argue that our success in framing a great legal system on a constitution that legitimately should be a model to the world allows us to ignore the laws and rights of others.
Every nation, the defenders argue, has a right to self-defence. But every nation also faces threats of many sorts. There are bad actors and organisations small and large and even other nations that pose physical, cyber, economic, and other threats to virtually every nation on Earth. Were any threat of any scale allowed to be the justification for the violation of another nation’s sovereignty, the concept of sovereignty would evaporate in a puff of smoke before our very eyes and surely chaos would ensue.
That is why, for all but the most egregious threats, nations must rely on international law and cooperation with other authorities as the mechanisms by which they defuse or manage such threats — grabbing wrongdoers and keeping them from committing further destructive acts. In the wake of the national trauma of 9/11, however, the US fell into a dangerous rabbit hole of dubious logic. Since it had seen one major terrorist attack by one non-state actor that had catastrophic consequences that shook the nation (much as an attack from a sovereign nation might have done), then, the thinking went, all terrorists must potentially pose a similar threat and, therefore, the right to self-defence gives the US a free pass to get ‘all exceptional’ on bad guys or data networks everywhere.
Grave threats justify self-defence under international law. Responding to them is not, therefore, exceptionalism. It is actually the opposite, working within a common set of rules. The trick is defining such threats very narrowly. This error of judgement and logical slippery slope are then compounded by the exceptionalist idea that all other nations and systems are somehow less worthy of respect than ours.
Having been wanted for the Uganda and Kenya bombings in 1998, Al Libi was clearly a very bad actor. But it did not serve US interests to go into a country in which it had ostensibly militarily intervened in order to help restore the rule of law to only then violate those laws and the rights of that country and to send the kind of message that will create more Al Libis than the raid could possibly have taken into custody.
In a seemingly unrelated coda that was also rife with irony, the White House let slip that it is going to withhold certain aid from the Egyptian government because of its origins in a coup and, presumably, its post-coup efforts to restore stability to that country. Set aside for a moment the bizarre timing of this announcement. Set aside for a moment the fact that literally every major ally the US has in the region from the Israelis to the Saudis to the Jordanians to the Kuwaitis to the Emiratis to the Bahrainis surely object to it. Set aside the fact that other aid will keep flowing, thus sending yet another confusingly mixed message to the Egyptians. The decision also underscores that the US is selectively punishing a country that has historically been an ally for trying to reduce the threat posed (and demonstrated) by Islamic fundamentalists while failing to similarly go after those who have supported fundamentalist troublemakers in places like Libya — which is precisely the reason Al Libi was found there. Who are those people we choose not to squeeze? The Qataris come to mind.
During the UN meetings in New York, one smart regional leader said the Qataris were supporting the fundamentalist push in Libya because they saw it, with its hydrocarbon resources, as a potential “milking cow” for the Muslim Brotherhood and similar movements throughout the Middle East. These are the same Qataris that have supported fundamentalists (as have the Turks) in Syria … and where once again, the US has refused to truly read them the riot act even as it beat up on those going after the fundamentalists.
Exceptionalism is one of the great flaws of US foreign policy exacerbated in the post-9/11 era. But it has been compounded by the mistake of confusing tactics for strategies — of allowing the pursuit of a few terrorists, which generates headlines when successful (and is swept under the rug when not), to distract the US from forming the kind of coherent strategy that advancing American interests in the Middle East and across the Islamic world warrants. The US grabs a terrorist, but inflames the street that is giving birth to the next generation of terrorists. The US punishes an ally for acting extralegally even as it does so as a matter of policy — and fails to realise the terribly mixed and counterproductive message it is sending to those who could help it achieve its greater goals.
As a consequence, while touting a sequence of high-profile wins against individuals or the hierarchy of groups like Al Qaida, the US has watched as new threats have proliferated to the point that they are greater than ever before and its standing has deteriorated to reach new lows. (Ongoing idiocy in Washington on domestic issues doesn’t help.)
In short, the US has become the incoherent exceptionalist. Not just a giant stomping on the rights of others and seeking to be hailed for it, but one doing so in a way that systematically undercuts the characteristics that have made it great and weakens it at the same time.
Source: Washington Post
David Rothkopf is CEO and editor-at-large of Foreign Policy. He is the author of Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power.
Last week I met two members of London’s Somalian community to talk about Barclay’s decision to pull out of Britain’s £2 billion remittance market. This will have a huge impact on Somalia and other countries whose economies are, rightly or wrongly, reliant on international money transfers.
We spoke about individual families sending money they have earned in the UK home to help feed relatives, and assist with building a civil society in this war-torn country. Together, these individual acts of people sending money back to their family are key in preventing people from dying of hunger with the remittances contributing a massive 50 per cent to Somalia’s GDP.
Later that day I heard Boris Johnson talk at the Conservative Party Conference about how he is proud to be Mayor of French, Australian and Chinese Londoners. As Mayor of London he has a responsibility to speak up for all Londoners and he is singularly failing to step in to help.
There are a number of reasons why the Mayor should step in and help resolve the imminent crisis Barclay’s decision will trigger.
The first is a humanitarian one. The people I spoke to were quite clear – this would cut off vital funds to their friends and relatives and lead to starvation as people are pushed further into poverty.
The second reason Boris Johnson should intervene is in relation to our economy here in London. If you walk along a high street you are likely to see businesses who rely on the commission from remittances to pay the rent and which also provide other services such as internet cafes. They will no doubt suffer if there is not a safe way to transfer funds, and this market will be pushed underground with cash in suitcases replacing traceable movement of money
From an international perspective, it makes good sense to ensure we have as stable a Somalia as possible. The American intervention against terrorist targets in Somalia this weekend shows how fragile the situation there is. The gap left by remittances will create instability and ultimately will need in the short-term at least to be filled by foreign aid.
However, this transition is likely to be chaotic and trying to suddenly plug the £160 million sent a year sent by the 300,000 Somalians living in the UK will put many vulnerable families at risk. It also provides a space for the terrorist group Al Shabab to move in. The UK government hosted a conference in London in May to help rebuild the country highlighting that it recognises this is an important issue. The cutting off of remittances will clearly hinder efforts to stabilise Somalia.
Despite Mo Farah’s voice being added to the debate on this issue, it is the financial transaction and the risk to Barclays of the current system rather than the impending human tragedy that has been centre stage.
Barclays has a huge presence in London because of its sponsorship of the cycle-hire scheme. At the very least, the Mayor should use his influence to ask the bank to delay implementing their decision until alternative arrangements for arranging money transfers can be found.
The risk is that removing a cash lifeline from an impoverished people could lead to a humanitarian crisis which could in turn lead to a strengthening of terrorist organisations.
The Somalis I spoke to were more than willing for additional safeguards to be put in place and supported the idea of a ‘safer payment corridor’. They were, however, deeply concerned at the human tragedy likely to unfold.
Testimony by Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs
Security and Governance in Somalia: Consolidating Gains, Confronting Challenges, and Charting the Path Forward
Good afternoon, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is my pleasure to appear before you today to talk about Somalia, which, during my tenure as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, will remain a top foreign policy priority for the Department of State, as it is for the Obama Administration. The past year marked significant changes in Somalia and in our bilateral relationship with Somalia. The election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was a welcome signal that room for political progress in Somalia was opening. This was made possible, in part, by the international community’s support of the Djibouti Peace Process and the leadership role of our regional partners, notably the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). On January 17, we formally recognized the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), after two decades of transitional governments. Nonetheless, the U.S. Government also understood very clearly that Somalia would face considerable challenges as it worked to rebuild its statehood.
The successes of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), AMISOM troop-contributing countries, and strategic partners to combat and eviscerate al-Shabaab are demonstrating the strength of an Africa-led model. Nonetheless, this Somalia-based al-Qa’ida affiliate remains a dangerous presence. The all-too-recent terrorist attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, for which al-Shabaab has taken credit, is a chilling example of the challenges for Somalia and the region. This attack suggests that violent extremism in the Horn of Africa may be evolving. It also makes clear that al-Shabaab presents a threat to U.S. partner nations in East Africa, to American citizens, and to U.S. interests. Al-Shabaab must be stopped. The Federal Government of Somalia must increase its capacity to counter al-Shabaab, unify a fractured political system, and provide basic services to the Somali people. For all this, the government of Somalia needs our support – and much more of it. Our primary interest in Somalia is to help the people of Somalia build a peaceful nation with a stable government, able to ensure civil security and services for its citizens. This in turn will prevent terrorists from using Somali territory as a safe haven.
U.S. Policy and Engagement in Somalia
Prior to our recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia, our Somalia policy had three primary elements:
1. provide support for the African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM as it is commonly known, and AMISOM’s strategic partner Ethiopia, to combat al Shabaab and provide political space for the government to operate;
2. respond to humanitarian crises and initiate stabilization where possible; and
3. promote our “dual-track” policy.
Post transition, these three elements of our Somali policy have evolved as follows:
– First, we continue to support AMISOM as the primary stabilizing force in Somalia, as we expand our assistance to the Somali National Army to build its institutional and operational capacity. From FY2007 through FY 2013, the United States obligated approximately $512 million in support of AMISOM, in addition to our assessed contributions for the UN logistics support package for AMISOM. During that same period, we obligated more than $170 million to support the Somali National Army to counter al-Shabaab more effectively.
– Second, we have shifted focus from humanitarian crisis response, now concentrating on security and stability, laying the foundation for economic recovery through our development-focused programming. In FY 2012 and FY 2013, we provided nearly $140 million in funding to support Somalia’s stabilization, democracy, and economic growth activities.
– Third, our dual-track approach concluded with the successful completion of the Djibouti Peace Process and the recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia. The United States has underscored the importance of outreach and engagement with the regional administrations to form the federal framework. We will continue to fund humanitarian assistance and civil society programs in Somaliland and Puntland, with an objective of improving regional collaboration towards federalism.
Our assistance to Somalia includes an emphasis on human rights and accountability, child soldier prevention, countering human trafficking, and budget transparency and fiscal management.
Westgate Attack
The tragic and cowardly attack on innocents at Kenya’s Westgate Mall has underscored vulnerabilities in the Horn of Africa and demonstrates that al Shabaab has a capable network in East Africa and is willing to carry out attacks outside Somalia. Concerted pressure from AMISOM and the Somali National Army has weakened al Shabaab’s ability to wage conventional military offensives and to hold territory inside Somalia. We attribute this to the success of the African-led model for achieving greater stability in Somalia. However, al-Shabaab can still conduct destabilizing operations in the East Africa region. The Department is working closely with our regional partners on counterterrorism efforts, and we are reviewing internally what further resources we can shore up to further support AMISOM, secure the borders of Somalia and its neighbors, and contribute to the international effort to shape the Somali National Army into a cohesive, professional, and effective force.
U.S. Presence
For the United States to effectively engage on these complex issues, understand local dynamics, build relationships, and manage our expanding programs in Somalia, we eventually need to establish a permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in Somalia. Ultimately, it is the security conditions in Somalia that will dictate when we can establish a more permanent presence and we recognize that the time is not right to do this. However, we are moving in that direction. Our current posture allows for our Nairobi-based diplomatic team to travel into the Somali capital and other key regions with increased frequency and duration, as security conditions permit.
Federalism/Political Cooperation
Building political cooperation among Somali regions and clans in support of the Federal framework is essential, if democracy, economic growth, and security are truly to take hold in Somalia. This is a message that President Hassan Sheikh emphasized during his Washington meetings with Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, and National Security Advisor Rice. We see budding signs that Hassan Sheikh is meaningfully engaging regional administrations: The Somali Federal Government signed the Jubbaland Accords on August 22, recognizing the regional entity and mapping a way forward to become a federal state; the Federal government introduced a roadmap to the 2016 elections with a focus on political inclusion and security; and Mogadishu and Somaliland came to an agreement on regulating air-space, a step towards wider reconciliation.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the development of participatory, accountable, and representative governmental institutions that respond to the needs of the Somali people will secure the country’s future. We are committed to work with the Government and people of Somalia to help them realize this vision.
The European Union and the Somali government spent months preparing for a conference on Somalia, which was held in Brussels on September 16.
Declared as “A New Deal for Somalia” the one day affair’s purpose was to accomplish two things: Focus the attention of the international community on the progress made in Somalia over the last year; and mobilise resources for the one-year-old Somali regime and assist it in the country’s reconstruction. The conference takes its name after the American Depression era economic plan put forth by President Franklin D Roosevelt to jump start the US economy and get Americans back to work.
Symbolically and rhetorically, the conference set out an ambitious plan for Somalia’s reconstruction with a great deal of pomp. So far, it has been successful in receiving financial pledges to the tune of over $815m. However, these donations are significantly less than what has been promised to similarly war-devastated countries like Afghanistan.
All people of goodwill, and certainly Somalis, hope and pray that the conference is successful in attaining its stated objectives.
The Brussels conference was the third conference of its kind held for Somalia . An earlier convention organised by the British government convened in London in early 2012 .
Generally speaking, the Brussels and London conferences had the same goals as both affirmed their intentions of helping Somalia with financial aid and rebuilding the country’s security organs. Nearly 18 months after the London conference and despite the bombastic original claim of the British, Somalis have yet to see any material footprint in the country that indicates the project’s positive impact on their lives.
The third convention was organised by Turkey and took place in Istanbul in mid-2012. Turkey’s intervention was different in orientation from the London and Brussels conferences as its stated aim was to try and assist Somali “civil society” groups and “traditional elders” find a common political ground before the selection of the new regime in September 2012.
Turkey’s contributions
Despite the goodwill of the Turkish government, its seriousness of purposes, and the support of the vast majority of the Somali people, the deliberation in Istanbul failed to gain traction. This was due to Turkey’s poor understanding of the nature and dynamics of political problems in the country and the ill-informed way the conference was organised.
However, unlike Britain, Turkey has undertaken many tangible and visible projects in the country that has improved the quality of life for many in the country. For starters, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited the famine devastated people in Somalia in 2011 with his family and brought with him a large contingent of humanitarian agents who continue to serve the famine-afflicted population three years after his visit. Turkish public and non-governmental sectors have also been very active in rebuilding schools, hospitals, water systems and roads in and around Mogadishu and providing supplies for internally displaced people in the capital.
Additionally, Turkey has provided scholarships for hundreds of Somali students to study in Turkish schools and universities. Finally, Turkey has offered to help rebuild Somali security forces. Although this project has yet to start many Western powers and their African clients oppose it.
The West’s agenda
By contrast the West’s main investment has been in financing AMISOM, and whatever other assistance they have offered has been considerably consumed by the overhead charges paid to their staff and contractors. This means that little of their aid actually reaches the population. More significantly, little investment has been committed to the establishment and training of Somali security forces in such a way that they could replace AMISOM within a year or two. A symptom of the impoverishment of the Somali security forces is that a year after the post-transition regime came to power the Somali Presidency and the President are mainly guarded by AMISOM forces rather than tested Somali soldiers. One of the exceptions to the invisibility of Western Aid is the solar powered street lights in the main streets of Mogadishu which were donated by Norway.
Because of the limited impact of Western assistance on the livelihoods of the population, many Somalis speculate that the West, including the EU, is not committed to help Somalia stand on its own feet. Previous assistance in Somalia has had limited impact on increasing the capacity of the Mogadishu regime or the population’s ability to conquer their livelihood challenges. Since the old Western deals for Somalia has not done what their rhetoric claimed, would the EU’s “New Deal for Somalia” be any different than earlier projects?
For the past two decades the West’s strategy has been to contain problems in Somalia from spreading to their allies in the region. This was done through a variety of methods. The West used Somali warlords and more recently incompetent but pliant religious or other types of henchmen to insure that an independent Somalia does not re-emerge. They also deployed humanitarian and development “experts”, dubbed the Nairobi Mafia by Somalis, to whitewash the ineptness of their work and intellectually justify their strategy. Finally, the most effective instrument of the West has been the African Union and AMISOM. AMISOM is completely funded by the West without simultaneous and sufficient allocations of resources for the Somali military.
It is undeniable that AMISOM has succeeded in pushing the terrorist group al-Shabab out of Mogadishu and some parts of southern Somalia, but it appears that there is no rush to equip and resource a reliable and effective Somali military that can replace AMISOM. Consequently, AMISOM is both an asset and a liability for Somalis, but as long as AMISOM is there the Somali government will remain hostage to others and will be unable to push the limits of prevailing politics to inspire its citizens.
Steps to success
For the New Deal to succeed where earlier EU and Western projects have failed, it must bring a no nonsense agenda to the table. First, it must heavily invest in rebuilding the necessary Somali public institutions whose design and orientation is determined by Somalis. Second, it must significantly reduce the number of overpaid expatriates employed in these projects and replace them with capable Somalis whose integrity is beyond reproach. Third, it must set aside at least $270m annually, for five years, to fund the establishment of a credible national security force loyal to the country and the people and that can replace AMISOM, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces in two years.
Fourth, and for the first time, the EU must use its diplomatic and economic muscle to condemn the tribal-based political formula currently framing the so-called federal political system as inhumane and unworkable. Such a stance will give an enormous boost to the civic minded Somalis who have been, at best, ignored and often dismissed as unrealistic by Western authorities. Fifth, The EU and others who claim to want to help the Somali people should challenge the regime in Mogadishu by being forthright about what must be done. Sixth, to help Somalia via the New Deal, the EU must alter its standard operating procedure pertaining to aid and consider adopting what some Islamic charities have done in Somalia. The latter’s approach involves progressive reduction of assistance as Somalis increasingly gain capacity to shoulder their responsibilities. The EU’s standard cookie cutter formula doesn’t work for anyone except for the contractors and the bureaucrats that get fat from the largesse.
The EU alone cannot be blamed for the failure of Western assistance in Somalia; the regime in Mogadishu must take increasing responsibility for the mess in the country. Previous Somali transitional regimes in the last decade or so were corrupt, sectarian, and most significantly incompetent. Because of the character of these regimes, the country has sunk deeper into a political black hole. Getting it out of that hell is going to take a wise and courageous leadership that is not intimidated by the donors, but inspired by the tenacity of the Somali people.
A year into its four-year tenure, the regime has lost most of its original glow which came with the change of national leadership, and has yet to provide any policies or practices that can kindle civic mobilisation. Incompetence and tribal political gamesmanship rule Mogadishu’s high hill and the authorities seem completely oblivious to the rut that has set in. Such a system cannot be a productive and progressive partner for the EU if the “New Deal for Somalia” is to produce livelihoods and political order that can move the population.
The New Deal for Somalia appears to be stillborn unless five fundamental changes are affected by the EU and the Somali government:
1- It is essential that the EU radically rethink its old ways of doing aid and adopt new strategies that put the needs of the Somali people first. Among those needs are the establishment of a national government of their own that is accountable to them and not to the Western world. This will require a greater attention to helping Somalia rebuild its governmental institutions in order for the Somali government to manage the affairs of the country as a sovereign.
2- There is a need to shift resources away from AMISOM and dedicate that to the professionalisation of the Somali military and police force.
3- If the EU delivers on its financial pledge, then it should concentrate on three major problem areas, including employment generation, for the effort to have the necessary catalytic effect. It’s worth noting that the new EU pledge is less than the remittance diaspora Somalis annually send to their relatives.
4- The regime in Mogadishu has lost whatever currency it had with the people when it came to power. Consequently it cannot cleanse the rut unless it begins a systematic journey of building national institutions. For a start, the country needs a credible and capable new prime minister and cabinet that can measure up to their constitutional responsibilities.
5- A new believable political engagement with the population is of utmost urgency in order to earn their trust and support. Without these combined reengineering of EU and Somali agendas, it is highly likely that the “New Deal for Somalia” will be successful.
Abdi Ismail Samatar is President of African Studies Association and Professor of Geography, Environment and Society at the University of Minnesota. He is also a research fellow at the University of Pretoria.
When Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected last year September 2012 by Somali parliament, it was thought that his government had the best chance of succeeding and uniting Somali people fragmented by civil war over 22 years.
After the nomination of the Prime Minister Saacid was approved by the parliament, president Hassan said that the top three leaders of the government namely the president himself, the speaker of the parliament and the prime minister committed to working together for the benefit of Somali people unlike any other previous interim government since the collapse of the center government in 1991.
However, after one year in the office, it became clear that the government agenda specially when it comes of forming regional administration where the constitution should be the guide is being pulled into three different directions by the president and his team Dem jaded, the speaker of the parliament and now the prime minister who finally decided to engage the politics after a rumor that the president and his team planning to replace him.
First, President and his team Dem jaded decided to centralize the power of the three branch of the government( legislative, executive and judiciary ) into president’s hand in order to centralize the government power into Mogadishu against the federal constitution Somali people agreed upon and in which the president is elected to uphold.
To that end, the president is accused, among others, of running the executive branch by making most of the day to day operation of the government by himself and his team, by bypassing the parliament and making deals with both locally and international entities without the approval of the parliament and by interpreting the constitution as it fit to his agenda without final decision by supreme court.
Case in point, the president who opposed originally the forming of Jubbaland state claiming that administration was not inclusive finally reached an agreement with the Jubbaland leaders in Addis Ababa, where he recognized the interim administration of Jubba, after he was pressured by international community to show a sign of reconciliation and compromise before he attend Somali conference (New deal) being held in Brussels, Belgium.
Second, the speaker of the parliament realizing that the president is doing whatever pleased him in disregard of the constitution and without involvement of the parliament decided to seek support from his base in Baydhabo city where traditional elders in the area were holding reconciliation and consultative meeting in order to form regional administration in protest of the Addis Ababa agreement.
At end of that meeting, the elders agreed to form regional administration consist of 6 districts of which three were already recognized by the president’s team as an interim administration of Jubba. In press conference after the end of the meeting, the speaker of the parliament agreed with the elders and supported their plan knowing the president and his team just signed an agreement in which they recognized Jubba administration.
Third, while most of the Somali people surprised a lack of communication between the speaker of the parliament and the president, they were also astound to find out the prime minister’s involvement of the politics all of sudden when he called upon reconciliation meeting of Jubbaland stakeholders to be held in Mogadishu again contrary to the Addis Abba agreement which calls the first meeting to be held in Mogadishu which was done and the second meeting to be held in Kismayu which is still pending..
Most of the political analysts think that the prime minister who was not involved in politics and his duties were being exercised by the president since he was elected as prime minister all of sudden realized that he also need to seek support from his base of Gedo district and as result insisted the involvement of all stake holders including Barre Hiirale in the reconciliation meeting he called upon to be held in Mogadishu.
Now after one year of the current administration, we have a situation where Jubbaland administration is recognized by the president, unrecognized by the speaker of the parliament and being sabotaged by the prime minister, each one trying to satisfy either international community, in the case of the president in order to gain financial or his base from home town, in the case of both the speaker of the parliament and the prime minister.
The only way to come out of this confusion is to go back to the constitution agreed by Somali people and to allow parliamentarian to debate those confusing articles in order to clarify. In the constitution, there is clear distinction of the task of the president, prime minister and the speaker of the parliament and the president, as leader of the government should respect and follow the constitution and allow the prime minister and speaker of the parliament to do their job.
Only then, there may be a hope that Somali people will come out of this political mess created by the president whom most Somali people thought he had the best chance of uniting Somali people at last. Somali people cannot afford another three years of this kind of administration where each one of the top three leaders does what pleases him while disregarding constitution.
