A delegation consisting of foreign diplomats based in Nairobi, Kenya and representatives of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Counter Piracy Programme arrived in the country yesterday for a three day visit working visit.
Somaliland Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Hon Hussein Ahmed Aided was there receive the visiting diplomats upon their arrival in the country at the Egal International Airport.
The Diplomats from Australia, Holland and Norway and representatives of UNDOC Counter Piracy Programme are expected to visit and inspect the various development projects funded by their respective governments in Somaliland during their three day visit.
The Justice Minister speaking to the press said “Speaking on behalf of the people of Somaliland I would like to use this opportunity to extend our profound gratitude for their generosity of these three friendly nations which have been providing us with much needed assistance critical to the success of fighting piracy and in ensuring that judicial provisions on land are in place UNODC are working with the Somaliland authorities in the judicial reform process and prosecution services in a bid to step up responses to what is clearly a scourge both to maritime trade, travel and to local development.
The Commander of Somaliland custodial corps Brig. Gen. Mohamed Hussein Hiraanee speaking during the opening of a new vocational training building at the Mandera Maximum Prison said, “With this new facility we expect a shift in approach by prison authorities to supplement incarceration with skills development and rehabilitation is critical for transforming the lives of convicts. With this kind of prison reform in place we hope it will assist in tackling the long-term goal of dealing with piracy.
The visiting Diplomats are expected to visit the several correctional facilities in the country including the recently refurbished Hargeisa Prison in Somaliland, which was officially opened two years ago as part of UNODC’s counter-piracy work in Somaliland. The prison is considered critical to Somaliland’s efforts to deal with the piracy and will provide additional space for pirates arrested by Somaliland’s Coast Guard and convicts tried in other courts.
Above Mr. Abdirashid Duale ,CEO & UK PM David Cameron
“I am extremely proud and honoured to be part of the Muslim News Awards for Excellence. The awards are an important way to celebrate success and recognise the contribution of Muslims from all walks of life to British Society. Mr. Abdirashid Duale, CEO , Dahabshiil Group
Dahabshiil are extremely proud and honoured to be part of the Muslim News Awards for Excellence 2014 which took place last night at Grosvenor House, London. The Muslim News is celebrating its 25th anniversary this year and the awards are an important celebration of Muslim talent and the contribution of the Muslim community to British Society.
In 2013, Dahabshiil was honoured to be the recipient of the Excellence for Enterprise award for its vital role in fostering social development and increasing financial stability in developing countries through remittance finance.
Last night, Mr Abdirashid Duale, CEO of the Dahabshiil Group, was proud to present the Fazlur Rahman Khan Award for Excellence in Engineering, Science and Technology to Dr Farid Khan for his outstanding contribution to technological innovation in the field of human health in the UK and the Developing World.
At London’s Grosvenor House Monday, Prime Minister, David Cameron, joined some 800 people to celebrate the Twelfth The Muslim News Awards for Excellence – Britain’s longest standing Muslim awards event. The coveted award ceremony recognises the very best of Muslim contribution to British society.
The Guest of Honour, Prime Minister, David Cameron, presenting the Enterprise award to Shabir Randeree, Executive Chair of DCD Group, said, “I’m delighted to have taken part in this year’s Muslim News ds for Excellence, where we were able to champion and celebrate the huge contribution British Muslims make to our country. I was truly impressed hearing about the extraordinary work of the nominees and winners, and it was great to have been able to meet some of them tonight.”
The special Judges award went to Ola Lawal, an active volunteer working to improve the lives of young and disabled people, as well as the local community around her.
Amongst the other 15 winners were, in sport, Mo Farah, Olympic gold medalist, who is also involved in various philanthropic initiatives; in the media, Roohi Hasan, a senior producer at ITV News; children’s award went to 10-year-old, Ahmed Saleh, who has won numerous kickboxing and freestyle karate titles at national, European, and global levels.
Cameron said that, “I see for myself on a daily basis the massive contribution of British Muslims. From my own colleagues, such as Sayeeda Warsi, Sajid Javid and Tariq Ahmad on the Government benches to the Muslim businesses and enterprises that are bringing growth back to Britain. And of course I frequently see the outstanding achievements of Muslim sportsmen and women, public servants, entertainers and community leaders. The list goes on and on.”
“Tonight we celebrate an entire community – one that is vibrant, hard-working and proud. My message to British Muslims is that this Government is here for you. We are backing hard-working families who want to get on and do the right thing; we are reforming the education system, giving parents more say and delivering the schools and skills that our young people need to succeed; we are reforming the welfare system so it rewards those who want to work; we are cutting taxes, so that people get to keep more of their hard-earned money, and we are creating jobs, so people can provide for their families and feel secure. This is all part of our long-term plan to build a stronger economy and I know that British Muslims will play a vital part in helping to achieve future prosperity and security for our country.”
Special guests included Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, Shadow Justice Secretary, Sadiq Khan, Minister of State at Ministry of Justice, Simon Hughes.
They were joined by civic and religious leaders, as well as representatives from the worlds of politics, business, sport and the arts, to honour unsung heroes and heroines of the community.
Now in its twelfth year, the ceremony has distinguished itself for pioneering an initiative that finds the very best in British Muslims.
The Editor of The Muslim News, Ahmed J Versi, said, “We began this event twelve years ago because we wanted to acknowledge the noble accomplishments and displays of distinction within the British Muslim community and showcase the tremendous contributions British Muslims make to Britain. We wanted also to identify and highlight Muslim role models for the younger generation.”
In a message, Opposition Leader Ed Miliband, said: “Tonight’s awards ceremony is an opportunity to celebrate the great talent shown and contribution given by Muslim people in all walks of life.
“The awards recognize not only excellence in business, sport, arts and technology, but also those who have served their communities selflessly. It is a true celebration of values core to our country – of community and commitment, of education and learning.”
Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of Liberal Democrats, said: “The Muslim News Awards for Excellence has become the flagship event for Muslim communities in the UK highlighting British Muslim contributions to society which might otherwise go unrecognized.
“The contribution of British Muslims to the country’s rich multicultural landscape cannot be underestimated.”
RESOLUTION DATED November 13, 2013 OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEGITIMATE DJIBOUTI
REQUESTING THE SUSPENSION OF THE REPRESENTATION OF DJIBOUTI OF THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY ACP-EU
No3/ANL/2013 resolution of 13 November 2013
Legitimate National Assembly (ANL) of the Republic of Djibouti,
Meeting in Djibouti November 13, 2013,
Pursuant to the Constitution,
Having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the one part and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 as amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005
Given the preamble of the Cotonou Agreement, which emphasizes that political environment guaranteeing peace, security and stability, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law and good business management, is part of the long-term development “
Having regard to Article 9 of the ACP-EU stressing that “respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for fundamental civil rights, democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance are an integral part of sustainable development “
Given the UN Charter, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all relevant international and regional legal instruments,
Given the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,
Considering the Declaration of the African Union on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (2002)
Given the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966,
Given the resolution of the European Parliament of 4 July 2013 on the situation in Djibouti,
Given the Rules of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly adopted on 3 April 2003 and revised 25 November 2004 23 November 2006 28 June 2007 28 November 2008 18 May 2011 and 29 November 2012,
A. Whereas the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, which represents the population of the ACP-EU is a key element of ACP-EU relations,
B. Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that the right to express themselves through honest elections to be held by universal and equal suffrage and secret ballot is a right that everyone should be able to benefit and that this right is an essential element of democracy and the rule of law to which the European Union and the ACP States are committed under various legal obligations they have undertaken,
C. Considering that the electoral process is the touchstone of fundamental principles of political pluralism, which implies that States must organize elections in accordance with recognized international and regional standards,
D. Considering that elections can not be carried out if the three phases of the electoral process are sufficiently met – namely the pre-election phase, the election phase and the post-election phase – given that each of them is very importance and should be recognized as such,
E. Considering that democracy is a political system in which sovereignty emanates from the people,
F. Considering that, despite repeated requests from the Djibouti opposition parties grouped in the “Union for the National Hi” (USN) and the International Community, the detailed results of parliamentary elections in the Republic of Djibouti February 22, 2013 are not published by the government this day
G. Considering that this situation is causing serious post-electoral crisis that prevails and persists in Djibouti since February 23, 2013,
H. whereas under the pressure of Djiboutian people and the international community the Djibouti government began with the USN political dialogue,
I. Considering that political dialogue, open August 14, 2013, is suspended since 14 September 2013,
J. Considering that deadlock in political dialogue is exclusively due to the irresponsible actions of the government and its leader,
K. Considering that this impasse has led the leaders of the USN to introduce a request for mediation with the African Union,
L. Whereas the application of the USN and introduced October 21, 2013 is being processed by the organs of the African Union,
Mr. Whereas under Article 3 of the Regulations of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly members can only be democratically elected parliamentarians,
N. Considering that the alleged representatives of the Republic of Djibouti appointed by a body that has no legal existence are not democratically elected parliamentarians, the elections of February 22, 2013 having been unsuccessful for candidates in power,
1. Urges the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and particularly its Bureau to consider the situation and draw all the consequences including the suspension of the Representation of the Republic of Djibouti to the resolution of the post-election crisis
2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, the Bureau of the Assembly, the Commission of the African Union, the Pan-African Parliament, the Pan-Arab Parliament, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Secretary General of the United Nations.
On Wednesday 2 April, Sheffield City Council will debate a motion calling on “the British government to recognise Somaliland as an independent state and to encourage other governments around the world to do the same.”
This historic debate will be attended by Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Mohamed Bihi Yonis, Energy Minister Hussein Abdi Dualeh, Speaker of Parliament Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, Somaliland’s Ambassador to the UK Ali Aden Awale as well as several parliamentarians.
The motion was tabled by Councillor Mohammad Maroof who today received over 2,000 signatures from the Somaliland community in Sheffield, petitioning the council to support recognition.
On Friday 4 April, Sheffield Central MP Paul Blomfield (Lab) will be speaking at ISRAAC: Somali Community and Cultural Association in support of Somaliland’s case for recognition.
Sheffield South East MP Clive Betts (Lab) has also expressed his support for Somaliland’s independence. In 2009 he asked the FCO to “work with other members of the EU, with the United States and with members of the African Union to see how we can get recognition for Somaliland.”
In Djibouti, the opposition was banned from holding a political rally on Monday.
The Union for National Hi (USN) was unable to meet his supporters when she claims to have informed the authorities of the holding of the meeting as required by law.
The spokesman for the coalition, he was prevented throughout the afternoon out by a security device deployed around his home.
The USN strongly denounces the continued repression of the dictatorial regime.
The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice(CPVPV) Chairman Sheikh Mohamed Mohamud aka Xiiray has being dismissed from his position after the scholar hard-pressed his case on the issue of gender equality on the amount of manslaughter blood money.
More than 20 Islamic clerics converged at the ministry of religious where they issued a joint statement on the renowned Somaliland scholar in which they dismissed him as the chairman of Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention because he refused to retract his views on the issue hence being in contradictions with the teachings of Prophet Muhammad’s peace be upon him
For almost 20 day today, Sheik Xiiiraye is said to have unwaveringly urged with fellow Islamic clerics based in the country regarding the in which he said to have challenged fellow to either prove him wrong or otherwise seek the intervention of other Islamic scholars based outside the country since to him they seemed not to have sufficient knowledge on the issue but instead his fellow scholars decided to expel him in a widely publicized press conference aired live on Somaliland national Television and some even went to the extent of accusing him of Blasphemy during the live transmission others likened him to the late dictator General Mohamed Said Barre and so forth.
On the other hand Chairman Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud in a private press conference yesterday just few hours after his expulsion began by reading a recitation from the holy Quran
We have prescribed for thee therein ‘a life for a life, and an eye for an eye, and a nose for a nose, and an ear for an ear, and a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds retaliation;’ but whoso remits it, it is an expiation for him, but he whoso will not judge by what Allah has revealed, these be the unjust.[1] Surat al-Ma`idah 5:45
After reciting the verse he went on to clearly state that there is no evidence backing that the compensation paid for mistakenly killing a woman should be half that for a slaughtered man.
“No evidence in the Noble Qur’an support s such arguments on discrimination drawn between men and women in that regard.”quoting Sheikh Qaradawi’prominent Muslim scholar, who is also head of the International Association of Muslim Scholars (IAMS)
Sheik Xiiraye went on to say , ” i have been modarete in my teaching those in the 10 years i have been living in the country and thats why they want to see me go, i have numerous times in the past urged them not to teach young children how to be come radicals in their religious schools but instead to teach the youth to be tolerant to others and because of such believes i have earned many enemies along the way.
The Islamic Scholar added, “Those against me have their own agendas and that’s why they have ousted me today but still I shall stand firm in my believes.
Here is a similar case which took place in the Islamic nearly a one decade ago
DOHA, (IslamOnline.net) – Prominent Muslim scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi pressed for gender equality on the amount of manslaughter blood money.
Qaradawi said during a forum in Qatar’s Supreme Council for Family Affairs on Wednesday, December 22, that there is no evidence backing that the compensation paid for mistakenly killing a woman should be half that for a slaughtered man.
“No evidence in the Noble Qur’an supports such arguments on discrimination drawn between men and women in that regard.”
The prominent Muslim scholar, who is also head of the International Association of Muslim Scholars (IAMS), said earlier generations of scholars such as Ibn Alia and Al-Aasam used to pay equal blood money to compensate the families of those killed regardless of their gender.
Not as Inheritance
Sheikh Qaradawi further rejected that the blood money issue should be dealt with as that of inheritance – where women get half that offered to men of the legacy of their dead relatives.
“Still, there are many inheritance cases in which women are paid equally as men.”
Sheikh Qaradawi refuted claims that men are paid double the amount presented to women due to men’s responsibility for their families.
“Islamic Shari`ah doesn’t state this. Rather, we see a little kid is paid equally as to an old man, and a porter as a professor – with no discrimination whatsoever.”
Known for his moderate edicts and widely-respected views, Sheikh Qaradawi maintained that reconsideration of the women’s share of blood money would be an honor for women.
He called on the government of Qatar, where the Egyptian scholar now stays, to put his recommendation into action.
Agreement
Sheikh Qaradawi’s call was welcomed by a host of prominent scholars attending the forum.
Chief among them are Qatari participants Sheikh Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad al-Amari, the former deputy chief of the Appeal Court, professor Aisha al-Mannaa, the dean of the Shari`ah faculty of Qatar University, and her colleague professor Mohamed Othman Shber.
Al-Mannaa said review of women’s share of bloody money would be seen as an effort to promote women rights.
Shber concurred, saying these days are completely different from earlier eras when opinions on women’s blood money share were given.
Salem Rashid al-Marrekhi, member of the national human rights committee in Qatar, hailed the scholars’ stance on equalizing women’s share of blood money as a boost of human rights in the Islamic world.
“Human rights laws don’t strike a difference between between males and females.”
Disagreement
However, a cohort of Muslim scholars voiced opposition to equalizing men and women on the blood money share.
“The four madhhabs (religious schools) have agreed on paying half share of blood money to women,” said Saleh bin Jassem Al Muhanadi, head of the first class court.
He urged to take into account men’s financial burdens when tackling the issue of women’s blood money share.
“Men pay dowry and are totally responsible for their families, burdens that women are exempted of.”
More Studies
Other Muslim scholars pressed for conducting more studies on the issue of women’s share of blood money.
Dr. Thaqeel bin Sayer al-Shamry of the Court of Cassation said the issue requires deep examination, warning against hasty decisions on what he calls a thorny territory.
Shamry believed that scholars advocating equal blood money to men and women have used weak hadith (Prophet Muhammad’s sayings).
The forum comes following mounting calls to introduce amendments to the Qatari law on women’s blood money share which states that families of killed women are paid half that to killed men as a settlement to potential disputes over the killings.
The Supreme Council for Family Affairs which hosted the lecture was established in 1998 under the presidency of Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al-Misnad, Qatar’s First Lady.
Hargeisa-The Deputy Managing Director of the state owned Hargeisa power supply Agency Mr. Abdullah Yusuf Elmi has apologized to residents of the capital city for latest blackout which has affected much of the city residents who depended on the state owned power supplier because of it charges less rates compared to private power supplies who charge exorbitant $1 per kilowatts one of the highest rate in the world.
The Deputy MD of the State owned power supply agency blamed local faults for the latest outage while speaking to the media, this is what he had to say, “The power outage was caused by one of the main generators malfunctioned and ceased operating that when we were forced to cut power to some residential areas of the city but the other remaining two generators couldn’t cope with the heavy so we resorted to switching them off altogether to avoid another malfunction of the remaining generators and that the most of the city will remain without power until tomorrow.
“We have deployed all our resources and our staff are currently working on a 24 hour shifts , I do hope this situation will be resolved soon,” he said.
The power supply agency official, however, claimed that apart from the latest power outages all is well. They are able to meet most of the city’s power needs.
Unscheduled power cuts in local areas have not only irked city people but at the same time have also resulted in acute water shortage in many parts of the city. Several localities of the capital city including the city center have in the past witnessed frequent power cuts lasting several hours due to technical snags in power transformers and snapping of cables.
Mr. Abdi saleh who runs a small business told us, “The power situation in Hargeisa seems to go from bad to worse each time with prolonged power cuts, low voltage accompanied with frequent fluctuations the current government must act urgently or else we shall go bust.
There has to be some way of improving the country’s power supply as outages become common and the fact citizens continue to grapple with severe water crisis, with supply plunging to an all-time low of the usual volume in many areas.
According to the Failed States Index compiled by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy, Somalia has been the number one failed state in the world since 2008. The 2011 Ibrahim Index of African Governance rates Somalia an 8 out of 100, making it a state “with no ability to create or implement policies that promote the well-being of people within its borders” (Gordon & Gordon, 2012, p.103). There have been at least sixteen attempts since 1991 to reconstitute the failed Republic of Somalia (Walls, 2009, p.372). During this time no single representative government controlled the entire territory of Somalia or even maintained a prolonged existence. Southern Somalia, the area formerly known as Italian Somaliland, is claimed by several groups, none of which maintains control over more than a few square miles, and in the case of the internationally recognized Transitional National Government (TNG) and its successor, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), only a few blocks of the capital Mogadishu have been successfully controlled (Anonymous, 2002, p.259; Menkhaus, 2006 p.92). For twenty-two years Somalia has been a black hole of government, international aid and efforts at state and nation building. Attempts by the international community to stabilize Somalia have been many, with billions in international aid poured into the region, yet tangible results have been virtually nonexistent. However, there is an example of successful state building within Somalia: the stable yet unrecognized Somaliland Republic in northwestern Somalia.
Somaliland’s example provides the most compelling alternative to the failed attempts to implement governance in Somalia from above. Here, voters line up prior to the opening of polls in November 2012 elections that were predominantly peaceful. Photo: Dustin Turin.
Western government models have repeatedly failed in Somalia. Multiple internationally supported transitional governments have been unable to take control of the country’s territory and repeated foreign interventions have done little to provide stability. These top-down approaches to government formation are based on the western assumption that Somalia as a whole is a failed state based on a Westphalian model. According to Max Byrne this narrative of a failed state “occludes the reality of the situation and is harmful to attempt to encourage development from within the country” (2013, p.113).
“For many Somalis, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population” (Menkhaus, 2006, p. 87).
The success story in neighboring Somaliland, which has led to a locally legitimate and organically grown government, has largely been ignored by international actors. In states with little or no functioning government there is “evidence that social and political structures are characterized by ‘hybrid political orders’ which blend ‘traditional and modern norms and practices’” (Debiel, Glassner, Schetter & Terlinden, 2009, p.38). Somaliland has used traditional practices to create a sustainable modern government by blending “modernity and tradition” (Jhazbhay, 2009, p.51) into a functioning state.
A Failed Historical Legacy
During colonial rule the Italian and British administrators did not create the necessary institutional foundation for a strong central government. Once independence and unification were achieved in 1960 the resulting government was unable to consolidate its position. Moreover, the decentralized clan and sub-clan pastoral system that defines Somali culture can be seen as fundamentally contrary to a centrally organized state: “During unification very little thought was apparently given, either by enthused Somali nationalists or their international supporters, as to whether the European-style centralized state that was hastily created was necessarily appropriate for the diffuse nature of Somali society” (Pham, 2012, p.10). Due to an exclusion of traditional clan-based governance structures the Somali unification experiment was predestined to fail.
Meanwhile, the local stability of clan and sub-clan structures in Somalia have made top-down implementation of western-style governance excessively difficult. The inability to form a viable government over the past two decades has earned Somalia the “dubious distinction of being the world’s foremost graveyard of externally sponsored state-building initiatives” (Menkhaus, 2006, p.74).
Multiple nationwide elections have taken place with relative peace and calm in Somaliland. Above, a quiet polling station near Salaxley, Somaliland during November 2012 elections. Photo: Dustin Turin.
Although it lacks international recognition, Somaliland is the lone example of a functioning sovereign state in the Horn. The unrecognized state of Somaliland “has now functioned since 1991 as a self-sustaining state and has repeatedly received positive attention from the international media for the way it has embarked upon post-conflict reconstruction” (Doornbos, 2002, p.95). This is largely due to the bottom up approach at state building that derives its legitimacy from local clan elders and the local ownership of civil institutions, including stable economic, political, security and social welfare institutions. Compared to international attempts at imposing western style government on Somalia, “the Somaliland ‘nation-building’ process was more bottom-up and does function as a state” (Kibble, 2001, p.18). The methods for state formation in Somaliland may provide the best model for stabilization efforts in greater Somalia: at this point, “it is clear that development in Somalia must focus on bottom-up, organic gro
The Clan System in Somali Politics
The ethnic Somali population is divided into six major clan groupings. In the north the Isaaq and Darod control most of the area comprising Somaliland and Puntland respectively while in the south the Hawiya, Rahanwein and Digil occupy the rest of Somali territory (lib.utexas.edu). Djibouti, to the northwest of Somaliland, is home to a smaller Dir clan. Darod and Hawiya clans also occupy areas in Ethiopia and Kenya (Greater Somalia). Steve Kibble writes, “the history of Somalia is impossible to understand without some knowledge of the interweaving of an un-centralized egalitarian political system…with the effects of British, French and Italian formal colonization… and the attempt to create a post-colonial modernist nation state” (2001, p.10). By reviewing the role of clans and clan elders in Somali society and their ability to reconcile violence between clans and sub-clans after the civil war, we see that the single strongest institution remaining in Somali society may be that of clan leadership.
Clan affiliation is one of the most important units of identity within Somali society and is based on patrilineal descent. Somalis, like many Muslim societies, typically trace their ancestry back to the Prophet Mohammad and “an understanding of the political relationships between groups requires a knowledge of their genealogical relationships” (Pham, 2012, p5). Within clans are sub-clans and sub-sub clans known as dia-paying groups and organized so “that families within the group have a collective responsibility for settling acts committed by, or against their members.” Dia groups are considered the most stable unit within Somali culture (Ahmed & Green, 1999, p.114) and interaction of dia groups forms the basis of relations in Somali social order. Richard Posner (1980) sees the connections developed within collective guilt units such as dia as cornerstone of Somali society. Alliances between dia groups “join or split in a fluid process of ‘constant decomposition and re-composition’” typically working through a “diffuse and decentralized decision making process” (Kaplan, 2008, p.145).
Hargeisa, Somaliland’s center of commerce and government, is a safe and bustling metropolis when compared to ravaged Mogadishu. Photo: Dustin Turin.
The civil war saw dia groups and clans battle amongst and against each other in constantly shifting alliances. Continued bloodletting created massive debts between dia groups that could not possibly be paid and perpetuated violence throughout Somalia. The concept of long-lasting conflict in traditional Somali society was rare because dia ideals of collective security and guilt precluded such action. “The principle of collective responsibility enables the society to set a level of compensation higher than the average individual can pay since his kinsmen are liable for the judgment debt” (Posner, 1980, p.46). This traditional system came under duress during the civil war because dia groups were unable to pay the debts their members incurred, while continued fighting exponentially increased the debts owed.
In Somaliland, clan elders were eventually able to reconcile blood money payments by the dia groups in order to counter the detrimental effects of civil war. Clan elders in Somalia carry considerable political and social weight because they are chosen by “virtue of personal attributes,” not simply age (Ahmed & Green, 1999, p.123). Debiel et al. see the “composition and relative strength of local elites” as “decisive factor[s]” in the ability for a fledgling state to develop (2009, p.38). As stated above, the debts accrued between these groups were too large, and quickly became too complex to adjudicate and resolve under traditional Somali contract law (xeer), which is based on the dia groups having to share the burden of compensation between members. Xeer is an “inter-family social contract” (Jhazbhay, 2009, p.57) and based on ad hoc committees of judges who resolve disputes and are well respected within the clan communities. Xeer is centered on property and the understanding that crime can only be defined in terms of property. Therefore “there can only be crimes against individuals, and justice is compensatory, not punitive” (Lutter, 2011).
The reason Somali society reached this breakdown can be traced back to the colonial institutions and post-colonial state that arose after independence. The colonial state did not emphasize the traditional elements of Somali society such as dia groups and xeer. European colonization “did not originate to assist African countries to develop… It originated to benefit European countries” (Gordon & Gordon, 2012, p.119). The institutions that Europeans left in place were the same institutions that would develop into a system based on autocratic, patrimonial rule and predatory systems. These institutions ignored clan structures except for the purposes of extending and strengthening the patron-client systems that became the status quo after independence. During the post-colonial period, there was no emphasis on clan-based governance.
Colonial and State Governments
No stable western-style government existed in Somalia before the Italian administration in southern Somalia, while present day Somaliland was an important link in a Haud, Hargeisa, Berbera, Arabia trade axis. The imposition of artificial colonial borders changed the traditional authority structures and the equilibrium of clan management (Kibble, 2001, p.11) as well as the pastoral society of Somalia. “With the creation of these artificial (colonial) boundaries, cohesive social groups were separated and logical and well-established trading areas were divided” (Gordon & Gordon, 2012, p.64). There was never an effective attempt by British colonial authorities to change the structure of Somali society, as opposed to the Italians who attempted to remake Somali culture and civil society in a more European image. This is attributed to what Fredrick Lugard referred to as “indirect rule” whereby “British rule could be maintained at minimal cost by delegating all local power to existing elites, retaining only the essentials of central authority (in particular the purse strings) in British hands” (Ferguson, 2002, p.175). Somali governance under the British did not entail institution building in any meaningful way. Clan elders retained their power and position in society while furnishing the colonial government the extractive capacity to maintain administrative cohesiveness (Kibble, 2001, p.8). In the case of British Somaliland, continued exertion of social and political power by clan elders lead to the prospect of a more stable government after the ouster of Barre in the early 1990s.
By contrast, Italian administration of southern areas was eclectic at best. Malvezzi contends that “Italy had no (colonial) system” and had “worked out colonial policy on practical, rather than on theoretical lines” (Malvezzi, 1927, p.234). Like the British; administration of Italian Somaliland was designed so “infrastructure development was perpendicular to the coast for resource extraction” (Malvezzi, 1927, p.241). Unlike the British; Italian governance of Somalia was supposed to be more direct, removing the traditional political power of the clan elders in favor of a more centralized system. Where the British “preferred to leave such governance as was needed on a day-to-day basis in the hands of Somali elders” Italy embarked on a policy of attempted cultural change by displacing traditional structures, such as “supplanting xeer and other traditional Somali usages with institutions imported from Italy” (Pham, 2012, p.9). The resulting manipulation of Somali society in Italian controlled territory led to a disjointed and unorganized government. “In no case… did European colonizers invest in cogent, rational programs of development designed to make African states self-sufficient” (Gordon & Gordon, 2012, p.119). The smaller clans of Italian Somaliland continued to have their traditional governance replaced by western imposed institutions in an attempt to ready the territory for independence. As with most African states, “The transition from colonial despotism to liberal democracy was expedited in a few years without any fundamental transformation in the economic, cultural, or bureaucratic domains” (Fatton Jr., 1990, p.457). This subsequently left Somali society with no means to coalesce around a centralized authority upon independence. “As a result, notions that authoritarianism was an appropriate mode of rule were part of the colonial political legacy” (Gordon & Gordon, 2012, p.67) and drove Somalia and many other African states to develop a highly patrimonial centralized government after independence.
Post-colonial development in Africa focused on “the state, rather than the individual or the market” (Kibble, 2001, p.6). The creation of The Republic of Somalia in 1961 was the result of unification between British and Italian controlled territories; the creation of a strong central government in the south would prove detrimental to traditional clan roles within Somali society. The Republic of Somalia quickly became a powerful central authority, government institutions were concentrated in the southern capital city of Mogadishu and the traditional clan-based pastoral society was supplanted by a southern dominated socialist state. “There were very high initial expectations about the role the state would play as the prime mover in all development efforts” (Doornbos, 1990, p.182) and there was a feeling that the state alone needed to push modernization forward (Barkey and Parikh, 1991). Clan participation in government quickly became a key to economic success through access to the large amount of foreign aid which was pumped into the Somali state. In much the same way social and ethnic cleavages formed the basis of political party formation in other post-colonial states (Gordon & Gordon, 2012, p.72); Somali politics was based upon the clan and which one was favored by Siad Barre. The patrimonial nature of the Barre regime enhanced divisions between the clans in order to increase the power of the ruling elites in Somalia. While Barre was fairly successful in keeping the majority of the foreign aid delivered to Somalia during his dictatorship for enrichment of his own coffers, the distribution of the remaining money from the centralized government became a contest of patronage and loyalty.
By the mid-1980s 58% of Somali Gross National Product (GNP) came from foreign aid (UNDP 1998 as cited in Leeson, 2007, p.14). Ken Menkhaus believes this created a view of the state as, “the primary source not only of power but of wealth-as the catchment point for foreign aid…and as the coercive instrument with which empowered clans and coalitions have expropriated the assets of rivals” (2006, p.80). Barre’s hold on power and the predatory nature of the Somali state under his control has made the idea of a western-style top down government implausible for the Somali people. Douglas North (1990) sees the function of institutions in a society as to “reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (if not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction” (p.6). Institutions of the Somali Republic could be seen in the light of other “developmental dictatorships” of Africa. Richard Sklar saw these systems as leading to “corruption and injustices; instead of promoting economic development they fostered material stagnation and decline; instead of establishing viable political order they engendered divisive tendencies, military coups and civil wars” (as cited in Fatton Jr., 1990, p455). The result of Barre’s overdeveloped predatory state was the destruction of traditional societal factors which would have prevented the civil war which ensued after his ouster. North also highlights two points related to the direction of state resources “(1) The institutional framework will shape the direction of the acquisition of knowledge and skills and (2) that direction will be the decisive factor for the long run development of that society” (1990, p.79). Traditional clan structures were too worried about survival in a patrimonial system to create the investments in human capital necessary to develop Somalia. Meanwhile the state was over dependent on foreign aid, used to perpetuate the patron-client systems which had started under colonial rule to develop the physical infrastructure necessary to develop Somalia economically. The result was a total collapse of the state under its own inabilities.
Failure of Western State Building in Somalia
For the past fourteen years internationally backed and aided governments in Somalia have been able to do little more than exist on paper. Various strongmen attempted to fill the vacuum created by a lack of government and gain access to the foreign aid designed to help legitimize these paper governments. All of these attempts lack a bottom-up and clan legitimized approach to Somali government formation. Ahmed & Green highlight that unlike the internationally backed attempts at state building, “conflict resolution in the north has always been the responsibility of elders who have authority to represent their clans” (Ahmed & Green, 1999, p.123). The ineffectiveness of the transitional governments stems from their “willful mismanagement of public resources” which “prevented the state from being self-supporting” (Leeson, 2007, p.8). Western state building attempts did not focus on a clan or local level: “no constructive attempts were made to engage local networks and mosque-related groups… nor were clan elders recognized as constituting genuine historically rooted community conduits; nor was it realized that by strengthening them, peace lords would have been supported” (Ahmed & Green, 1999, p.123).
The overwhelming problem with the transitional governments is that they are not seen as legitimate in the eyes of the Somali people. This deficiency of legitimation stems from the exclusion of actors capable of delivering on a bottom-up approach. Martin Doornbos states, “the issue is neither the provisional government nor the parliament has been recognized by a number of important political groups and stakeholders” (1990, p.93). Byrne believes that a top down solution does not allow for cleavages within Somali politics to be locally reconciled, noting that top down institutions cannot be sensitive to the requirements and structures of society and therefore lack a stable foundation (2013, p.121). In the case of Somalia it can therefore be assumed the social contract between state and citizen is “most likely to occur from the bottom up in irregular forms and with imperfect coverage, rather than imposed from above” (Leonard & Samantar, 2011, p.561).
Unlike the internationally backed transitional attempts at Somali government consolidation, the Somaliland approach has been organic in nature. There has been little if any international aid given to these state building projects. Clan elders have been the catalysts for ending violence between clans and sub-clans and providing security for and legitimacy to the government in Somaliland. “A major problem with these high profile affairs (the transitional governments) is that legitimate representatives of the affected communities, such as elders, merchants, women’s groups and other genuine stakeholders, are not included” (Ahmed & Green, 1999, p.124). This lack of legitimation can be seen in the structures of the conferences that transitional governments and organic governments have derived from.
By all accounts Somaliland has succeeded where the internationally backed attempts at Somali government have not. The incorporation of Somaliland realized a stable government in the former Somali territory and initiated the building of an organic Somali state from the bottom up. Somaliland has a constitution, a functioning representative government and security forces which protect a defined territory. The population of Somaliland recognizes the government as legitimate and has sent emissaries to foreign capitals, even if those same foreign capitals do not officially recognize the existence of Somaliland for political reasons.
How Clan-Based Governance Can Work for Somalia
Somaliland’s claim to sovereignty stems from the fact that in 1960 it was itself an independent state, which freely joined into unification with Italian administered areas of southern Somalia to create the Republic of Somalia. Somaliland asserts that when the government collapsed in 1991 it returned to its independent status after the Conference at Burao, when Clan elders met for a week in the center of Isaaq Somaliland and agreed to six resolutions which would end the civil war in northern Somalia and establish a separate administration from Mogadishu (Walls, 2009, po.379). The territory of Somaliland would encompass Isaaq, Dir and Darod clans and be exactly the same territorially as British Somaliland was at the time of independence.
Inter-clan conflict after the Burao conference was successfully resolved by delegations of clan elders from the conflicting groups, proving that conflict resolution on a local level was achievable. “The financial and human cost of the fighting had been high, no attempt would be made to calculate the compensation for people killed or property destroyed” (Walls, 2009, p.379), the dia groups would have to reconcile their differences without compensation, which meant the territory would be in a better position to move forward by removing a long and drawn out reparations process which could potentially return the territory to fighting based on perceived wrongs in compensation cases. “It is notable that the principle of ‘forgetting’ grievances rather than calculating and enforcing compensation payments was applied in each of the Somaliland peace-building processes” (Byrne, 2013, p.121). It is also important to note the unique direction reconciliation takes in the case of Somaliland.
The major difference between Somaliland’s reconciliation process and other processes, such as those in South Africa, Northern Ireland, or Guatemala, was the lack of retribution for the victims. In the South African and Guatemalan examples reconciliation followed a course of acknowledgement, giving public recognition to the victims and their families. In these cases the injustices were ostensibly perpetrated under government sanction and acknowledgement was a way of showing government culpability in the infractions against its citizens. The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland took a different approach, providing “only for the release of prisoners, and not for their pardon, the public verdict still stands” (Biggar, 2002, p.177). By allowing for the pardon of criminals the Good Friday Agreement still acknowledges the guilt of perpetrators, but allows breathing room for the healing process by admitting that the prisoners were incarcerated under less than favorable conditions.
In all three cases the political solution to the problem was facilitated by some form of government, which was able to broker and enforce not only peace, but also establish recognition of the problems at hand. Somaliland is a different case because the reconciliation clan leaders arranged occurred out of a lack of government, and with the direct intent of creating an environment for government creation to occur. “In a very real sense, the clan elders have served to guarantee peace and security in Somaliland in that they are the nation’s ultimate fallback as an ‘insurance policy’ against descent into anarchy” (Jhazbhay, 2009, p.58). The elders in this case were also able to create an agreement that all sides were able to consider just as well as politically viable. Biggar (2002, p.168) would see this as a successful resolution tactic because “insofar as people regard a political settlement as unjust, they will not support it; and if enough people regard it as unjust, it will cease to be politically viable.”
This method of forgetting grievances may not be transferrable to the rest of Somali society, but Walls points out that “it is an option in situations where conflict has been so complex or devastating as to make calculation of dia compensation impossible” (Jhazbhay, 2009, p.177). In order for this kind of tactic to be adopted by southern Somali clans and dia groups there has to be an understanding that the conflict is in fact over, and no return to violence should occur based on previous grievances. This kind of stability enhancing measure is precisely what is needed in the still fractured south. Byrne states that in order “to be stable, any state building in Somalia must account for the devolved nature of Somali society, something less possible with a centralized development focus” (2013, p.120). The development of structural institutions has been at the heart of transitional governments and western interventions for years instead of placing emphasis on clan and dia reconciliation.
Somaliland has a twenty-year plan to modernize and solidify government function. A key element of this plan that could be applied to the entire territory of Somalia with great success would be that of decentralization. “Grassroots and civil society participation in the decision making process will be assured through a decentralized system where local communities will decide on the issues that affects them most” (Somaliland National Vision, 2011, p.8). Decentralization of the state government in favor of local districts has worked extremely well in the clan based system. In fact early proponents of Somaliland independence envisioned a future dispensation where power was devolved to the regions (Pham, 2012, p.13) and the structure of the government would be as simple as possible while elevating xeer to establish traditional law and custom to a national level (Jhazbhay, 2009, p.57). This decentralized government allows the clans to retain a level of autonomy which was common under British rule, and present in the south before Italian colonization. Decentralized government would also end a trend started by the Italians of attempting to bring together disparate parts under a strong central government. Advocates of some form of decentralized, federal or even confederal systems claim only a decentralized approach can guarantee to local communities protection from a central state dominated by another lineage (Menkhaus, 2006, p.83). By giving the clans more responsibility in local government, ownership of projects and their results are shared by the communities on a local level. Focusing the ownership of projects at a local level creates strong local government institutions, which become reactive and sensitive to what the citizens need when compared to a top-down western style government imposed by the international community.
Decentralization does not come without risks and past evidence of difficult implementation can be found in several examples throughout Africa. In many cases decentralization has proceeded slowly in the wake of overdeveloped post-colonial states which “highly favored centralized systems of government” (Barrett, Mude, and Omiti, 2007, p.1). Proponents of decentralization will argue that it brings government accountability, community empowerment, and efficiency in the use of public services as well as improved local and national governance (Garcia & Sunil, 2008, p.8). The goal in Somaliland is to achieve these objectives while creating a hybrid government sensitive to traditional clan structures. In order for decentralization to be effective, infrastructure; political, social and physical, needs to be in place. Ethiopia has seen federal spending increases going toward basic services in order to effectively implement decentralization accounting for six-percent of the federal budget (Garcia & Sunil, 2008, p.59). Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann analyze four decentralization case studies in Ghana, Uganda, Malawi and Tanzania and conclude that none achieved greater government accountability (2008, p.240) and three out of four had generally negative results, only in Tanzania were “outcomes perceived more positively” (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008, p.234). These findings are not exactly a glowing endorsement for the decentralization Somaliland is attempting to undertake. Susan Steiner emphasizes the point that “decentralization is a highly complex reform process” requiring comprehensive changes in political, administrative and fiscal structures (as cited in Crawford & Hartmann, 2008, p.235). It is precisely because these changes occurred within an existing government that they prove to be so difficult and often have less than desirable results. In the cases of Somaliland and the lack of functioning government should provide an excellent point of embarkation for an attempt at creating a stable, functioning and decentralized government.
The Somaliland Guurti, or House of Elders, which represents the major clans and ensures balance within the clan system is cited in the Somaliland Constitution as being responsible for “review (of) the legislation passed by the House of Representatives before it is forwarded to the President; and shall have special responsibility for passing laws relating to religion, traditions (culture) and security” (Republic of Somaliland Constitution, 2006, p.21). This places significant power back into the hands of clan elders – members of the Guurti must be 45 years of age or more – who have the experience of the civil war and peacemaking behind them. In 1993, as part of the overall strategy of decentralization of the Somaliland government, the President deferred to the Guurti to assume responsibility for mediating disputes between the government and opposition groups. Walls points out that, “in taking this action, he effectively transferred responsibility for negotiating a transition to civilian government to a traditionally based (and civilian) Guurti” (2009, p.383). The ceding of executive power showed clans that the Somaliland government was not going to be a system similar to previous Somali regimes.
Seth Kaplan (2008, p.144) states, “Somaliland’s evolution shows that states should look inward for their resources and institutional models and adopt political structures and processes that reflect the history, complexity, and particularity of their peoples and environments” also Walls (2009, p.386) asserts, “only moving to issues of future conflict management and governance when issues relating to the past have been dealt with or agreement had been reached” allows for a precedent that creates trust and honesty between negotiating groups. These “pragmatic first-level principles” were the basis for clan negotiations in Somaliland and carried a lot of weight toward establishing peace in Somaliland and ending the civil war there. The approaches are also reflective of “traditional concepts of Somali governance by consultation and consent” (Kaplan, 2008, p.144). Joel Samoff uses Tanzania, as an example of the same kind of first level principles at work in creating a consultative and sensitive government in Africa. Coffee revenue in the Kilimanjaro region is extremely important to the markets in a way which gives the region almost outsized influence in the Tanzanian government. This influence stems from educational advantages resulting from high earnings in the area which “enabled its citizens to assume prominent roles and have substantial influence in the national leadership” (Samoff, 1980, p.13) and enabled the proliferation of values and ideas of development beyond the regions borders.
Clans are the most important element in Somali society that endured repeated attempts at state building in the wake of colonization and independence. “Different types of local polities have emerged in Somalia, but the most common manifestation has been a coalition of clan elders, intellectuals, (and) businesspeople.” (Menkhaus, 2006, p.85) Consequently clans are the logical unit from which to build a bottom up Somali government. “The principle that each clan should take responsibility for the actions of individuals within that clan’s territory similarly represents a pragmatic application of an established principle of responsibility” (Walls, 2009, p.386) which seems to be lacking in modern Somalia due to the failure of the central state and the failure of the international community to build a new one in its place. “The important distinction” according to Bradbury is that state-building in Somaliland has been “rooted in a popular consensus and embedded in society rather than imposed from above” (as cited in Byrne, 2013, p.121). The reliance on traditional societal norms helps to bring legitimacy to the Somaliland government and fosters a sense of ownership of that government among the people through the power of the clans.
Political parties are limited to three by the Somaliland constitution. Some western critics see this as a limiting of the opposition voice and an attempt to centralize the political system in favor of a few clan elites. This is not the case. “Significant political differences encouraged a proliferation of parties to the point where Somalia had more parties per capita than any other democratic country except Israel” in the last multi-party elections in 1969 which were contested by over 60 parties (Ahmed & Green, 1999, p.116). By limiting the number of political parties to three the Somaliland government is adapting to the local realities of Somali politics. Having a three party cap is politically beneficial because it limits the effects of fracturing sub-clan and dia alliances and forces groups to ally themselves in a focused manner. This still allows for dissention against the government, but in a focused way which allows for the development of liberal institutions through political competition. The political parties need to be sensitive to their members in order to be successful. If they are not, the allegiances will shift from one party to another that is more receptive. The number of political parties is roughly reflective of the number of regional clans; in a southern Somalia state-building effort this structure could be mirrored, or even broken into a slightly greater number of parties reflective of a sub-clan structure in order to give greater voice to the population and create a greater sensitivity to local issues and to support a greater base of political needs.
Conclusion
The history of Somali statelessness is also a history of state building failure by the international community. Using a top down approach to construct western style government institutions in Somalia has not worked for over twenty years. “For many Somalis, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population” (Menkhaus, 2006, p.87). This kind of perception does not lend itself to the creation of a state apparatus imposed by outside sources. The answer is state building based on the traditional Somali clan system, such as in the example set by “Somaliland’s extraordinary indigenous conflict-resolution methods” which “may provide an example to the southern Somalis” (Jhazbhay, 2003, p.81). If state building in Somalia is “approached from the bottom up, evolving in an organic and irregular manner and using existing Somali social and religious institutions” (Menkhaus, as cited in Leonard and Samantar, 2011, p.576) there may be light at the end of the tunnel for Somalia.
Somali state failure has endured for 21 years largely based on a lack of legitimacy of attempted central governments. This stems from a lack of focus by international actors on the unique nature of Somali clan society and politics. Pham asserts:
“Although none are likely to risk the loss of face by ever admitting it, the example of Somaliland’s progress by leveraging the strength and resilience of traditional institutions to build a sustainable polity amid the chaos of the former Somalia has not been lost on Somalis in other regions.” (2012, p.23)
Somaliland has proven to be the only region within greater Somalia able to effectively form a government. Based on proven local methods the Somaliland experiment has yielded an effective formula for state construction.
While clan identity may run counter to modern ideas of citizenship in a Westphalian world, the ideals of clan-society can be conveyed into a stable and successful state model. European state models did a disservice to Africa during the post-colonial period. Badie and Birnbaum see the modern state as “a unique social intervention devised to solve the specific crises of the western European societies at a particular point in their development” (as cited in Barkey and Parikh, 1991, p.529), and therefore not necessarily ideal for other regions at other stages of development. International trade and industrial capacity can be built within Somaliland over time. Michael Van Notten outlines as much in the closing chapter of his book, The Law of the Somalis, where he frames trade centers designed to operate within the boundaries of xeer. “Such traditional development could enable Somalis to assume a respected place in the world by leaving aside their colonial legacy and building on their indigenous institutions” (Lennartz, 2007, p.130).
If Somalia is to achieve stability and success the legitimacy of the government needs to come from the Somali people and not from an outside source. After so many failed attempts, evidence from Somaliland suggests that a locally oriented clan-based approach will be the most likely model to succeed in Somalia.
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With Kenya’s unilateral decision to enter and create a new buffer state inside Somalia, Ahmed Abdi Godane’s urging this week to kick foreigners out has an audience, and even some logic.
In his message, Mr. Godane urges his Somali comrades to throw out their Kenyan and Ethiopian occupiers. Mr. Allison notes that, although unsettling, Godane is, in certain respects, correct, and is tapping into widespread sentiments.
Despite operating in Somalia under the authority of an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to rid the country of Al Shabab, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops are, in fact, occupying Somalia. Their goals are not altruistic, and are largely informed by their own national security and political considerations.
Although troubled by these developments, the United States and its partners have other goals in the region that will prevent any significant intrusion into Kenyan or Ethiopian plans.
Godane’s message is particularly striking when considering the formation of federal states in Somalia. In the absence of strong leadership from the Somali Federal Government (SFG), Kenya and Ethiopia have assumed leadership positions as state builders and negotiators in southern Somalia.
In practice, this means that Kenya and Ethiopia have been able to influence the formation of new federal states, and create governments that will benefit their own national security concerns.
As an example of this influence, Kenya and Ethiopia had an important role in the creation of the Interim Juba Administration (IJA), a new federal state consisting of the Somali regions (Gedo, South Juba, and Middle Juba) bordering Kenya.
Effectively, the IJA acts as a buffer state between Kenya and the threat posed by Al Shabab in Somalia.
Ethiopia is involved as a negotiator for the creation of the IJA because it wants to maintain involvement and influence in the region as it deals with its own ethnic Somali population.
This competition for influence over land in southern Somalia is not likely to lead to a sustainable governance model for Somalia moving forward, and is already causing regional strife.
Somalia would be wise to ensure that whatever governance plan or federal state organization is put in place is durable enough to last after the African Union forces have left, regardless of current security concerns.
Due to the African Union’s recent successes against Al Shabab, various proxy states and vigorous counter terrorism operations by foreign forces seem likely to continue.
Unfortunately this also means that the pattern of Kenyan and Ethiopian meddling in Somalian political affairs is likely to continue.
Godane’s message is dangerous because it taps into that fact.
The US is interested in the long term stability of Somalia. But its immediate concern is to stabilize the Horn of Africa and exterminate Al Shabab. Therefore, despite feeding Al Shabab’s propaganda machine and potentially destabilizing Somalia in the future, the United States will likely turn a blind eye to Kenyan and Ethiopian influence in Somalia.
Mr. Dick-Godfrey is a program coordinator for the Council on Foreign Relations studies program.
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Hargeisa-Somaliland Ministry of Industry officials, businessmen and members of the public converged at the Egal international airport to welcome group of Chinese industrialists arrived in the country today just months after the signing of joint agreement last year to construct and establish of 20 factories in Somaliland to be funded by the Afro China Commerce Industry Group.
The head of Afro China Commerce Industry Group said, “We plan to setup and establish range of manufacturing plants here in Somaliland which produce and assembly motor vehicles, electronics, household goods, bicycles and food stuffs in parts of the country namely in Hargeisa, Tog Wajaale and Aw-barkhadle .
The Chinese industrialists had previously spent a couple of weeks last year in the country on a familiarization tour and exploring the country unexplored business opportunities and by visiting the various regions of the country said they were satisfied by both the people and the business environment which is vital for investment.
Mr. David Chin head of Afro China Commerce Industry Group said the consortium controls large, medium, and small in all branches of industry, commerce and the service sector and that they are planning to initiate a partnership in which will hence play a significant role for the industrialization and commercial development of the country.
Somaliland minister of Industries told the visiting entrepreneurs that Somaliland is open for business and that the government is welcomes and is ready to assist all those who are interested in investing in the country.
