The government of Somaliland has taken a strong stance against the infringing of its affairs and the flouting of the country’s territorial integrity by the Mogadishu government of Somalia.
The latest development has been underscored by the House of the Representatives of Somaliland’s National Assembly who scoffed at the Mogadishu naïve act of purporting to render null and void the recent MoU agreement that the government of Somaliland struck with the Federal Government of Ethiopia over their bi-lateral relations.
The parliament moved a motion that was expressly endorsed unanimously to make it clear to both the Somalia government and the international community of nations that Somaliland has always been an entity as a nation quite separate from that of Somalia.
It reiterated its rights as having won its independence from Britain and that it did not secede from Somalia but simply severed its ill-fated union that factual history has well documented it.
The motion made it vividly clear to all concerned that Somaliland was a country with all the trappings of nationhood that charted and cruised its own course as a quite independent and sovereign a state as any other may be as per the aspirations of its people.
It termed the innuendoes emanating from Somalia of purporting to hold sway over Somaliland as a blatant infringement of the country’s territorial integrity and internal affairs.
While citing several legal clauses enshrined in Somaliland National Constitution, the parliament further reiterated its right as a national institution which is obligated to oversee the legalities entailed whenever the country enters any international agreements with any foreign country, multi-national institutions or whatever collaborative entity thereof, since Somaliland is an independent entity as a nation.
The motion took a swipe on the purported claim and action made by Somalia to assume that Somaliland was part of its territory.
It is worth noting that since Somaliland severed its ties and dissolved its ill-fated union with Somalia over three decades ago and reverted to its nation-hood status, the only times that the two former unions had discussions were through the initiatives of Somaliland-Somalia Talks whereupon both entities were at a round table as separate nations.
Somaliland has never been, nor is not, part and parcel of the regional government of Somalia as largely assumed.
It all rests at the essence of Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty of States, which Somaliland is holding its sway in, as an independent nation.
Unlike Somalia, Somaliland’s electioneering processes has for the past two decades perfected that of universal suffrage from the councilors level at the grassroots all the way to the parliamentarians and office of the president itself, with yet another (sixth) forthcoming national elections around the corner later this year.
The office of the Somaliland Special Envoy reasserts Somaliland’s independence from Great Britain on June 26th, 1960. On May 18, 1991, Somaliland formally withdrew from its failed union with Somalia and has been separated from that country since that date.
Therefore, this office categorically refutes Somalia’s false claim of ownership of the Republic of Somaliland and its mischaracterization of the recent MoU signed by the Republic of Somaliland and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to port access in Somaliland is no different from the many leases that countries have made with other countries.
on 8th January 2024 The office of the Somaliland Special Envoy categorically rejects Somalia’s recent misrepresentation of the current MoU between the Republic of Somaliland and the Federal Government of Ethiopia. Contrary to Somalia’s claims, Somaliland has consistently entered into agreements with Somalia as the independent sovereign state of Somaliland and has never been a “federal member state of Somalia.” This principle underpins all nine agreements with Somalia, dating back to the first bilateral meeting when Her Late Majesty’s government, headed by Prime Minister David Cameron, hosted the ‘Chevening Talks’ between Somaliland and the then Transitional Federal Government of Somalia on June 20-21, 2012.
The Somaliland Special Envoy further wishes to clarify Somaliland’s position regarding agreements entered with Somalia. While Somaliland has consistently engaged in these talks in good faith to seek peaceful solutions to our differences and mutually beneficial neighborly collaboration with Somalia. Regrettably, Somalia has consistently failed to uphold its commitments in these agreements and has never honored any of the agreements it had publicly co-signed with Somaliland.
Furthermore, any suggestion that Somaliland requires Somalia’s consent for a bilateral agreement is again blatantly false. Somaliland proudly maintains independent relations with numerous countries. including Ethiopia, and has successfully entered a number of international and bilateral agreements prior to this MOU. None of these agreements sought or received consent from Somalia.
Over the past 33 years, the contrasting situations of Somaliland and Somalia speak volumes. Somaliland has emerged as a thriving democracy and a beacon of stability in the Horn of Africa, effectively managing its internal affairs, governance, and elections without international support. Our country and its coast have consistently been free of piracy, terrorism, and banditry.
By contrast, Somalia continues to need international peacekeeping forces for its own protection as it has struggled for the past 33 years with internal strife, corruption, and terrorism, which repeatedly gets referred to as a failed state by the international community. Therefore, instead of resorting to mischaracterizations and unfounded claims of ownership over Somaliland, which has often been described as a ‘Rare African Miracle,’ Somalia would be better advised to put its own house in order.
Surely, the international community recognizes the stark differences between the two entities and appreciates Somaliland’s contribution to the regional peace and stability of the Horn of Africa.
While Somaliland will not hesitate to defend its sovereign right to enter into independent international relations as it sees fit, we remain committed to constructive dialogue and peaceful coexistence with Somalia as a neighbor.
Somaliland’s Minister of Information Hon. Ali Hassan Mohamed (Ali-Mareehan), said that Somalia cannot change anything about the agreement that Somaliland enters into with the Ethiopian government.
He pointed out that every time Somaliland enters into an agreement with another country or an international institution Somalia becomes fussy without any justification.
Minister Ali Marehean gave the sentiments during a BBC Somali Friday Debate program which he participated in. other participants were the Minister of Information of Somalia, and a legal official.
Minister Ali Marehaan, who was responding legally to Somalia’s inability to do anything about the agreement reached by Somaliland and Ethiopia, replied, “The lawyer only gave the sentiments of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud which testates further in our favour that Somalia always cries foul when we enter any international agreements”.
He gave the example of the fortunate accord struck with the DP World of the UAE which they vehemently rejected to their chagrin but was successfully implemented since.
Continuing his speech, he said, “Their Parliament made decisions, they ran to the United Nations Security Council, but that move did not change the decision.”
In terms of legality, he argued that for Somalia to claim a stake they have to own the land and rule the people they area but in reality they hold no sway over Somaliland whatsoever.
On the other hand, Minister Ali Marehaan argued that there are no major governments in the world, or international organizations that have publicly declared that the agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia is illegal.
He said, “This agreement has not been opposed by major governments and international organizations. The issues raised was of diplomatic inclinations that urged and called for sanity to prevail.
He pointed out that Somalia had leased their ports and gave foreign military bases places to occupy without consultations to any other powers, a fact that is similar to Somaliland’s justifiable cause to chart its way forward.
Somaliland’s Minister of Information also said that this agreement will come into force after the legal process entailed is executed. “This agreement will be fulfilled as it was entered”.
He accused Somalia of perpetually reneging on the points in talks agreed upon and in this case have no any iota of right over Somaliland at all.
It has been nearly 13 years since the world recognized a new country as South Sudan won widespread recognition after a decades-long fight. The year 2024 might be young, but it could very well see the international community welcome a new country: Somaliland. The United States should be a the front of the queue with its recognition.
Somaliland’s story should be better known but both Somalia’s failure and the State Department’s lack of imagination have buried appreciation for the Horn of Africa’s best success stories. Black Hawk Down shaped most Americans’ perception of Somalia. The film memorialized the murder of 18 American servicemen during the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu. It was the deadliest battle for Americans since the Vietnam War and led President Bill Clinton to withdraw American forces providing humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Al Qaeda leader Usama Bin Laden subsequently declared that the rush “out of Somalia in shame and disgrace” showed US vulnerability.
For much of Somalia, peace remains elusive. The international community has pumped tens of billions of dollars into the country but regional warlords hold de facto power and the reconstituted army is unable to eradicate the Al Qaeda-linked Al Shabaab, let alone even secure the four miles from Mogadishu’s international airport to the country’s equivalent of the White House. Fahad Yasin, a former Al Jazeera stringer who rose to be Somalia’s intelligence chief even worked with an Al Qaeda affiliate in his earlier years.
Not all of what the world today defines as Somalia fits that narrative of state failure, Islamist terror, and lawlessness. Somalia itself formed from the merger of two separate territories: British Somaliland won independence on June 26, 1960. All five permanent members of the UN Security Council recognized it. Five days later, however, Somaliland merged with the former Italian Somaliland to former the Somali Republic, with its capital in Mogadishu. It was an unhappy union worsened by Cold War-era dictator Siad Barre’s brutality.
It was against this backdrop of Somalia’s collapse that, in 1991, Somaliland reasserted its independence. Its logic was compelling: It entered into a marriage with Mogadishu voluntarily and so could divorce it voluntarily. The rest of the world disagreed, but Somaliland has governed itself as an independent albeit unrecognized country for nearly 33 years, longer than it was under Mogadishu’s control.
While Somalia descended into anarchy, Somaliland remained peaceful. I have visited the country five times at my own expense, including with my then-nine-year-old daughter and have also visited Somalia proper. While the international community pumped billions of dollars into unsuccessful efforts to organize one-man, one-vote elections in Somalia, Somaliland became the first country to secure elections with biometric iris scans; it has conducted one-man, one-vote elections for decades without demanding billions of dollars to do so. Peaceful transfers of power are the norm, with one elections decided by less than 100 votes among more than one million cast.
Businesses flock to Somaliland for its stability and transparency. The country hosts Africa’s second largest Coca Cola bottling plant, is a livestock hub for the Middle East, boasts a deep water port that rivals Djibouti’s, and has one of the highest penetration rates of mobile money. The newly renovated Berbera Airport, a former emergency landing strip for NASA’s space shuttle program, has one of the largest runways in Africa.
The country’s geopolitical orientation enhances its value. It is one of only two countries in Africa to recognize Taiwan over China. It has remained firm even as Chinese officials try to bribe its politicians with hundreds of millions of dollars and also as Beijing sought revenge by encouraging a Somali invasion and insurgency in Somaliland’s Sool region.
Many Western European and East African countries maintain offices or consulates in the country. Emirati and African airlines serve its capital. Somaliland would even welcome partnership with Israel, and it rejects reactionary states like Iran and Syria. Meanwhile, with few resources, Somaliland secured its 460-mile coastline. Unlike Somalia, Somaliland prevents piracy, terror safe-haven, and weapon smuggling.
The Pentagon and intelligence community have long wanted to partner with Somaliland and Congress called for closer ties in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, but the State Department refuses, fearing they might anger Mogadishu. Arguments about shifting borders are empty, given that international treaties defined Somaliland’s borders since its days as a protectorate and its brief period of independence. Rejecting Somaliland is contrary to American national security. A base in Berbera, for example, could allow Ospreys and helicopters to patrol the Bab el-Mandeb rather than force length naval deployments.
The State Department’s resistance, however, may now be futile. Ethiopia long joked that they would not be the first country to recognize Somaliland, but they would not be the third either. They have now changed their mind. In exchange for a long-term port lease, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has offered to recognize Somaliland’s independence. That Al Shabaab is furious should only reinforce to Washington that Somaliland is a good bet.
When the United States absconds leadership and a forward presence, the forces of altruism do not fill the vacuum; rather, in the Red Sea region and Horn of Africa, malign forces like the Houthis and al-Shabaab or Iran and Turkey do. Recognizing Somaliland can reverse a 33-year error, and restore security and moderation to a strategically important corner of the Middle East.
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Former Assistant Secretary of State of the United States of America who was also at one time an ambassador to Addis Ababa, Tibor Nagy, called on the Somalia government to focus on stabilizing its nation and coming out of chaos. He urged the Somalia leaders to stop meddling in Somaliland and Ethiopia historic agreement which will enable landlocked Ethiopia to have access to the Red Sea.
The diplomat said that Somalia should solve its problems and focus on finding a solution to its challenges and stop criticizing neighbouring countries.
The former assistant secretary of the United States stated this in a broadcast on X formerly Twitter.
After decades of conflict, Mogadishu reached a historic milestone by attaining IMF/World Bank debt relief. REUTERS/Feisal Omar
By Hassan Ali Khaire
The long-suffering East African country will accumulate further debt arrears unless it undertakes bolder reform, says former prime minister Hassan Ali Khaire.
It is said that a cow with no tail should not try to chase away flies. This African cautionary tale warns us to match our ambitions with the resources and tools we have at our disposal.
As Somali policymakers, we ignored this old lesson and embarked on an ambitious reform agenda under the auspices of an IMF debt relief programme. We intentionally did this without having the necessary resources or required environment because the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative offered us two complementary rewards. First, a route out of debt distress, and second, policy discipline, as the programme would support us in formulating robust policy options, which we could then use as an anchor to drive comprehensive reforms.
advertisements
On 13 December 2023, the IMF and World Bank Executive Boards approved Somalia’s HIPC Completion Point. This great milestone was widely celebrated within the country and internationally. Nevertheless, questions persist about how we managed to achieve this momentous milestone given our long-standing complex issues. Moreover, how can we now ensure that the country does not fall back into new debt distress?
Identifying challenges
After more than two decades of civil strife, Somalia resumed its relationship with the IMF in 2013, followed by the first Article IV Consultation in 2015. These preliminary interactions led to a series of four annual staff-monitored programmes (SMPs), which were informal agreements (not endorsed by the IMF executive board) that allowed the fund to monitor our country’s economic programmes while offering us targeted technical assistance.
On assuming office as prime minister in February 2017, we were struggling with satisfying the four basic prior actions and 11 structural benchmarks required under SMP I, and there were signs we were unprepared for an IMF programme due to our multifaceted challenges. However, I was determined to persevere with the programme, amid an absence of state bureaucracy required to deliver on such an ambitious project.
Within 45 days in office, we organised the whole government apparatus under four pillars: economic development, inclusive politics, social affairs, and security and justice. This enabled us to efficiently use the few experts we had, while strengthening cross-departmental learning, collaboration and coordination.
The IMF programme was nested within the economic development pillar which had membership from 13 stakeholder ministries and the central bank. I chaired this pillar’s weekly meetings throughout my premiership, driving the reform process forward and ensuring accountability. We also secured buy-in for the reform process from all concerned stakeholders, guaranteeing the programme remains on track even if our team left office.
Massive setbacks
Unfortunately, we encountered critical matters to contend with besides the IMF programme. On October 14, 2017, a terror attack rocked Mogadishu, resulting in death, injury and untold damage in a section of the city. Moreover, prolonged and recurring climate-related shocks in the form of droughts in 2016/2017 and 2019/2020, ravaged the entire country.
The worst locust infestation in a quarter of a century struck in June 2019, further exacerbating a fragile humanitarian situation. Then Covid-19 came at the worst possible time and we were faced with a series of unfathomed crises.
Despite these setbacks, we successfully navigated through three comprehensive and challenging SMPs (SMP II: May 2017 – April 2018; SMP III: May 2018 – April 2019; and SMP IV: June 2019 – July 2020), containing more than 50 structural benchmarks in addition to numerous quantitative performance indicators.
Ultimately, our steadfastness for reforms and team tenacity paid off when, in March 2020, the IMF and the World Bank’s IDA agreed we had met the requirements to qualify for debt relief (under HIPC ‘Decision Point’). We thereafter embarked on decentralising our structures by strengthening key institutions such as the central bank and the ministry of finance, allowing us to facilitate clear pathways towards HIPC Completion Point.
Substantial risk
It is extremely pleasing to see that our external debt stock is reduced and relatively manageable at around 6% of GDP, presenting an opportunity for Somalia to rejoin the global economic and financial system after a long hiatus. However, there are substantial risks of falling back into accumulating debt arrears unless we significantly up our game and put in place bolder reform measures.
Debt relief or not, the underlying economic fundamentals of our country remain the same. The same resource gaps exist; our fiscal space is non-existent, domestic savings are absent and cannot meet the massive demand for domestic investments, and we have a huge trade deficit.
I strongly urge our friends and international partners to support us at this critical juncture
Basic public services are lacking, and we need social safety net programmes to boost human capital and resilience against recurring shocks. Most importantly, our debt-carrying capacity is dismally weak. HIPC Completion Point implies that our country will most likely not have access to future IDA grants, meaning new concessional borrowing is the only option.
At the moment, the federal government is unable to cover its recurring expenditures and running costs with the amount of revenues it generates. The recent plans to deploy new army personnel and the recruitment of 3,000 teachers, while essential, will exacerbate current finances. My worry is that the government will start acquiring new debt to cover its current expenditure, eventually jeopardising years of reform efforts.
It will be unfortunate if we do not learn from the experiences of previous HIPC Completion Point graduates, many currently in some form of debt distress (out of the 36 countries, 17 in moderate debt distress risk, 13 in high debt distress risk and five in debt stress).
To fully leverage the debt relief, I strongly urge that we remain steadfast in our efforts to improve domestic revenue mobilisation and public financial and debt management while strengthening integrity, transparency and accountability measures.
I also strongly urge our friends and international partners to support us at this critical juncture so we do not fall back into the darkness of debt default and exclusion from the international financial and monetary system.
Somalis march against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal at Yarisow stadium in Mogadishu on January 3, 2024 [Feisal Omar/Reuters]
By Abdifatah Ismael Tahir
On January 1, 2024, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, and Somaliland’s President, Muse Bihi, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) granting Ethiopia naval and commercial access to coastal areas along the Gulf of Aden. In exchange, Ethiopia will formally recognize Somaliland, which previously declared an unrecognized secession from Somalia. While the MoU is not legally binding, it sets the stage for a potential formal treaty, with further details expected in a follow-up meeting.
Reacting to the MoU, the Somali government, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, convened an emergency cabinet meeting and a joint parliamentary session to strongly oppose the agreement. This stance is echoed by prominent Somali politicians and analysts, who express concerns about the agreement’s implications for Somalia’s sovereignty and regional stability.
Ethiopia’s history in Somalia, especially post-state collapse, suggests a strategic use of Somalia’s instability and challenges, like those posed by Al-Shabaab, to advance its own interests. This perspective also seems to inform Ethiopia’s current contemplation of annexing Somali territory.
However, Ethiopia’s 2006 military intervention in Somalia under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, which resulted in a challenging and complex conflict leading to their withdrawal, serves as a reminder that military strength alone does not ensure success or influence, particularly in regions with deep political and social complexities.
In response to the present aggression, Somalia has several options, including bolstering national unity, strengthening internal governance, and enhancing diplomatic relations with regional and international allies. Somalia can more effectively counter external misjudgements or aggressions by forming a united front and leveraging diplomatic channels.
Internal Governance and Security
Somalia can prioritize strengthening its military capabilities, central to developing a cohesive governance model incorporating clan militias like SSC and Macawisley into the official government security forces. This strategy involves professionalizing these militias, fostering a sense of national duty, and ensuring their adherence to laws. Such a transformation is critical for a stronger defence against external threats like annexation.
Despite its risks, negotiating with Al-Shabaab is another crucial step against foreign threats. It entails engaging with the group as a political entity to mitigate internal conflict and violence. This could solidify the country’s defence against external threats, although it requires careful navigation due to Al-Shabaab’s designation as a terrorist organization by various countries and international organisations.
Another tactic in Somalia’s strategic response to potential annexation is to support or establish resistance movements in Somaliland. This involves providing these groups with logistical, military, and political assistance. By backing these movements, Somalia can create a more formidable front against annexation efforts, leveraging local and potentially international support to bolster its position and safeguard its sovereignty.
Lastly, Somalia could expel the Ethiopian contingent from the African Union Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). This would signify a profound shift in regional military relationships and operations. It would also indicate a possible reassessment of Somalia’s approach to external military involvement, reflecting a desire to redefine its defence strategies and control.
Regional Diplomacy and Coalitions
On the diplomatic front, Somalia’s strategy could involve building and strengthening alliances with other countries in the region and international players equally threatened by the reckless actions of the Ethiopian government. Eritrea’s historical relationship with Ethiopia positions it as a crucial ally in the region. Eritrea’s strategic importance and contentious past with Ethiopia could make it a key player in counterbalancing Ethiopian influence in the Horn of Africa.
Restoring diplomatic relations with Iran could significantly alter the geopolitical, presenting Somalia with a powerful ally. Iran’s involvement in regional affairs has the potential to shift the balance of power, potentially offering Somalia a strategic partnership to counter Ethiopian influence. This diplomatic move could enhance Somalia’s position in regional politics, countering Ethiopia’s actions and alliances in the Horn of Africa.
A key aspect of Somalia’s diplomatic strategy should be revaluating relationships with countries whose interests may align with Ethiopia’s, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Considering its close economic cooperation with Ethiopia, adjusting ties with the UAE is crucial. This recalibration aims to mitigate any negative impacts and potential threats that might arise from this relationship, ensuring Somalia’s interests are protected, and its diplomatic position is strengthened in the face of Ethiopian influence in the region.
A more controversial yet potentially impactful strategy would be a retaliatory recognition and encouragement of secessionist movements within Ethiopia, such as those in the Tigray or Oromia. This approach could internally destabilize Ethiopia, diverting its focus and resources from external annexation efforts. While this could weaken Ethiopia’s ability to meddle in our affairs, it also carries significant risks, including escalating regional conflicts and attracting international criticism.
Finally, aligning with Ethiopia’s regional rivals, particularly Egypt, could provide strategic leverage. Egypt’s historical disputes with Ethiopia, especially over the Nile River, could align with the interests of resisting Ethiopian expansion. Collaboration with Egypt might extend to various domains, including diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, or even the provision of military bases.
Legal Actions and International Alliances
Somalia could leverage international legal frameworks to contest any annexation efforts. This might involve bringing the issue to international bodies like the United Nations or the African Union to seek a peaceful and lawful resolution. Engaging in dialogue and negotiations to find a mutually beneficial solution while maintaining sovereignty could be another diplomatic approach.
Seeking a powerful international ally, “godfather,” is also a significant strategic move. This approach involves forging an alliance with a globally influential country that can provide both diplomatic backing and military support. The ideal ally would be a state with considerable clout on the international stage, capable of effectively deterring Ethiopian annexation efforts. The ally should receive significantly advantageous access to Somalia’s vast natural resources in return for this support.
Another critical response is implementing legal measures against renegade factions like the secessionists within the country. This strategy would involve prosecuting individuals or groups that support the annexation or otherwise undermine the government’s position. Actions could include filing treason charges and issuing international arrest warrants. Such measures would demonstrate a strong commitment to national sovereignty and might deter similar actions by other groups.
Each strategy entails a complex interplay of diplomatic, economic, and military considerations. They necessitate careful evaluation of long-term regional implications, potential international responses, and the overarching objective of maintaining our territorial integrity.
The author is a researcher with a keen interest in urban politics, governance, and geopolitical issues in the Horn of Africa region. He holds a PhD in geography, specializing in urban governance, from the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom.
Telesom’s officials when they launched Somaliland’s first ever 5G connectivity on January 1, 2024 in the city of Hargeisa. In attendance are Somaliland’s Vice President Abdirahman Abdillahi Saylici, ICT minister Dr Ahmed Yousuf Idiris, and minister for Investment and Industrial Development Abdirazak Ibrahim Mohamed.
By Daniel Ogetta
Somaliland, a self-declared independent nation-state located in the North-West region of Somalia has long been known for its resilience in the face of adversity. Now the small nation is taking a bold step towards the future with the recent launch of its first 5G network. This leapfrog over 4G, pioneered by the telecommunications company Telesom, promises to unlock a world of possibilities for the country’s burgeoning economy and digitally-hungry population.
On January 1, Telesom, a telecommunications provider, which has 90 percent market share in Somaliland, launched the first-ever 5G mobile service and Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) service in the country.
“Telesom’s 5G mobile service represents a quantum leap in wireless technology, offering unparalleled speed, reliability, and connectivity,” the company said in a statement. “This next-generation service is set to revolutionise the way people communicate, work, and experience the digital world.”
Unlike other countries that first run pilots of the technology before the official launch, Telesom launched what it describes as a “nationwide rollout” in 13 urbanised cities and towns. These include the capital city Hargeisa and the towns of Burco, Borama, Berbera, Erigavo, Gabiley, Sheekh and Wajaale among others. Telesom’s 5G internet has a download speed of 1016 Mbs per second.
Telesom Chairman Abdikarim Eid told Nation.Africa the 5G deployment marks a watershed moment for Somaliland, with subscribers now able to access 5G data bundles on Telesom’s network with all compatible 5G phones.
36 African countries
“We are launching this ahead of 36 African countries, making us among the forerunners in technological innovation on the continent,” Eid said. “We want to ensure our customers benefit from near-instantaneous download speeds that enable businesses to operate seamlessly, students to access educational resources like never before, and healthcare professionals to diagnose and treat patients remotely.”
This unprecedented connectivity, Eid said, has the potential to revolutionise other sectors like finance, transport and agriculture, fostering innovation and driving economic growth.
But the impact of 5G extends beyond mere speed. Its low latency, or the time it takes for data to travel, opens doors for real-time applications like smart farming, remote surgery, and immersive virtual reality experiences.
However, challenges remain. Infrastructure rollout is in its early stages, currently limited to major cities. While affordability will also be a crucial factor for mass 5G mobile adoption, Somalia already ranks in the top five African countries with the most affordable mobile internet. The Worldwide Mobile Data Pricing 2023 index by UK-based internet affordability analysis firm Cable ranked Somalia fourth in Africa.
At $0.50 per GB on average, Somalia has the cheapest mobile internet in East Africa, with the cheapest mobile connectivity provider in Somalia charging $0.19 per GB. However, there will still be affordability obstacles in relation to 5G-enabled handsets. This may be where Somaliland’s 5G take-off is expected to incur some hiccups.
Combined, Somaliland and Somalia have one of the largest coastlines in Africa, where many undersea internet cables for fiber networks pass. And while both countries have rolled out fiber internet connections for business and residence, the majority of the infrastructure is limited to highly urbanised areas. “With the rollout of Telesom’s FWA using our 5G network, we will be able to bring high-speed internet to areas outside the fiber network in all the cities where our network is available,” Eid added.
Robust cybersecurity systems
Somaliland will need to lay robust cybersecurity systems and adapt to existing legal frameworks to the demands of this new technology for a smooth transition. Telesom, on its part, will need to secure its new network since the decentralised nature of 5G networks, with more data being processed at the edge, opens up new points of vulnerability.
However, the launch of 5G in Somaliland represents a powerful symbol of the country’s unwavering spirit amidst existential challenges. The nation’s 5G leap depicts the tenacity of its people and their determination to embrace the opportunities offered by the digital age. With careful planning, strategic partnerships, and a focus on inclusivity, 5G has the potential to be a game-changer for Somaliland, propelling it towards a brighter, more connected future like its neighbour Kenya.
As the network expands and applications evolve, the next few years will be crucial in shaping how this technology can best serve the needs of the nation. But one thing is clear: Somaliland is no longer on the sidelines of the digital revolution. It’s actively charting its own course, one powered by the potential of 5G thanks to Telesom, and the world is watching with anticipation.
He stated that the agreement indicates that Ethiopia will be the first country to recognize Somaliland as a state
By M.A. Egge
The President of the Republic of Somaliland, H.E. Musa Bihi Abdi and the delegation he led, returned to the country to a rousing reception whereby a multitude of thousands of people in the city came out to welcome him following a deal he struck with neighbouring Ethiopian government at the beginning of the year. Enthusiastic and elated people lined up along the several kilometres of road that snaked from the Egal International Airport all the way to the Presidency.
Amid ululations and chants of ‘triumph…triumph’, the multitude of people led by members of the cabinet, parliamentarians, traditional and contemporary leaders of Maaroodi-Jeeh region, the leadership of Hargeisa local city council, the service commanders of the various arms of the and eminent personalities joined together in the tumultuous reception while most carrying miniature flags of the nation while others adorning clothes that bore the colours of the national flag.
The Head of State addressed a large gathering at around a gate near the entrance of the airport whereby he elaborated on the historic MoU deal that was struck with Ethiopia that has at its gist the aspirations of the country as concerns the long sought justified international recognition.
He noted that the agreements made had in its core the Federal government of Ethiopia acknowledging Somaliland as a dejure state, thus according it the deserved international recognition.
The President likewise scoffed at the hullabaloos that emanated from the Mogadishu government that went berserk with chagrin when they got wind of the deal struck with Ethiopia.
He at the same time dispelled rumours and allegations of insincerity on the part of the nation saying that the agreements will have to be subjected to legalities at par with both the local and international laws as applicable.
The president first spoke about the type of agreement that the two governments have entered into, which is one seen to be in the interests of both parties, and which is in accordance with the rules and the constitution of Somaliland and the international rules.
He stated that the agreement indicates that Ethiopia will be the first country to recognize Somaliland as a state, and Ethiopia will in return get lease of Somaliland with specified size, in accordance with the internationally recognized rules.
The President dismissed the false statements that the enemies of Somaliland are spreading that Somaliland’s land has been sold to Ethiopia, “Somaliland’s land cannot be sold, the president cannot sell arbitrarily for he has no such powers nor can a future president dispose of the nation’s land whimsically”, he said.
He sent a strong message to the leaders of Somalia to refrain from disrupting the development of Somaliland and its achievements, and to stop the propaganda as concerns the agreement that Somaliland is striking with Ethiopia.
President Muse Bihi Abdi has called on the people of Somaliland to stand by their nation, work together to implement the important historical country’s agreement, and unite for the common good of the nation.
On the other hand, a brief ceremony was held in the presidential palace to pay tribute to the president and his delegation that saw the top national leaders led by the Vice President H.E. Abdirahman Abdillahi Ismael Seyli’and and bothe Speakers of the Upper and Lower Houses of the Parliament the Honourables Suleiman Mohamoud Adan and Prof. Yasin Faratoon profusely hail the President in his achievement of taking the nation forward with the bold step taken for the good of the nation and the people of Somaliland.
The President in turn thanked all who turn out to brave the sun to welcome him back home and appealed to the populaces for solidarity, unity, brethrenship and concerted efforts in a harmonious way to move the nation towards a positive direction, reiterating that the main aspirations of the country was to be accorded the deserved dejure status as any other country amongst the international community.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) condemned Monday’s port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, as did Al-Shabaab on similarly nationalist grounds, despite those two being existential enemies. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed (HSM) even went as far as to fearmonger that the group might soon revive its activities in the aftermath of that agreement. This curious convergence of interests ominously hints that an unholy alliance might soon form between these two.
The UN’s lifting of its three-decade-long arms embargo on Somalia in early December could enhance the FGS’ anti-terrorist capabilities and thus help it finally defeat Al-Shabaab, though Mogadishu might be reluctant to go on the offensive against this group anytime soon now that they share the same goal. HSM’s furious reaction to this latest port deal, which is actually a diplomatic masterstroke for the reasons explained here, has redirected the public’s focus away from Al-Shabaab and towards Ethiopia.
Social media is now flooded with warmongering from some Somali activists who all of a sudden consider that neighboring nation to be more of a threat to their country than this UN-designated terrorist group despite Somaliland having been functionally independent since 1991. They no longer mind that Al Shabaab has slaughtered thousands of their compatriots since its inception because all that matters to them for the moment is that Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland will doom their nationalist dreams.
This socio-political development works in HSM’s interests since it could enable him to consolidate his power, indefinitely delay any future offensives against Al-Shabaab in the face of the faux external threat that he claims Ethiopia nowadays poses, and hope that the group attacks it instead. His fearmongering about its possibly impending revival that’ll supposedly be due to this latest deal could be a signal to them to concentrate their activities against Ethiopia with the FGS’ tacit approval.
In exchange for them launching a cross-border terrorist campaign against Ethiopia, he might eschew any future offensive plans in favor of holding a dialogue aimed at peacefully resolving their disputes like he told the Royal United Services Institute in late November is his “preferred option” if they agree to talks. Now that these domestic existential enemies share the same external one, which each falsely portrays as an even greater existential enemy, the basis objectively exists for this unholy alliance to take shape.
If these are indeed HSM’s calculations or at the very least something that he hasn’t fully ruled out, then he’d do well to rubbish them as soon as possible because the risks far outweigh the benefits. Not only would he discredit his administration through such a Faustian bargain, which could include losing US support if it concludes that he’s indirectly wielding Al-Shabaab as a weapon of hybrid war against Ethiopia, but the latter could be prompted to take out their camps if this terrorist threat soon returns.
Given how HSM has redirected the public’s focus away from Al-Shabaab and towards Ethiopia as supposedly representing their top existential threat, he could come under tremendous pressure to militarily respond to any cross-border anti-terrorist strikes that might be carried out. In that event, any attack by the Somali Armed Forces (SAF) against the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) would amount to them defending a UN-designated terrorist group, which would expose his deal with the devil.
The best-case scenario is that HSM decides against informally allying with Al-Shabaab despite them both being on the same side against Ethiopia’s Somaliland deal and instead continues planning the SAF’s next offensive against that group as opposed to weaponizing it against the ENDF. Egypt and Eritrea might try misleading him into becoming their proxy war pawn against Ethiopia in order to fight it to the last Somali, but he must resist their siren songs at all costs otherwise it’ll end in another national disaster.
