Somalia concocted the dual fearmongering narratives falsely claiming that Ethiopia will soon annex Somaliland and that this will then supposedly lead to a resurgence of Al-Shabaab throughout the region. The first half of this lie is meant to assemble a regional anti-Ethiopian coalition while the second is intended to imbue the larger international community with a sense of urgency for tangibly backing Mogadishu’s hoped-for reconquest of Somaliland on a false anti-terrorist pretext.

Somaliland’s Deputy Foreign Minister Amb Rhoda Jama Elmi comprehensively debunked the false narrative alleging that her country’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia will help fuel Al-Shabaab’s (AS) resurgence in the region. Ambassador Rhoda J. Elmi’s tweet can be read in full here, but the present piece will summarize her insight for the reader’s convenience prior to analyzing it so that they can fully appreciate the points that she made.

She began by reminding everyone that Somalia’s chaotic socio-economic and political conditions gave birth to AS, not hatred of Ethiopia like some have inaccurately claimed. The failure to resolve structural weaknesses in the years since and the federal government’s misplaced priorities fertilized the soil for this group’s continued growth. Ambassador Elmi then drew attention to academic research proving the connection between corruption, poverty, and militancy in support of her aforesaid assessment.

The next part of her tweet highlights the geo-economic drivers behind the recently signed MoU, which will help alleviate poverty and grow the economy on both sides of the border, thus drawing a sharp contrast with the regrettable state of affairs in neighboring Somalia where AS continues to operate. She also reminded everyone that the Ethiopian National Defense Forces have played a key role in fighting this terrorist scourge and then ended by hoping that her tweet will help clarify matters for everyone.

The context within which she shared her insight concerns the efforts by some Somali and other actors to misportray the MoU as a secret plot by Ethiopia to annex Somaliland. Somalia still claims that country as its own despite Somaliland’s redeclaration of independence in 1991 and its functional sovereignty since then. Mogadishu can’t reconquer Somaliland after failing to do so over the past one-third of a century, not to mention failing to exert sovereignty within Somalia itself, ergo the need for foreign help.

Therein lies the reason why Somalia concocted the dual fearmongering narratives falsely claiming that Ethiopia will soon annex Somaliland and that this will then supposedly lead to a resurgence of AS throughout the region. The first half of this lie is meant to assemble a regional anti-Ethiopian coalition while the second is intended to imbue the larger international community with a sense of urgency for tangibly backing Mogadishu’s hoped-for reconquest of Somaliland on a false anti-terrorist pretext.

The reality is that “The Somali Authorities & Al-Shabaab Are On The Same Side Against Ethiopia’s Somaliland Port Deal” and “The Somali Leader Is Looking For Allies As He Plots Hybrid War Against Ethiopia & Somaliland”. This explains why Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) chose Eritrea as the first country that he traveled to since the MoU was signed due to its troubled ties with Ethiopia stemming from November 2022’s Cessation Of Hostilities Agreement between it and the TPLF.

Eritrea had previously been sanctioned by the UNSC for arming and even training AS, but these restrictions were lifted in late 2018 following its rapprochement with Ethiopia at the time that only ended after the abovementioned peace deal was agreed to between Asmara’s enemies and Addis. HSM then visited Egypt, where its leader saber-rattled against Ethiopia out of desperation to distract from his betrayal of the Palestinians and surprisingly insulted Somalia by calling it a failed state to HSM’s face.

Egypt has sought to contain and ultimately Balkanize Ethiopia for decades, with Eritrea joining it after the start of the war with Ethiopia in 1998 and until their half-decade-long rapprochement beginning in 2018. It’s now widely suspected that Eritrea is once again colluding with Ethiopia’s historical rival due to its disapproval of November 2022’s Cessation Of Hostilities Agreement. The public justification for this anti-Ethiopian coalition that HSM is seeking to assemble is the false claims that his country is spewing.

By debunking the lie that this month’s MoU is a secret plot by Ethiopia to annex Somaliland and that AS will then enjoy a regional resurgence in the aftermath, Ambassador Elmi is informing the international community that this emerging coalition actually embodies that which it claims to oppose. Somalia wants Eritrean and especially Egyptian support for annexing Somaliland, and it also hopes that those two will help it arm, fund, and train AS as their Hybrid War proxies for destabilizing that country and Ethiopia.

The sooner that the international community realizes the truth about the processes that are taking shape in the Horn, the better that it’ll be since they could then diplomatically intervene to avert the larger war that HSM risks provoking. To that end, pressure can be put on Egypt to reconsider the wisdom of following through with its leader’s saber-rattling in parallel with threatening to withhold the foreign funds upon which Somalia depends if it dares to declare war against Ethiopia and/or Somaliland.

It’s not Ethiopia or Somaliland that are “rogue states”, but Somalia and any country that helps it wage war against either or both of those two, which is what would really create space for AS to expand even without any support from Somalia, Eritrea, and/or Egypt. “Somalia Should Negotiate A ‘Dignified Divorce’ With Somaliland As Soon As Possible” for the sake of regional peace and development, but HSM is hellbent on trying to reconquer that country and thus bears full responsibility for the consequences.

Somaliland declared itself an independent state in 1991. It used colonial boundary lines to separate itself from Somalia. More than three decades later, however, it has yet to gain international recognition. It has had a difficult relationship with Somalia. A recent memorandum of understanding to grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the sea threatens the relationship further. But it could support Somaliland’s quest for recognition as an independent state. We asked Aleksi Ylönen, who has studied politics in the Horn of Africa and Somaliland’s quest for independence, some questions about this situation.

1. What has Somaliland achieved in its quest for statehood?

Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence in 1991, based heavily on its separate colonial experience from Somalia. Britain declared a Somaliland protectorate in 1884. Italy established another protectorate, which became a colony, in 1889.

British Somaliland gained independence on 26 June 1960. It voluntarily joined the former Italian Somaliland upon its independence on 1 July 1960 to form Somalia.

This union was never formally ratified and eventually fell apart.

In the decades since 1991, Somaliland’s people and their representatives have emphasised their distinct colonial status and associated borders. Regional organisations and foreign powers have adhered to colonial boundaries when recognising independent states in post-colonial Africa.

Somaliland’s political system is democratic in a neighbourhood of authoritarian states like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudans.

Somaliland has organised successful elections and peaceful transfers of political power. Recently, however, there has been some backsliding.

Its security apparatus is elaborate. With the active contribution of citizens, it has ensured a measure of internal stability and security in an otherwise troubled region.

No United Nations member state or global organisation recognises Somaliland’s independence officially. Still, Somaliland has diplomatic relations with various UN member states. It also maintains relations with other marginalised nations and territories and partially recognised Taiwan.

Several foreign nations have representative offices in its capital, Hargeisa. It maintains liaison offices in 20 countries on five continents.

How would you describe the relationship with Somalia?

It’s turbulent.

The Federal Republic of Somalia rejects Somaliland’s independence and agreements with foreign parties. Meanwhile, Somaliland has accused Mogadishu of involvement in the conflict in its eastern territories.

Negotiations over their relationship have taken place from time to time since 2012, with little progress.

Ethiopia’s recent announcement of a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland has set back relations between Somaliland and Somalia even further.

Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi in January announced a plan to give Ethiopia access to 20km of the Somaliland shoreline.

In exchange, Ethiopia said it would seriously consider Somaliland’s aim of international recognition. The exchange also included Somaliland getting a stake in Ethiopian Airlines or EthioTelecom.

The government of Somalia reacted swiftly to this announcement.

It held an emergency parliamentary session and withdrew its ambassador from Ethiopia for consultations. It also declared the proposed deal “null and void” and a sign of Ethiopian “aggression” towards Somalia.

3. What other bilateral arrangements has Somaliland signed?

Many of the deals Somaliland has made with foreign agencies haven’t been made public. It does have diplomatic ties with various countries. It has also signed agreements with foreign countries and organisations linked to its political elites.

These include deals around infrastructure development and management, as well as investment and natural resource extraction.

Ethiopia-Somaliland ties have been strong for decades.

In the early 1980s, Addis Ababa provided sanctuary for the Somali National Movement, which sought to topple the repressive Siad Barre administration in Somalia.

In the 1990s, Ethiopia eyed Somaliland as a possible import-export route to the sea to lower its reliance on Djibouti.

As a result, Dubai Ports World, a state-linked United Arab Emirates ports and logistics company, agreed with the Somaliland administration to develop and manage the Berbera port in 2016. Two years later, Ethiopia agreed to take a 19% stake in a Berbera port consortium.

Although Ethiopia didn’t follow through, it still had plans for a logistics corridor through Somaliland.

4. What can Ethiopia offer Somaliland on the independence issue?

The understanding between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa includes a provision for an in-depth assessment of Somaliland as a sovereign state. This would make Ethiopia the first UN member state to recognise it.

It would give Somaliland what it wants most. Recognition would help open doors for international public financing and raise Somaliland’s status in the region.

Ethiopia seems committed to the proposed deal. Some of the reasons for this include:

• its wish for sea access
• its strong ties with Somaliland
• national security advisor Redwan Hussien’s comments that discussions would include other sectors of collaboration. Ethiopia is already talking to Somaliland about military cooperation.

Somaliland is holding a long-delayed presidential election towards the end of 2024. Gaining international recognition would likely give President Muse Bihi Abdi a second term in office, even though he has been criticised for mishandling the conflict in Somaliland’s eastern borderlands. People in this area have tried to set up their own state as part of federal Somalia.

5. Why has Somaliland made so little progress and what needs to change?

Achieving recognition has been a foreign policy priority for Somaliland. All administrations have made efforts to raise awareness about its situation internationally.

But international politics have not favoured Somaliland. Most states, including great and middle powers, fear that recognising Somaliland could be destabilising. They have opted to support unity, and peace and state building of federal Somalia.

One of their reasons for non-recognition is that Somaliland’s 1991 self-declaration of independence may appear illegal under international law.

In my view, it’s wrong to think that dividing up states inevitably causes instability and conflict. Each case is unique and deserves consideration based on historical and legal arguments, as well as current conditions.