Somaliland Deputy Ambassador in Ethiopia Barkhad Mohamud Kariye has said it is good omen that Somaliland’s identity that has been sought for a long time is now realized through reciprocal relations made with Ethiopia.
In an interview on concerning different aspects the acting Ambassador had with MM tvon Wednesday, Barkhad talked about the efforts of President H.E. Musa Bihi Abdi has contributed to the achievement of the goals of aspirations of the people of Somaliland for thirty years and more.
He underscored the deep bilateral relations between the two countries of Somaliland and Ethiopia has that includes trade, security, social, diplomatic and political.
He explained that the MoU between the two nations “as the government and the President of the Somaliland have explained severally is a reciprocal exchange of interests, at an international level”.
He further explained, “The agreement has been signed and technical committees are in the process of cobbling the modalities for the implementation of the landmark agreement”.
Ambassador Barkhad said that the community of Somaliland has welcomed the agreement with Ethiopia and they are waiting for its details.
“I am correcting one thing, no one is against the MoU, and those who spoke about it pointed out that they are only waiting for details about it”, he said.
He said that the aspersions cast were only the work distracters and enemies hence when the real modalities are vividly put in place people would appreciate and rejoice.
The Minister of the Ministry of Information, Culture and National Guidance, who is also the spokesperson of the Government Hon. Ali Hassan Mohamed (Ali Mareehaan), inaugurated the largest project to date implemented by the ministry which has expanded the reach of the broadcasting of Radio Hargeisa, with 2000 KW radio stations in the cities of Eerigabo, Aynaba, Burao, Oodweyne, and Berbera.
The function held for the expansion of the FMs in the cities was held at the headquarters of the ministry and attended by the heads and officials of the ministry.
Hon. Ali Hassan Mohamed also revealed that a more powerful and large radio station will soon be brought to the country that can be heard from all over the world, and an education-related FM radio station will be established that will contribute to the promotion of education and community awareness.
The minister noted that in the short period that he has been at the helm of the ministry he has been able to achieve the expansion of the signals reach of the FM radios’ strength.
He said, “When we arrived at the Ministry, the FM stations in Hargeisa and Borame were both working. However that in Boorame was 300KW which we have now expanded it to 2000KW. Similarly such efforts were extended to have such relays in five other cities with their FM stations expanded to the larger 2000KW strength. These cities include Eerigabo, Aynaba, Burao, Oodweyne and Berbera. With each now reaching a radius of 60 km the beams has now been able to render the services to residents in remote areas almost in all parts of the country, including to the military bases far afield”.
Minister Ali Mareehaan said that soon the country will acquire the powerful medium wave radio station, and an educational related FM radio station will be established. He also praised the technicians and staffers of the Ministry and pointed out that they have made efforts in their work for the nation.
On the other hand, the Director General of the Ministry of Information, Mr. Mustafa Abdi Isse (Shiine), gave details of the efforts that they are making in relation to the expansion of Radio Hargeisa.
He said, “The entire leadership team of the Ministry led by the Minister is new. It has been possible for us to listen to Radio Hargeisa in most of the regions of the country, which came with the efforts and leadership of the Minister of Information, who ordered us to be swift in our undertakings and not to delay what we can do.”
The Director General noted that the national forces have been complaining for a long time that they used to listen to radio stations controlled by the enemy of Somaliland.
He said, “Since the directives of the Minister have been implemented to expand the broadcasting of the radio station, we, with myself at the helm, are expected to turn to the aspect of improving the programs and what is being communicated to the nation. It was unfortunate that the Ministry of Information, which is considered to be one of the ministries with the highest budget, was only in name since Hargeisa and Borame were the only ones who benefitted from the national radio services”.
He added that, “This means that the news of the government and the nation did not reach the rest of the country. There were many complaints that the Somaliland national forces were listening to various foreign radio stations, some of which are in the hands of Somaliland’s enemies. Today it is fortunate that Somaliland troops are listening to Radio Hargeisa”.
The Director of the Radio Department, Abdirisaaq Osman Mohamed, thanked the ministry officials for their efforts in expanding the reach Radio Hargeisa’s broadcasting.
A preliminary agreement with Somaliland giving landlocked Ethiopia access to the Gulf of Aden has heightened tensions in the Horn of Africa, a region already in turmoil. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts explain the implications of the controversial accord.
What happened?
Though Ethiopia has not publicly committed to recognising Somaliland as an independent state, many Somaliland officials … claim that it promised to do so.
So far, the preliminary accord’s details are opaque, with Ethiopian and Somaliland officials offering different accounts of its contents. First, Ethiopian officials have suggested that the new facility will have both military and commercial purposes. Yet Somaliland insists that Ethiopia will build only a naval base, continuing to use the Berbera port for trade. The size of the area under discussion is also unclear. While the two sides originally announced that Ethiopia would lease 20km of coastline, a top Ethiopian official later said the deal covers 20 sq km of land and sea. Even the facility’s location is vague. Some claim that it will be situated at Lugaya, close to the Djiboutian border. Others say it will be close to Berbera. By some accounts, the deal provides for Hargeisa to obtain shares in Ethiopian state-owned enterprises such as Ethiopian Airlines. Though Ethiopia has not publicly committed to recognising Somaliland as an independent state, many Somaliland officials, including President Muse Bihi, claim that it promised to do so under the accord. Given that Somaliland would be unlikely to move ahead with such an explosive initiative without extracting the prize of official recognition, it seems clear that the two signatories understand the memorandum as a port-for-recognition swap.
What happens from here is unclear, however, in no small part due to the practical and technical details that would need to be hammered out to move the deal forward. In the meantime, the news has sent shock waves through the Horn of Africa, reminiscent of those generated by Addis Ababa’s 2011 announcement that it would build a massive hydropower plant on the Blue Nile upstream from Egypt and Sudan. The project sparked a bitter dispute with Ethiopia’s regional rival Egypt that remains unresolved even after the mega-dam began filling in 2020. Many in Addis expressly compare the two episodes, claiming that the government will persevere with the port as it did with the dam. If Ethiopia begins constructing a coastal foothold while recognising Somaliland as an independent state, tensions among the various powers jockeying in the region will soar. With relations between Ethiopia and Somalia increasingly acrimonious, a flurry of diplomatic activity on both sides of the Red Sea suggests that regional divides are widening as other countries line up behind the two opponents.
What is the deal’s significance for Ethiopia and Somaliland?
Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy and Somaliland’s Bihi have presented the deal as a major win for their respective national goals: restoring sea access, on Ethiopia’s side, and gaining international recognition, on Somaliland’s.
With some 120 million people, Ethiopia is the world’s most populous landlocked nation, having lost its coastline when Eritrea seceded in 1993. Over the last two decades, successive administrations have stressed that the country is over-reliant on neighbouring Djibouti’s port, which handles the bulk of Ethiopian trade. But, before the January memorandum, the closest Ethiopia got to port ownership was a 2017 agreement with Somaliland under which Addis Ababa was to take a 19 per cent share in Berbera. The deal fell through, reportedly because Ethiopia failed to make timely payments.
[Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed] described regaining sea access as a matter of existential importance to a growing Ethiopia.
Abiy’s ascent as prime minister gave the aspiration to restore sea access a new push. He and his close-knit team of advisers have long signalled that he views sea access as part of the legacy he wants to leave the country. The prime minister has also made clear that he envisions Ethiopia as a future naval power. Strains between Ethiopia and Djibouti, partly due to Ethiopian complaints about Djibouti’s port fees and excessive red tape, may factor into Abiy’s calculus. In a speech televised on 13 October 2023 (but reportedly delivered months earlier), he described regaining sea access as a matter of existential importance to a growing Ethiopia. Many regional and outside officials took Abiy’s speech as an implicit threat to invade Eritrea and seize its southern port of Assab. Following quiet diplomatic entreaties, Abiy clarified that he was not envisaging military action.
For Somaliland, the memorandum of understanding is a political gamble that has energised its long quest for outside recognition. Since 1991, Somaliland has developed many trappings of a state, including a largely stable, functional administration and relations – both diplomatic and commercial – with foreign powers, including the U.S., UK and United Arab Emirates (UAE). In particular, the Emirati firm DP World is investing $442 million in Berbera port, aiming to make it into a regional trade and logistics hub. Meanwhile, Somalia continues to demand that Somaliland rejoin its federation, leading external partners that want the two to resolve their differences amicably to support off-and-on talks between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. The latest attempt at reviving these talks came just days before the memorandum, with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and President Bihi of Somaliland meeting in Djibouti on 28-29 December. Somaliland officials described the memorandum to Crisis Group partly as a response to Somalia’s uncompromising stance on the independence question, including at that meeting, and an expression of frustration with Somaliland’s unresolved status.
Additionally, the deal with Ethiopia is likely driven by Bihi’s desire to bolster his political standing at home. A long-running dispute over how to sequence elections likely weakened his chances for the presidential vote, which is now scheduled for November. He has also taken flak for a disastrous military failure in the Sool region, which Somaliland disputes with neighbouring Puntland. In February 2023, Hargeisa attempted – and failed – to quell an uprising by the Dhulbahante clan in Las Anod, Sool’s capital. The Dhubalhante belong to the Darod family, which is not part of Somaliland’s dominant Isaaq clan. The Dhulbahante prefer that the Sool area, in which they make up a majority, become a state in Somalia’s federation, rather than fall under Somaliland (or Puntland) jurisdiction. In August, after recurrent clashes, Somaliland forces retreated to positions about 100km west of Las Anod, and an uneasy calm settled in. Nonetheless, the front lines are heavily militarised, the two sides eyeing each other warily and expecting that fighting could resume at any moment.
What were the reactions in Somalia and beyond?
The announcement infuriated Somalia, which recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia and immediately declared blocking the accord a national priority. On 6 January, President Mohamud signed a parliamentary bill declaring the deal “null and void”, though this step was mostly rhetorical. Opposition to the deal spread quickly among the public as well, and government officials participated in a protest march in the Somali capital on 11 January. Mogadishu’s most hostile move so far came six days later, when it denied air traffic clearance to an Ethiopian Airlines flight carrying a high-level Ethiopian delegation to Hargeisa for discussions about the memorandum. (Mogadishu has almost no sway over what happens inside Somaliland, but it retains control of the skies.)
Somalia is angry about more than the idea that Ethiopia might recognise Somaliland’s independence. First, it accuses Addis Ababa of meddling in its internal affairs, initiating discussions about an affair of state with Hargeisa without even notifying Mogadishu in advance. (Ethiopia says it did inform Somalia that talks would take place, but Somali officials say Addis did not provide full details.) Secondly, while Somali officials say they do not object to Ethiopia using the Gulf of Aden coast – whether at Berbera or another port along the Somali cost – for commercial purposes, they draw a red line at an Ethiopian military installation on what they consider Somali soil. Thirdly, and relatedly, the initiative feeds centuries-old Somali suspicions that Ethiopia is eyeing Somali-inhabited lands. This last sentiment is deepened by the fact that Mogadishu is not sure what is in the memorandum, given the conflicting reports about its contents.
Mogadishu has focused on galvanising its allies and international organisations to help persuade Ethiopia to renege on the January memorandum.
But despite the torrent of condemnatory statements, the Somali government has thus far acted cautiously vis-à-vis Ethiopia. It has refrained from cutting political or economic ties with Addis or from undertaking military preparations. Its approach probably reflects the asymmetry in its overall relations with Ethiopia, which has sent thousands of troops to fight Al-Shabaab, both as part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and as a separate contingent. Instead, Mogadishu has focused on galvanising its allies and international organisations to help persuade Ethiopia to renege on the January memorandum. It has been able to convene emergency summits and meetings of the League of Arab States, the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a Horn of Africa body, and the UN Security Council. (Lacking outside recognition, Somaliland is excluded from all these organisations.)
International reactions have largely favoured Somalia’s argument that the deal runs counter to principles of preserving territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. In the immediate vicinity, Abiy’s push for sea access has unsettled neighbours Djibouti and Eritrea, which both seem to have sided with Mogadishu. Although Eritrea’s government has been quiet about the deal, President Isaias Afwerki invited Somalia’s President Mohamud to Asmara. Mohamud’s press office said “profound talks” were held “while refraining from a reactive posture to various provocative agendas”. Djibouti, which is friendly with Somaliland despite competing with it commercially, has come out strongly against the January memorandum. Djibouti has taken on significant Chinese debt to improve a road connecting its port to Ethiopia, assuming that a large volume of trade would continue to transit, and stands to lose significant revenue from port fees if the deal holds up. Additionally, Bihi signed the memorandum shortly after Djibouti President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh tried to mediate between Somaliland and Somalia, which likely came as an insult.
Farther afield, Egypt has perhaps been most active in capitalising on the dispute, doubtless due to Cairo’s longstanding rivalry with Addis Ababa. On 20 January, Egyptian President Abdelfattah al-Sisi invited President Mohamud to Cairo, pledging to defend Somalia if asked. Traditional partners like the European Union and the U.S. have expressed strong support for Somalia. Other powers closer to the Horn of Africa, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the UAE, have publicly backed Mogadishu but likely seek to balance their relations in the region. The UAE appears to be in a particularly awkward position, given its majority stake in Berbera port, its strong security partnership with Mogadishu and its warm relations with Addis Ababa. Somali officials complain quietly that they see the Emirates playing a role in the deal, given Emirati leaders’ proximity to Abiy, although foreign diplomats are less certain.
Mogadishu has thus far refused to enter bilateral talks with Addis.
The AU has urged its high representative to the Horn, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, to foster dialogue between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. But early indications are that Obasanjo is struggling to make headway, with Somalia reluctant to engage him. Mogadishu has thus far refused to enter bilateral talks with Addis: Abiy reportedly tried to speak with President Mohamud, but Mogadishu insists that Addis pull out of the memorandum before the two leaders meet face to face.
Indeed, hopes that the two leaders would talk on the sidelines of the annual AU summit in Addis Ababa on 17-18 February quickly evaporated. Mohamud claimed that Ethiopian authorities tried to prevent him from leaving his hotel to drive to AU headquarters. Ethiopia blamed the incident on the Somali delegation, saying it refused the Ethiopian security team assigned to it under AU protocols. Authorities also alleged that Somali security personnel tried to enter the AU building’s premises carrying firearms without prior notification.
Kenya seems to be taking a lead within the regional bloc IGAD to mediate. Abiy and Mohamud met separately with Kenyan President William Ruto in Nairobi, on 28 and 29 February, respectively, but there was no significant breakthrough, although some reports suggest a quiet agreement to de-escalate. Ethiopia and Kenya released a joint statement pledging to respect the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of states” but without naming Somalia.
What are the dangers of further escalation?
The agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland could spell further friction in an already troubled Horn of Africa. Even if the deal collapses, the question of sea access for Ethiopia will remain a divisive issue that is likely to resurface soon. Abiy is bent on restoring it, and he has a penchant for unilateral action. Although the prospect of more armed conflict as a result of the January memorandum seems low, given that both Ethiopia and Somalia seem to be keeping their differences in the diplomatic and political arena, that could change if Addis Ababa and Hargeisa move quickly to the deal’s next stage.
Another major concern is that the feud could become the latest front for proxy shadowboxing in the Horn of Africa, echoing previous bouts of competition among Gulf powers in the region. The deal could drive a wedge between two emerging blocs – on one hand, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and their allies, including Eritrea and Djibouti, all of which are situated on the Red Sea; and the UAE, Ethiopia and their allies, on the other. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Eritrea share a desire to prevent other powers from encroaching on the Red Sea, while Djibouti has drifted closer to Saudi Arabia since it fell out with the UAE and seized control of a container terminal operated and jointly owned by DP World. These blocs are already at odds over the Sudan war, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Eritrea favouring the Sudanese army on one side and the UAE backing the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces on the other. Recent developments – Egypt’s vocal support for Somalia, the pomp attending the announcement of a surge of Saudi aid to Somalia, and a series of meetings between Djibouti and Saudi Arabia – suggest that the parties are indeed positioning themselves along these lines.
A breakdown in relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu could threaten their close cooperation in fighting the [Al-Shabaab] insurgents.
Al-Shabaab is another concern. A breakdown in relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu could threaten their close cooperation in fighting the insurgents. Should Addis use its troops as a bargaining chip or Mogadishu expel them to spite Ethiopia, a security vacuum would emerge that Al-Shabaab could exploit. The insurgents would then pose a greater danger not only to Somalia but also to Ethiopia and other countries in the region. Even the threat of such measures could prove destabilising, given that ATMIS is slated to draw down by the end of 2024 and talks with the AU about a follow-on mission are still under way.
Al-Shabaab may also benefit from the nationalist backlash to the memorandum in Somalia. It has portrayed itself as the only actor capable of rolling back Ethiopian ambitions in Somali territory, depicting the Somali federal government as too weak to stand up to outsiders trying to manipulate it. Al-Shabaab will undoubtedly attempt to win new recruits based on this narrative, something it has done in the past, particularly following Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion of Somalia to depose the Islamic Courts Union, an Islamist outfit that had seized power in Mogadishu.
What should be done?
Ethiopia, Somaliland and Somalia should strive to de-escalate tensions. Despite aggressive rhetoric, all three parties have so far avoided rash decisions. They should continue to show restraint. All the external actors trying to mediate, including IGAD and the AU, should make sure to coordinate efforts so that they do not work at cross-purposes. As a first step, regional and other actors with influence should work toward a conciliatory step from Ethiopia that could pave the way for direct talks. For instance, Ethiopia could issue a clear statement acknowledging its respect for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Meanwhile, despite the stance taken by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, now is the best time for Mogadishu to engage, because the memorandum is a preliminary accord whose formal contractual obligations still need to be negotiated. A failure to talk now could result in a missed opportunity before the deal gets fleshed out. Given Somalia’s preference for multilateral engagement, the two heads of state can meet in the company of fellow IGAD heads of state, such as Ruto and current IGAD chair Guelleh.
For Addis Ababa, the moment is likewise opportune: its economy is in deep distress and relations with many neighbours are deteriorating. Pushing ahead with the deal amid such stiff regional opposition would carry major risks. Outside actors should encourage the parties to engage in such discussions rather than use the dispute to further their own interests.
Mogadishu and Hargeisa will … need to resume direct dialogue.
Mogadishu and Hargeisa will also need to resume direct dialogue, since no other path to resolving Somaliland’s limbo status is apparent and since spiralling tensions risk harming both. Such talks look unlikely until the present crisis dies down.
The memorandum of understanding has brought two of the Horn’s enduring questions to the fore: Ethiopia’s long-held desire for sea access and Somaliland’s uncertain status. Dealing with both simultaneously will be tricky indeed, especially given the regional and geopolitical posturing at play. The priority today must be to prevent further escalation of the crisis. Still, regional diplomats should ensure that addressing these core disputes in a manner that all can live with and benefit from remains firmly on their agenda. Failure to do so means that the disputes will inevitably resurface down the road, as will the tensions that come with them.
The 11th African Islamic Finance Summit was successfully organized by AlHuda Centre of Islamic Banking and Economics (CIBE) in association with the Central Bank of Somaliland and the National Insurance Authority (NIA) in Hargeisa, Somaliland.
The event attracted a diverse audience of industry leaders, scholars, and practitioners from across Africa and the globe. This monumental occasion was made possible through the collaborative efforts of esteemed sponsors, Amanah Insurance and International Turnkey System (ITS), along with the unwavering support of the Somaliland Banker’s Association (SLBA), Egyptian Islamic Finance Association, and Islamic Finance Research Institute.
The primary aim of the Summit was to facilitate dialogue, exchange of ideas, and explore avenues for the advancement of Islamic finance across the African continent. The event discussions centered on key topics such as Islamic Banking, Islamic Fintech, Regulations & Shariah Governance, Challenges and Investment Opportunities for the Islamic Finance Industry, Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Product Innovation, and the Development of Islamic Microfinance in Africa.
Delegates engaged in insightful discussions, strategic dialogues, and knowledge-sharing sessions aimed at advancing the Islamic finance landscape on the African continent. The Summit was followed by a two-day post-event workshop designed to provide participants with in-depth knowledge and practical skills in Islamic finance.
The summit featured distinguished speakers, including Mr. Khalif Omer Nour, CEO of Somaliland Banking Association, Dr. Mufti Muhammad Zubair Usmani, Chairman Sharia Board at Habib Bank Limited – Pakistan, and Miss Heba Abdel Aziz Mohamed, Pre-Sales Manager at International Turnkey Systems – Egypt, Mr. Samuel Oumkoko, CEO and Founder, Metropol Credit Reference Bureau Limited – Kenya, Mr. Asseged Gebremedhin, Chief Executive Officer, Insurance Brokerage & Consulting Firm – Ethiopia and among others
Thursday, March 7 2024-In Somaliland, IDLO works to expand and improve access to justice through physical and mobile Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Centres. The ADR Centres use community-run customary and informal justice mechanisms to resolve civil disputes and minor offenses, while referring more complex or criminal cases to formal courts.
In Somaliland, through a project funded by the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and implemented by IDLO, the support to the customary and informal justice mechanisms takes an approach known as Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA).
In a new product, Strengthening the social contract through access to justice in Somaliland: Reflections from applying the Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation approach, we break down this approach and reflect on how it’s helping IDLO to identify and address challenges for both actors and users of CIJ mechanisms in Somaliland.
The Supreme Court of Somaliland has overturned certain sections of the electoral law following a petition by the nation’s President, Muse Bihi Abdi. The legal action modified specific clauses within the electoral legislation.
The judicial body concurred with the president’s plea to void two segments of the electoral law, which he argued were not aligned with the Somaliland constitution.
The invalidated clause stipulated that any organization achieving 20% of the votes in all regions and an equal share of the general ballot would trigger a parliamentary division. The court, aligning with the president, maintained that the elected parliamentary councils lacked the authority to assess the legitimacy of the representatives chosen by the populace.
Additionally, the court ratified the electoral law. According to recent statements by the president, the legislation is finalized, and election preparations are currently in progress. Presidential elections are scheduled to be held in Somaliland on November 13, 2024
Turkey and Somalia signed an energy exploration and drilling deal on Thursday, further strengthening bilateral ties after concluding a defence agreement last month.
The deal targets hydrocarbon reserves in its exclusive economic zone, which hasn’t been developed since the collapse of the Somali government in the early 1990s. It also includes land exploration.
The agreement was signed by Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar and Somali Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed in Istanbul.
The move came after Ethiopia signed an agreement in January that grants it naval and commercial access to ports along Somaliland’s coast, in exchange for recognition of the breakaways region’s independence.
In response, Ankara signed a comprehensive naval defence deal with Somalia last month, which Mogadishu says mandates Turkey to defend Somali sea waters against terrorism, piracy and any external threat that could violate Somali state rights for the next 10 years.
The “historic” deal also reportedly empowers Turkey to develop Somalia’s maritime resources in its exclusive economic zone.
The Turkish Navy has already operated off the shore of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden under a UN mission to combat piracy and armed robbery since 2009.
Turkey has years of experience in offshore energy exploration since it discovered gas in 2020 in the Black Sea. Ankara is now developing the gas and pumping it to its local network for domestic consumption.
US government reports indicate Somalia may have at least 30bn barrels of oil and gas reserves, but it requires investment that could take three to five years.
In 2022, the Somali government signed an exploration deal with US-based Coastline Exploration for seven offshore blocks. Drilling is planned to start in 2025.
Somaliland, the northern autonomous breakaway region with no international recognition, also signed an oil exploration deal with the London-based Genel Energy in 2022. The drilling, in an area potentially containing 5bn barrels of oil, is set to start later this year.
Mogadishu views the deal as illegitimate and considers it null and void.
Challenges and costs
The Turkey-Somalia deal would require extensive efforts on the Turkish side to drill and develop resources, according to a Turkish energy expert.
“Turkey signed a similar land and offshore exploration deal with Libya in 2022 but the progress has been non-existent,” said the expert, who did not wish to be named to freely express his opinion.
“Turkey’s exploration and drilling ships are largely slated for the Black Sea blocks, but Ankara could deploy Turkish petroleum drillship Abdulhamit to Somalia if it wants.”
The expert assessed that Turkey would have to spend up to half a billion dollars to conclude an exploration and successful drilling operation in Somali waters and further development of gas or oil would cost at least a few billion dollars.
It is not clear whether Turkey would look for private or public partnerships to finance the projects.
“The West is increasingly targeting green energy and working on hydrocarbons is becoming more and more inefficient as funding is scarce,” the expert said. “Somalia would appear as insecure to many companies, but Turkish naval presence and military assistance against terrorism may ensure some interest.”
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government has invested a significant amount of money into Somalia since 2011, establishing the largest Turkish embassy in the world in Mogadishu and extending more than $1bn in humanitarian aid to the country in response to a deadly drought.
Turkey now has a large military base in Mogadishu, and Turkish firms operate the city’s airport and port. It is estimated that Turkey has trained more than 16,000 Somali soldiers, an equivalent of one-third of the military, both on Turkish soil and in its Mogadishu base, known as Turksom.
Mr. Abdiqadir Aw Ali Firdhiye, the leader of SSC Khatumo, warned Somaliland, cautioning against any potential invasion of SSC-Khatumo areas. Addressing the residents of Lasanood at the Abdi Bille Abdi football stadium, Firdhiye urged vigilance and readiness for defense in the face of purported plans by Somaliland for military action.
Addressing crowds in Las Anod town on Thursday, the leader stated that his administration had received reports indicating that Ethiopian troops were being deployed to the SSC areas to support Somaliland troops.
Expressing defiance against the alleged aggression, Firdhiye emphasized the resolve of SSC Khatumo, asserting, “We know what President Muse Bihi is orchestrating and hell defiantly lose..” He urged President Muse Bihi Abdi and the people of Somaliland to exercise wisdom and refrain from instigating conflict.
Mr. Firdhiye instructed his troops to remain on high alert and prepared for any incursion from Somaliland.
SSC Khatumo’s traditional leaders have in recent days issued conflicting reports of an imminent attack by Somaliland forces, prompting heightened concerns among the populace in Las Anod.
Solar Mamas initiative trains rural women as technicians and provides the tools and support necessary to start up small-scale ventures in their own villages
Dubai, 6, March 2024-DP World has launched a new collaboration with Barefoot College International (BCI), aimed at empowering rural women in Somaliland.
Through the expansion of the Solar Mamas programme, DP World and BCI are committed to providing access to clean energy and economic opportunities for women in underserved communities.
Globally, around 1 billion people lack access to electricity, with many development solutions relying on complicated technologies that are inaccessible to rural populations and difficult to maintain. Recognising this challenge, the Solar Mamas initiative works at the grassroots level to empower women with practical skills that transcend language and literacy barriers, enabling them to install and maintain solar power systems in their own villages.
In collaboration with their local communities and BCI, DP World selected 10 women from Berbera and Hargeisa to participate in a 3-month training course at BCI’s training centre in Zanzibar. During the programme, the women will learn essential skills in solar engineering and entrepreneurship, equipping them with the knowledge and tools needed to start up their own small-scale ventures in their communities.
Of the first cohort, six are from Berbera, where DP World operates the Berbera port and Berbera Economic Zone. Another four come from underprivileged areas of the capital Hargeisa. The Somaliland programme builds on the success of the Solar Mamas in Senegal, which saw its first batch of graduates in 2022. The original 19 Solar Mamas from Senegal are now well on their way to transforming their own communities by electrifying 952 homes already.
Daba Cissokho is one of the Senegal programmes’ graduates. Hailing from Kedougou in south-eastern Senegal, nearly 750km from the capital, the 42-year-old single mother of three used to run a stand in the local vegetables market to support her extended family. She speaks with pride of her new skills.
“Daba before and after the training is not the same person. I have a profession for which people will reach out to me. I am a solar engineer,” said Daba. “Women should not be scared to try or explore new things. We have so many options to improve our lives if we try”, added Fatumata Ladji Dialo, another graduate.
Maha AlQattan, Chief Sustainability Officer at DP World, emphasised the company’s commitment to women’s education and empowerment: “Our investment in the Solar Mamas initiative has been a resounding success, and we are thrilled to expand this program into Somaliland. By harnessing the potential of women in solar engineering and entrepreneurship, we’re not just lighting up homes; we’re igniting the engines of community growth and resilience.”
Rodrigo Paris, CEO of Barefoot College International added: “We are incredibly fortunate to have found a partner as committed to our core values as DP World. Their support has changed the lives of marginalized women and dramatically improved living standards in their communities. Together, we are driving positive change for generations to come.”
As International Women’s Day approaches, DP World urges stakeholders to support initiatives that empower women and accelerate progress towards gender equality. For more information about the Solar Mamas in Senegal and DP World’s sustainability strategy, click here.
The chairman of the UCID opposition party, Eng. Faisal Ali Warabe, has strongly condemned a report issued by the Heritage Institute in Somalia which has proved their animociousness and hostility towards the people and the cause of the Republic of Somaliland.
Chairman Faysal Ali Warabe criticized the report of the institution on the memorandum of understanding signed by Somaliland and Ethiopia as being financed by the enemy of Somaliland.
“It’s not a political report. It’s a harshly written by criminals who have been tribal leaders and financed by the enemies of the Republic of Somaliland and the political leaders of the failed country of Somalia,” said Eng. Faisal Ali Warabe said in a message he posted on his Twitter account.
Governor Faysal added that the resolve and aspirations of Somaliland people will not be undermined by the mere hostile report issued by the Mogadishu Heritage Institute in any way hence have portrayed and laid bare their chagrin to bitterness of having the Ethiopian government officially recognize Somaliland.
