Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and the chairman of the Waddani Party, Abdulrahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro, discussed the upcoming elections, focusing on ensuring peaceful competition and defending the existence of the breakaway Somaliland region.
The former President of Somaliland, Dahir Riyale Kaahin, organized Wednesday’s meeting, which also addressed the political discord between the opposition Waddani Party and President Bihi, who also leads the ruling party of Somaliland.
According to a press release from the presidential office, both parties agreed to unite against threats to Somaliland, emphasizing the importance of conducting the election campaign peacefully and accepting the election results. They also decided to hold further meetings within the next three days to discuss these implementation points further.
President Muse Bihi expressed gratitude to former President Dahir Rayale Kaahin for facilitating the meeting and promoting the common interests of Somaliland.
Two weeks before the meeting, President Bihi signed two amended electoral laws: the Electoral and Voter Registration Law (number 91/2023) and the Regulation of Organizations and Political Parties Law (number 14/2023). Following this, the chairman of Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) informed local media that the commission is fully prepared for the dual elections scheduled for November 13, 2024.
Humanitarian organizations have long relied on contingency plans to deliver prompt and efficient assistance to those in need. Traditionally, contingency plans identify potential disaster scenarios and outline response measures. However, the emergence of anticipatory action has sparked discussions about how to integrate proactive measures into these plans, thereby expanding their scope across the disaster risk management continuum – to act before, during and after a crisis.
Recognizing the importance of this, the Somali Red Crescent Society recently took steps towards multi-hazard contingency planning. Supported by the German Red Cross and the Finnish Red Cross, it organized a four-day workshop involving around 30 participants from its various departments. The aim was to develop a comprehensive contingency plan that integrated anticipatory action, while addressing the challenges inherent in this humanitarian approach.
The process
The workshop participants followed a four-stage process to establish the contingency plan.
1. Hazard and risk analysis: understanding the landscape
The first step was to conduct a comprehensive assessment of potential hazards within its operating environment, which encompass both natural and human-caused threats. Building on insights from previous exercises, such as the process of developing the Early Action Protocol (EAP) for Drought, the participants identified several hazards, including floods, drought, epidemics and desert locusts.
Rather than focusing solely on past occurrences, the Somali Red Crescent Society embraced a forward-thinking approach by anticipating future crisis scenarios. Through scenario-building exercises, the participants developed trigger thresholds to indicate the onset of these hazards. These triggers, based on a combination of numerical forecasts and qualitative observations, will enable it to predict the magnitude and severity of these potential hazards.
3. Strategy development: mitigating risks and impacts
Building upon the identified scenarios, the participants formulated a strategy to address risks and impacts across the disaster risk management continuum. This delineated the scale of potential mitigation operations, the target populations and focus regions, and the sectors for intervention, along with expected timelines for these actions.
4. Operational planning: implementing the actions
Operational planning translated this strategy into actionable steps, encompassing activities spanning anticipatory action through to response and early recovery. Anticipatory actions, which aim to prevent or mitigate the immediate impacts of crises, were integrated seamlessly within the planned response and recovery efforts.
Challenges and lessons
Despite the potential benefits of integrating anticipatory action into contingency plans, the Somali Red Crescent Society encountered several challenges with this process.
1. Scope: balancing breadth and specificity
A contingency plan is usually quite broad in scope and covers a range of actions, from preparedness to early recovery. By contrast, anticipatory actions focus on a particular node within the disaster risk management continuum; this means that the actions are much more specific than those usually articulated in a contingency plan.
One of the challenges in integrating anticipatory actions into contingency plans is striking a balance between the breadth of actions needed across the continuum, and the specificity needed for anticipatory actions. To address this, existing EAPs and other anticipatory action frameworks – which contain details such as the triggers to be used and the actions to be carried out – can be added as annexes to contingency plans (much like for standard operating procedures).
2. Preparedness versus anticipatory action: clarifying the distinctions
During the workshop, the distinction between preparedness and anticipatory action was particularly challenging for epidemics, where there was a lot of overlap; for example, hygiene promotion and awareness-raising activities are done regardless of whether trigger thresholds are reached or not. The purpose of a contingency plan is to ensure that the various actions follow seamlessly, including between the preparedness to anticipatory action phases.
For actions such as hygiene promotion, risk communication and the establishment of mobile clinics, the targeting and intensity of the actions appeared to be more focused and heightened in the anticipatory action phase (e.g., targeted communication and intensified hygiene promotion) – but these activities are also part of epidemic preparedness. This indicates a gap that warrants further research, which the Working Group on Anticipatory Action and Health could take up.
Developing clear triggers for activating a contingency plan proved to be a technical and resource-intensive endeavour. The Somali Red Crescent Society opted for simplified triggers based on qualitative and quantitative data, which will facilitate prompt action in the face of impending crises. For hazards such as drought and floods, it adopted triggers from existing frameworks, such as the EAP for Drought and the Anticipatory Action Plan for Flooding.
4. Resource allocation in a multi-hazard context
Resource constraints pose a significant hurdle, with many organizations prioritizing disaster response over anticipatory action. To address this, the Somali Red Crescent Society will use its contingency plan as a tool to mobilize resources and advocate for anticipatory action, while also exploring a layered approach (e.g. a blend of different financial instruments) and existing funding mechanisms such as the IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund.
Conclusions
The process of integrating anticipatory action into contingency plans has many challenges, yet it holds immense promise for enhancing humanitarian preparedness. Through initiatives such as the multi-hazard contingency plan developed by the Somali Red Crescent Society, organizations can proactively mitigate risks, safeguard vulnerable populations, and build more resilient communities in the face of uncertainty. As the humanitarian landscape continues to evolve, embracing innovative approaches such as this will be essential in shaping more effective disaster-response strategies for the future.
There is a strong and unwavering commitment from both Somaliland and Ethiopia to sterilise this deal
The Technical Committee overseeing the agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia reached a significant milestone today as it engaged in discussions with key figures from the opposition parties WADDANI and UCID and the parliament standing committee. In a series of meetings, the committee, along with the candidates and leaders of the opposition parties, elucidated their stance on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and the Federal Government of Ethiopia.
There is a strong and unwavering commitment from both Somaliland and #Ethiopia to sterilise this deal. In addition to these pivotal engagements, the Technical Committee has been actively soliciting input from various sectors of Somaliland’s society and stakeholders. By incorporating diverse perspectives, the committee aims to ensure that the forthcoming agreement reflects the interests and concerns of all parties involved.
The MoU agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia is now approaching its final stages of negotiation. With discussions progressing steadily, stakeholders anticipate that the agreement will be formally concluded in the coming weeks, marking a significant stride in bilateral relations between the two nations.
Somaliland has committed to implementing the sea access agreement it signed with Ethiopia recently, according to Mohamed Hussien Jama Rambo, a member of Somaliland’s parliament.
During an exclusive interview with The Ethiopian Herald, the MP criticized external intervention and stated that Hargeisa would not give in to any pressure. “We have faced pressure from entities that do not appreciate our development. Nevertheless, we resist these pressures and demonstrate our resilience. We honor agreements and Somaliland will not succumb to any pressure,” he added.
Regarding the Arab League’s comments on the agreement, he said that the agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia does not concern the Arab League and they should not waste their time on such matters. He also mentioned that although Somalia had objected to Somaliland’s agreements with DP World and the U.S., their objection did not work and did not affect the implementation of these deals.
When asked about the reaction of the Somaliland public, he stated that the people of Somaliland are pleased with the agreement. They welcomed it and expressed their happiness. Somalilanders are prepared for business and are committed to working closely with their neighbors to ensure integration, as stated in the constitution.
Access to the seaport in exchange for official recognition of its existence. This is the essence of the trade deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia. The German newspaper “Süddeutsche Zeitung” reports from this country, which has maintained de facto independence since 1991 and is trying to assert its identity in relation to Somalia, risking another crisis in the unstable Horn of Africa.
By Getachew Melaku
Ali Aden Naleye, 62, is ready for the day ahead. He woke up at 4 a.m. to pray, then headed to the port of Berbera to handle a container’s arrival, manage the formalities, and oversee cargo loading onto a truck. This particular container, originating from Turkey, contained all the furnishings required for ten houses. Ali Aden Naleye would appreciate having a bit more to do—more work to occupy his time. Some weeks, there’s enough to keep him busy every day, while other weeks, there’s nothing at all. Now, in the early afternoon, with the oppressive heat bearing down, it’s time for Naleye’s afternoon nap. At 62 years old, he struggles to adjust to the brevity of the nights.
Ali Aden Naleye has a strong feeling that those days are behind him. After all, there’s this recent agreement that Somaliland has concluded with Ethiopia. That’s what everyone is talking about at the transport company. Naleye is convinced that the deal will ignite a boom in Berbera, Somaliland’s second-largest city, and will significantly bolster his company’s business.
Ali Aden Naleye, a dock worker from Berbera.
A boom. But that’s not all he’s certain about: this agreement will ultimately transform Somaliland, the nation for which he fought and was wounded, into what it could have been long ago if the world were fair: an independent state.
“Definitely,” says Naleye with conviction.
Somaliland, a rising star in East Africa with 5 million inhabitants situated in the Gulf of Aden and slightly smaller than Italy, is not internationally recognised as an independent state. It seceded from Somalia in 1991 following a devastating civil war. Since then, it has been governing itself – and remarkably successfully at that.
Somaliland may be impoverished, but it stands out as the most stable, secure, and peaceful entity in the Horn of Africa—especially when compared to the “failed state” of Somalia. It has achieved this without external assistance, which is typically reserved for recognized states. In the eyes of the international community, Somaliland is still viewed as part of Somalia rather than a distinct state.
Somaliland has won in the struggle for independence, yet for 33 years, it has been losing the battle to gain international recognition. However, a significant development occurred on New Year’s Day when the small nation signed an agreement with its larger neighbor, Ethiopia, causing ripples across the Horn of Africa. The exact wording of the deal has not been made public. Still, according to Somaliland’s version, it fulfills the lofty aspirations of both parties.
And Somaliland—arguably the most independent dependent country in the world—could potentially receive official recognition from Ethiopia.
Somaliland’s government is touting the deal as a historic triumph, citing its potential to strengthen economic ties and facilitate expanded Ethiopian trade via Berbera. Nevertheless, the agreement could also be a historic mistake, as Ethiopia’s commitment to recognizing Somaliland appears less resolute than desired by Somaliland.
On the other hand, the purported win-win deal created two disgruntled parties: Somalia, which talks of aggression and rallies its allies and residents along the coast of Somaliland where the Ethiopian flag could soon fly.
Somaliland was indeed a state, albeit briefly, for five days. On June 26, 1960, it attained independence from Great Britain and was recognized by more than 30 states. However, on July 1, Somalia gained independence from Italy, and the two territories merged. The resulting state adopted the name of the southern part—of Somalia—and its capital, Mogadishu.
This historical sequence holds particular significance for the inhabitants of Somaliland: It is Somalia that has joined Somaliland, not the other way around.
“We were deceived,” sighs Ali Aden Naleye in a café in Berbera. The people in the North desired a state for all Somalis—but what they received was one in which the South dictated everything. “Whether you wished to study, obtain a passport, or travel by air—it all had to be done in Mogadishu,” Naleye laments. Although he was not yet born in 1960, Ali Aden Naleye witnessed the dream of unity for Somaliland crumble into a nightmare under the rule of the dictatorship of Siad Barre, who served as president of Somalia between 1969 and 1991.
“Those belonging to the Isaaq clan, which is by far the largest in Somaliland, could simply be shot in the street,” he says.
Naleye’s brother joined the resistance against Barre in the early 1980s—and perished fighting the army. It was then that Naleye resolved to go underground and join the fight himself. At the time, he was in his mid-twenties and a father of two children. He was present when the rebels marched across the border from Ethiopia.
He was there when they conquered Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. When they sought shelter from the air bombardment. He was there when they encircled the port city of Berbera, the last bastion of the army, and witnessed from the beach how the commanders fled on ships towards Yemen. “We were a small militia against an entire army,” says Ali Aden Naleye. “But we knew the country. And we knew what we were fighting for.”
In 1991, after ten years of war, the rebels emerged victorious, but the country lay in ruins. Hargeisa resembled “Gaza today,” says Naleye. He still cannot comprehend how planes bearing the Somali flag on their wings—a white star against a blue background—bombed Somali cities into rubble. Today, they have placed one of those planes, a Somali Air Force Mig jet, on a stand in the center of Hargeisa as a reminder of what they endured and who inflicted it upon them.
The relative peace and safety enjoyed by Somaliland since then, unlike Somalia, is often credited to a council that commenced in April 1991 in the city of Burao. Clan chiefs convened to deliberate on a way forward and explore methods of conflict resolution without resorting to violence. On May 18, the council culminated in the Declaration of Independence.
Since then, Somaliland has been engaged in rebuilding efforts, supported by development aid and foreign investment. However, poverty remains widespread, alongside stark inequalities. In Hargeisa, beggars hold out cardboard signs with a phone number, hoping for donations through the widely used mobile phone payment system, as cash is scarce. In Berbera, paved roads are scarce, yet the port thrives with millions from Abu Dhabi.
Ali Aden Naleye says that the port’s activities have flourished for quite some time. Containers filled with furniture from Turkey, rickshaws from India, and pipes from China arrived regularly. However, he observes that they have now reached a limit, with growth stagnating. Naleye believes that Somaliland has reached its limits as a state unrecognized by the world—neither excluded nor integrated. But now, thanks to Ethiopia, opportunities are emerging.
Somaliland has all the trappings of a country: a populace, territory, anthem, political system, and independence. However, unlike an association, a state cannot be established merely by the agreement of seven adults on statutes, a president, and a name. Statehood is conferred when other states recognize it as such. Only then can a secessionist region potentially gain membership in the United Nations—similar to recent cases such as East Timor, South Sudan, or Montenegro.
Is Somaliland soon? The government is absolutely convinced—now that the first step has been taken,” says Rhoda Elmi, the deputy foreign minister. “We have been fighting for this recognition for thirty-three years, and that’s just the beginning.”
Instead of a meeting at the ministry, Elmi suggested lunch at a hotel in Hargeisa. With the Foreign Minister away on a trip—to Ethiopia, of course—she stepped in. Arriving almost punctually and alone, without a bodyguard or press officer, she ordered mango lassi and chicken skewers. Her headscarf was pink, her fingernails painted black—except for those of her middle fingers, which were purple.
Rhoda Elmi, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somaliland
Rhoda Elmi, like many others here, was a child of the diaspora. She grew up in Sweden, where her father had sought refuge. In Gothenburg, she studied pharmacy and was involved in local politics for the Liberal Party. In 2013, she founded a distribution company in Hargeisa for medicines and hygiene products that she imported from Sweden.
A year later, she had been appointed ambassador to Sweden. She spent five years knocking on doors in Stockholm and Brussels, says Elmi, and only to receive the same response: If you seek our recognition of your country, you have to start in Africa. “That’s exactly what we’re doing right now,” she asserts.
Elmi does not disclose the specifics of what her government has negotiated with Ethiopia. But she dispels certain rumors, including the claims that Ethiopia would purchase the twenty-kilometer coastal strip in Somaliland or that Ethiopia would construct its own port, thereby competing with the port in Berbera. “None of this is true,” she asserts.
Ethiopia will be able to conduct its import and export activities through the port of Berbera and lease the coastal area for fifty years to build a naval base there. In return, Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state. Rhoda Elmi has indeed noted that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has not presented this as fact in his appearances so far but as an option to be examined in an undefined future. However, she adds coldly, that does not contradict the information she has.
The fact that Ethiopia requires and will secure access to the sea, one way or another, was a point Abiy Ahmed had emphasized before January 1, leading to widespread fear of conflict in the Horn of Africa—particularly in Eritrea, which had seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, taking its entire coastline. The entire region is aware of what he is capable of since he deployed his army against the Tigray region in 2020. Therefore, Abiy has found a method to secure access to the sea without resorting to violence, though not necessarily peacefully.
US Aid supplies being loaded at the port of Berbera.
The agreement with Somaliland has been viewed unfavorably in Djibouti, which has been Ethiopia’s primary trade conduit. Additionally, the government in Somalia considers it “outrageous” and “unauthorised”. According to international law, it is their territory that Somaliland aims to lease to a foreign power.
Mogadishu protested and announced that it would defend its sovereignty by all means available, including going to war to stop Ethiopia from building a port in Somaliland. Somalia garnered support from the UN, the United States, the African Union, the European Union, Eritrea, and Egypt. Despite facing significant opposition, Rhoda Elmi remains unfazed. “That shows that we’ve set something in motion,” she asserts.
Somaliland has no reason to fear an invasion by Somalia, as the Somali army is already preoccupied with its struggle against the al-Qaeda-linked militant groups and pirates. “Somalia doesn’t even have full control over its territory,” remarks Rhoda Elmi, almost cynically.
Getachew Melaku is a writer and translator based in Addis Ababa.
Washington Institute
Ido Levy
Tuesday March 19, 2024
The United Arab Emirates recently began reducing its funding for several Somali National Army (SNA) brigades, likely due to frustration with increasing Turkish and ongoing Qatari activities in the country. The particular trigger appears to have been a bilateral defense agreement committing Turkey to expand its military support to the SNA, initiate assistance to the Somali navy, and help patrol the country’s coastline—a deal the UAE itself likely coveted. Moreover, Qatar has continued providing substantial financial and military support to the Somali government, funding the UAE itself hoped to supplant in tandem with its ultimately increased support for the SNA.
The Turkey-Somalia agreement follows a major January deal allowing Ethiopia to operate for commercial and military purposes the UAE-refurbished port of Berbera, in the breakaway Somaliland region. This transaction alarmed Mogadishu, which disputes the independence of Somaliland. Although no UN member state currently recognizes the territory’s independence, Ethiopia has indicated it would break this barrier in exchange for the port arrangement. The Somali government warned it was “ready for a war” to prevent such an outcome, and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud subsequently shuttled to Eritrea, Egypt, and Qatar to garner diplomatic support for his cause.
Yet the reduction came as a surprise amid renewed Emirati military support for Somali federal forces after the return to power of Hassan Sheikh, who has maintained close ties with the UAE. Since August 2022, his government has waged a large-scale military offensive against al-Qaeda–affiliated jihadist group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahedin (al-Shabab), which controls swaths of southern and central Somalia. Spearheaded by the elite U.S.-trained Danab Brigade, with American and Turkish air support, the government liberated significant territory in the country’s south and center. In mid-2023, in the run-up to an anticipated phase two of the campaign, UAE-funded SNA forces proved to be an asset in the fight against al-Shabab.
That SNA phase two, however, has yet to actually be launched, for reasons including an inability to hold recently liberated territories and field sufficient forces. The drawdown of forces from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), numbering 15,000 and scheduled to depart entirely by the end of 2024, makes the problem all the more urgent. Since 2007, ATMIS and its predecessor, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), have played an indispensable role in recapturing Mogadishu, Kismayo, and other major population centers from al-Shabab and holding them. UAE-funded forces have demonstrated promise as replacements for departing ATMIS troops.
Growing UAE Military Involvement in Somalia
Emirati involvement in the decades-long Somali civil war stretches back to 1993–94, when the UAE contributed troops to United Nations humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. In 2010, Emirati advisors returned to oversee the creation of the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), which was founded to combat growing piracy and funded annually at about $50 million by Abu Dhabi. When the piracy threat subsided, the PMPF effectively transitioned into a counterterrorism mission, helping to suppress the jihadist insurgency in the Galgala mountains beginning in 2014, to repel a 2016 al-Shabab seaborne attack on Puntland, to lead that year’s liberation of Qandala from the recently formed Islamic State affiliate, and to secure Puntland’s major airports. Yet PMPF prowess in counterterrorism eventually came at the expense of its original mission, with piracy resurging off Puntland since November 2023, while rampant illegal fishing and Iranian weapons smuggling have continued unabated.
Since 2010, the UAE has developed a sizable base for the PMPF in Bosaso and increased its total presence in Somalia to as many as 180 troops. Fears, moreover, that the PMPF would become a harmful political tool for the Puntland administration have proven mostly overblown. The force has periodically been involved in political disputes, but the UAE has restrained it on important occasions such as the 2014 presidential transition and the Somaliland-Puntland clashes of 2018. Alongside major bases in Berbera, Somaliland, and Assab, Eritrea—which it used for operations against Yemen’s Houthis—the UAE foothold in Bosaso has augmented its Red Sea presence to not only facilitate operations in Yemen but also more easily counter Iranian smuggling.
Furthermore, in 2014 the UAE began training and paying salaries for thousands of Somali cadets. A 2018 row with the administration of President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed ended the mission, but UAE training of SNA cadets resumed when Hassan Sheikh returned to power in 2022. Al-Shabab, apparently heeding the UAE’s contributions, recruited a former SNA cadet to strike General Gordon Camp in Mogadishu, killing four Emirati officers and one Bahraini officer.
At least since summer 2023, the UAE has conducted drone strikes and provided vehicles and training to Jubaland state forces, whose longtime leader, Ahmed Mohamed Islam, maintains close ties with Abu Dhabi. The UAE is likely now building another base near the Jubaland capital, Kismayo.
In parallel, the UAE has invested in helping create a new federal military police unit and several army brigades, having provided—until recently—the funding for 10,000 personnel, with the 3,500–4,500-person military police unit having trained in Uganda, and the rest, forming new regular army brigades, doing so in Ethiopia and Egypt. The UAE regularly retrained the deployed soldiers at Camp Gordon and provided about $9 million per month to pay the new brigades. During last year’s Ramadan, a period that typically sees increased jihadist violence, the military police unit’s activities helped keep Mogadishu free of terrorist attacks and thus earned local respect. Some of the new brigades have since moved to the capital’s outskirts and will constitute a major component of the government’s continuing campaign. Emirati support for these troops is one element in a larger push to generate 30,000 military, 40,000 police, and 8,500 prison guard forces to replace ATMIS and support the government’s campaign, according to a presidential advisor.
An Effective Emirati Training Model
Parallel training efforts by the United States, the European Union, Turkey, and Britain have generally fallen short because most SNA brigades are, in fact, clan militias beholden to the interests of their respective elders. As a result, SNA units—no matter the quality of their training—have mostly pursued clan interests and proven ineffective at fighting al-Shabab, especially outside their own lands. Alongside the Danab Brigade, only the Turkish-trained Gorgor special forces are truly capable of offensive operations, but Turkey has not taken sufficient steps to protect it from political misuse. In the case of Danab, the United States has circumvented this problem by recruiting cadets from a diverse array of clans, setting up a command-and-control system insulated from politics, ensuring on-time pay, and training carefully vetted cadets separately from the regular forces.
The UAE has implemented similar measures for the units it trains, including by intentionally maintaining multi-clan representation among its trainees. It also names combat veterans to lead units and monitors new units through a continuous retraining program at Camp Gordon. Finally, it provides on-time salaries at about twice the regular SNA rate.
Implications of the Current Crisis
UAE-trained forces are currently the most promising replacements for the ATMIS presence, and the withdrawal of Emirati support threatens to hinder the government’s campaign against al-Shabab. To be sure, the Emirates has ample reason to resume its earlier funding levels for the SNA. Al-Shabab conducts illicit financing activities inside the UAE, and U.S. Department of Treasury sanctions regularly target UAE-based individuals and companies with links to the Somali jihadist group. Effective in-country counterterrorism forces offer the best means of targeting the personal transnational networks of al-Shabab operatives. Also justifying a strong Emirati role are al-Shabab’s close links to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—a UAE nemesis—and the group’s receipt of Iran-smuggled weapons.
UAE-sponsored forces have shown much promise, whereas other countries have generally struggled to build reliable SNA brigades. Indeed, the UAE has emerged as a leading practitioner of “by, with, and through” operations, and a strong Emirati position will allow more focused U.S. attention on reinforcing the elite Danab Brigade. A “trilateral operations” model, which saw success in Yemen, could thus possibly arise in Somalia.
In addition to persuading Abu Dhabi behind the scenes to resume its previous levels of SNA funding, Washington should use its good relations with the three Middle East rivals in Somalia to encourage coordination of efforts. Ultimately, the UAE, Turkey, and Qatar are assisting the SNA in positive ways. A robust coordination mechanism, perhaps a U.S.-run joint operations center, could help make the contributions of each greater than the sum of their parts. Such an institution could also increase transparency among the three while mitigating the risk that their geopolitical rivalry will compromise the fight against al-Shabab.
Ido Levy is an associate fellow with The Washington Institute’s Military and Security Studies Program and a PhD student at American University’s School of International Service.
Somali police and international navies were preparing on Monday to attack a commercial ship that was hijacked by pirates last week, the Puntland region’s police force said, two days after Indian commandos rescued another cargo vessel held by pirates.
The MV Abdullah was hijacked off the coast of Somalia last week, the latest of more than 20 attacks since November by Somali pirates who had laid dormant for nearly a decade.
On Saturday, the Indian navy rescued another cargo vessel, the Maltese-flagged MV Ruen, which had been seized in December, freeing its 17 crew members and arresting 35 pirates.
The police force from the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, a base for many pirate gangs, said it was on high alert and prepared to participate in an operation against the pirates holding the Abdullah.
“Puntland police forces are ready after they got reports that international navies are planning an attack,” the police said in a statement.
India’s navy, which has disrupted several other attempted hijackings, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
On Sunday, the Puntland police said they had seized a vehicle that was transporting the narcotic khat to be supplied to the pirates on board Abdullah.
At the peak of their attacks in 2011, Somali pirates cost the global economy an estimated $7 billion, including hundreds of millions of dollars in ransom payments.
Reporting by Abdiqani Hassan and Abdi Sheik; Writing by Giulia Paravicini; Editing by Aaron Ross, William Maclean
Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and visiting Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud held bilateral talks in Asmara, the Eritrea’s capital.
During the “extensive” meeting on Sunday, the two leaders discussed regional issues, including Somalia’s fight against militants, Eritrean Information Minister Yemane Meskel posted on X.
Talks on “important regional and global topics” also featured in their meeting, state-owned Somali National News Agency said, without providing more details.
This was President Mohamud’s second visit to Eritrea this year and the sixth since he came to power in May 2022, highlighting the strong relations between the two countries.
President Mohamud last visited Asmara in January amid tension with neighbouring Ethiopia over a port deal between Addis Ababa and the self-declared republic of Somaliland. The deal is contested by the Somali government.
A video shared on X (formerly Twitter) shows President Isaias and visiting President Mohamud strolling in the streets of Asmara, with residents cheering and taking pictures.
Eritrea has been training thousands of Somali soldiers to boost the Somali army as African Union troops are expected to withdraw from the Horn of Africa country at the end of this year.
On 14 March, the Council of Ministers appointed members of the new Somali Media Council, without involving consultation with media organisations and including a former senator. This has never happened before and contravenes the media law. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) joins its affiliate, the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ), in condemning the unlawful appointments of the Somali Media Council, which undermine press freedom and disrespect rule of law in the country.
Somali journalists and media organisations, including the IFJ-affiliate NUSOJ, are sounding the alarm on the dire consequences of the government-appointed Media Council’s members, that will tighten the state control over the media, revoking media licences and fining journalists who are critical of the government.
Clause 14 of Somalia’s amended media law, passed in 2020, states that the National Media Council should be independent from political and government interference.
“The journalists community was shocked to find a former senator among the nine names presented to the Council of Ministers, blatantly compromising the Council’s independence and credibility and exposing it to political influence,” reads NUSOJ’s statement following the announcement that sparked outrage among journalists’ and media organisations in the country.
The media law mandates that the formation of the Media Council should involve consultations among the Minister of Information, media organisations, NUSOJ and civil society, among others. These did not occur.
Media owners, managers, and journalists of independent media outlets came together on 17 March in Mogadishu to condemn the unlawful establishment of the National Media Council and called on the Somali president, Hassan Sheikh Mahmud, to ensure that the right procedures are followed before signing it into a presidential decree.
NUSOJ Secretary General Omar Faruk Osman said: “Having previously raised alarms about the repressive provisions within this amended media law, we are utterly astounded to witness the selection of its nine members through such an unlawful process. While we acknowledge the presence of some colleagues within these nine who possess genuine credibility and integrity in the media, it is beyond belief that nominations were made in complete violation of the law.”
IFJ General Secretary, Anthony Bellanger stated: “Press freedom and pluralism are in danger in Somalia if the composition of the National Media Council is approved as it will expand the state control over the media. We back the demands of our affiliate NUSOJ and media organisations in the country to ensure that the amended 2020 media law is respected and press freedom is upheld.
The Ali Matan Mosque has officially concluded the 25th edition of the Holy Quran competition held in the holy month of Ramadan, which the Dahabshiil group of Companies regularly supports.
This competition is the longest-running in the Holy Quran competitions in all Somali-speaking regions. Students from different regions participated and the top three students scooped the top awards and all 38 students who participated were awarded valuable prizes.
Addressing the audience Sheik Abdi Aden said, “It is a victory for our country to hold a noble competition, I supplicate to Almighty Allah to make it an annual event.”
The cleric stated that the community should hold Quran recitation competitions so that people of high prolificacy spring out of their midst.
Sheikh Mohamed Omar Dirir supplicated to Almighty Allah to bless all the reciters for the noblest undertaking recitation of the book of Almighty Allah the holy Quran. He urged parents, leaders, and religious people to encourage this noble endeavor to promote the recitation of the holy Quran.
Amongst the audience who graced the occasion of the closing ceremony were the members of the Holy Quran competition organizing committee, cabinet ministers, the clergy, MPs, politicians, Dahabshiil officials, eminent personalities, and members of the general public.
