“If we don’t unite, the biggest thing will be the collapse of our security, we are proud of being a democratic nation, let’s…” VP Sayli’
By M.A. Egge
The Vice President H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Sayli’ has underscored the importance of having a united people in a nation, where the setting is of harmonious setting.
The VP underpinned the fact when he opened the 17th Hargeisa International Book Fair on Saturday at the Hargeisa Cultural Centre.
In his speech he emphasized the need for solidarity hence reminded the audience that Somaliland was a nation that boasted democratic processes and tradition which is only realised through unity and togetherness.
He cautioned that when such togetherness is ruffled, much is stood to be lost.
He however noted that there was much goodness realized in uniting a people.
He said that vast achievements and benefits reaped through togetherness than when a people are divided.
The VP pointed out that it was a year of elections, despite having been post-ponded, hence there is even more need in maintaining and safeguarding the prevalent solidarity.
He said that it was an honour for the country to host the exhibition and hailed the efforts of the head of the centre Mr. Jama Musa Jama for his constant efforts and in putting the country in a global map.
The fair which has this year’s theme is “Togetherness”, and Tunisia is a guest nation had its opening graced by the attendance of international participants, eminent personalities from the various councils of the government, diplomats that include those of resident embassies, a horde of artistes and numerous notable personalities.
It is worth noting that each year the fair has a partner country as it hosts the expo, with this time round being Tunisia.
The event is expected to be held for five days and would have in its itinerary 123 speakers, 35 panels and 3 children’s sessions, 24 new Books (Somali), 22 performance artistes, 16 paint artists, 10 diplomats, 1 circus and 1 Chess and a tradition African “Shax” competition.
In a speech delivered by the Vice President, he said that it is aa great honour for Somaliland to host the International Book Fair successfully perennially for almost the past two decades.
“We thank the cultural centre and its chairman, Jama, and the workers for the hard work they have been doing for 17 years, and they started from scratch, they are very grateful”
“It is a great honour for us that every year different countries come to this forum to exchange knowledge and learn a lot from us, and we learn from them”, he said.
He continued, “This year’s theme is togetherness, its value has been widely explained, and today there is a great need for the country and people to be together”, and added, “Togetherness is doing a lot in our country and the world where there are many challenges, and togetherness can overcome challenges be they, climate change, drought, education, health, access to clean water or associated issues”.
He advised the populaces to shun tribalism and to think of themselves as constituents.
“If we don’t unite, the biggest thing will be the collapse of our security, we are proud of being a democratic nation, let’s not undermine it”, he concluded.
Illegal money changers have been rounded up in Tog-wajaale town in a clean-up operation campaign led by the Central Bank at the end of the week in efforts to cushion exchange rates stability.
In a bid to rogue out illegal money changers at the vibrant frontier town, the exercises le by none other than the Director of the Central Bank himself Mr. Mohamed Qasim Hussein Dalmar, around seventy unlicensed money changers were rounded up an had their operations curtailed and their tools of the trade and working facilities confiscated.
The administration of Tog-Wajale district and all the area security agencies participated in the operation meant to curb disruptions of the main exchange rates hence curtail scamming which spikes them.
The DG reminded the people that the Central Bank’s rules guiding the regulations of exchange rates ought to be adhered hence the stakeholders in the business have to be registered and licensed.
He gave a stern warning to operators who flout the law that action would be taken against them swiftly.
He reveled that those they rounded up hence found to have flouted the regulations number 70.
Given that Wajaale is a border town and the main gateway to Ethiopia cherishing vibrancy in the commercial sector, it was precarious and a soft spot to disrupt the exchange rates since there was a myriad of money changers.
Addis Abeba – Relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have gone through at least two major episodic moments since the coming into 2018. The first is related to the tripartite agreement between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, and its short-lived euphoria. As the Horn of Africa has historically accumulated unresolved grievances and contestations, the agreement was largely expected to herald a new chapter in the modern political history of the region. It was thought to usher healthy Ethio-Eritrean interstate relations, given almost three-decades-old mutual suspicions triggered by the 1998 border war that led to unresolved disputes, proxy wars, and diplomatic hostilities. Eritrea-Somalia relations have not been peaceful either. The Eritrean government has been accused of directly sponsoring the al-Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen militants in Somalia and has unresolved border issues with Djibouti.
The advent of the Abiy flabbergasted many observers and seemed to raise the bar of hope for the region. The tripartite coalition, largely perceived as spearheaded by Abiy, was then expected to chart a new path in the Horn. A joint declaration on comprehensive cooperation between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea was signed in Asmara, on September 5, 2018. In January 2020, leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia vowed to further deepen ties under what they called “Joint Plan of Action for 2020”. The joint action plan was aimed at focusing on two main and intertwined objectives of consolidating peace, stability and security as well as promoting economic and social development.
Unfortunately, what followed next in four years has resurrected and reified the decades-old mutual suspicions and political standoffs in the region. The two-year devastating war in the Tigray region and Ethiopia’s recent MOU with Somaliland constitute major events that have redefined the Horn of Africa in general and peace and security in the region in particular. Since the signing of the Pretoria agreement, Ethio-Eritrea relations have been, measured by all possible indicators of interstate relations, going south. Eritrea’s absence and/or denial of participation in the agreement, some allegedly “offensive” comments made by Ethiopian officials about accessing the Red Sea via Eritrea, claims that Isaias-led PDFJ is sponsoring proxy war in Ethiopia’s ongoing war, and others appear to reinstall the pre-Nobel deadlock.
Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland and the MOU signed on 1 January 2024 is the other major episodic moment with significant consequences. The MOU has the potential to weaken Ethio-Somalia relations in many ways. It certainly emboldened al-Shebab’s presence and influence in the Horn. Neighboring and non-African actors are redefining their moves and perhaps instrumentalizing this growing fiasco. Among others, Eritrea, Egypt, Türkiye, Europe, and the US are making tactical as well as strategic moves to secure their own needs in the region.
Nevertheless, the MOU appears to fulfill the mutual needs of Ethiopia and Somaliland. For Ethiopia, the deal would bring about two major benefits, and for another reason, it is unlikely to easily let it go. For one thing, the deal would secure Ethiopia’s commercial access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia has been a landlocked country since Eritrea’s independence. Under the deal, Somaliland would, for fifty years, lease 20 km of its coastline to Ethiopia. Second, Somaliland’s coastline would also make Ethiopia a naval power in the Red Sea area as Ethiopia plans to build a military base there. Third, although Ethiopia, Dubai’s DP World, and Somaliland signed a deal to develop and manage the port of Berbera in 2017, Ethiopia has reportedly lost its 19 percent share due to perhaps failing to fulfill the conditions required to complete the ownership deal. Consequently, having already lost the opportunity to access the Red Sea via peaceful means with Eritrea and the tripartite Berbera deal, Ethiopia is likely to be highly protective of any remaining opportunities that might provide access to the Red Sea or improve its maritime trade capabilities, as these are crucial for its economic and strategic interests.
In addition, although different in some ways, Ethiopia’s unflinching determination to pursue the construction of the GERD – a project contested for its political and developmental aspirations – might signal the possible course the MOU with Somaliland would likely take. If the MOU is successfully implemented, it is likely to bring about substantial economic and political benefits, as well as enhance Ethiopia’s relative standing in Africa in general and East Africa in particular. For Somaliland, Ethiopia would only need to officially recognize Somaliland, a process that has been frustrated by the international community for three decades.
However, Somalia rejected the deal and vehemently resisted any further progress. The immediate reaction to the deal came from the Somali government which viewed it as “an act of aggression against Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Many countries of the world, including Egypt, the USA, and Turkey, came out and voiced their concern and expressed support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is, however, unclear whether these reactions constitute something consequential or diplomatic lip service.
In addition to diplomatic appeals to the international community, Somalia’s Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took a series of measures. Accusing Ethiopia of “bluntly interfering” in its internal affairs, it ordered the expulsion of Ethiopia’s ambassador and the closure of two consulates in Somalia. Hassan’s government also demanded all Ethiopian troops, both those who came under bilateral arrangements and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), to leave Somalia by the end of 2024. According to Somalia’s National Security Adviser Hussein Sheikh-Ali, this was a move aimed at showing Somalia’s rejection of Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland.
Yet, the Somali Federal Government’s (SFG) approach to dealing with this dispute might not necessarily yield positive outcomes. Evidence snowballing in the days after the deal shows something to the contrary. If anything, the SFG’s (re)actions have been and will likely undermine SFG’s and partners’ efforts against al-Shabaab in the Horn. Following the signing of the MOU, it was not only the SFG that outrightly condemned the deal but also al-Shabaab. In its press release rejecting the MOU, al-Shabaab has drawn a close parallel between Ethiopia’s part in the MOU and the historical crusaders. Al-Shabaab’s press release reads:
Harakat Al-Shabab Al Mujahideen (HSM) unequivocally rejects the proposal, entertainment, and submission of one inch of Somalia territory or coastline to the Ethiopian Christian crusaders. The Jihad waged by our forefathers, the likes of Ahmed Gurey, Hasan Barsane, and Syid Muhammad Abdullah Hasan, have previously prevented Ethiopia from actualizing its goals in the Horn of Africa, and by the grace of Allah, HSM will continue their legacy of fighting the Ethiopian crusaders and defending their religion, land, dignity, and resources (Al-Shabaab, press release, 18 October 2023).
Instrumentalizing this, Al-Shabaab is now undertaking a massive propaganda campaign against Ethiopia and recruiting individuals, Ethiopians included, for a new round of terrorist acts in the region. It’s not only the forceful emergence of al-Shabaab but also the already weak SFG that can further complicate security and political challenges in the Horn. It was noted elsewhere that Somalia’s national army suffers from “poor military strategy, inexperienced field commanders and corruption among leadership, including theft of food rations, military equipment, weapons and ammunition to sell on the black market”. Given, therefore, the already weak and incoherent military capability of the SFG and the ongoing propaganda campaign, al-Shabaab is poised to gather more strength, further weaken the SFG and continue attacking neighboring countries, and consequently, turn the region into a convenient site of fragile and failed states.
In any case, unlike SFG’s demand, it’s unclear if and when or even necessary that Ethiopia’s forces leave Somalia. Given security and political interests -including individuals, political groups, or otherwise, Ethiopian forces may not consider leaving Somalia. Measured by the analysis of possible outcomes, Ethiopia’s presence might rather be functional for both countries. The potential withdrawal of Ethiopian forces would create a conducive environment for al-Shabaab to expand operations beyond central and southern Somalia. In both case scenarios, Somalia needs another mechanism of pressuring Ethiopia and/or Somaliland to abandon their planned joint ventures.
Turkey seems to be actively working to bring about a peaceful – or at least non-confrontational – way out of this deadlock. Turkey’s involvement can be justified because it aims to protect its existing political and economic interests or expand on its “strategic depth” (popularized by Türkiye’s former Prime Minister-turned opposition leader Ahmet Davutoğlu) and presence, or both in the Horn of Africa. If successful, Turkey’s actual involvement can result in two possible logical outcomes. One is the de-escalation of diplomatic tension between the two countries. Turkey can facilitate direct talks and mutual understanding. This can reduce and prevent potential escalation of unilateral actions by the contending actors.
The first round of talks held in Türkiye’s capital, Ankara, signaled hopes in this direction. Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs apprised the meeting as “friendly and transparent”. However, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said, “There are no indications so far that they [Ethiopia] are turning back from that path”. Nevertheless, another round of discussion is scheduled to take place on the upcoming September 2024 in Ankara. Still, if Addis Abeba and Hargeisa insist on implementing the MOU, Türkiye’s leverage can only be on mitigating conditions and factors, helping contending actors accept the inevitable with minor frictions.
It’s, however, unclear if Somalia would take such an outcome easily, and if it does not, in what ways. Another challenge is the fact that Somaliland does not seem to be actively participating in this Türkiye-led discussion. Understandably, this could have agitated Somalia, as it would mean the de facto recognition of the country and, consequently, its deal with Ethiopia. Yet, as an indispensable piece of the puzzle, Türkiye will have to find some innovative ways to involve Somaliland. Finally, any missteps, miscalculations, or mishandling can have immense ramifications for all the parties involved.
The Selel region and the Zeyla district officials and top officials of the Amoud Foundation have jointly inaugurated and laid the foundation stones for the development of various projects, that will be implemented in the area.
These projects include borehole wells that have been completed and those that are in the process of being implemented in the Asha-addo and Kala-Bayd areas.
Ahmed Abdi Ismail, the Horn of Africa representative of the Amoud Foundation, said that the organization plans to add three different wells to the Asha-Ado area, explaining that two of the wells would cater to the pastoralist herdsmen and their livestock. At the same time, the third would be a larger comprehensive one to boost Asha-addo water needs of the residents.
Other locations to get the water wells in the area are Kala-bayd and Hussein
The adminitrator of Asha-Addo prefecture thanked the national organization Amoud Foundation for initiating of the water wells projects.
The locals thanked profoundly the foundation saying that they were greatly indebted to them for the various constant humanitarian needs that they have supported them with.
The pointed out that the relief foods that they are always at hand with and the stocking of the area MCHs with the medicinal drugs highly needed were just a part of the support they have been honoured to be bestowed upon by the foundation.
The governor of Selel region, Mr. Mawlid Mohamed Noor, on his part elaborated on the works done so fa, and yet to be embarked on, as far as the water resources are concerned.
Geed Beer, Rejo Beer Initiative has been Empowering grassroots communities for Locally Led Climate Action and supporting Young people over the past few weeks.
On Wednesday, the hashtag#GeedBeer, in collaboration with Oxfam Somali, organized a two-day Training on “Locally Led Climate Action for Community” at hashtag#Abaarso Village. This training program was part of the African Activists for Climate Justice (AACJ) Program.
The training program was designed to equip local communities with the knowledge, skills, and capacity to take direct action against climate change. The focus was on helping community members identify climate risks, develop and implement localized solutions, and drive sustainable change from the ground up.
Hargeisa, Somaliland – The Attorney General of Somaliland has called for the impeachment of Member of Parliament (MP) Mohamed Abib, citing allegations that he met with officials from the Somali Embassy in Djibouti and discussed issues pertaining to the Somaliland forces. This request has sparked significant controversy and debate within Somaliland’s political sphere.
The second deputy chairman of Somaliland’s House of Representatives, Ali Hamud Jibril, while speaking to the BBC said that the letter from the Attorney General had indeed been received by the House. MP Abib, who traveled to Djibouti in late May, reportedly met with Djibouti’s Finance Minister Ilyas Dawaleh. In a Facebook post, Abib shared a photo with the minister and discussed the progress of a project intended to connect Somaliland and Djibouti.
In an interview with MMTV, a television station based in Hargeisa, Abib mentioned that he sought a passport for Djibouti. However, he refrained from providing detailed information about the accusations against him when contacted by the BBC.
Legal experts have weighed in on the situation, expressing concerns over the validity of the charges. Lawyer Mohamed Abdi Afyare argued that meeting with members of the Somali Embassy in Djibouti and discussing military issues do not constitute sufficient grounds for removing an MP’s immunity. Afyare emphasized that MPs have the right to discuss national policies and military matters.
“These issues alone are not enough to accuse a member of parliament in order to remove his immunity,” Afyare stated. “The details of what was discussed with the embassy, whether it was anti-national, need to be clarified.”
Afyare further noted that the dismissal of a member of the House of Representatives requires the consent of the House, indicating that the process involves multiple layers of approval.
The House of Representatives is currently on vacation, and opinions on the matter are divided. Ali Hamud Jibril acknowledged that the council does not have a unanimous stance on the issue. He indicated that the council will address the matter when it reconvenes after the vacation.
This controversy unfolds against a backdrop of heightened tensions between Somaliland and Djibouti. Recently, Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi accused Djibouti of harboring a rebellion threatening Somaliland, an accusation Djibouti’s leaders have vehemently denied. Djibouti maintains that it supports peace in the Horn of Africa.
At least five people were killed when militiamen ambushed a convoy in central Somalia and seized heavy weapons, the local government and residents said on Tuesday, seven months after a decades-long arms embargo was lifted.
The convoy was traveling on Monday with a security escort near the town of Abudwaq when militiamen from a local clan attacked and overpowered security forces, four residents told Reuters.
They said the arms, which included machine guns, anti-aircraft weapons and rocket-propelled grenades, originated in neighbouring Ethiopia.
“It is unfortunate that five people died from both sides yesterday over weapons,” said Ahmed Shire, a security adviser to the president of Galmudug State, where Abudwaq is located. “We understand the weapons fell into the hands of civilians.”
Rashid Abdi, an analyst with the Sahan Research think-tank, called the incident “the single most serious incident of arms proliferation in central Somalia” and said some of the weapons would likely be bought by al Shabaab, an al Qaeda affiliate.
Writing on X, Abdi said it was a “clear case of why lifting of arms embargo on Somalia was big strategic mistake”.
The last restrictions under an arms embargo that had been in place, in some form, for more than 30 years were fully lifted by the U.N. Security Council in December.
Somalia’s government said the move would allow it to confront security threats and build up its national forces.
The country has been confronting an insurgency by al Shabaab for nearly two decades. African Union peacekeepers are drawing down their presence to hand over great responsibility to Somali forces, but the AU and Mogadishu government have warned of a possible security vacuum if that happens too quickly.
Clan-based militias have fought alongside government forces in a military campaign against al Shabaab in central Somalia. They have also turned their weapons on one another in disputes over land and resources.
While engagement with international partners is crucial for Somaliland’s development and pursuit of recognition, it is essential to strike a balance that respects the country’s sovereignty and democratic processes
Somaliland faced significant challenges in its quest for international recognition since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991. While Somaliland has established a relatively stable democratic system and functioning government, it continues to face pressure from international partners seeking to influence its policies and decisions.
It is becoming increasingly burdensome to the general public. People tend to go along with external pressure forcing a government to correct excesses or withdraw harmful bills and policies. Influencing the government and political parties to abide by the rules and not deviate from the democratic path is also palatable to most. But when such pressure impacts the lives, security, and living standards of the ordinary man on the street in more ways than one, that is when resentment sets in and people sway towards government lines even if it is still wrong in more ways than one.
This external pressure, often exerted by more powerful nations and organizations, is proving to have multi-faceted adverse effects on Somaliland’s development and sovereignty, and people are beginning to take notice.
One of the most concerning impacts of undue international pressure is its potential to undermine Somaliland’s democratic processes. When external actors attempt to force their will on Somaliland’s government, it can lead to decisions that may not align with the wishes of the Somaliland people. This interference can erode public trust in democratic institutions and weaken the legitimacy of elected officials.
Somaliland’s unrecognized status makes it particularly vulnerable to economic pressure from international partners. Threats to withhold aid or impose sanctions can force Somaliland’s government to make concessions that may not be in the best interest of its citizens. This economic leverage can lead to policies that prioritize external demands over local needs and long-term development goals.
External pressure on Somaliland threatens its de facto sovereignty and ability to make independent decisions. By yielding to the demands of more powerful international actors, Somaliland risks losing control over key aspects of its governance and foreign policy. This can hinder the country’s efforts to assert its independence and gain international recognition.
When international partners push Somaliland to take certain positions or actions, it can affect decisions that are the best for the country both in the short term and in the long term but not in the interests of external actors. The geostrategic location of Somaliland and its command of both inland Africa and its outlet to the Red Sea makes it specifically of avid interest to all the forces and opposing blocs of today’s world as they vy for privileged positions in the Horn of Africa. It can also make it more difficult for Somaliland to navigate its complex relationships with other nations in the Horn of Africa.
Constant pressure from international partners can divert Somaliland’s government resources and attention away from crucial state-building efforts. Instead of focusing on strengthening institutions and addressing domestic challenges, officials may be preoccupied with managing external demands and expectations. This can slow the development of effective governance structures and hinder progress towards Somaliland’s long-term goals.
External pressure often comes with attempts to impose foreign values or practices that may not align with Somaliland’s cultural norms and social fabric. This can lead to tensions within society and resistance to reforms that are perceived as externally driven rather than locally initiated.
Security
International partners forced Somaliland to abandon parts of its country to a host of militias among which were reported extremists donning the tribal garb.
To highlight but one consequence of undue meddling in a country’s intricate, internal affairs, the situation in Las Anod – past and present – must be of greater concern to the international community than holding elections today, tomorrow, or the day after in Somaliland as much it is of importance to us all.
The withdrawal from Las Anod, perceived as a result of international pressure, cnegatively impacts Somaliland’s claims to statehood in several ways:
It js seen as a sign of weakness or inability to maintain control over its claimed territory.
It undermines Somaliland’s narrative of being a stable and effective de facto state.
It emboldens other regions within Somaliland to challenge the central government’s authority.
Creates a power vacuum in the Las Anod area, potentially leading to increased instability or conflict.
Possible increase in clan-based tensions or violence in the disputed regions.
Potential for increased activity by extremist groups like Al-Shabaab in areas of reduced government control.
Lends heart to undisciplined militias and their leaders most of whose lie in vengeance and looting, to push their advantage to start armed engagements elsewhere in the area such as Erigavo, especially at a time the Khatumo leaders are patted on the back by the likes of Djibouti, Somalia, and China.
Increases support for opposition groups or dissenting clans within Somaliland.
Intensified diplomatic efforts to isolate Somaliland internationally.
Exploits internal divisions or grievances to weaken Somaliland’s cohesion.
Increases attempts to disrupt Somaliland’s economic development projects or foreign investments.
What is perhaps more perplexing to many observers is the apparent silence or muted response of international partners regarding several critical issues in the Sool region including, but not limited to, the growing threat that had been developing in the area for some time, the invasion into Somaliland by Somalia troops, led by Somalia generals, the involvement of troops trained by these international partners and Turkey fighting alongside the rebels they had incited, and the presence of various jihadist elements and units that have been identified in the area.
These groups appear to have integrated themselves into the local population, potentially with the intention of transforming the region into a breeding ground for terrorism. There are concerns that this area could become a safe haven for extremists, from which they could plan and launch operations throughout the Horn of Africa and East Africa.
The lack of significant international response to these developments is particularly troubling given the potential regional security implications. This situation raises questions about the consistency and effectiveness of international engagement in the region, especially concerning counter-terrorism efforts and regional stability.
Somalia and Djibouti
Perceived weakening of Somaliland’s position indeed encouraged Somalia and Djibouti to take more assertive stances. Somalia, for instance, intensified efforts to reclaim control over Somaliland, viewing the Las Anod situation as an opportunity; increased diplomatic pressure against Somaliland’s recognition efforts; and is focusing on the disruption of other areas and regions sowing dissension and anarchy.
Djibouti, on the other hand, has already started training armed rebels to be infiltrated back into the Awdal region in an attempt to replicate Somalia’s successful exploitation of the unrest it initiated, fueled, and militarily supported in the Sool region.
Djibouti sees this open aggression against Somaliland as an opportunity to strengthen its position as the primary port and economic hub in the region. The World Bank CPP Index of 2023 placed Berbera port far above both Djibouti and Mogadishu ports. Djibouti was visibly scared by the rating and has a vested interest in preventing Berbera from taking away a substantial volume of the Ethiopian import/Export portfolio.
Somalia and Djibouti are determined not to see the January MOU between Somaliland and Federal Ethiopia go through. The agreement granted landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea through Somaliland in return for diplomatic recognition to revive the internationally recognized statehood of Somaliland in 1960. Somaliland, at the time, chose, to be the first of the five Somali-inhabited territories that the 5-pointed star on the blue flag represented to join the second, Somalia, for NFD (Kenya), Ogadenia & Reserve Area (Ethiopia), and Djibouti (France), to join them later.
Developing Strategies
Somaliland’s government and civil society must work together to resist undue external pressure and prioritize the needs and aspirations of its citizens. International actors, in turn, should seek to support Somaliland’s stability and progress through constructive dialogue and partnership, rather than coercive measures that undermine the country’s autonomy and democratic foundations.
Somaliland needs to develop strategies fast to effectively communicate its position and garner more international support on its terms. These may include – but not confined to the insights below.
Develop a cohesive public diplomacy campaign
Create a clear, consistent narrative highlighting Somaliland’s democratic achievements, stability, and strategic importance.
Utilize social media, international press, and cultural exchanges to share Somaliland’s story.
Engage diaspora communities to act as informal ambassadors in their host countries.
Enhance economic diplomacy
Showcase Somaliland’s potential for foreign investment, particularly in sectors like energy and ports.
Pursue bilateral trade agreements with sympathetic nations.
Highlight Somaliland’s strategic location and potential role in regional economic development.
Leverage regional partnerships
Strengthen ties with neighboring countries and regional bodies like the African Union.
Emphasize Somaliland’s role in promoting regional stability and combating terrorism.
Seek observer status in regional organizations where possible.
Engage with international civil society
Build relationships with think tanks, NGOs, and academic institutions.
Invite international observers to elections to demonstrate democratic credentials.
Encourage research and publications on Somaliland’s unique situation.
Focus on specific policy areas
Highlight Somaliland’s efforts in areas like counterterrorism, anti-piracy, and migration management.
Demonstrate commitment to international norms on human rights and good governance.
Showcase successful development projects and potential for further growth with international support.
Pursue targeted diplomatic initiatives
Establish representative offices in key countries, even without formal diplomatic recognition.
Engage in track II diplomacy with influential non-state actors.
Seek opportunities for participation in international forums and conferences.
Develop legal and historical arguments
Articulate clear legal justifications for independence based on international law.
Commission and promote historical research supporting Somaliland’s distinct identity.
Engage international legal experts to bolster the case for recognition.
Improve domestic governance
Continue strengthening democratic institutions and processes.
Address internal challenges transparently to demonstrate good governance.
Invest in education and infrastructure to showcase development potential.
Cultivate media relationships
Develop relationships with international journalists and media outlets.
Provide regular briefings and facilitate press visits to Somaliland.
Respond promptly and transparently to media inquiries.
Explore innovative recognition strategies
Pursue membership in international organizations that don’t require full statehood.
Investigate the possibility of associated statehood or free association models with supportive countries.
The key is to maintain a consistent, multi-faceted approach that emphasizes Somaliland’s strengths and to address the concerns of the international community in ways that do not undermine the independence or integrity of its people.
International partners must note that.
As Somaliland continues its journey towards international recognition and sustainable development, fostering relationships based on mutual respect and shared interests will be key to navigating the complex dynamics of global politics while preserving its hard-won independence and unique identity.
The Somaliland Energy Commission (SEC), in collaboration with the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, held a consultation meeting to discuss the first draft of electricity licenses and tariff regulations.
The event is part of the deliverables that the SEC will contribute to the Somaliland Energy Sector Recovery Project (SESRP), which the World Bank funds.
Hargeisa, Somaliland –The Government of the Republic of Somaliland expresses grave concern over the alarming escalation of arms proliferation in Somalia, as evidenced by recent events. In the past three months, Al Shabab has successfully seized substantial quantities of weaponry from government forces in central Somalia. Moreover, the recent incident in Aabud Waq, where civilians and clan militias captured a large cache of weapons and ammunition from the Mogadishu government, further highlights the critical security situation.
These developments serve as a serious reminder of the Somaliland government’s and other frontline states’ longstanding concerns regarding the lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia. Despite our fervent warnings, the embargo was lifted in December 2023. The subsequent proliferation of these captured arms, now widely documented on social media, raises serious questions about the wisdom and timing of this decision.
Given the Mogadishu government’s apparent inability to secure its arms stockpiles, and the potential catastrophic consequences of this situation, the Somaliland government calls upon the United Nations and the International Community to urgently re-evaluate their decision to lift the arms embargo.
We urge the international community to take immediate steps to address this crisis and prevent further destabilization of the region.
