The Somaliland Journalists’ Association, SOLJA, has called on journalists in the country to be wary of news or items that are tailored to harm the country.
A press release from the organization praised the steadfast role of journalists in protecting Somaliland’s interests, hence urging the scribes to promote cohesiveness and united solidarity amongst the people of the nation.
It is worth noting that journalists and their associations the world over tend to combine by bonding the democracies with the national interests first and make them the foremost priority.
They noted that as far as the nationhood of the country and the peoples’ aspirations are concerned, the media fraternity should take their cue and defend it to the hilt.
The organization further added that the media has come through difficult times in Somaliland and should play their part in safeguarding the essence of the country’s nationhood as expected while reporting on news soberly and per ethics.
SOLJA underpinned the fact that during the electioneering period the media fraternity’s responsibility was much more needed hence they ought to rally the nation for cohesive and harmonious setting in safeguarding peaceful stability.
The media association called on both the government and the opposition to refrain from uttering uncalled for malicious and acrimonious accusations or sentiments that would divide the people, and instead, strive towards uniting the people in defense of the nation.
National day in Somaliland means joy, pomp, and machines of war. On May 18th the president and assembled dignitaries watched, from the grandstand, the annual parade in the capital, Hargeisa, as police held back jubilant crowds. Acrobats, fire-eaters, cyclists and footballers flowed past, while a bemused lion paced in its cage, the red, white, and green national flag draped over its back. Then came the coastguard and soldiers, fire engines and police cars, and finally armored trucks, each one mounted with more terrifying weapons than the last. All in all, an impressive inventory of a state.
Except that Somaliland is a state visible only from within. It has governed itself since 1991, when it separated from Somalia after a bloody civil war. If not perfectly democratic, nor uniformly secure, it has done far better by those measures than the splintered country it left. Much of the time, for many of its 6m people, it has provided a taste of nabad iyo caano (“peace and milk” in Somali). It has a government, elections, army, courts, currency and passports. But when its borders are shown on maps if at all, it’s with a tentative broken line.
In London and Washington, a smattering of lawmakers advocate for Somaliland’s sovereignty. But Western governments, who have poured money into the faltering project of state-building in Somalia, say they do not want to recognise Somaliland before African countries do; and African governments, many of whom face their own secessionist movements, are loth to change the status quo.
Somaliland is a state visible only from within. It has governed itself since 1991, when it separated from Somalia after a bloody civil war
That is until now. In January the president of Somaliland, Muse Bihi Abdi, and the prime minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, signed a memorandum of understanding, the first step towards what would be a historic deal. “Ethiopia needs sea access; Somaliland, recognition,” Bihi told me when I met him at his presidential palace. “And we bargained.”
The president sat in a white chair beside a Somaliland flag, his slightly stiff demeanor betraying his training as an Air Force pilot. Under the proposal, he said, Ethiopia would lease a 20km by 20km swathe of coastal land on which to build a naval base and recognize Somaliland in return. “We want to be masters of our country,” he told me.
Most Somalilanders support Bihi’s ambition and hope that recognition would bring investment, aid and national pride. But many worry about the details of the deal, which have not been released. Some fear that Ethiopia has not forsaken its old expansionist habits. There have been protests against the agreement in the Awdal region, where the naval base would be built. The defense minister resigned, calling Ethiopia an “enemy”.
The deal is not guaranteed to happen. Turkey is mediating between Ethiopia and Somalia, which considers the plan to be a violation of its sovereignty. But Bihi, who faces a tough battle for re-election in November, seemed keen to put pen to paper. Recognition would boost his reputation, which was damaged last year when a rebel force in the eastern borderlands ousted Somaliland’s army from Las Anod, the largest town in the Sool region, and declared allegiance to Somalia instead. It was a humiliating defeat for politicians in Hargeisa – and a challenge to the idea of Somaliland itself.
The flags of Somalia and Somaliland share a common symbol, the five-pointed star. It represents the five territories into which the Somali people were divided when colonial powers carved up the Horn of Africa in the late 19th century: the coastal regions of Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, and French Somaliland (now Djibouti), British East Africa (now part of Kenya), and Ethiopia.
Somalis shared a language, a pastoral tradition and a religion – Islam – but had never been ruled by a single government. Social and political life was structured partly through genealogy: there were several major clans, which branched into sub-clans and again into smaller units, like a national family tree. But in the struggle against colonial rule Somali nationalists started to dream of a unitary state, bringing together all Somalis – a greater Somalia, or Somaliweyn.
In the struggle against colonial rule Somali nationalists started to dream of a unitary state, bringing together all Somalis – a greater Somalia, or Somaliweyn
It was in that spirit that, after five short days of independence in 1960, the former British protectorate in the north united with the former Italian colony to the south to form Somalia. They hoped the other three points of the Somali star would one day join them, but Somaliweyn never came to be. An armed attempt to prise away the Somali parts of Ethiopia in 1977 ended in catastrophic defeat.
The new Somalia had internal problems too. Nine years after its inception, the government was overthrown by Mohamed Siad Barre, the head of the army. He spoke of building the nation, but his brutal rule divided it. He banned political parties and imprisoned opponents, such as a group of young professionals in Hargeisa who had started a self-help scheme to fund social services. The Isaaq, the largest clan in the north, were particularly targeted. By the 1980s they were in open rebellion, behind the banner of the Somali National Movement (SNM).
In 1988 the north slid into a full-blown civil war. Under the command of Barre’s son-in-law, the Somali army killed tens of thousands of Isaaq people: bombed in their homes, shot in the streets, or executed and buried in mass graves. Journalists called Hargeisa the “Dresden of Africa”. One pilot was so horrified by the destruction that he refused his orders and kept flying until he ran out of fuel, landing on a beach in Djibouti.
Saado Abdi Amarre was in her 20s when the war began. She cooked meals for the fighters and sometimes carried a gun herself. But her weapon of choice was poetry. In Somali culture poetry can be a language of politics: a way to warn and inspire, admonish and exhort. When I met her at an arts venue in Hargeisa recently, she recited the first poem she had ever written.
“When our land turns to dust, when our land burns with fire,” she said. “Oh, my people, I feel your pain deep inside.” She pointed to her heart and then to her imaginaryaudience, as if she saw them still: the gaunt fighters who rebelled against a dictatorship. She recited the words like an incantation, each line falling onto a long vowel, never quite becoming song. In the final verse she addressed Barre himself: “May hurricanes and destruction touch you.”
In 1991 Barre’s administration fell and the SNM took control in the north. But Hargeisa lay in ruins. “Everybody was either repairing his house or another,” remembered Bobe Yusuf Duale, who was one of the SNM’s leaders. “The hammer and the nail was the biggest noise that you could hear.”
Duale is a historian by instinct, an inveterate collector. At his home in Hargeisa he keeps an archive of oral poetry on cassette tapes, verses dense with allusion and resistance. On one wall hangs a groundsheet, which was his bed while fighting in the bush; on another, his old belt.
Many Somalilanders juxtapose the relative stability of their self-built state with a dystopian caricature of Somalia – its roads stalked by jihadists, its seas swimming with pirates – from which anyone would want to escape
The SNM had fought to liberate Somalia, he said, not to leave it. But by 1991 the people had suffered enough. The rebels and the northern clans met to discuss the future, as a crowd outside chanted “no more Mogadishu”, referring to the capital of Somalia. They decided to dissolve the union with the south, re-establishing the independent state that had briefly existed before. Duale showed me his copy of the declaration, typewritten on a single sheet of paper.
This new, self-described state – called Somaliland – was bound together by homegrown traditions of democracy and xeer, the unwritten rules and obligations that kept the peace between clans. In the early years, competition for control of national assets, such as the port, sometimes spilled over into open fighting. Each time, the elders met and talked until their differences were resolved. Somalilanders would make their own nation, without outside help.
Today Hargeisa is a city of low-rise compounds and sleepy afternoons. Its bloody past is commemorated with a Soviet-made MiG-17 aircraft, responsible for the deaths of so many of its residents, which now stands on a plinth in a central square. The city is perhaps better known these days for its international book fair, which draws thousands of people each year. The hotels and cafés downtown thrum with diaspora money. On the outskirts, shepherds steer their goats past half-built houses, funded by remittances slowly sent back from London or Toronto or Dubai.
Some of the diaspora are coming home. Mohamed Isaaq, a returnee from Canada, told me he felt healthier in Hargeisa, his spirit a little freer; over there the government had “milked” you, he said, but here he was milking his camels and thriving. His friend Ali Hussein, born in Cardiff to a Somali seaman, was hoping to start a bank – no easy task in an unrecognized state (some banks have to fly cash abroad because they cannot wire it internationally).
Remittances and livestock are the lifeblood of the economy, but neither can be taken for granted. Officials worry that younger generations of Somalilanders, born and raised abroad, will feel less connection to their ancestral homeland. As for livestock, just ask Halimo Fadal Jama, who was herding her sheep in the dry scrubland near the Ethiopian border when I met her. The rains are not like they used to be, she said.
Many foreign investors are deterred by the legal uncertainty that comes with Somaliland’s unrecognized status, but not all. I visited Berbera, a port city that was known to ancient Greek merchants for its myrrh, frankincense and cinnamon. The Somaliland government is pitching it as a trade corridor to Ethiopia, hoping to attract some of the sea traffic that currently passes through Djibouti. That ambition is backed by the United Arab Emirates, which has expanded its influence in the Red Sea region as part of its rivalry with other Arab powers.
DP World, an Emirati logistics company, says it is investing “up to $442m” on upgrading Berbera’s port and creating a special economic zone, where investors can take advantage of tax exemptions. Its warehouses, situated on a deserted plain, stand in austere contrast to the city’s whitewashed mosques and Ottoman colonnades.
Somalilanders’ legal claim to recognition has always rested on the idea that they are returning to old borders, not drawing new ones
Many Somalilanders juxtapose the relative stability of their self-built state with a dystopian caricature of Somalia – its roads stalked by jihadists, its seas swimming with pirates – from which anyone would want to escape. With each retelling of Somaliland’s story, the weft and warp of nationhood become a little tighter. But history has left a lot of loose ends.
The official narrative of liberation means less to people in the west and east of the country, outside the Isaaq heartlands. Some of them had fought against the SNM during the war (one businessman from Awdal region told me that he considered the SNM to be “criminals”). Last year, in the eastern city of Las Anod, an unraveling began. Some people, it turned out, would rather be part of Somalia after all.
Somalilanders’ legal claim to recognition has always rested on the idea that they are returning to old borders, not drawing new ones. The eastern region was once part of British Somaliland and so, they say, it is part of modern Somaliland too. That argument has never convinced the eastern clans, even though some of their leaders were involved in meetings that led to the revival of Somaliland. The Dhulbahante and Warsangeli, who live close to the colonial border, are part of the larger Darod clan. So are most of the people in Puntland, the autonomous region of Somalia on the other side, which controlled Las Anod until 2007. Locals see no reason to respect a line that colonisers drew.
But perhaps they could have been won over, if only Somaliland had provided security and investment. Instead, a string of assassinations saw politicians, journalists, clerics, elders, and businessmen killed for unknown reasons by gunmen who were never caught. Most people I met in Las Anod blamed the Somaliland government for the killings, an allegation which it rejects. They also complained that wealth is concentrated in Hargeisa – a grievance shared by many outside the capital, irrespective of clan. Several times they had tried to form an administration of their own, loyal to Mogadishu.
The last straw came in 2022 when a young politician was shot dead as he left the mosque. Somaliland forces killed protesters who were angry at his death, then withdrew from Las Anod. In February 2023, local leaders declared that they “will never accept or participate in [Somaliland’s] separatist program” and declared their allegiance to Somalia. A war had begun.
For months the Somaliland army shelled Las Anod. More than 150,000 people fled their homes. “It was a ghost town when I came here,” said Fardus Ibrahim Ali, who had been working as a nurse in London when she saw pictures of the war on social media. She flew over to help in the hospital, tending to the wounded who lay on the floor outside the wards.
It would be a mistake, many people told me, to think that politics is only a manifestation of clan identity – but also a mistake to ignore its influence
The hospital itself was not safe. When I visited, some of the damage was still visible, nearly a year after the shelling stopped. The outer wall of the maternity ward was pockmarked by shrapnel. An ambulance was punctured by bullets; one had killed a nurse who had been rescuing injured fighters from the front line. At the doorway of the university, a poster displayed pictures of students who had been slain in the conflict. The paint was barely dry in the mayor’s office, which has been rebuilt after taking a direct hit.
In August 2023, local forces drove the Somaliland army into retreat, taking hundreds of prisoners of war. They called themselves SSC- Khaatumo – the initials stand for the regions they claim, and “khaatumo” means a positive or final decision – and have been recognized as an interim administration by the federal government in Mogadishu.
I arrived in Las Anod during the windy season, as dry gusts stiffened SSC- Khaatumo’s flags: pale blue with a white Somali star and a horseman, who represents the Dervishes, a Sufi movement that fought against British rule here in the early 20th century. The new branding was everywhere: on wristbands and football shirts, painted on wooden stalls selling khat leaves and on the walls of hotel lobbies. The Somaliland flag was nowhere to be seen.
One morning I drove out to the Somaliland army’s abandoned barracks, a cluster of stone buildings beyond a crinkle of hills. Guarding it were a handful of SSC-Khaatumo fighters. The leader of the group, Mohamoud Jama Warsame, used to be a camel herder. His sarong flapped in the wind. When I asked why he had fought, he described his horror at the shelling of the city. And anyway, he continued, “We are defending our lands.”
That phrase – “our lands” – was a clue to something that I, an outsider, could only dimly understand. Clan is only one of many kinds of identity among Somalis, its meaning evolving, its divisions never as fixed as in the family trees that anthropologists draw. And yet it remains an important part of the way that people navigate the world. My interpreter illustrated this point by showing me the WhatsApp group for members of his sub-clan, who are scattered across the globe. He knew his lineage stretching back 20 generations, and considered this perfectly normal.
It would be a mistake, many people told me, to think that politics is only a manifestation of clan identity – but also a mistake to ignore its influence. On my last evening in Las Anod I met Garad Jama Garad Ali, the highest of the Dhulbahante garads, or traditional leaders. “When there is no government our responsibility broadens,” he told me in careful English. “When there is a good system, the government will take care of [problems], and it shrinks.”
We were speaking at his house, in a room the size of a tennis court, with gold trim on the curtains and chairs. He had returned to Las Anod in January last year, after more than a decade in exile. Locals told me he was more powerful than the SSC-Khaatumo president, who had been chosen by representatives that the garads had helped to appoint.
The President of the Republic of Somaliland H.E. Musa Bihi Abdi, received on Thursday the credentials of the new Ambassador of Ethiopia to the Republic of Somaliland H.E. Teshome Shunde Hamito, who was recently appointed.
The Ambassador conveyed warm greetings to the President of Somaliland from the Prime Minister of Ethiopia H.E. Abiy Ahmed Ali.
The Head of State welcomed the new Ambassador and wished him the best in his duties and responsibilities.
They discussed security issues in the Horn of Africa region, strengthening the relationship between the two brotherly countries and also the future cooperation between the two nations and the people.
The Somaliland government strongly objects to the recent deployment of Egyptian military forces in Somalia. according to statement
The Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement today.
The Government of the Republic of Somaliland strongly objects to the recent deployment of Egyptian military forces in Somalia. Given the history of such deployments, the lack of assessment or consideration for the stability and security of Somalia and the entire Horn of Africa region is concerning.
The Republic of Somaliland finds this development to be aggravating the already fragile peace that has been painstakingly established over the years, both by the people of Somaliland and countries in the region. The introduction of foreign military forces into neighboring Somalia, under any pretext, risks destabilizing the region, undermining peace efforts, and escalating tensions that could have far-reaching and catastrophic consequences.
As a sovereign and democratic nation in the Horn of Africa, we take it upon us like other neighbouring countries to categorically reject any foreign military presence in the region that could jeopardize the stability and security of our people.
We call upon the international community to urgently condemn this potentially dangerous move by Egypt. It is imperative that all responsible nations act swiftly to prevent further destabilization and to promote diplomatic solutions that respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations in the Horn of Africa.
The Republic of Somaliland will not stand idly by in the face of actions that threaten its hard-won peace and the stability of the region. We urge our international partners to closely monitor this alarming situation and to take immediate steps to safeguard the security and stability of Somaliland and the broader region.
Ministry of Foreign Relations and International Cooperation urged the International Community to take immediate notice of this attack, which poses a grave threat to regional peace and security.
A press release issued on 28th August 2024, read as follows;
The Government of the Republic of Somaliland is deeply concerned about the recent outbreak of hostilities in and around the town of Goof, located in the southeastern part of the Sanaag region. These hostilities have been deliberately instigated by militia groups with the clear intent of disrupting Somaliland’s upcoming elections, scheduled for November, and undermining the decades-long peace the Government and people of Somaliland have diligently maintained. The upcoming elections and sustained peace in Somaliland are what set us apart and embody the will and aspirations of Somaliland’s citizens.
Initial intelligence reports received by the Government of the Republic of Somaliland indicate that these anti-Somaliland hostilities are being led by Ahmed Karaash, the former vice president of the Puntland administration, along with several external anti -Somaliland militia forces, who not only aim to destabilize the Republic of Somaliland but also threaten the entire Horn of Africa region. intelligence reports also show that Karaash is currently in the border district of Buuhoodle in the Republic of Somaliland’s Togdheer region and is actively attempting to mobilize militia forces.
So far, this unprovoked aggression by militia groups has tragically claimed the lives of eight people, including five innocent nomadic herders who were brutally murdered in Goof, located 80 kilometers southeast of Erigavo, the regional capital of the Republic of Somaliland’s Sanaag region. In retaliatory actions, three members of the militia forces have also been killed. Despite these troubling developments, the Government of the Republic of Somaliland categorically condemns these aggressions by anti-Somaliland militia forces. We call upon the international community to take immediate notice of this attack, which poses a grave threat to regional peace and security.
To the Somaliland people, we assure you that all necessary measures are being taken to prevent further escalation of violence. The Government of the Republic of Somaliland is unwavering in its commitment to safeguarding the peace and security of our territories and citizens. We further issue a stern warning to those fueling this conflict to cease their inflammatory aggressions immediately. The Government of the Republic of Somaliland will not hesitate to take decisive countermeasures to protect the country and ensure the safety of its citizens.
The situation is evolving, and the Government of the Republic of Somaliland will provide further updates as additional information becomes available. We strongly urge all Somalilanders, at home and abroad, to unite in the face of this naked aggression against Somaliland.
Press Statement on the Current Situation in the Horn of Africa issued Office of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 28 August 2024, suggested that the new peace support mission take into account the legitimate concerns of countries of the region and the TCCs.
Ethiopia is concerned that the transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to a new peace support mission is fraught with dangers to the region. While the African Union and the United Nations are preparing for this transition, the region is entering into uncharted waters. Repeated calls by Ethiopia and other Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) have not been taken seriously. Ethiopia is being expected to ignore hostile statements, and the continued attempt to undermine the sacrifices of Ethiopian defense forees. Ethiopia cannot stand idle while other actors are taking measures to destabilize the region. Ethiopia is vigilantly monitoring developments in the region that could threaten its national security.
Ethiopia has worked tirelessły for the peace and security of Somalia and the region, for shared growth, and has nurtured the close bonds between the peoples of the region. Ethiopia has also been engaged in facilitated discussions to resolve differences with the Government of Somalia. Tangible progress has been made in these talks. Instead of pursuing these efforts for peace, the Government of Somalia is colluding with external actors aiming to destabilize the region.
All those responsible for preparing and authorizing a new peace support mission must take into account the legitimate concerns of countries of the region and the TCCs. Forces trying to inflame tension for their short-term and futile objectives must shoulder the grave ramifications. Ethiopia cannot tolerate these actions that endanger the gains made against regional and international terrorist groups.
Ethiopia remains committed to the peaceful resolution of differences and to working with the people of Somalia and the international community to avert dangers to the peace and stability of the region
Somaliland House of Elders, commonly known as the Guurti, was originally conceived as a body that would embody the wisdom and traditions of Somaliland’s elders, ensuring that the nation’s governance was grounded in cultural and religious values while providing a stabilizing force in the young republic’s political landscape. However, in recent years, there has been growing public discontent with the Guurti, with many calling for its disbandment due to allegations of gross dereliction of duty, corruption, and a failure to fulfil its constitutional mandate.
More importantly, the House of Elders was created to play a crucial role in the nation’s governance by upholding religious and cultural values, ensuring security, and advising on government shortcomings. However, the Guurti’s deviation from its constitutional mandate, allegations of corruption, lack of accountability, and failure to represent the people, has led to widespread calls for its disbandment. As Somaliland continues to evolve, whether the Guurti can be reformed to meet the needs of a modern democratic society remains a pressing issue. For many, the answer lies in disbanding the Guurti and creating new structures that better reflect the values and aspirations of the people.
The Guurti was established with clear powers and duties under the Somaliland constitution, including the passing of legislation related to religion, traditions, and security; the review of legislation passed by the House of Representatives (excluding financial legislation); and advising on the shortcomings of government administration. However, critics argue that the Guurti has strayed far from these responsibilities, becoming more of a political entity than a traditional council of elders.
Instead of focusing on legislation related to religion, culture, and security, the Guurti is accused of engaging in political manoeuvring and supporting specific political agendas. This shift has led to a perception that the Guurti is no longer fulfilling its constitutional role as a neutral body that should advise on and support the government in matters of religion, security, and culture.
One of the most serious accusations against the Guurti is the widespread corruption and misuse of public funds. The Guurti is meant to assist the government in matters relating to the economy and society while consulting with traditional community leaders. However, instead of serving the public interest, there are claims that Guurti members have been misusing the budget for personal gain, disregarding the intended outputs of allocated funds. This misuse not only violates principles of transparency and accountability but also erodes public trust in the institution.
The Guurti’s constitutional duty includes advising on the shortcomings of the government and presenting such advice to the House of Representatives. Yet, there is a growing concern that the Guurti has failed to hold the government accountable. Rather than providing checks and balances on executive power, the Guurti is seen by many as complicit in governmental excesses, thus neglecting its responsibility to protect the interests of the people.
Another criticism levelled against the Guurti is its failure to adequately represent the diverse and evolving needs of Somaliland society. The House of Elders is supposed to reflect the wisdom and traditions of the nation’s elders, but in practice, it is often seen as an outdated institution that is out of touch with the broader population. This lack of effective representation has led to calls for reform or disbandment, as the Guurti is perceived to no longer align with the needs and aspirations of Somaliland’s younger generation.
A significant concern is the advanced age of many of the Guurti’s leaders, which has reportedly impaired their ability to effectively monitor the actions of their departments, particularly in finance. The trust placed in these departments by the elderly leaders is often exploited, leading to unchecked misuse of funds and other malpractices. This inability to provide rigorous oversight, especially in critical areas like finance, further compounds the issues of corruption and mismanagement that plague the Guurti, raising questions about its capacity to fulfil its duties.
The Guurti’s tenure has been extended multiple times without direct input from the public, raising serious concerns about its democratic legitimacy. According to the constitution, the Guurti has the power to review legislation approved by the House of Representatives, refer it back with written reasons, and summon members of the government to question them about their duties. However, its prolonged tenure without a clear mandate from the people undermines its role as a democratic institution. This has fueled arguments that the Guurti should be disbanded to ensure that governance structures in Somaliland remain accountable and representative of the will of the people
Finally, there is a strong argument that the Guurti, in its current form, impedes democratic progress in Somaliland. By engaging in political manoeuvring and resisting necessary reforms, the Guurti is seen as obstructing the development of a more democratic and accountable governance system. Its involvement in prolonging the terms of other governmental bodies without elections is viewed as particularly detrimental to the democratic process.
In light of Somalia’s recent intensification of pressure on Somaliland, including directives to airlines, financial institutions, and trade partners to refrain from using the name “Somaliland” in favor of “Somalia,” the de facto independent state is considering a comprehensive range of retaliatory measures. This move by Somalia is widely interpreted as a misreading of Somaliland’s willingness to engage in dialogue, perceiving it as a sign of weakness rather than a gesture of goodwill.
Diplomatic Offensive
Somaliland is preparing to launch a comprehensive diplomatic campaign in response to Somalia’s renewed aggression. This multi-faceted approach aims to protect Somaliland’s interests and raise international awareness of the situation.
Firstly, Somaliland has decided to suspend all ongoing talks and negotiations with Somalia. This decisive step underscores the seriousness of the situation and Somaliland’s refusal to engage in dialogue under duress.
A key component of this diplomatic offensive is to alert the international community and development partners to Somalia’s misuse of aid and developmental funds. Somaliland intends to demonstrate how these resources are being diverted to undermine Somaliland’s established democracy, security, stability, governance, and trade. This move aims to ensure transparency and accountability in regional aid distribution.
Furthermore, Somaliland plans to apprise the international community of the primary objective behind Somalia’s renewed aggression: to derail Somaliland’s 34-year-long success in governance and state-building. By highlighting this aspect, Somaliland seeks to frame the conflict not as a mere territorial dispute, but as a threat to regional stability and democratic progress.
In light of upcoming elections, Somaliland will enlighten its development partners and the international community about Somalia’s ill-concealed intention to foil these democratic processes. This includes exposing Somalia’s attempts to divert attention to other concerns of its own creation, potentially destabilizing the region.
Somaliland is set to intensify its outreach to international partners, reaffirming its sovereignty and seeking formal recognition from sympathetic countries. This push for recognition is crucial in solidifying Somaliland’s position on the global stage.
Appeals will be made to regional and international organizations such as the African Union, IGAD, EU, and BRICS. Somaliland will urge these bodies to take serious action against Somalia’s naked aggression and to support Somaliland in thwarting and cushioning the intended effects of Somalia’s actions.
Through these concerted diplomatic efforts, Somaliland aims to garner international support, protect its interests, and maintain the stability and progress it has achieved over the past three decades. The success of this diplomatic offensive could significantly influence the trajectory of the conflict and Somaliland’s standing in the international community.
Economic Countermeasures
Somaliland is exploring several options to mitigate the economic impact of Somalia’s actions. These include strengthening economic ties with countries that acknowledge its autonomy, diversifying trade routes and partnerships to reduce dependence on Somalia, and potentially imposing restrictions on Somali businesses operating within its borders. The further development of Berbera port is also under consideration as a means to compete with Mogadishu for regional trade dominance.
Legal and Public Relations Initiatives
Somaliland is gearing up to launch a comprehensive legal and public relations campaign to counter Somalia’s claims and reinforce its position on the international stage. On the legal front, Somaliland is preparing to challenge Somalia’s assertions of sovereignty in international courts or through arbitration. This bold move aims to expose the illegitimacy of the unratified 1960 union with Somalia, effectively undermining the legal basis of Somalia’s continued claims over Somaliland. Simultaneously, legal experts are being enlisted to bolster Somaliland’s case for independence, meticulously compiling historical documents, treaties, and legal precedents that support Somaliland’s right to self-determination and recognition as an independent state.
In a proactive stance, Somaliland is also exploring the possibility of seeking injunctions against companies and organizations complying with Somalia’s demands. This legal strategy could extend to multiple jurisdictions, aiming to prevent businesses from acquiescing to Somalia’s pressure to deny Somaliland’s existence. Furthermore, Somaliland is preparing to file human rights appeals with international bodies, highlighting potential violations of Somalilanders’ rights to self-determination and democratic governance that Somalia’s actions represent.
On the public relations front, Somaliland is crafting a multi-faceted approach to increase global awareness of its situation. A comprehensive media strategy is being developed, which includes engaging with international news outlets, organizing press conferences, and facilitating journalist visits to Somaliland. This traditional media outreach will be complemented by a robust digital diplomacy effort, leveraging social media and digital platforms to share Somaliland’s narrative directly with a global audience. The campaign will create compelling content highlighting Somaliland’s democratic achievements, stability, and distinct identity.
Recognizing the power of academic influence, Somaliland plans to engage with international academic institutions and think tanks to produce research and analysis supporting its case for recognition. This academic outreach will be bolstered by cultural diplomacy initiatives, showcasing Somaliland’s unique heritage and contemporary art scene through international exhibitions, performances, and cultural exchanges. These efforts aim to differentiate Somaliland’s identity from that of Somalia and build cultural bridges with the international community.
The Somaliland diaspora will play a crucial role in this campaign, being mobilized to act as ambassadors in their host countries. They will engage with politicians, media, and civil society to advocate for Somaliland’s cause, leveraging their unique position to influence opinion in key international arenas.
To underscore its commitment to good governance, Somaliland will launch transparency initiatives demonstrating its dedication to anti-corruption measures and responsible management of natural resources. This will be coupled with a campaign to showcase Somaliland’s economic potential, strategic location, and investment opportunities, aiming to generate international business interest and potentially create economic pressure for recognition.
Through this interwoven tapestry of legal and public relations strategies, Somaliland aims to mount a formidable challenge to Somalia’s claims, reinforce its own position, and garner international support for its sovereignty and recognition. These cohesive measures are designed to work in concert with diplomatic and economic initiatives, creating a robust and multi-faceted approach to asserting Somaliland’s independence and countering Somalia’s aggressive stance. By addressing both legal and public perception fronts, Somaliland is positioning itself to reshape the narrative around its status and future on the global stage.
Security and Internal Consolidation
Enhanced border security measures and increased military preparedness are being considered to assert territorial control and serve as a deterrent. Internally, efforts to reinforce national identity, strengthen domestic institutions, and invest in infrastructure are being prioritized to further differentiate Somaliland from Somalia and improve self-reliance.
Commercial and Infrastructure Development
Somaliland is encouraging local businesses to rebrand and distance themselves from Somali associations. Plans are underway to develop alternative financial networks and promote Somaliland as a distinct investment destination. Additionally, the establishment of direct air links with friendly nations and the development of independent telecommunication infrastructure are being explored to reduce reliance on Somali-controlled systems.
While these potential measures represent a robust response to Somalia’s aggressive stance, it is important to note that the situation remains complex and sensitive. Any actions taken by Somaliland will need to be carefully calibrated, taking into account regional dynamics and international law. As the situation unfolds, the international community watches closely, recognizing the potential implications for regional stability and the broader Horn of Africa
The Root of the Conflict: A Complex Historical Tapestry
The current tensions between Somaliland and Somalia have deep historical roots, tracing back to the formation of the Somali Republic in 1960. This union, which was never formally ratified, brought together the former British Somaliland Protectorate and Italian Somaliland. From its inception, the merger was fraught with challenges and inequalities that would set the stage for decades of conflict.
Unequal Partnership and Misinterpreted Referendum
The 1961 referendum, often cited as the foundation of the disenchantment with a domineering junior partner – Italian Somalia, was, in fact, a misinterpreted expression of Somaliland’s desires. Contrary to popular belief fed and fueled by Somalians, Somalilanders overwhelmingly voted against the proposed union. This crucial detail has been obscured over time, leading to misconceptions about the legitimacy of the unified state.
Moreover, the new republic’s distribution of power and resources was markedly unequal. Somaliland, despite its strategic location and resources, found itself marginalized in the new political landscape. This imbalance sowed the seeds of discontent growing over the following decades.
Shifting Identities and Broken Promises
The frequent changes to the government’s name and structure were not part of the original, unapproved deal. These alterations, often made unilaterally by the southern-dominated government, further eroded trust and reinforced the sense of betrayal felt by many Somalilanders.
The Siad Barre Regime and the Genocide of the 1980s
The situation deteriorated dramatically under the dictatorship of Siad Barre. In the 1980s, the regime unleashed a campaign of terror against the people of Somaliland, then known as the northern regions of Somalia. This campaign, widely recognized as genocide, involved the systematic destruction of cities, the looting of property, and mass killings of civilians.
The cities of Hargeisa and Burao were particularly hard-hit, with large portions of their infrastructure reduced to rubble by aerial bombardment. The human cost was staggering, with tens of thousands killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. This period of brutality left deep scars on the collective psyche of Somalilanders and solidified their resolve to seek independence.
The Path to De Facto Independence
In the wake of the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somaliland declared its independence, reverting to the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate. Since then, Somaliland has functioned as a de facto independent state, establishing its own government, currency, and armed forces. It has held multiple democratic elections and maintained relative stability in a region often characterized by conflict.
Despite these achievements, Somaliland’s quest for international recognition has been an uphill battle. Despite its internal challenges, Somalia has consistently opposed Somaliland’s claims to independence, insisting on the territorial integrity of a unified Somalia.
Regional Power Play and External Manipulation
The conflict between Somaliland and Somalia is further complicated by the strategic maneuvering of regional powers, particularly Turkey, Egypt, and Djibouti. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, and President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti appear to be exploiting the situation, using Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud as a pawn in their own political and strategic chess game. These leaders are leveraging their support for Somalia to protect and advance their respective interests in the Horn of Africa.
In exchange for providing Hassan Sheikh with the military and diplomatic clout he desperately needs on the international front, they are influencing Somalia’s policies and actions towards Somaliland. This support emboldens Somalia’s aggressive stance, as Hassan Sheikh attempts to bring Somaliland to its knees, believing he has the backing of these regional powers. The situation has been further intensified by the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between President Musa Bihi Abdi of Somaliland and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia. This agreement, which grants landlocked Ethiopia access to the sea through Somaliland, has sparked significant concern among the aforementioned regional players. Their opposition to this deal is rooted in the potential shift in regional power dynamics it represents, particularly the prospect of Ethiopia becoming the first country to boldly step forward and diplomatically recognize the Republic of Somaliland as the 55th sovereign state of Africa. Such recognition would effectively reinstate Somaliland’s 1960 pre-union status and could trigger a domino effect of international recognition.
This development has galvanized these regional leaders to intensify their support for Somalia’s claims, seeing the potential recognition of Somaliland as a threat to their strategic interests in the region. Consequently, what should be a bilateral issue between Somaliland and Somalia has transformed into a multi-faceted power struggle involving several nations, each with its own agenda. This complex web of interests not only threatens Somaliland’s hard-won stability and democratic progress but also risks turning the Horn of Africa into a battleground for competing regional ambitions, potentially undermining the entire region’s security and economic development. The MOU with Ethiopia has thus become a pivotal point in this geopolitical chess game, with Somaliland’s potential recognition hanging in the balance amid intense regional maneuvering.
Current Context
The recent aggressive moves by Somalia, including attempts to control Somaliland’s airspace and pressuring international partners to refrain from using the name “Somaliland,” are seen by many as a continuation of the historical pattern of marginalization and denial of Somaliland’s distinct identity and aspirations.
What Somalia appears to have not realized yet is that Somaliland and Somalilanders cannot be subdued or fazed by any amount of pressure. History proves this right.
As a former business owner in the USA, human resource (HR) challenges were among the least complicated issues my organization encountered. A reliable supply of skilled and unskilled labor was always available. In contrast, Somaliland businesses are currently facing a significant shortage of skilled and unskilled workers. Speaking with business owners ranging from small-scale ventures to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), it’s clear that a common challenge they all are facing is finding reliable and professionally trained local workforce. Somaliland’s labor deficit is attributed to a combination of inadequate education system, a lack of professional development, and insufficient cultural and vocational learning.
The workforce challenge stems from a flawed educational foundation, particularly at the elementary, middle and secondary levels. By the time students reach university, they have been conditioned to doing only the bare minimum when it comes to task performance. The education system, or rather the lack of an effective system, has failed to prepare students with the essential skills needed to compete in today’s fast-paced result driven work environment. In 2023, Somaliland allocated only 8.36% (slmof, n.d.) budget to education from its fiscal year budget towards education, a stark contrast to neighboring Ethiopia which allocated 24% (ukfiet, n.d.) of its national budget for education and Kenya allocated 30% (the-star, n.d.)of its national budget towards education. Consequently, the result of low budget is that Somaliland’s students attend school only four hours each school day, in comparison with students in neighboring Ethiopia, which offers six hours of daily learning, while Kenya provides 7.5 hours, giving their students a stronger educational foundation and an edge over Somaliland students.
Research has shown that when students attend longer school day they perform better academically and economically. Back in the early 1990s, several Latin American countries, including Chile, extended the school day from four to seven hours which led to higher educational accomplishments and increased incomes. Research from University of California, Berkley on the benefits of the extended school hours in Latin America states “the nature of these benefits is consistent with more time in school facilitating human capital accumulation, and the results show that large-scale investments in public education can generate long-term improvements in economic well-being” (dol.gov, n.d.). Somaliland government should increase its educational spending to enable students to attend longer school hours, helping them build a stronger educational foundation.
Although Somaliland universities are producing thousands of graduates with specialized college courses, they often lack providing training opportunities in work ethics and the discipline to commit to a full eight-hour working day to their students. Universities have the responsibility not only to award degrees but also to educate students on professionalism and performance standards. Unless the universities ‘actions are changed, it will limit the ability of existing businesses to grow and prevent new companies from entering the market. A ResumeNow study revealed “84% of polled believe that having a higher level of educational attainment drives better performance and 78% agree that promotion opportunities are greater with more education” (ResumeNow, n.d.).
My findings on how Kenya and Chile transformed their education system was implementing educational reform and government accountability. According to World Bank on Kenya’s education system “the government embarked on ambitious reforms which sought to improve the quality of education through several approaches: a competency-based curriculum (CBC), reforming professional teacher development, textbook policy, and management practices at the local level” (Worldbank, n.d.). Somaliland’s education system on the other hand has been associated with lack of accountability and poor higher education governance that resulted in a disconnect between the curriculum and domestic demand for technical skills. To empower the next generation of students and leaders, the government must align the mission and vision of the education systems with the country’s long-term strategy. The Ministry of education should lead by example and maintaining a more visible presence in the schools and actively listening to the feedback of all stakeholders. It is vital that the Ministry’s involvement extends outside just the national examination period to prove genuine and continuous engagement with all stakeholders.
Culture considerably impacts work performance in Somaliland, as many parents do not emphasize the importance of pursuing and excelling at work from a young age. It is fundamental for parents to instill a strong work ethic and appreciation for hard work in their children. At the same time, the education system should implement one day a year in which parents are encouraged to take their children to work, giving them an early opportunity to learn the value of work and the benefits it provides.
In order to resolve the current HR matters, the government, private businesses, and the community must work together to achieve sufficient workforce in Somaliland. My recommendation to the government is to implement comprehensive changes management across the entire education system, including curriculum updates, quality teachers hiring, professional development, and ongoing support for teachers. In light of the increased number of foreign technical workers in the country, 27% per the ministry of labor, I urge the government to establish more technical schools to address the current shortage of skilled workers. Furthermore, the Ministry of education should incentives students to attend technical and vocational schools offering scholarships and internships with local businesses and government departments. The business communities must also take part in investing the progress of the next generation of our children by offering them internships and mentorship to students at early stage and let us remember that “it takes a village to raise a child”. Parents should “model the way” for their children by demonstrating strong work ethics and consistently completing tasks, serving as positive role models. At the same time all citizens have a shared responsibility and in this upcoming election to ask the running candidates what they plan to do about the current failed education system in the country to have a better future.
God bless Somaliland.
Mohamed Ibrahim Haji Abdi, holds a BSBA/MBA, previously served as an editor at Somaliland Press and currently lives in Hargeisa, Somaliland.
Osen, G. (2024, June 14). Education among budget winners after getting Sh656 billion. The Star. https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2024-06-14-education-among-budget-winners-after-getting-sh656-billion/
World Bank Group. (2022). Kenya Economic Update: Lessons from Kenya’s Education Reforms. In World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/publication/lessons-from-kenya-s-education-reforms
Mohamed Abib, a member of parliament in Somaliland, has emerged as one of the most contentious political figures in the region. Known for his fiery rhetoric and controversial statements, Abib has become a polarizing force in Somaliland’s political landscape, with his actions now drawing legal scrutiny and raising security concerns.
Abib, who hails from the Awdal region, has gained notoriety for his persistent claims that the Somali National Movement (SNM) caused harm to Awdal during Somaliland’s struggle for independence. However, he paradoxically acknowledges that today, Awdal does not lag behind other regions in Somaliland in terms of development. This contradictory stance has raised eyebrows among political observers and citizens alike.
One of the most concerning aspects of Abib’s political behavior is his frequent use of inflammatory language, particularly when addressing high-ranking government officials. He has repeatedly engaged in verbal attacks against the President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, often using language that many consider disrespectful and unbecoming of a parliamentarian. These actions have contributed to heightened political tensions and have sometimes overshadowed important policy discussions.
The situation has escalated to a point where the Somaliland Attorney-General’s office has requested the House of Representatives to strip Abib of his parliamentary immunity. This unprecedented move would allow Abib to face court charges ranging from treason to defamation. The House’s decision on this matter is pending, adding a layer of legal drama to the political tension.
Despite the looming threat of legal action, Abib has not tempered his rhetoric. Instead, he has intensified his accusations and verbal attacks. More alarmingly, his recent statements have included elements that pose a palpable threat to the security of Somaliland and the broader region. This escalation has raised serious concerns among security experts and political analysts about the potential ramifications of his words on the stability of the nation.
Abib’s penchant for holding frequent and fiery press conferences has become a hallmark of his political strategy. During these events, he often makes caustic remarks that grab headlines but rarely offers constructive solutions to the issues he raises. This approach has led to mixed reactions among the populace. While some, particularly in his home region of Awdal, view him as a vocal advocate for their interests, others see his rhetoric as divisive and potentially harmful to Somaliland’s unity.
The impact of Abib’s statements on Somaliland’s social cohesion is a matter of growing concern. His comments often touch on sensitive tribal and regional issues, which can exacerbate existing tensions within the society. This has led to worries, especially among the diaspora community, that his rhetoric could undermine the fragile peace and unity that Somaliland has worked hard to achieve.
Despite his high profile, Abib is not known for initiating or championing significant development projects or fundraising efforts for his constituents. This lack of tangible achievements stands in stark contrast to his vocal presence in the media and political circles.
Political analysts argue that while Abib has the power to influence public opinion, his approach often falls short of providing lasting and effective solutions to the real problems facing Somaliland. There is a growing call for political leaders like Abib to move beyond divisive rhetoric and instead focus on constructive dialogue and actions that can foster unity and progress across all regions of Somaliland.
In the past, many Somalilanders, including some of his constituents, afforded MP Abib the benefit of the doubt, viewing his provocative statements as passionate, if misguided, advocacy. However, as his rhetoric has escalated and the potential consequences of his actions have become more apparent, public opinion has shifted dramatically. Many of his former sympathisers have withdrawn their support, recognising that his inflammatory discourse poses a genuine threat to Somaliland’s stability and progress. This erosion of his support base underscores the growing consensus that Abib’s approach to politics is not only ineffective but potentially dangerous to the nation’s interests.
MP Mohamed Abib remains a controversial figure in Somaliland politics, now facing potential legal consequences for his actions. His fiery press conferences and caustic remarks continue to spark debate and division, with the added dimension of security threats heightening the stakes. As Somaliland strives for international recognition and internal stability, the case of Abib highlights the delicate balance between free speech, responsible leadership, and national security in a young democracy. The pending decision on his parliamentary immunity and the potential court cases against him may set important precedents for political conduct in Somaliland. The challenge for Somaliland’s political class, including Abib, is to channel their influence towards strengthening national unity and addressing the pressing needs of the population, rather than engaging in rhetoric that may threaten the cohesion and security of the state
