Home Blog Page 10

Somaliland: Las Anod’s Tragic Descent from Prosperity to a State of Delusional Non-Existence

0

2007, Somaliland’s forces triumphantly entered Las Anod, a town in the disputed Sool region, marking the beginning of a new chapter to the city and its residents. Over the next sixteen years, Somaliland poured resources into transforming this once-neglected town into a thriving urban center. Potable piped water, modern infrastructure, fully-equipped hospitals, boarding schools, and universities helped shape Las Anod into a place of opportunity and progress. The investments were a lifeline for a town that had long languished in neglect, enabling its residents to aspire to a brighter future.

Las Anod became a symbol of Somaliland’s ambition for regional growth and stability, a beacon of progress in the contested territory’s heart. However, behind the facade of development, deep-rooted tensions simmered, and by late 2022, those tensions exploded into violence, leading to a full-blown rebellion that culminated in Somaliland’s humiliating withdrawal from the town in August 2023.

Somaliland’s Investment in Development

For over a decade, Somaliland’s administration worked to build a modern Las Anod, a town that had long been viewed as peripheral to the core regions of the breakaway state. What was once a dilapidated collection of buildings became a city with paved roads, street lighting, and a public water system that many other towns in the Horn of Africa could only dream of. Education flourished as boarding schools and primary and secondary schools sprouted, and universities opened their doors to future generations. Healthcare services also blossomed; new hospitals offered modern medical care, reducing the region’s dependency on far-flung cities for treatment.

The town’s development was an unmistakable sign of Somaliland’s commitment to strengthening its hold over the Sool region. By investing in infrastructure and services, Somaliland hoped to win the loyalty of Las Anod’s residents, who had historically been sceptical of the government’s authority.

Yet, despite the tangible improvements, the seeds of discontent were being sown.

Extremist Influence and Political Opportunism

While Somaliland was building the city’s infrastructure, forces working against the government were infiltrating the population, laying the groundwork for future rebellion. Extremist elements, including Al-Shabaab sleeper cells, quietly made their way into Las Anod. These groups began a slow but deliberate campaign of manipulation, targeting the town’s most vulnerable residents to dupe a hapless population to believe that Somaliland security elements were picking off the cream of their society despite the preposterousness of the idea.  Over time, these extremists planted the idea that Somaliland’s government was not a force for good but an oppressive regime that had overstayed its welcome. The narrative began to shift, and skepticism of the government grew.

Compounding this, local political factions within Somaliland saw an opportunity to turn the growing unrest to their advantage. One opposition party in particular began stoking anti-government sentiment, amplifying grievances and fanning the flames of rebellion. These political actors saw an opportunity to undermine Somaliland’s ruling party by aligning themselves with elements pushing for autonomy or a break from Somaliland altogether.

The situation became untenable as a series of high-profile assassinations rocked the town. Key figures in Las Anod’s society—business leaders, intellectuals, and elders—were systematically eliminated, with the blame squarely placed on Somaliland’s security forces. As the killings continued, anger toward the government reached a fever pitch, and extremist elements capitalized on the chaos, deepening the divide between Las Anod’s residents and the government.

From Protest to War

By December 2022, tensions had reached a boiling point. The assassination of a local politician sparked violent protests, with demonstrators clashing with Somaliland security forces. The town was in turmoil, and the unrest quickly spiraled out of control. Dhulbahante clan leaders, who had long harbored suspicions about Somaliland’s intentions, declared that the town would no longer recognize Somaliland’s authority. In early 2023, they proclaimed the creation of the SSC-Khatumo state, aligning themselves with Somalia and rejecting Somaliland’s sovereignty.

Somaliland’s forces, confident they could quash the rebellion, launched a military campaign to regain control of Las Anod. What followed was a brutal and protracted conflict, as Dhulbahante militias, bolstered by support from Puntland and Somalia, put up fierce resistance. For nearly 20 days, Las Anod became a war zone, with house-to-house combat devastating the town. Somaliland’s military strategy, initially focused on quickly reclaiming the city, devolved into indiscriminate shelling as militias outgunned their forces. The fighting displaced over 185,000 of an estimated total town population of around 200 000 to 250000 people, most of whom fled to seek refuge in neighbouring areas.

Las Anod Falls to Chaos

In August 2023, after months of intense fighting and mounting casualties, Somaliland’s forces were forced to retreat from Las Anod, marking the end of the government’s 16-year control over the town. The withdrawal was a moment of reckoning for Somaliland, whose investments in Las Anod had been undone by the very forces it had sought to protect the town from​.

As Somaliland troops withdrew, the town was left in the hands of militias, war profiteers, and extremists who quickly moved to fill the power vacuum. The artificially germinated, fictionally conceived, ‘politically encouraged (at certain quarter) soon turned into a revolution of a kind and ethnic hatred the likes of which were last seen in the late ’80s in Somaliland, leaving the town a desolate image of its former self. The emerged groups began exploiting the ensuing chaos, making millions of dollars off the misery of the displaced population. Hospitals, schools, and businesses that had been symbols of the town’s progress were left in ruins. Las Anod, once a beacon of Somaliland’s regional ambitions, was now a battleground for competing interests.

Extremists, to make matters worse, turned the area into a no-man’s land that opened up to extremists as training grounds in the guise of building clan militias. Known Shabab leaders such as one Abdi-Madoobe openly preach invasions into other Somaliland regions to spread the chaos and lawlessness further calling himself the Chief of Staff of the SSC Dervishes.

Clash of Visions Over Spoils

The dispute between Garad Jama Garad Ismail and Garad Jama Garad Ali, two influential leaders in the Las Anod rebellion, underscores the evolving political landscape in the Sool region, where clan allegiances and aspirations for autonomy have come into sharp focus. Garad Jama Garad Ismail advocates for Sool’s alignment with the Federal Government of Somalia, envisioning the region as an autonomous federal state under Mogadishu’s jurisdiction. This move would allow for self-governance within the larger framework of a unified Somalia, rather than being part of Somaliland, which has long sought independence. Ismail’s position, however, is as unworkable as that of his opponent since the SSC jurisdiction of territories does not comply with federal constitutional parameters. SSC does not control even one full region let alone the two and half the Somalia constitutes stipulates.

On the other hand, Garad Jama Garad Ali argues for a different strategy, one rooted in pragmatism and regional alliances. He contends that SSC (Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn) cannot stand alone as an independent entity and should instead join forces with Puntland, a region largely controlled by the Harti-Darod clan, to which the Dhulbahante belong. Ali’s argument leans on the shared cultural and clan ties between SSC and Puntland, advocating for greater cooperation and integration with Puntland’s governance structure as a way to bolster regional strength against external threats, particularly from Somaliland forces.

This difference in strategic visions has led to a significant rift, with Ismail’s vision seen as a path toward federalism within Somalia, while Ali’s approach is more about consolidating power within a broader clan-based alliance. The discourse reflects deeper clan dynamics, where allegiances are shaped by both historical grievances and the current political realities on the ground. As both leaders push their respective agendas, the situation risks escalating into a broader clan-driven conflict, especially as external actors such as Puntland play a role in influencing the outcome. The ongoing war of words between these two leaders is reflective of the broader complexities in Somali politics, where clan affiliations, territorial control, and the struggle for autonomy intersect​

Moreover, most of the Dhulbahante now believe that Garad Jama Ali (dubbed by many as the ‘illegitimate Garad’) got unbelievably rich by projecting himself as the ultimate leader of the SSC rising from a one-suit village chief to a jet-hopping millionaire living off the contributions that poured into his accounts to finance a SSC state.

The Role of International Actors

The international community, particularly Western countries and development partners inadvertently exacerbated the situation. While well-meaning, their calls for peace and human rights often appeared to side with the insurgents, providing tacit support for the rebellion. International aid that was meant to alleviate suffering sometimes ended up reinforcing the insurgents’ control over the region. The perception of foreign involvement, particularly by Somaliland, added another layer of complexity to the conflict, further complicating efforts for reconciliation.

 A Region Wound Back in Time

Today, the Las Anod and Sool region that Somaliland once knew is no more. The town’s development clock has been wound back by decades. The schools, hospitals, and infrastructure that once made the town a regional success story have been destroyed or abandoned. Somaliland, having poured so much into the town’s development, sees the rebellion as a deep betrayal, and reconciliation seems far off. The people of Las Anod, now under the rule of militias and insurgents, face a precarious future as they navigate a new reality defined by instability and violence.

The involvement of Puntland and Somalia, both of whom played significant roles in the rebellion, has further complicated the situation. The town, once a part of Somaliland’s fold, is now a pawn in a larger geopolitical struggle between Somaliland, Puntland, and Somalia. False accusations, regional alliances, and the desire for territorial control have turned Las Anod into a symbol of the fragility of progress in the Horn of Africa.

Can Las Anod Be Saved?

Despite the devastation, there remains a glimmer of hope for reconciliation. A mutually acceptable path forward will require both sides—Somaliland and the people of Las Anod—to come to the table with a willingness to address their grievances. Somaliland could look to traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, rooted in the region’s history, as a way to rebuild trust. Offering a pathway to reintegration, with guarantees of local governance and representation, might help ease tensions

For the people of Las Anod, the rejection of extremist influence and the embrace of dialogue with Somaliland may be the only way to restore peace and stability to their town. The international community, for its part, must ensure that its interventions are balanced and do not inadvertently support militancy or further inflame the conflict.

In the end, the tragedy of Las Anod serves as a reminder of how fragile development and stability can be. In the blink of an eye, years of progress were undone, and a once-thriving town was plunged into chaos. If Somaliland and the people of Sool can find a way to bridge their differences, perhaps Las Anod can rise from the ashes and once again become a beacon of hope in a region too often defined by conflict.

Somaliland: Darlington Gacmadheere Foundation Comes of Age

0

Achievements of the institution in its 13th anniversary

Edna Aden profoundly lauds Prof Eid’s initiatives

By M.A. Egge

The Darlington-Gacmo-dheere-Foundation held an event on Tuesday in Hargeisa to celebrate the 13th anniversary of the establishment of the organization which mainly caters for education scholarships.

This event, which was held at Hotel Mansoor in Hargeisa, presented the achievements of the Darlington Gacma-Dheere Foundation during its 13-year existence and was attended by various eminent personalities, leaders and numerous state officials.

The Darlington Gacmo-dheere Foundation is a non-profit organization that aims to improve the education of young people in Somaliland who cannot afford to pay for tertiary education, and at the same time they are getting help in high schools.

The organization was founded by the students who graduated from the Ex-Sheikh School and named after their beloved teacher Richard R. Darlington  who was locally known by the nickname Gacmadheere, meaning ‘long hands’.

Revealed at the event was the fact that the organization has so far sponsored 82 students from the regions of Somaliland; fifty eight (58) students have already graduated from different colleges and now they have found different jobs in different parts of Somaliland in different fields. The organization pays for university tuition fees as well as textbooks.

Sponsored students studied in various faculties such as Business, Law, Medicine, Engineering, ICT, Education, Lab techniques, Public Health etc with the students freely choosing the institutions or courses they want faculties they want such as Hargeisa University, Amoud University, Golis University, Sanaag University, Burao University, Berbera University and Nugaal University.

Professor Eid Ali Ahmed who is the main force behind the foundation spoke in depth about the stages the program has gone through and the way they select the students whom they award the scholarships.

He beamed with contentment when he narrated that one day as he was entering a mosque a young man greeted him and when he sought the youth’s introduction he was informed that the young man happened to be one of the recipients of the foundation’s scholarship and was now an employed engineer.

The young man, said the professor, was from Badan.

“The students we sponsored came from different areas like Badan, Lasaanood, Zeyla, Erigavo, Burao, Hargeisa, Berbera, they come from all areas of Somaliland. For instance we do not know the 7 students sitting here but we know that they were the best students and are really quite hard working people”.

He pointed out that they provided education to deserving students from low income families.

Of the 58 students have already graduated from the sponsorship programme, about twenty nine are fresh graduates with 13 of them having studied medicine, 6 are civil engineering graduates, 5 are ICT, and the rest did Nursing, Nutrition and Agricultural courses.

The Chairman of Higher Education of the Republic of Somaliland Prof. Suleiman Dirir Abdi greatly praised the Darlington Gacma-dheere Foundation for their fete in seeing to it that deserving students are financed in education.

He described the foundation as a light and a candle for the nation of Somaliland, and he pledged that his organization would support the programme.

He said that the higher education board will see to it that such students are supported even further. He also spoke about the history of Richard Darlington in whose honour the programme is named.

The chairman of the independent banking association of Somaliland, Mr. Khalif Noor, also spoke at the venue and expressed his elation to the programme and its achievements.

On her part Dr. Adna Adan Ismail profoundly lauded the initiatives done by Prof Eid and mentioned that the practical performance of the Darlington Gacma-dheere Foundation as being a result of just and equal examinations and tests subjected to the deserved recipients.

She said, “Professor Eid, I applaud the work that Darlington Foundation is fronting, I am very grateful to you, and the students who passed the test that made it possible for you to get a free education at Darlington – Foundation through your own prowess”.

She hoped that such compassion, goodwill, humanity and patriotism depicted may be instilled upon the youth of Somaliland and wished them well in their endeavours.

The former Vice President of the Republic of Somaliland, Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah, praised the efforts made by the foundation and their vision in advancing education in the nation by supporting the under-privileged.

He said. “I am grateful to the Darlington Foundation, when listening to their moving stories, these young people deserve to be role models”.

He continued, “In fact, this institution of Darlington Gacma-dheere Foundation is the foundation of Professor Eid Ali Salaan, who put in a lot of energy and tirelessly worked on it”.

He spoke at length on the ideals the late Darlington stood for and described him as a father figure.

A happy recipient of the scholarship, Farhan Farah Ali, narrated his experience since Prof. Eid first broke the news to him and told him to register himself at Burao University under the programme.

He hailed the transparency in the awarding system and was elated when he informed the audience that upon finishing his accounting degree he got a job with the local bottling company SBI and have since risen up the ranks to head its sales division.

He profusely thanked the foundation and its vision.

Guest of honour Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah lastly presented certificates to the esteemed members of the foundation who have put their selfless efforts into the programme.

Somaliland: We are not insulting anyone, but we are defending the nation, says Information DG

0

By M.A. Egge

The Director General of the Ministry of Information, Culture and National Guidance Mr. Mustafe Abdi Isse has called for the preservation and heralding of culture and its positive tenets.

The DG expressed the sentiments as he held a meeting with the staffers of the department of culture at the ministry’s headquarters.

He noted that the culture department of the ministry held in trusteeship the preservation and impartation of culture and its wisdom and associated positive norms, to and for the nation.

On the other hand, he urged the artistes to uphold expected etiquettes that befit cultural wisdom.

He said that the Department of Culture and the Ministry of Information is not a place to attack individuals or produce malicious plays, songs and messages directed to specific individuals, but instead they cater for the preservation, upholding and heralding cultural norms and social etiquettes that further cohesion and solidarity amongst the people of the nation.

He said, “It is good that we work together, and work well together. We do not want anyone to be insulted. This is the department of culture and national guidance. We do not produce insulting plays, insulting songs, mocking comedies”.

He continued, “We are bringing out something that is useful for the society and we give guidance that is useful to, and for, the nation and defending the country”.

Unskilled workers in Berbera lose jobs to foreigners

0

Since mid-June, Abdirahman Ibrahim Mohamed’s family of 10 has struggled to eat a meal once a day after he lost his construction job in Berbera, in Somaliland’s Sahil region, where he had been working for several years.

He is one of hundreds of construction workers who have become unemployed as construction companies started hiring foreign workers to replace them.

Abdirahman explained that the loss of his job has affected his family in all aspects of life, leading them into uncertainty. Currently, they rely on occasional $50 remittances from relatives abroad, which is a far cry from the amount he used to earn.

“For the past three months, I have only worked for 10 days. I managed with what I earned during those days, and for the rest I had to either borrow or find other means of survival. This is all due to the lack of work. You can see how tough things have become now,” he told Radio Ergo.

Abdirahman was in construction for 24 years and had no alternative plan in place. His earnings, which ranged between $300 and $450 monthly, were enough to sustain his family.

As the sole breadwinner of his family, he feels increasing anxiety, particularly as he visits construction sites daily hoping to find work but usually returning empty-handed.

“The difference between night and day is stark. Previously, I had work, and I could provide for my family and even help others. But now, I can’t give anything to anyone, not even my dependents,” he complained.

He has been unable to pay for the education of seven of his children in middle and high school. He used to spend $80 a month on their education, but now his father has stepped in to cover these costs.

Abdirahman attributed the loss of local jobs to the influx of foreign workers from Kenya, Uganda, and Bangladesh, who are hired because they accept lower wages.

“There is no special skill they have over us. The only difference is that one person can do several tasks—being a carpenter, electrician, and metalworker all at once—while here, three local citizens, each specialising in one of these skills, are needed. The companies opt for one foreigner who can do it all, and sometimes have to lay off four locals who were doing the same job,” he observed.

Abdirahman and his family were pastoralists in Togdher region until he moved to Berbera 33 years ago after drought and disease decimated their livestock. With no other skills, manual labour in the city became his only option.

The unemployment issue has affected most casual workers for construction companies in Berbera. Many say their job opportunities have declined over the last two years, with 2024 being the worst year yet.

Diriye Abdi Jama, who also works in construction, shared a similar story. For the past three months, his family of eight has faced severe food insecurity. Diriye’s monthly income ranged between $300 and $400, which provided adequately for his family.

“This situation has hit my children the hardest. I have six kids and a wife, and we live in a rented house. The water tank costs $70 per refill, and the children’s school fees are $80. Rent is $60. It has caused so much stress that I have started getting grey hair early. Every day I wonder where to find something for my family,” Diriye told Radio Ergo.

He fears eviction because he has been unable to pay his rent for several months and owes $300.

Diriye explained that this year alone, they have taken their issue to the government four times but have received no response. He used to work over 20 days a month, but now he only works two or three days.

Mubarak Aydid, an engineer at the local Daar Construction Company, said they prefer to hire citizens but often turn to foreign workers since many locals don’t meet their job expectations.

“The foreign worker arrives with multiple skills. He can handle several tasks, whereas some of our workers waste time due to distractions like chewing khat and other habits. We expect eight hours of work, but they sometimes only give us four or five,” Mubarak explained.

Director of Somaliland’s Ministry of Employment for the Sahil region, Farhan Mohamed Hassan, stated that around 3,200 foreign workers were employed in Berbera’s construction sector, while approximately 10,000 to 12,000 locals worked in the same industry.

“The demand for skilled workers in Berbera’s large-scale projects led to the influx of foreign workers. We are aware of the concerns from local workers, and we are working on a solution. Locals have a right to these jobs, as per our labour laws and constitution,” Farhan said.

He emphasised the need for Somaliland’s labour force to improve their skills, suggesting that each worker should be able to perform at least two different tasks to reduce reliance on foreign workers and alleviate local unemployment.

The Last Will and Testament of a Dictator: Djibouti’s Precarious Transition from Guelleh and Its Global Reverberations

0

As Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s once-iron grip on Djibouti loosens, the Horn of Africa teeters on the brink of upheaval. Whispers of the president’s failing health have begun to circulate through diplomatic channels, lending an air of urgency to discussions about the country’s future. While such rumors are often exaggerated in the world of geopolitics, they serve as a stark reminder of an immutable truth: Guelleh, like all mortals, will one day depart the stage. This inescapable reality casts a long shadow over Djibouti’s political landscape, forcing regional and global powers to confront the implications of a post-Guelleh era.

The potential power vacuum left by Guelleh’s eventual exit threatens to unleash a perfect storm of domestic instability and international power plays that could reshape the geopolitical landscape far beyond Djibouti’s borders. Guelleh’s regime, while repressive, has maintained a delicate balance between ethnic factions, foreign interests, and economic pressures. However, Guelleh’s failure to craft a coherent succession plan—a political testament—has left Djibouti exposed to chaos. This oversight leaves the nation vulnerable to chaos and opportunism in the wake of his departure, whether through natural causes or political upheaval

In the aftermath of Guelleh, both the U.S. and China will likely vie to install their favored proxies at the helm of the government. Yet this power struggle will only serve to exacerbate Djibouti’s already volatile domestic situation. As these giants compete for influence, the country risks descending into political fragmentation, economic stagnation, and potentially, civil unrest. The U.S., having focused solely on maintaining military dominance without investing in local governance or economic resilience, could find itself marginalized in Djibouti’s next chapter. China, with its calculated approach, may exploit this vacuum, tightening its grip on the region.

The fragility of Djibouti’s political system cannot be overstated. Guelleh’s iron-fisted rule has systematically eroded the country’s institutions, leaving them ill-equipped to manage a transfer of power. The judiciary is a tool of the regime. The electoral commission is a mere rubber stamp. Even the military, traditionally a stabilizing force in many African nations, is a wild card. Guelleh has cultivated personal loyalty among its leadership, raising the specter of factional infighting or even a coup in his absence.

Lurking beneath the surface are simmering ethnic tensions. The majority Issa and minority Afar communities have a history of conflict, kept in check by Guelleh’s calculated balance of power. His exit could reignite these divisions, plunging the country into unrest. The stakes extend far beyond Djibouti’s borders, threatening regional stability and global trade routes.

Djibouti’s escalating debt to China, now over 70% of its GDP, has shackled the nation to Beijing’s economic will, placing it on the brink of economic collapse. Despite IMF warnings, Guelleh’s borrowing spree continues, playing into China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ through projects like the Doraleh Port. This strategic asset could fall under Beijing’s control, granting China unprecedented leverage over one of the world’s most crucial maritime chokepoints. The ability to monitor or potentially interfere with maritime traffic at the mouth of the Red Sea would be a strategic coup for China, shifting power dynamics not just in the Horn of Africa, but across the Middle East and beyond.

Meanwhile, the U.S. now stands on the verge of strategic obsolescence, its influence fading in the shadow of China’s rise. Years of myopic focus on counterterrorism in Somalia have left Washington unprepared for the complexities of a post-Guelleh Djibouti. The State Department’s Africa Affairs division and AFRICOM’s lack of strategic foresight have resulted in a policy vacuum. While the U.S. has been fixated on maintaining its military foothold at Camp Lemonnier, China has been playing a long game of economic and political influence

France, long Djibouti’s primary ally and protector, finds itself treading a delicate line between maintaining its foothold and resisting China’s expanding reach. Recent developments underscore the precariousness of America’s position. Djibouti’s increasingly erratic foreign policy moves, particularly its tacit support for Houthi forces, have sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles. This apparent realignment threatens to transform Djibouti from a stabilizing force in the region to a potential enabler of maritime insecurity. Rumors of Guelleh’s government imposing restrictions on AFRICOM’s operational capabilities suggest a deliberate effort to constrain the U.S. military’s ability to project power.

Adding to this complex tableau is the rise of the Republic of Somaliland, Djibouti’s neighbor to the south. Somaliland’s ascent threatens to redraw the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical map. With Ethiopia poised to reroute trade to Berbera, Djibouti’s lifeblood—its control over regional commerce—could be drained. The UAE’s investment in Berbera is as much about countering Turkish influence in Somalia as it is about economic opportunity. As Somaliland gains clout, pressure for international recognition may grow, potentially redrawing the political map of the Horn of Africa.

As Djibouti approaches the inevitable end of Guelleh’s rule, the stakes could not be higher. What happens next will ripple across the region, shaping the balance of power not only in the Horn of Africa but in the global corridors of trade and influence. The battle for Djibouti’s future will be fought on multiple fronts – political, economic, and strategic. The outcome of this struggle will have profound implications not just for the Horn of Africa, but for global trade and power dynamics. As Guelleh’s reign draws to a close, the world must brace for turbulence in this small but pivotal nation. The question is not whether change will come to Djibouti, but what form it will take and who will shape it. The answer may well determine the future of East Africa and beyond.

Somaliland is where India can counter China in east Africa

0

India should develop closer relations with Somaliland, especially by using its port. This could provide India a valuable tool for countering China’s influence along the eastern coast of Africa.

In looking for access to the Red Sea, India should avoid overcrowded Djibouti and opt for Somaliland’s port of Berbera. Berbera handles 1/10 as much traffic as Djibouti’s port, but it is growing, thanks to investment by Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which are new members of the BRICS grouping and key partners for India.

India has frequently deployed anti-piracy patrol boats and warships to the Gulf of Aden, north of Somaliland, to maintain stability in the region. As India strives to gain more influence, Somaliland itself could become India’s strategic lynchpin.

Somaliland’s location and history hold key advantages for India. A breakaway region of Somalia, it controls an 850km coastline along the Red Sea, and Berbera is one of Africa’s busiest ports. Before a civil war destroyed Berbera, the British used the port to connect Ethiopia with India. And earlier this year, Ethiopia signed a historic deal with Somaliland to gain commercial and military access to the port.

In developing closer relations, India would be joining Somaliland’s growing network of partnerships. In striking contrast to Somalia and many other African countries, Somaliland is relatively stable and has been a democracy for more than 30 years. Despite being broadly unrecognised as a sovereign state, it has begun partnering with many countries. Its capital, Hargeisa, hosts consulates of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Turkey, as well as liaison offices of Britain, Denmark, the UAE, Egypt and Kenya.

India and Somaliland already share strong trade relations. Somaliland imports various goods from India: food, petroleum, gas, machinery, building materials, apparel, tobacco, pharmaceuticals and cars. India is one of Somaliland’s major trading partners by container volume, along with the UAE, China, Turkey, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.

Berbera port’s impressive operations and location within Africa make it a strategic asset for India. Last year, Berbera ranked even above Kenya’s port of Mombasa in the World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index.

It is also well placed for India to establish a naval base. From it, India could counter Pakistan’s attempt to spread Islamist extremism in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the regional influence of the Chinese army, which has a base in Djibouti.

Closer ties with Somaliland could also strengthen India’s relationship with the UAE, which has invested US$300 million in expanding Berbera port and the nearby free trade zone. Among other extensive investment and aid to Somaliland, the UAE is co-developing the Berbera Corridor with Ethiopia to connect that landlocked country to the port. In return for such help, Somaliland will allow the UAE to establish an air and naval base in Berbera.

The UAE has already docked ships at Berbera, about 250km south of Yemen, where the Saudi-led coalition that includes UAE troops was recently fighting Houthi rebels.

Because Ethiopia and the UAE became members of the BRICS in 2023, closer collaboration with them could enhance India’s status within grouping and provide opportunities for accessing Berbera port. Ethiopia is leading the way by shifting all its commerce to Berbera.

Crucially, a stronger bond with Somaliland would help India counter China’s influence in the region. In 2020, Somaliland recognised Taiwan. It continues to support Taiwan diplomatically, despite intense pressure from China and lobbying by members of the opposition Waddani Party. However, given the small size of its economy and lack of broad diplomatic recognition, Somaliland will not be able to resist China’s influence for too long—unless India shows up.

If India established a stronger economic presence in Somaliland, it would benefit Indian businesses and enhance Somaliland’s prosperity. As African countries increasingly seek to extricate themselves from China’s debt-trap diplomacy and look for alternatives, India’s growing engagement in the region could inspire other fence-sitters to eschew finance from China.

India must revisit its Africa strategy and partner with other like-minded countries to counter China’s influence in the region. Closer relations with Somaliland are crucial in developing a pax-India—a zone of influence for India—along the east African coast.

Samir Bhattacharya is an associate fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme of the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Somaliland to deploy iris biometric equipment donated by Taiwan for November polls

0

Iris biometrics devices donated by Taiwan to Somaliland for election in that East African country in 2021 will still be deployed for upcoming elections in the country in November.

This is according to Taiwan’s Ambassador to Somaliland, Allen Lou. The diplomat mentioned this recently as he announced fresh support of $2 million given by Taiwan to the country in preparation for the presidential and national party elections to take place in six weeks from now.

The official said the equipment donated four years ago will be used in six of the country’s cities during the general elections scheduled for November 13, according to Taiwan News.

In 2021, the government of Taiwan donated 2,500 iris biometric voter verification devices estimated at $2 million to help Somaliland’s National Election Commission (NEC) organize parliamentary and local government elections that year.

Iris ID has previously confirmed to Biometric Update that its iris biometrics software and hardware are part of the system, and it is working in partnership with South African integrator Neametrics Africa.

The new support of $2 million, the Taiwanese representative is quoted as saying, is part of their collaboration with Somaliland to “advance transparency, accountability, fairness, and trust of the 2024 Somaliland election.”

The Taiwanese official also praised the government of Somaliland for its commitment to democratic principles, describing the country as a beacon of democracy in East Africa.

The two countries have longstanding collaboration on various issues of mutual interest that touch on politics and the economy.

Somaliland, like Taiwan, functions as an independent country without much international recognition. It declared independence from Somalia in 1999, but it is not yet recognized by the United Nations.

Meanwhile, as the elections in Somaliland approach, the country is in full swing with preparations. Not only has the elections management agency field-tested the equipment to be deployed, it has also been holding meetings and campaigns urging people to take part in the elections.

Somaliland has used the holding of regular and credible elections to showcase its democratic maturity and assert its independence.

Third Conference of the Somaliland Economic Forum kicks-off next week

0

By M.A. Egge

The Minister of Finance Development of Somaliland, Dr. Saad Ali Shire, has announced that the Third Conference of the Somaliland Economic Forum will start on 8th 2024.

The conference brings together the government, businessmen and academics together in analyzing the economic issues of the country.

The minister revealed that this year’s theme was “economic development”, while pointing out that social services should be improved.

The conveners are the committee of cabinet ministries for economic affairs.

“This conference is the third one which brings together the government, businessmen and academics to discuss current and future economic issues, and its basis is cooperation between government agencies and investors and businessmen in the private sector out to boost businesses”.

Public Employees Retirement and Entitlement Bill Approved

0

By M.A. Egge

The Somaliland Senate, the GUURTI, unanimously approved the Law on Pensions, Entitlements rights of Government Employees, Law No. 108/2024, which was previously passed by the Somaliland House of Representatives.

The session was chaired by Speaker Hon. Suleiman Mohamoud Adan had 54 MPs seated and saw 47 of them pass the bill; four rejected it and 2 were silent.

The Speaker informed the members of the council that soon its members will be dispatched upcountry, to the regions and districts of the nation, so that the members can inform the community about the importance of maintaining and sustaining public security in the face of the elections, that is, in six weeks away.

Taiwan to donate NT$63 million to Somaliland National Election Commission

0

Taiwan to donate US$2 million to Somaliland National Election Commission

Taiwan working to strengthen Somaliland’s democracy

Taiwan has pledged to donate US$2 million (NT$63.26 million) to Somaliland’s National Election Commission (NEC) in support of its upcoming presidential election on Nov. 13.

Taiwan’s representative to Somaliland, Allen Lou, said on Sunday (Sept. 29), “Taiwan is proud to collaborate with the Somaliland Government to advance transparency, accountability, fairness, and trust of the 2024 Somaliland election.” Lou added that Somaliland is a “beacon of democracy in East Africa,” just as Taiwan is a beacon of democracy in East Asia.

The representative pointed out Taiwan also donated US$2 million to Somaliland’s 2021 parliamentary and local government election to purchase 2,500 sets of the Iris Biometric Voter Verification System.

The systems will be used in six cities during November’s election, Lou said.

Earlier on Sunday, Lou presided over the signing ceremony of a code of conduct for Somaliland’s political parties and associations.

“Freedom and democracy constitute the fundamental and common values that connect Taiwan and Somaliland to the international community,” Taiwan’s Somaliland office said in a Facebook post on Sunday.

NEC Chair Musa Hassan Yousuf visited Taiwan in January for a week-long trip to gain a deeper understanding of the electoral system. Yousuf met with then-Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) and stopped at the Central Election Commission and other institutions to learn more about Taiwan’s electoral system, election operations, and citizens’ political participation.

The East African nation has three political parties, including the Somaliland National Party, the Kulmiye Peace, Unity, and Development Party, and the Justice and Welfare Party.