The Trump administration’s approach to the Horn of Africa appears to undermine Turkey’s strategic interests in the region. Reports suggest that Trump may recognise the breakaway Republic of Somaliland in exchange for a naval base, with the controversial possibility that Somaliland might agree to take in Palestinians from Gaza. This aligns with Trump’s broader plan to evacuate the Gaza Strip of its population. Additionally, reports suggest that US pressure on Somalia led to the sacking of Somali Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, who has strong ties to Turkey.
US Recognition of Somaliland: A Game Changer for the Region
Rumours of a possible U.S. recognition of Somaliland first surfaced before Trump’s inauguration. His past actions, such as recognising Israeli sovereignty over Syria’s Golan Heights and Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, suggest he is willing to bypass international norms in such matters. Somaliland’s strategic location at the entrance to the Red Sea adds to its significance, especially as the region faces instability due to missile and drone attacks by Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthis) on military and commercial vessels, in response to Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza.
The U.S. already has military bases in Djibouti and leads Operation Prosperity Guardian against the Houthis. Establishing a naval base in Somaliland would further strengthen its presence in the region. Establishing a presence in Somaliland is also important for containing China’s influence in the region. Despite lacking international recognition and being involved in conflicts, Somaliland is more stable than Somalia, a fragile state and a terrorism hub. However, the potential relocation of Palestinians to Somaliland could spark widespread controversy and further destabilise the Horn of Africa. Turkey, a strong supporter of the Palestinians, including Hamas, would likely view this development as highly problematic.
Turkey has deep ties with Somalia, which firmly rejects Somaliland’s independence. Since 2017, Turkey has maintained its largest overseas military base close to the Somali capital of Mogadishu, where Turkish officers train Somali forces to combat the jihadist terrorist group al-Shabaab, which is an affiliate of Al-Qaeda. If the US recognises Somaliland, it would not only challenge Somalia’s sovereignty but also threaten Turkey’s investments and influence in the region.
US Pressure on Somalia
The Trump administration’s stance on Somalia has put additional pressure on Turkey’s influence. Following US demands, Somalia dismissed its Defence Minister, Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, due to his strong ties with Turkey. This move indicates a broader US policy shift away from supporting Turkey’s role in Somalia, despite Turkey’s contributions to Somali security.
Instead, Trump appears to align with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a country that has historically pursued mostly competing interests with Turkey in the region. The UAE has strong ties with Somaliland, having secured a military base in Somaliland’s Berbera in 2017. In 2021, DP World, a UAE-based logistics giant, opened a terminal at Berbera Port.
While the UAE has never officially recognised Somaliland, it has maintained its influence there. Despite a recent thaw in UAE-Somalia relations – likely influenced by the broader UAE-Turkey normalisation – the UAE never withdrew from Somaliland. Therefore, Trump’s possible recognition of the breakaway republic could undermine Turkey’s standing in the Horn of Africa in favour of the UAE.
Regional conflicts and Somaliland’s struggle for recognition
Ethiopia is another key player in the Horn of Africa, and its ambitions further complicate the situation. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1991 (formalised in 1993), Ethiopia has been the most populous landlocked country in the world. Desperate for access to the sea, Ethiopia initially attempted to secure maritime access through improved relations with Eritrea. In 2018, Ethiopia withdrew its forces from Eritrean territories it had occupied during the 1998–2000 war, hoping for Eritrean cooperation. However, Eritrea has yet to grant Ethiopia access to its ports.
Facing this obstacle, Ethiopia turned to Somaliland. In early 2024, the Ethiopian government signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, granting Ethiopia a 50-year lease for access to the Gulf of Aden. In return, Ethiopia was expected to recognise Somaliland as an independent state. This agreement alarmed Somalia, leading to fears of potential military escalation.
Turkey, leveraging its strategic partnerships with both Somalia and Ethiopia, intervened as a mediator. Ankara brokered an agreement where Ethiopia agreed to abandon its plans to recognise Somaliland and use its ports in exchange for Somalia pledging to work with Ethiopia on securing maritime access. This move not only protected Somalia’s territorial integrity but also reinforced Turkey’s influence in the region.
Turkey’s Long-Term Interests in Somalia and the Horn of Africa
Turkey’s presence in Somalia extends beyond military cooperation. In early 2024, Turkey and Somalia signed two critical agreements: a defence and maritime pact, under which Turkey pledged to build, train, and equip Somalia’s navy while also committing to protect Somalia’s territorial waters, and an oil and gas cooperation deal, securing Turkey’s access to Somalia’s offshore energy resources.
These agreements demonstrate Turkey’s long-term commitment to Somalia and its broader ambitions in the Horn of Africa. Turkey views Somalia as a gateway to expanding its political influence, defence cooperation, and economic investments in the region.
However, recent US policies threaten to disrupt this strategy. The Trump administration’s previous withdrawal of US troops from Somalia weakened the country’s fight against al-Shabaab. Although Biden later redeployed US forces, Trump’s return to office could mean another shift in policy. In February 2025, Trump ordered his first military strike of his new term against an ISIS-affiliate in Somalia, but experts argue that this does not signal a broader US military engagement in the country. Meanwhile, the US has frozen foreign aid, worsening Somalia’s humanitarian crisis and making the country even more reliant on partners like Turkey for stability and development.
If Trump recognises Somaliland, it could destabilise Somalia, harm Turkish economic and military interests, and further embolden the UAE to challenge Ankara’s influence. Given Turkey’s strategic priorities – ranging from security cooperation and energy access to transregional influence – Trump’s shift in policy presents a direct challenge to Ankara’s long-term goals in the Horn of Africa.
What’s next?
Trump’s Horn of Africa policy, particularly the potential recognition of Somaliland and the sidelining of Turkey’s role in Somalia, could have far-reaching consequences. Somaliland’s recognition by the U.S. could trigger a domino effect, prompting recognition from Ethiopia or the UAE. The potential resettlement of Palestinians in Somaliland, if pursued, would add another dimension of instability, affecting Turkey’s relations with both Somalia and the wider Middle East. While Turkey has successfully mediated tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, a US-backed recognition of Somaliland could severely undermine Ankara’s influence in the region.
Source: Brussels Morning Newspaper