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Somaliland’s Rising Stakes: A Test of Diplomacy, Resilience, and Survival

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By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin

As the sun rises over Somaliland’s rugged mountains and golden coastline, it casts its light on a nation caught in the crosshairs of history. For decades, Somaliland has fought to define itself as a beacon of democracy and stability in one of the world’s most volatile regions. Its peaceful elections, marked by the triumph of Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Ciro,” have once again placed this unrecognized state under the global spotlight. Yet, even as it celebrates its democratic gains, Somaliland finds itself encircled by a web of adversaries—regional and global powers united by a singular goal: to derail its march toward self-determination.

Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, China, and Turkey—each with their own agenda—are converging in an unholy alliance of geopolitical intrigue. They see in Somaliland not just a fledgling democracy but a potential disruptor of the status quo, a nation determined to carve its destiny free from the constraints of external control. For Somalia, Somaliland’s assertion of independence threatens its territorial integrity and political narrative. Somalia’s diplomatic machinery, fueled by allies such as Egypt and Qatar, works tirelessly to choke Somaliland’s quest for recognition at every international forum.

Suffice it just to mention Djibouti, the region’s traditional trade and maritime hub, views Somaliland as an emerging rival. Its leaders understand the implications of a recognized Somaliland, with its Berbera port poised to challenge Djibouti’s stranglehold on regional logistics and trade routes. Eritrea, ever the shadowy operator, sees an opportunity to maintain its influence by ensuring Somaliland remains isolated and embroiled in regional complexities.

But the stakes rise further with the entry of global powers. China, with its insatiable appetite for strategic outposts, is determined to extend its Belt and Road Initiative into Somaliland, not as a partner but as a master. Its opaque infrastructure deals and media manipulation campaigns are aimed at embedding its influence while ensuring Somaliland remains beholden to its economic leverage. Meanwhile, Turkey, with its eyes on military and economic dominance in the Horn of Africa, seeks to align with Somalia and other regional players to block Somaliland’s aspirations.

These forces are not just vying for influence; they are engaging in active destabilization. Proxy actors, economic isolation tactics, disinformation campaigns, and military posturing are the weapons of choice. Somaliland, perched on the Gulf of Aden and near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, holds the keys to one of the most strategic maritime corridors in the world. Its geographical position is both its greatest asset and its most perilous vulnerability. The waters surrounding it are rife with piracy, terrorism, and global power competition, making Somaliland’s stability essential not just for the region but for the global economy.

And at the heart of this storm stands Dr. Ciro, a seasoned diplomat with decades of experience in navigating the treacherous waters of international relations. His victory in the polls has inspired hope among Somaliland’s people, but it has also made him a target. He inherits a nation rich in untapped resources but surrounded by adversaries eager to exploit its weaknesses. The world has seen what happens to resource-rich but vulnerable nations in Africa—Sudan’s descent into chaos, the Sahel’s spiral into extremist violence, the Congo Basin’s plunder by transnational criminals. These are cautionary tales that Somaliland cannot afford to ignore.

Dr. Ciro’s challenge is nothing short of monumental. He must walk a tightrope, balancing immediate threats with long-term ambitions. Somaliland’s democracy, still fragile, must be fortified against the external pressures of disinformation and internal cracks that adversaries will seek to exploit. The president must forge alliances not out of desperation but from a position of strength, ensuring that any agreements with foreign powers serve the long-term interests of his nation.

Recognition remains Somaliland’s ultimate goal, but it cannot come at the cost of sovereignty. Dr. Ciro understands that his nation’s rich resources and strategic location are bargaining chips in a high-stakes game. Yet, he also knows that Somaliland must not trade these assets for fleeting gains. His vision must extend beyond the immediate allure of international recognition to a future where Somaliland is a sovereign leader, respected and self-reliant.

The battle ahead will test every ounce of Dr. Ciro’s diplomatic skill, every fiber of Somaliland’s resilience. It is a battle not just for recognition but for survival in a world where power and influence often trample over principle. Somaliland stands at a crossroads, its destiny hanging in the balance. The question now is whether its leaders can rise above the machinations of those who seek to contain it, crafting a future defined by self-determination and strength.

As the world watches, Somaliland’s struggle is more than a regional story. It is a lesson in resilience, a testament to the power of democracy, and a warning to those who underestimate the resolve of a nation determined to chart its own course. And for Dr. Ciro, this moment is not just a test of leadership—it is the defining challenge of his life. And Somalilanders are confident that President “Ciro” has the ability to overcome these challenges.

Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps

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Staff
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Author: Kathryn Tyson

Contributor: Liam Kar

Editor’s Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaway: Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of a Turkish-mediated deal that will likely benefit Ethiopia and Turkey and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy. Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the breakaway Somaliland region because of the new agreement with Somalia, which is known as the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new African Union (AU) mission in Somalia to combat al Shabaab in 2025. Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy by reducing Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti, while the Ankara Declaration benefits Turkey by protecting Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia and bolstering Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the broader Red Sea area. The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the deal contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The agreement could lead to future tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia as it does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions, Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt that was intended to counter Ethiopia, or the feasibility of ensuring safe passage between Somali ports and Ethiopia given al Shabaab’s threat throughout southern Somalia.

Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of the Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to finalize “mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” that will allow Ethiopia to “enjoy reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea” as part of the agreement.[1] Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held separate talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Ankara, Turkey, on December 11.[2] Turkey mediated two previous rounds of negotiations between Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s foreign ministers in July and August 2024.[3]

Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region as a result of the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland in January 2024 that granted Ethiopia land for a naval base on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast in return for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.[4] Ethiopian officials also said the deal included commercial aspects, but Somaliland officials maintained that the deal was naval only.[5] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the deal as an illegal violation of its sovereignty—as the SFG considers Somaliland to be part of its territory—and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country.[6] Ethiopia has deployed approximately 10,000 troops in Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and through other bilateral agreements to fight al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab.[7] Abiy and Mohamud implied that the discussions in Ankara addressed the nearly yearlong political dispute between over the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal even though the Ankara Declaration does not directly mention the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal.[8]

Figure 1. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline

Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson.

Ethiopia has little room to balance between the SFG and Somaliland and their competing deals after it agreed to the Ankara Declaration due to the zero-sum positions of the SFG and Somaliland on Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somali officials insisted that Ethiopia withdraw from its deal with Somaliland in previous Turkish-mediated discussions and called the Somaliland agreement a violation of Somali “territorial integrity.”[9] The Ankara Declaration implicitly acknowledges the SFG’s position without directly mentioning Somaliland when the text says that Ethiopia and Somalia “reaffirmed their respect and commitment to one another’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity.”[10] Somaliland officials have insisted that Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland is required if Somaliland is to follow through on its agreement to lease Ethiopia land for a naval base.[11]

The Ankara Declaration gives Ethiopia an alternative to the Somaliland deal because the agreement theoretically provides Ethiopia access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Ethiopia has sought to acquire sea access since it became landlocked, after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993.[12] The Ankara Declaration recognized the “potential benefits” of Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea and stipulated that Ethiopia and Somalia will hold technical talks in February to ensure this access no later than June 2025.[13]

Officials from Somalia and Somaliland have made contradictory statements about whether Ethiopia will follow through on the Somaliland deal. Somali officials said on December 12 that Ethiopia retracted its agreement with Somaliland as part of the Ankara talks.[14] Somaliland officials said that the Ankara Declaration “does not concern” Somaliland and that Ethiopia has insisted privately that it will not withdraw from the Somaliland deal.[15]

Future international recognition of Somaliland’s statehood would give Ethiopia greater political cover and legitimacy to resume talks on a port deal with Somaliland. No countries currently recognize Somaliland, although many countries have consulates and diplomatic relations with Somaliland. US policymakers are increasingly contemplating giving US recognition to Somaliland’s independence, however. US State Department officials who worked on Africa policy during US President-elect Donald Trump’s first term have voiced public support for the US to recognize Somaliland.[16] US Republican House Representative Scott Perry introduced a bill on December 12 for US recognition of Somaliland independence.[17] The US news outlet Semafor reported in December that Trump advisers and US congressional Republicans plan to encourage Trump to recognize Somaliland’s independence when he takes office, in January 2025.[18] US recognition of Somaliland could encourage other countries, including Ethiopia, to extend recognition to Somaliland.

Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the SFG to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new AU mission in Somalia in 2025. Somali officials in June ordered Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Somalia at the end of the current AU mission at the end of 2024 if Ethiopia followed through on its deal with Somaliland.[19] Somalia shifted its tone in the Ankara Declaration, however, and acknowledged “the sacrifices of Ethiopian soldiers within the African Union Missions.”[20] The Somali national security adviser said on December 15 that the SFG is reviewing the decision to exclude Ethiopian forces from the new AU mission.[21]

Ethiopia’s continued military presence in Somalia as part of the new AU mission would allow Ethiopia to continue fighting al Shabaab. Ethiopia seeks to maintain troops in Somalia to counter al Shabaab and create a buffer zone to prevent cross-border incursions. Al Shabaab demonstrated its strength near the Ethiopian border and threat to Ethiopia when it conducted a multiday campaign inside Ethiopia for the first time in July 2022.[22] Several hundred militants from the 2022 offensive established a rear base along Ethiopia’s southeastern border with Kenya.[23] Al Shabaab also regularly attacks Ethiopian forces in Somalia and uses anti-Ethiopian propaganda as a recruiting tool.[24] Local politicians in Somalia and Somalia’s international partners had signaled their support for Ethiopia’s continued participation in the new AU mission, and CTP previously assessed that Ethiopia would likely remain in Somalia despite the SFG’s demands.[25]

Figure 2. Ethiopian Forces and Bases in Somalia

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

It is unclear how the Ankara Declaration and subsequent agreements between Ethiopia and Somalia will affect Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt. Somalia signed defense deals with Egypt in August 2024 for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian forces in Somalia, ostensibly to combat al Shabaab.[26] Egypt has also sent three shipments of weapons to Somalia since August.[27] Egypt sought to threaten Ethiopia over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while the SFG aimed to retaliate against Ethiopia and counter Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland.[28] Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its border in Somalia as a national security risk and has warned against Egyptian military participation in the new AU mission.[29] The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized a de facto anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10 and agreed to strengthen Somalia to “confront various internal and external challenges.”[30] The Egyptian and Somali foreign ministers discussed the Ankara Declaration on December 15 and agreed to continue joint coordination and to hold a trilateral ministerial meeting with Eritrea at an unspecified date.[31]

Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea through Somalia would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy and reduce Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti’s main port for approximately 95 percent of its international trade and pays at least $1 billion in annual port fees to Djibouti.[32] Ethiopia previously sought to gain Red Sea access to decrease this reliance through an agreement with the SFG in 2018 to invest in ports and accompanying road links between Ethiopia and Somalia.[33] Abiy also attempted to secure a stake in the Emirati-owned and operated Berbera port in Somaliland in 2019.[34] Both efforts collapsed, however, after Ethiopia and the SFG failed to follow through on their deal and Ethiopia failed to make the necessary payments to secure its stake in the Berbera port.[35] Abiy continued to highlight Ethiopia’s landlocked status as a problem and framed Red Sea access as an existential issue and “natural right” in 2023.[36]

The Ankara Declaration does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions. The Ankara Declaration does not refer to any Ethiopian naval access, contrary to the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Ethiopia signed an agreement with France to develop Ethiopia’s navy in 2019, but France withdrew from the deal in 2021 due to human rights concerns related to the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray.[37] However, French President Emmanuel Macron is traveling to Ethiopia in late December and is reportedly prepared to reengage with the deal.[38]

Turkey benefits from its role in the Ankara Declaration as Turkey seeks to strengthen its economic, military, and political footprint in the Horn of Africa. The Ankara Declaration protects Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia by keeping its two partners from an open conflict. Turkey has been a major defense and economic partner in Somalia since the early 2010s and signed a maritime and defense deal with the SFG in February 2024 to reconstruct the Somali Navy in exchange for 30 percent of the revenue from the Somali’s offshore economic zone.[39] Somalia and Turkey also signed an oil and gas cooperation agreement in March 2024 that allows Turkey to engage in oil and natural gas exploration in Somalia’s offshore waters.[40] Turkey is simultaneously the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021.[41] Turkey sent drones to Ethiopia to help turn the tide in the federal government’s favor during the Ethiopian civil war in 2021 and 2022.[42]

The Ankara Declaration and Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa bolster Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the greater Red Sea area. The AU, European Union, and United States praised Turkey for its role in mediating the Ankara Declaration.[43] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered to mediate an agreement in Sudan’s civil war between the United Arab Emirates—which backs the opposing Rapid Support Forces—and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during a phone call with the SAF head on December 13.[44] Turkey has also framed its naval presence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region as an opportunity to combat piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues in the area.[45]

The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the agreement contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The SFG played upon anti-Ethiopian sentiment to turn popular Somali sentiment against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal as part of its strategy to undermine the deal. Mohamud said in January that “not an inch of Somalia can or will be signed away by anybody,” and the Somali foreign minister led thousands of Somali civilians in protest against the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal in Mogadishu in January 2024.[46] Al Shabaab has attempted to exploit anti-Ethiopian sentiment repeatedly to gain recruits and accuses Ethiopia of “occupying” Somalia.[47] Al Shabaab rejected the Somalia-Ethiopia deal on December 12 and reiterated that Ethiopia seeks to “dominate Somalia.”[48] There is no immediate evidence that the Somali public or Somali government officials are widely dissatisfied with the Ankara Declaration, but protests against the SFG’s decision to mend ties with Ethiopia would indicate public dissatisfaction with the SFG.

The Ankara Declaration does not address the feasibility of ensuring safe passage for Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somalia. Ethiopia would presumably secure preferential access to a commercial port near or in the existing major ports in Mogadishu or Kismayo in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab maintains extortion networks in both ports, regularly carries out attacks in both cities, and also controls or heavily contests the areas and roads between both ports and the Ethiopian border.[49] These challenges previously contributed to the failure of Ethiopia’s 2018 deal with the SFG. The SFG launched an offensive in central Somalia in 2022 that cleared one of the main roadways between Mogadishu and central Somalia that runs to Ethiopia.[50] However, the SFG was unable to completely clear al Shabaab from central Somalia and failed to expand the offensive to al Shabaab’s main havens in southern Somalia due to clan rivalries and al Shabaab counterattacks.[51] A lack of security across these regions would pose significant challenges to secure any overland route for Ethiopia to transport goods to a Somali port.

Figure 3. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Southern Somalia

Source: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr.

[1] https://x.com/MOFASomalia/status/1867120512822022244

[2] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1866956708297179388; https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-meets-somalia-ethiopia-leaders-separately-amid-somaliland-dispute-2024-12-11

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-mediating-somalia-ethiopia-talks-port-deal-officials-2024-07-01/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/second-round-somalia-ethiopia-talks-turkey-ends-with-no-deal-progress-made-2024-08-13

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-cabinet-calls-emergency-meet-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-02

[5] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal

[6] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24

[7] https://ecfr.eu/article/threes-a-crowd-why-egypts-and-somalias-row-with-ethiopia-can-embolden-al-shabaab/

[8] https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-says-ethiopia-somalia-reach-compromise-deal-to-end-feud-51034d60; https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink

[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgr7v1evvgo; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240927-ethiopian-actions-flagrantly-violate-somali-territorial-integrity-somali-pm

[10] https://www.mfa.gov dot tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa#:~:text=The%20Leaders%20of%20Somalia%20and,Act%20of%20the%20African%20Union

[11] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/01/ethiopia-and-somaliland-reach-historic-agreement-over-access-to-red-sea-ports

[12] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-means-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/11/turkey-somalia-ethiopia-joint-declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html; https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525

[14] https://x.com/TomGardner18/status/1867114091816550709; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo

[15] https://x.com/Ismail_Shirwac/status/1866972545712259467; https://x.com/RAbdiAnalyst/status/1867811339789271403; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo

[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somaliland-votes-with-leaders-seeing-international-recognition-reach-2024-11-13/

[17] https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/10402

[18] https://www.semafor.com/article/12/10/2024/somaliland-trump-white-house-looks-set-to-recognize-the-region

[19] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-wants-all-ethiopian-troops-to-leave-by-december/7641135.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03

[20] https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525

[21] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A9

[22] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia

[23] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setbacks-somalia-war-against-al-shabaab-james-barnett; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia

[24] https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaab-threatens-ethiopian-security-ahead-of-atmis-withdrawal-from-somalia/; https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-ethiopian-military-convoys-in-somalia-/7271962.html; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-militants-launch-attack-on-ethiopian-military-base-in-somalia

[26] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-5-2024-egypt-ethiopia-and-somalia-conflict-looms-is-gains-in-niger-russia-aids-burkina-fasos-nuclear-energy-push#Horn

[27] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cglk038p1d3o; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/egyptian-warship-docks-in-mogadishu-with-third-arms-shipment-amidst-regional-tensions

[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Somalia

[29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa

[30] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/somalia-eritera-and-egypt-pledge-to-bloster-security-ties; https://www.barrons.com/news/leaders-of-egypt-eritrea-somalia-meet-amid-regional-tensions-7eccc9a9

[31] https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1868315060172640515; https://x.com/mahmouedgamal44/status/1868346810068357217; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1868352708610043990

[32] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html; https://www.mei.edu/publications/djibouti-needs-plan-b-post-guelleh-era; https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2023/11/7/is-landlocked-ethiopia-starting-another-war-over-ports-in-horn-of-africa

[33] https://www.middleeastmonitor dot com/20180616-somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea/; https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-seeks-to-legitimise-port-deals-with-somalia-55700; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea-idUSKBN1JC0JK

[34] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/1/6/why-is-somalia-angry-about-neighbouring-ethiopias-new-port-deal

[35] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal

[36] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/inside-story/2023/7/26/how-will-landlocked-ethiopia-get-direct-access-to-a-port

[37] https://somaliguardian dot com/news/africa/france-suspends-military-cooperation-agreement-with-ethiopia/; https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2VZ/

[38] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867637502854803907; https://x.com/martinplaut/status/1866904409726206462

[39] https://www.mei.edu/publications/far-benefactor-turkish-government-exploiting-somalias-fragility; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them

[40] https://apnews.com/article/turkey-somalia-sign-oil-gas-agreements-312fcdf58789767f94b6c36a3444faec

[41] https://www.theafricareport.com/141761/ethiopia-turkey-ankaras-ongoing-economic-and-military-support; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/turkey-eyeing-more-investments-in-ethiopia-envoy/2144828

[42] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-us-concerned-over-turkeys-drone-sales-conflict-hit-ethiopia-2021-12-22; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ethiopia-tigray-dedebit-drone-strike/

[43] https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/african-union-welcomes-somalia-ethiopia-pact-praises-mediation-by-turkish-president-erdogan/3422654; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ethiopiasomalia-statement-spokesperson-ankara-declaration_en; https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-welcomes-the-ankara-declaration-by-ethiopia-and-somalia

[44] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-can-step-resolve-sudan-uae-disputes-erdogan-tells-burhan-2024-12-13/; https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1867562489627517116

[45] https://www.newarab.com/news/turkey-leads-anti-piracy-maritime-mission-gulf-aden

[46] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/1/4/ambiguous-ethiopia-port-deal-fuels-uncertainty-over-somaliland-statehood; https://www.ftlsomalia dot com/fiqi-addresses-huge-anti-ethiopia-protest-in-mogadishu/; https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/protest-against-ethiopia-s-red-sea-access-deal-rocks-somali-capital/3106328; https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1742661068760006984

[47] https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-01-06-voa9-66763232/563779.html; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/anti-ethiopian-protests-erupt-in-mogadishu-idUSL06725344/; SITE Intelligence Group, ”Shabaab Video Raises Alarm Over Ethiopian Ambitions in Somalia, Documents Major Ambush on Convoy Leaving 284 Dead,” April 4, 2024, available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com

[48] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867261152075325683

[49] https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-somali-base-handed-over-by-au-forces/7179521.html; https://acleddata.com/2023/09/01/special-report-kenya-somalia-border-rising-al-shabaab-threat-in-the-wake-of-atmis-drawdown/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/scores-killed-clashes-between-somali-forces-al-shabaab-2024-07-22/; https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/al-shabaab-remains-active-in-southern-somalia/

[50] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles/

[51] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will

Somaliland’s New Administration Expects to Cement People to People Ties: AU & IGAD Envoy

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Somaliland’s new administration would bolster cooperation with the peoples’ of Ethiopia, the Somaliland Ambassador expressed, as he highlighted the significant role Ethiopia has played for regional stability.

In an exclusive interview with The Ethiopian Herald, Somaliland’s Special Envoy to the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Ambassador Abdillahi Mohamed Duale, expressed his confidence in the newly appointed President of Somaliland to advance the long-standing people-to-people relations.

He also outlined Somaliland’s active engagement with IGAD and the AU, where efforts are underway to enhance the region’s perception of the state.

Somaliland’s New Administration Expects to Cement People to People Ties: Envoy
Ambassador Abdillahi Mohamed Duale, Somaliland’s Special Envoy to the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

These endeavors include promoting the state’s achievements in democratic governance and stability to strengthen its case for international recognition, he noted.

While mentioning that the former President Muse Bihi Abdi’s peaceful transition of power to Somaliland’s newly elected leader, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi, the Ambassador described the democratic process as a hallmark of Somaliland’s political maturity in a volatile region.

From Campaigning to Governance for the 6th Somaliland President
Somaliland’s new president-elect, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi. (Photo: X)

The transition to President Abdirahman marks another milestone for Somaliland, which has consistently demonstrated its commitment to democratic principles for more than three decades. This peaceful transfer of power is being celebrated as a testament to the strength of its democratic institutions, he added.

Mohamed also stated his optimism that the new president and his cabinet would consolidate recent developments in the relations among Horn of Africa countries.

The renewed collaboration between the peoples of both countries would enhance economic and security cooperation and infrastructure development, solidifying their longstanding relationship, it was learnt.

Somalia’s Scandalous Misuse of Aid: Lobbying, Corruption, and the Desperate Fight Against Somaliland’s Independence

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By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin, Hargeisa, Somaliland.

In a shocking revelation that underscores the depths of Somalia’s political dysfunction, the unelected government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud has been caught diverting foreign aid to bankroll an extravagant $50,000-per-month contract with the Washington, D.C.-based lobbying powerhouse BGR Group. This deal, paid for with funds meant to alleviate Somalia’s worsening humanitarian crises, is part of a broader campaign to sabotage Somaliland’s growing international legitimacy.

At the same time, the cracks in Somalia’s already fragile state are deepening. With Puntland and Jubaland inching closer to full secession and Mogadishu barely holding control over its immediate surroundings, President Mohamoud’s administration has prioritized costly lobbying, clandestine arms deals, and destabilization efforts in Somaliland over addressing the urgent needs of its own people.

The deal with BGR Group, officially aimed at lobbying against Somaliland’s recognition, is emblematic of Somalia’s misplaced priorities and endemic corruption. Instead of using international aid to address the famine, poverty, and insecurity plaguing the country, Somalia’s government is funneling resources into lobbying campaigns designed to keep Somaliland under its sphere of influence—a strategy that has failed for over three decades.

This is not an isolated incident. Mogadishu has also allegedly struck deals with China and Egypt to procure weapons, which are being funneled to tribal militias in Somaliland’s eastern regions of Sanaag and Sool. These militias, armed and funded by the Somali government, are part of a deliberate effort to create chaos and project an image of instability in Somaliland. The goal is clear: to undermine Somaliland’s hard-earned reputation as a peaceful and democratic state, thereby discouraging international recognition.

Somalia’s actions against Somaliland stand in stark contrast to its own internal chaos. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud has been accused of ties to extremist group Al-Shabaab—a group he has ostensibly declared war on—and of exploiting these alleged connections to secure international counterterrorism funding. Meanwhile, Mogadishu remains isolated as Puntland and Jubaland push for greater autonomy, if not outright independence.

Somalia’s fragmentation is accelerating, and Mogadishu’s authority is diminishing. Even as its government struggles to hold the capital, it continues to squander aid on high-profile lobbying efforts that have no bearing on its immediate crises.

Meanwhile, while Somalia descends further into dysfunction, Somaliland has emerged as a rare success story in the Horn of Africa. Over the past 30 years, Somaliland has built a functioning democratic system, held peaceful elections, and maintained stability in a volatile region. It has achieved these milestones without significant international aid, relying instead on self-governance, local leadership, and the resilience of its people.

Somaliland’s achievements have not gone unnoticed. U.S. Congressman Scott Perry recently introduced a groundbreaking bill to Congress advocating for Somaliland’s recognition as an independent state. Perry’s proposal is a bold challenge to the outdated “one Somalia” policy, which he argues has failed to address the realities on the ground.

“Somaliland has proven itself to be a beacon of stability and democracy in a volatile region,” Perry said when introducing the bill. “The ‘one Somalia’ policy has achieved nothing but chaos. It’s time for the United States to recognize Somaliland’s independence and support its continued progress.”

For decades, the international community has clung to the idea of a unified Somalia, hoping to rebuild a fractured nation under a single government. But this vision has proven unattainable. Somalia remains a patchwork of rival factions, with Mogadishu unable to enforce its authority even within its borders.

The “one Somalia” policy has not only failed Somalia but has also punished Somaliland—a nation that has thrived independently for over three decades. By denying Somaliland recognition, the international community has enabled Mogadishu’s corrupt leadership to continue its destabilizing campaigns.

The BGR Group contract is a stark reminder of how far Somalia’s government is willing to go to preserve the illusion of unity. This $50,000-per-month retainer—paid for with funds meant to feed the hungry and provide shelter for the displaced—represents the ultimate betrayal of Somalia’s people.

“This is more than corruption,” said a regional analyst. “It’s a deliberate act of sabotage, not just against Somaliland but against the Somali people, who desperately need real leadership and solutions.”

Congressman Perry’s bill offers a new vision for the Horn of Africa: one that rewards Somaliland’s stability, democracy, and self-reliance. By recognizing Somaliland, the international community can send a powerful message that good governance and peace will be rewarded, not undermined.

“The time for Somaliland’s recognition is now,” Perry said. “It’s not just about acknowledging reality—it’s about supporting a nation that has done everything right, even in the face of adversity.”

As Somalia’s government continues to implode under the weight of its corruption and mismanagement, the world must act decisively. The “one Somalia” policy is a relic of the past. Somaliland’s recognition is not just a moral imperative but a practical step toward stability and progress in the Horn of Africa.

The international community faces a choice: continue enabling Mogadishu’s failed leadership or support Somaliland as a beacon of hope in a region desperate for change. One thing is clear—Somalia’s lobbying scandals and destabilization efforts have only strengthened the case for Somaliland’s independence. The time to act is now.

Profound Gratitude for Your Leadership on the Bill to Recognize Somaliland.

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Dear Honorable Mr. Scott Perry (Congressman);
On behalf of the Republic of Somaliland and its proud citizens, I wish to express our deepest and most heartfelt gratitude for your visionary leadership in introducing and advancing the Bill to recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty. This historic step reflects not only your steadfast commitment to justice and democracy but also your profound understanding of the aspirations of the Somaliland people, who have worked tirelessly to build a peaceful, democratic, and self-reliant nation in the Horn of Africa.
Mr. Scott, your efforts serve as a beacon of hope for Somaliland’s more than 33-years pursuit of international recognition, an acknowledgment of the stability, good governance, democracy and respect for human rights that our nation has consistently upheld.
At a time when much of the region faces turmoil and uncertainty, Somaliland has remained an anchor of peace, democracy and progress—a testament to the enduring spirit of our resilient people and their desire to contribute meaningfully to the global community.
The introduction of this Bill also underscores the deep and enduring partnership between Somaliland and the United States of America. It reflects America’s unwavering support for democratic principles and the rights of self-determining nations. Your courage and foresight in championing Somaliland’s case will forever remain in our collective memory, as it marks a pivotal moment in our journey toward recognition and greater engagement with the international community.
We are profoundly moved by your solidarity and commitment, and we pledge to continue our efforts to uphold the ideals and values that inspired this significant legislation.
Somaliland looks forward to working even more closely with the United States in the months and years to come, building on this remarkable foundation of friendship and shared purpose.
Once again, thank you for your extraordinary leadership, vision, and dedication. History will remember this as a turning point in Somaliland’s success story, made possible by the unwavering support of champions like you.
With the highest regard and gratitude,
Hussein Adan Igeh (Deyr)
The Spokesman of The President of the Republic of Somaliland

Somaliland could host US military if it serves mutual interest and regional security-USA Envoy

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Somaliland reclaimed its sovereignty from Somalia over three decades ago, but it lacks international support for its independence

Somaliland is ready to host a US military base in the port of Berbera if it serves mutual interest and regional security, Bashir Goth, Somaliland representative in Washington, said in an interview with TASS published on Thursday.

According to the outlet, the envoy made the remarks in response to a question about Somaliland’s willingness to host an American army camp if its independence from Somalia is acknowledged.

“Somaliland will be ready to host a US military base in Berbera if it serves the common interests of our two countries,” Goth was quoted as saying.

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991, following the overthrow of Somali military ruler Siad Barre and after a decade-long civil war. While not internationally recognized as a country, the territory on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden has since established its own government, security structures, and currency. Despite this, Somalia still regards the province as its own territory.

Earlier this year, the de facto independent state struck a major deal with Ethiopia to lease 20km (12 miles) of coastline to the landlocked state for commercial purposes and to build a marine base – in exchange for Somaliland being recognized as a country. The agreement has since heightened tensions with Somalia, which accuses Ethiopia of aggression and undermining Somali territorial integrity through the “illegal” Red Sea access pact.

The authorities in Mogadishu have warned that they are prepared to go to war to prevent their East African neighbor from supporting Somaliland’s sovereignty claims. In October, the Somali government declared an Ethiopian diplomat persona non grata and ordered him to leave within 72 hours due to “activities incompatible with his diplomatic role.” It previously expelled Ethiopia’s ambassador from Mogadishu and has threatened to kick out thousands of Ethiopian soldiers fighting the Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al-Shabaab in Somalia if the maritime agreement is not revoked.

Speaking to TASS, Goth dismissed any negative consequences for relations with Mogadishu if the US, under President-elect Donald Trump, recognizes Somaliland’s autonomy.

“We consider ourselves an independent and sovereign state. Therefore, we view any partnership that we establish with friendly countries exclusively through the interests of our country,” the diplomat told TASS.

Somaliland is hoping Trump will support its statehood push when he returns to the White House in January. According to analysts cited by the Semafor Africa news agency, the move would allow Washington to establish long-term intelligence operations to monitor weapons movement in a volatile region and the activities of China, which has a permanent military base in neighboring Djibouti.

https://www.bignewsnetwork.com/news/274861513/somaliland-could-host-us-military-base-in-exchange-for-recognition—official

Somaliland’s Strategic Leverage in Global Geopolitics

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By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin

The recent intensification of U.S.-Somaliland relations, highlighted by military agreements, high-level meetings, and the tabling of a bill in the U.S. Congress advocating for Somaliland’s recognition, underscores a pivotal shift in global geopolitics. This development is intricately linked to the U.S.’s strategic interests in countering China’s growing influence in the Red Sea and the broader Horn of Africa region, as well as addressing the limitations of its current military footprint in Djibouti.

Djibouti, long considered the linchpin of U.S. military strategy in the Horn of Africa, is increasingly becoming a geopolitical liability. With over nine foreign military bases in the tiny nation, including China’s sprawling facility, the overcrowding has raised concerns about security and operational efficiency. China’s influence in Djibouti has further alarmed U.S. policymakers, particularly given the Belt and Road Initiative’s infrastructure projects that tether Djibouti to Beijing’s ambitions.

In this context, Somaliland emerges as an attractive alternative. Historically, the U.S. maintained a naval base in Berbera during the Cold War, underscoring its strategic significance at the Bab Al-Mandab chokepoint—a vital artery for global trade connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Reviving this presence in Somaliland would offer the U.S. a fresh and less contested base of operations, ensuring secure maritime routes while countering China’s expanding footprint in the region.

Congressman Scott Perry’s bill, supported by a Republican majority, seeks to fast-track Somaliland’s recognition, likely positioning it as a cornerstone of U.S. strategy in the region. The potential establishment of a U.S. naval and military base in Somaliland would not only bolster American presence at a critical chokepoint but also reaffirm its commitment to containing rival powers in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

The Ankara Agreement, signed between Ethiopia and Somalia under the facilitation of Türkiye, was designed to sideline Somaliland by granting Ethiopia access to Somali ports while ignoring the MoU between Somaliland and Ethiopia signed earlier this year. This agreement highlights an effort by Somalia to reassert its claim over Somaliland’s territory, despite decades of Somaliland operating as a self-declared independent state.

However, Somaliland’s newly elected president, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Ciro,” has reiterated his commitment to continuing the MoU with Ethiopia. Dr. Ciro has emphasized that the Ankara Agreement is not binding on Somaliland, as the self-declared republic was not consulted, did not participate in the discussions, and remains steadfast in its assertion of sovereignty. Somaliland’s determination to maintain the MoU reflects its refusal to be sidelined and its growing confidence in asserting its position as an independent, self-reliant state.

Somaliland’s case for recognition is also strengthened by the failures and contradictions of the African Union (AU). While the AU Charter emphasizes respect for the territorial integrity of member states, this principle does not apply to Somaliland. Unlike other secessionist movements, Somaliland’s claim to independence is rooted in its history as a separate British protectorate before voluntarily uniting with Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic in 1960. Following decades of marginalization and the collapse of Somalia in 1991, Somaliland reasserted its independence, reclaiming its pre-union sovereignty.

The AU’s 2005 fact-finding mission to Somaliland concluded that its case for recognition was unique and deserved special consideration. However, the AU has since failed to act on these findings, instead perpetuating a contradictory stance that undermines Somaliland’s legitimate aspirations while upholding Somalia’s claims, which lack practical or legal grounds.

Despite efforts to sideline Somaliland, the intensifying interest from global and regional powers underscores its rising significance in geopolitics. This attention offers Somaliland unprecedented leverage, provided it negotiates from a position of strength to secure maximum benefits for its people and nation should include:

  1. Guaranteed Sovereignty: Recognition should come with unambiguous guarantees of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Somaliland’s position as a stable, democratic state should be the foundation of any agreement.

  2. Economic Development: Foreign investments in infrastructure, particularly in Berbera Port and other strategic assets, must prioritize local benefits and long-term sustainability over short-term gains.

  3. Security Commitments: Any military base agreements must include comprehensive security guarantees for Somaliland, ensuring protection against regional hostilities or retaliation and finally

  4. Strategic Autonomy: Somaliland must ensure that its partnerships do not compromise its ability to engage independently with other nations or regional bodies.

The heightened interest in Somaliland is a testament to its growing significance in global geopolitics. However, this attention comes with risks. As the U.S. and other powers vie for control of Somaliland’s strategic assets, the government in Hargeisa must remain vigilant, ensuring that recognition is not achieved at the expense of sovereignty or long-term national interests.

Somaliland’s leadership should recognize this moment as an opportunity to rewrite its narrative, not just as a self-declared republic seeking recognition, but as a strategic player capable of shaping regional and global dynamics. By negotiating from a position of strength and securing agreements that prioritize the well-being of its people, Somaliland can ensure that its ascent to statehood is both historic and transformative.

Somaliland: A Nation on the Brink of Recognition

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By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin, Hargeisa, Somaliland

In the heart of the Horn of Africa, the winds of change are blowing. After decades of being overshadowed by the chaos of its southern neighbor, Somaliland is stepping boldly into the global spotlight. With unwavering resolve, it is demanding what it has long deserved: international recognition as a sovereign state.

This demand is no longer a distant dream. In Washington, U.S. Congressman Scott Perry has fired the first salvo, introducing H.R. 10402—a bill to officially recognize Somaliland. Backed by a Republican majority, Perry’s initiative signals a seismic shift in U.S. policy. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, British heavyweight Gavin Williamson and other prominent lawmakers are urging their government to follow America’s lead.

“The time for Somaliland’s recognition is now,” declared Perry in a statement that has sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles. “Somaliland stands as a beacon of democracy, stability, and governance in a region desperate for exactly those qualities.”

Williamson, equally impassioned, described Somaliland as a “crucial ally in the fight for stability and security in the Horn of Africa,” urging the UK to “stand on the right side of history.”

Breaking the Chains of “One Somalia”

For over three decades, Somaliland has been trapped in the shackles of the outdated “One Somalia” policy—a relic of Cold War geopolitics that clings stubbornly to the illusion of Somali unity. This policy, propped up by billions in international aid, has yielded little but corruption, insecurity, and failure in Mogadishu.

Somalia’s federal system is disintegrating. Jubaland and Puntland are edging toward independence, while Al-Shabaab continues its reign of terror. Yet the international community remains fixated on pouring resources into this failed state, ignoring Somaliland’s extraordinary achievements.

“It’s madness,” Perry exclaimed. “We are investing in chaos while overlooking a stable, democratic partner that has done everything right.”

Somaliland: An Exceptional Case

Unlike other separatist movements, Somaliland’s claim to sovereignty is rooted in history and legality. Formerly a British protectorate, it gained independence in 1960 before voluntarily uniting with Somalia—a union that collapsed in the ashes of civil war in 1991. Since then, Somaliland has charted its own course, building a thriving democracy and maintaining peace in one of the world’s most volatile regions.

This past year, Somaliland reaffirmed its democratic credentials through a peaceful transfer of power to President Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Ciro.” International observers hailed the election as a triumph for governance, with Perry calling it “a beacon of hope in a region desperate for such examples.”

Williamson agrees. “Somaliland is not just another case—it’s the case. Its recognition would uphold the principles of self-determination and reward decades of democratic resilience.”

Geopolitical Power Play

Beyond its moral and legal claims, Somaliland’s strategic importance is undeniable. Its position at the gateway to the Red Sea places it at the center of global trade routes. The port of Berbera, a rising economic hub, offers a vital alternative to Djibouti, where Chinese influence is growing unchecked.

A U.S. military presence in Somaliland, anchored at Berbera, could shift the balance of power in the region. Perry was blunt: “Recognizing Somaliland is not just the right thing to do—it’s the smart thing to do. It strengthens our hand in a region where global competition is intensifying.”

Williamson underscored this point, warning of the consequences of inaction. “Failing to recognize Somaliland risks ceding the region to forces that do not share our values. This is a moment for bold leadership.”

The Moral Imperative

Somaliland’s resilience is nothing short of extraordinary. While Somalia has descended into chaos, Somaliland has stood tall, proving that African nations can achieve stability and governance when given the chance.

Yet, the international community remains paralyzed, unwilling to abandon the failed policies of the past. The African Union, which recognized Somaliland’s unique case in a 2005 fact-finding mission, has done nothing to act on its findings.

“This is a moral failure,” Perry argued. “Somaliland has waited long enough. It has proven itself, time and again, as a partner we can trust.”

A Historic Opportunity

Somaliland is no longer asking for recognition—it is demanding it. With voices like Perry’s and Williamson’s growing louder, the question is no longer if Somaliland will be recognized but when.

For the U.S. and UK, this is a chance to realign their policies with reality. Recognition would affirm their commitment to democracy and stability, while securing a strategic foothold in a region vital to global trade.

For Somaliland, recognition would open the doors to development, investment, and international cooperation. More importantly, it would affirm the sovereignty of a proud and resilient people who have waited over 30 years to take their rightful place on the world stage.

“The world cannot afford to ignore Somaliland any longer,” Williamson declared. “The time to act is now.”

Conclusion

The drums of recognition are beating louder. Somaliland has proven itself a nation worthy of respect, partnership, and sovereignty. For those who stand with it, this is more than a political decision—it is a moral imperative.

Somaliland’s story is not just one of survival—it is one of triumph. The world must listen, for in the Horn of Africa, a nation awaits its moment in history.

The Somaliland Diaspora in the US pledge to work hand in hand with the US Congressmen towards the success of the recognition bill

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By Jama Ayaanle Feyte, is the Secretary Coordinator for United Nations and International Organizations

A month ago President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, “Cirro”, of the Waddani party, secured the presidency with a strong mandate, securing two-thirds of the vote in a poll that highlighted the resilience of Somaliland’s democratic institutions even amid regional instability. However, international recognition, particularly from a global power such as the US, would carry significant geostrategic weight.

The patriotic efforts of the dedicated diaspora lobbyists of Somaliland in North America, Europe, and all over the World have continuously engaged with members of the US Congressmen and In recent developments has achieved and managed , Somaliland’s inclusion in the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) signifies a notable shift in U.S. policy, acknowledging Somaliland’s strategic importance.The NDAA’s provisions focus on enhancing security cooperation and potentially paving the way for stronger diplomatic and economic ties. This move reflects the growing recognition of Somaliland’s stability and its role in countering regional threats such as terrorism and piracy, further integrating Somaliland into broader international security frameworks.

The Somaliland Diaspora in the US have pledged to work hand in hand with the US Congressmen towards the success of the recognition bill.

Attached below is a letter by the Engineer Ahmed Abdi Abdillahi,the Chairman of Somaliland National Party “Waddani” and Somaliland Diaspora in the United States to Congressman Scott Perry.

Somaliland: National armed forces press release on Sanaag militia fracas

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The Somaliland National Army Headquarters has issued a press release on the fighting between the National Army and the SSC militia in Duur-Madare in Sanaag region noting that they had tentatively contained insurgency in some parts of the area.

They however noted that they would avail further details at a later stage.

The press release noted; Today, 17/12/2024, a battle took place in the Duur-madare area of Sanaag region between the National Army of the Republic of Somaliland and insurgent militia who gathered in the eastern part of Sool region.

“In this battle, the National Army achieved a great victory by defeating the insurgents who had initiated the battles; they suffered heavy losses and with several of their armoured vehicles and prisoners captured.

“We will provide further details in due cause”. End.

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